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笛卡尔的信仰 2014-10-07 16:13:52

当我们把专业哲评家,包括一些著名的权威专业哲评家的评论与他们所评论的对象的原话仔细对比时,我们常常会发现专业哲评家们真有把已死去的作者再气死一遍的本事。

笛卡尔是被誉为现代西方哲学之父的生活在1596-1650的著名的法国哲学家【1】,也是现代科学所使用的三维坐标系的发明人因而也是解析几何的开创者和积分学的创始人之一。但是,过去几个世纪里作为极为虔诚的基督徒的笛卡尔常被莫名其妙地描述为无神论的领军人物,当然这里有某著名神学家在特殊的历史环境下从他特殊的个人背景出发所做的评论的影响。不过,就产生这种现象的文化机制来说,还是世人的皇帝新衣心结在起作用。近来万维也常有不止一位网友一再地向大家强调笛卡尔是无神论者。

至于笛卡尔到底是否无神论的领军人物还是虔诚的基督徒,我们还是从他自己的言论中来判断吧。我们先来看一段从笛卡尔的传世名著《方法论》【2】中摘录的文字,然后我在后面会进行一些简单的讨论。

。。。。

《方法论》第四部分摘选:

.....

所以唯一剩下的可能性是,我的概念思维是由真正地比我更完美的存在,实实在在地具有我所能思想的所有的没完美性的存在,用我自己的话来说,就是上帝将我的思想赋予到我的头脑中的。对于这点我再补充一点,既然我知道一些我自己不具备的完美,我一定不是唯一的存在。。。此外,必须有着比我自己更完美的我可以依赖的存在所以我可以获得我所具有的一切。因为如果我自己孤立地存在而不依赖于任何其他的存在,我那少得可怜的完美性是来自我自己的话,那么沿着同样的思路,我可以得出下述结论:
  • 我将能够得到我所知道的我所欠缺的完美性,
所以
  • 我自己就应该已经是无限的,永恒的,不变的,全知的,全能的;
简言之,
  • 我将具有我能在上帝那里发现的一切美好。
根据我前面提出的论据:为了对上帝的特性能够有我的特性所允许的尽可能多的认识,我所需要的仅仅是对于我所具有概念的每一个特性思考而已,不论这个特性是否为完美的特性;而且我肯定上帝不具备任何可能会意味着不完美的特性,所以剩下的就是上帝的特性。因此,我可以知道上帝不会有疑虑,不一致,悲哀以及与之类似的特性,这是因为我自己也乐意除去这样的特性所以就表明它们是不完美的。此外,我具有很多可以感知的实体的概念(即便我是在做梦,而且我所见到的和想象的一切都是假的,我仍然无法完全否认存在于我的感知中的实体的概念)。但是,既然我我已经从我自身的例子中非常清楚地认识到,智力的特性不同于身体的特性,而且如同我观察到的,
  • 如果一个事物由最简单的元素以任何形式组成,那么它就将依赖于其他的存在,
  • 依赖性本身就显然是一个缺陷,
所以我可以得出结论
  • 上帝的任何一个完美不可能是由智力与身体这两个特性组成的---而且相应地上帝也不可能由这两点构成;
另外,如果这个世界上存在着任何实体的话,或任何智力或其它的不是彻底完美的特性的话,它们的存在必须要依靠上帝的力量以至于离开了上帝它们片刻也无法存在。

除此之外,我想探求另一个真理:我选择几何学的对象,我设想一个连续的实体,或者一个在长度,宽度,高度或深度上无限延展的空间,将它分成可以具有各种形状和大小,且可以各种形式移动和彼此换位的不同部分(几何学家们通常假设他们的对象都具有这样的特性)。我运用了他们的较简单的证明,且注意到那是因为我们把它们设想为明显的存在,所以我们才认为它们根本是确定的。我也注意到这些示范并无法提供正确的保证。比如,我看到一个三角形的三个角必须等于两个直角;但是我没有看到任何对于这个世界上存在着三角形的保证。相反地,当我回来审视我关于完美的存在的概念时,我发现

这个关于完美的概念所包含的存在与

一个三角形的概念包含了三个角等于两个直角

或者
一个球体的概念包含了从中心到表面的距离不变的概念
相同或更加明显。

所以我得出结论:这个完美的存在,上帝,的存在至少比几何学的证明更加确定。

为什么很多人确信认识上帝或甚至认识他们自己的灵魂是困难的呢?这是因为他们从把他们的心智注意力上升到超乎他们的感官能够感知的对象以上去:他们已经习惯于以特别适用于物质性的对象的方式来对事物进行思考,也就是想象对象的形象,以至于他们认为任何他们无法想象出形象的对象都是无法理解或对之思考的。这一点表现在即便是专业哲学家也认为智力可以理解的一切都预先存在于感觉经历中;这就使得人们觉得很难认识上帝与灵魂,这是因为关于上帝和灵魂的思想肯定是从未存在于“感觉”之中。对我来说试图用形象的想象去理解这些思想就象试图用一个人的眼睛去看声音或气味一样地不可思议。实际上,试图通过想象力来理解要比试图用眼睛来看声音和气味更荒唐,这是因为两者之间有着这样的差别:观看的感觉可以提供与味觉和听觉所提供的一样的关于对象的现实性的确定性,而我们的想象和我们的感觉离开了理解力的帮助就无法让我们确认任何现实的存在。

