Grant 参谋部 后勤主管 deputy-assistant quartermaster-general
时年27岁中校 Lieutenant colonel 第一代子爵 嘉内德·约瑟夫·沃尔斯利
Garnet Joseph Wolseley, 1st Viscount Wolseley;1894年5月26日,
晋升为陆军元帅 Field Marshal
升级版谷歌同学一秒钟完工译文:
圆明园发现中国官方文献概述。莫里森先生收集的一些文件
领事处是最有趣的,并给了一个
公正洞察中国政策的秘密目的,
以及进行公务的方法。从其中一些出现,那
Kweiliang九月与我们的谈判是
只是为了获得时间,而且从来没有打算最终安排事情。如果我们证明顽固
在我们超越天津的意图中,它有了
一直都在安排尝试战争的机会
再次。为了最大限度地做到这一点,谈判被分拆出来,以便进行军事行动
如果可能的话,可能会延长到寒冷的天气,
在他们放置的宽容之后
像沙皇尼古拉斯那样依赖他们的保护
据报道,他们为塞巴斯托波尔的防卫工作做了贡献。
一些被捕获的论文非常聪明,而且
表现出非凡的外交能力。
不顾真理,不受任何罚款
人性的感情,但随时准备牺牲自己的无辜代理人的权宜之计
那一刻,他们的政治制度是非常重要的
for all the complex situations of diplomacy. The coldblooded rules for government enunciated in " The
Prince," appear to be well understood in China. His
Celestial Majesty can never do wrong ; not because
his actions are always guided by a council responsible
to the people, but that in the event of any failure on
the part of a public servant deputed for any special
duty, even though such may have arisen from a strict adherence to his orders, all responsibility is cast upon
the unsuccessful agent, who is publicly degraded, to impress the people with an idea that the whole con- duct of the affair had been initiated by him. Gratitude
for faithful services is never permitted to interfere with
the exigencies of the moment. Expediency to its most
extended limit is the one great law regulating the
official dealings of his Majesty, both with his own
people and foreigners. So in one of these papers we
find the draft of an Imperial decree directing Kweiliang to be degraded as soon as the mock negotiations,
in which he was engaged at Tien-tsin, came to an end.
It was no doubt expected that the publication of that
order would lead us to believe that he alone was to blame for the non-arrangement of affairs, and incline us to lend a more willing ear —as we subsequently did —to the proposals made by his successor. Success
covers all errors in most governments ; but in China we
find one of the highest and most faithful public ser- vants deprived of rank and station for carrying out
accurately the instructions he had received, in order to give to mock negotiations the semblance of reality. A
long paper, written with the vermilion pencil of royalty,
upon the subject of our demands, gives a fair outline
of the various degrees of importance attached by
Chinese politicians to each of the specific concessions
we had asked for. Of all others, they considered the march of troops
into Pekin as the most highly objectionable, and the
residence of an ambassador there as next in importance, both equally to be avoided. The paper went on
to say,—"If conciliation is once negotiated, why do they
want to bring soldiers to Pekin with their ambassadors?
Their doing so would seem that they had some hidden
purpose, which, when their troops were within Pekin,
it would be as impossible to concede as it would then
be to fight."—" Were we to assent, would there be any more word of that most important of all places, the
capital?" On the subject of war expenses, his Majesty
said, " Setting aside the impossibility of paying the two
millions of taels by the time named, it is utterly out of
the question to pay at all."—" From of old, it has been
held a disgrace to make treaties under your city walls,
and if one is again to tender gifts, whilst one's face is ashamed, will China be thought still to have a man ? " This head was to be disposed of by applying to us
for monied indemnification for the expenses which the war had entailed upon the Imperial Government.
As to the admission of Mr. Parkes within Pekin, his
Majesty considered that if once conceded, that gentleman, " idly yelping and frantically barking, is certain
to bring forward other conditions," and might not be
subsequently got rid of easily.
The memorial of Sang-ko-lin-sin, dated the 26th
August, two days after the fall of the Takoo forts,
addressed to the Emperor, was one, which, from many
other papers found and translated by Mr. Wade, seems
to have created great sensation amongst all the Imperial
ministers, and to have been condemned most strongly
by every official whom we know to have written to
his Majesty regarding it. The subject of the memorial was advising Hien-fung to start on a hunting tour ; the reasons he urges for the necessity of such a move
seem so inconclusive and so thoroughly untenable before
the great weight of argument brought to bear against
them, that the advice appears interested, and carries
with it a certain amount of what might be intended
treachery. So unanimous are all the civil ministers
in their condemnation of such a proceeding, that it would almost seem that they suspected some ulterior
motives on Sang-ko-lin-sin's part. From all previously
found documents emanating from his pen, and from his
general reputation, there cannot be any doubt regarding his mental ability and ordinarily sound views upon
military matters and public business in general. He
made a great mistake certainly in not fortifying Pehtang as strongly as he had fortified Takoo, but this to a certain extent may have arisen from want of men
and means ; but in the paper which he drew up
regarding the general defences of the coast-line, and
the chances of their being successfully attacked by
the barbarians — to which I have previously referred —his views were most able, and the opinions therein
set forth of the certainty of our complete overthrow
and failure, were based most fairly upon military
grounds, and would have been given under similar
circumstances by any man who was ignorant of our
superiority in guns and discipline.
Knowing the great strength of his position, he was naturally confident of victory. He had a very
large force of cavalry —an arm which he fancied it to be impossible we should be furnished with; he had
numbers of guns in position, to which, in the general
Chinese ignorance regarding field artillery, he thought
we should be able to reply only with small arms. With such data before him, surely it is not surprising
that he should be confident of success! Indeed, so powerful and ample must his resources have appeared
to him, that it was no wonder he regarded our being
able to effect a landing at Peh-tang as rather a matter
of indifference, so sure and certain must our final annihilation have seemed to be. The man who could argue
as clearly and with such soundness of logic, was not
likely to be blind to the insurmountable objections to the proposal which, upon the fall of the forts, he urged
so pressingly upon his Imperial master : for the Emperor to leave his capital at such a critical moment,
and fly away across the frontier of China Proper, was
as objectionable and faulty in a political