最后,如果我的前述论据仍然没有说服你确信上帝的存在和你自己的灵魂的存在,那么我来告诉你这点:你认为你可确认的任何其它存在,比如你有个身体,宇宙里有星辰地球等都不如上帝和灵魂的存在更确定。这是因为虽然我们出于日常的实践目的而对那些其它的存在有足够的确定,以至于怀疑它们显得很野蛮和不负责任,但是当它成为一个形而上学的问题时,我们必须承认我们有很好的理由认为它们并不确定。我们只需要注意到在睡梦中我们会想象我们具有不同的身体并刊登不同的星辰和地球,而那都不是真实的。这就是告诉我们关于我们的身体以及星辰等具有一定的不确定性的理由,因为:我们怎么知道梦里的智能状态一定比不是梦里更加不真实,仅仅因为不是梦里的更加生动和清晰吗?让这个世界上最好的大脑们来尽兴地研究这个问题,除非他们预设上帝存在的前提,我不认为他们能够给出任何可以排除前面提到的疑虑的回答。因为,首先,我现在依循这样一个原则,就是我们可以非常生动清晰地设想的为真的任何存在之所以是确定的是因为上帝是存在的而且是完美的,而且因为我们所具有的一切都来自上帝。因此,我们所有的思想和概念,作为来自上帝的具有生动和清晰特征的应该在它们所生动和清晰的每个方面都是真的。所以如果我们经常具有有些错误的思想的话,这仅仅是因为它们之中有一些困惑和阴影;因为它们的困惑等是它们与无所共有的,也就是说它们以困惑的状态存在于我们之内只是因为我们不是完美的。另外,假设这样的错误与不完美是来自于上帝的就如同假设真理或完美是来自无一样地是明显地矛盾的。但是,如果我们不知道所有的真实和对的存在都来自完美和无限的存在,那么不论我们的思想如何地生动和清晰,我们都没有理由确信它们具有真实的完美性。

。。。。。。。


讨论:

 

笛卡尔的名著《方法论》的第四部分到第六部分可以说就是围绕着认识上帝来讨论的。由于人类语言的局限性,他的这些讨论可能会使得人们从两方面产生一些误解:一方面是不习惯或干脆排斥笛卡尔的这种理性思维的基督徒会因为他的思维方式不同于教会里人们所熟悉的语言对他进行批评,这种批评即便是针对笛卡尔的语言表达的,也容易被人们解读为对是对笛卡尔的信仰的质疑。如果他的内心确实是在指责笛卡尔对上帝缺乏信仰的话,那么那样的指责是有失公允的(不论那是当时多么有名的大神学家说的);另一方面,由于语言本身的局限性,当人们过于注重其中的论证逻辑而忽略了整篇文章的基本出发点,也可能会引申出与笛卡尔本人的信仰不相符的哲学或神学理论来,就好比日后的泛神论。

但是,不论是后人还是同时期的人出于自身的骄傲偏见或其它的原因对笛卡尔的误解并不能改变笛卡尔自己的信仰。他当然不是完美的,所用的语言表达和论证逻辑也不是最完善和最先进的,但是这些都不能用来否认一个人的信仰。至于那位本人非常虔诚而且至今也被神学界尊为大神学家的人物因为别人在信仰方面的不很成熟的思考探索与自己的思维不同就论断人家的信仰本身是不符合圣经的教导的,但是在当时的历史背景下也是可以理解的,因为在那个时期不是很久的以前人们还可能会因为信仰的方面说错了话而被判刑,所以我们也不必对那位虔诚的神学家过于苛责,因为对于他们双方来说,都只是人类的局限与历史的遗憾的烙印而已。。。。。


【1】http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes

【2】http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/descartes1637.pdf



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作者:慕容青草 留言时间:2014-10-09 15:36:54
山哥弟兄好!

谢谢!
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作者:山哥 留言时间:2014-10-09 05:58:39
多谢弟兄分享。
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作者:慕容青草 留言时间:2014-10-08 04:19:10
本文所摘选的笛卡尔的话在所列的英文版链接中的内容为:

.....
So the only possibility left was that the idea had been
put into me by •something that truly was more perfect
than I was, •something indeed having every perfection of
which I could have any idea, that is—to explain myself in
one word—by •God. To this I added that since I knew of
some perfections that I didn’t myself have, I wasn’t the only
being that existed. . . .,and there had to be some other more
perfect being on which I depended and from which I had
acquired everything that I had. For if I had existed alone,
not depending on anything else, so that my meagre ration of
perfections had come from myself, then by that same line of
reasoning

•I could have derived from myself all the remaining

perfections that I knew I lacked,

and thus

•I could myself have been infinite, eternal, unchanging,

omniscient, omnipotent;

in short,

•I could have had all the perfections that I had been
able to discover in God.

For, according to the arguments I have just presented: in
order to know as much of God’s nature as my nature allows
me to know, all I needed was to consider, for each property
of which I had some idea, whether having it was a perfection
or not; and I was sure that God doesn’t have any of the
properties that indicate any imperfection, but that he does
have all the others. Thus I saw that God could not have
doubt, inconstancy, sadness and the like, since I myself
would have been very glad to be free from them, ·which
shows that they are imperfections·. Furthermore, I had
ideas of many perceptible bodies (even if I was dreaming, and
everything that I saw or imagined was false, I still couldn’t
deny that the ideas of bodies were in my mind). But since
I had already recognized very clearly in my own case that
intellectual nature is distinct from bodily nature, and as I
observed that

•if a thing is composed ·of simpler elements· in any

way, that shows that it is dependent on something

else,

and that

•dependence is obviously a defect,

I concluded that

•it couldn’t be a perfection in God to be composed of

these two natures—·the intellectual and the bodily·—
and consequently that he was not composed of them;
and also that if there were any bodies in the world, or any
intelligences or other natures that weren’t wholly perfect,
their being must depend on God’s power in such a way that
they couldn’t stay in existence for a single moment without
him.

After that, I wanted to seek other truths: I took up
the subject-matter of geometry, which I conceived of as •a
continuous body, or •a space indefinitely extended in length,
breadth and height or depth, and divisible into different parts
that can have various shapes and sizes, and can be moved
and swapped around in all sorts of way (geometers assume
that their subject-matter has all these properties). I went
through some of their simpler proofs, and noted that it’s
because we conceive them as evident [= ‘obviously true’] that
we all regard them as utterly certain. I noted also that these
demonstrations gave no assurance—none—of the existence
of their subject-matter. For example, I saw that given a
triangle its three angles of must equal two right angles; but I
saw nothing assuring me that there are any triangles in the
world. In contrast with that, when I returned to the scrutiny
of the idea I had of a perfect being, I found that
this idea of a perfect being included existence
in the same way as—or even more evidently than—
the idea of a triangle includes the equality of its three
angles to two right angles

or

the idea of a sphere includes the equidistance from the
centre of all the points on the surface.
Thus I concluded that the existence of this perfect being,
God, is at least as certain as any geometrical proof.

Why are many people convinced that there is some diffculty in knowing God, and even in knowing what their soul
is? It’s because they never raise their minds above things
that can be perceived by the senses: they are so used to
•thinking of things only in the way that is specially suited
to material things, namely by •imagining ·or picturing· them,
that they regard as unintelligible ·or •unthinkable· anything
that they can’t •imagine. This shows up in the fact that even
the scholastic philosophers take it as a maxim that there is
nothing in the intellect that wasn’t previously in the senses;
·which leads people to find God and the soul problematic, because· it is certain that the ideas of God and of the soul have
never been ‘in the senses’! Trying to •understand these ideas
through one’s •imagination strikes me as being like trying
to •hear sounds or smell odours through •the use of one’s
eyes. ·Actually, trying-to-understand-through-imagination
is even more absurd than trying-to-hear-or-smell-with-theeyes, because· there is this difference: the sense of sight
gives us as much assurance of the reality of its objects as do
the senses of smell and hearing, whereas our imagination
and our senses could never assure us of anything without
the aid of our understanding.

Finally, if you are still not really convinced of the existence
of God and of your soul by the arguments I have presented, I
tell you this: everything else of which you may think you are
•more sure—such as your having a body, there being stars
and an earth, and the like—is •less certain. For although
we have enough certainty for everyday practical purposes
about these things, so that it seems wild and irresponsible
to call them in question, nevertheless when it is a question
of metaphysical certainty we have to admit that there are
good reasons for not being entirely sure about them. We
need only observe that in sleep we may imagine that we have
a different body and see different stars and a different earth,
without any of these things being real. ·This is a reason for
having some uncertainty about the existence of our body,
the stars, and so on·, because: how do we know that the
mental states that come to us in dreams are any more false
than the others, seeing that they are often just as lively and
sharp? Let the best minds study this question as much as
they like, I don’t think they’ll be able to give any reason that
removes this doubt unless they presuppose the existence of
God. For, in the first place, what I took just now as a rule,
namely that whatever we conceive very vividly and clearly is
true, is assured only because •God exists and •is a perfect
being, and because •everything in us comes from him. It
follows that our ideas or notions, being real things that get
from God everything that is vivid and clear in them, must be
true in every respect in which they are vivid and clear. So if
we quite often have ideas containing some falsity, this can
only be because there is something confused and shadowy
in them; for their confusion etc. is something they share
with nothingness, which means that they are in us in this
confused state only because we aren’t completely perfect.
And it is evident that it’s just as contradictory to suppose
that falsity or imperfection as such should come from God
as to suppose that truth or perfection should come from
nothingness. But if we didn’t know that everything real and
true within us comes from a perfect and infinite being, then,
however vivid and clear our ideas were, we would have no
reason to be sure that they had the perfection of being true.

。。。。。
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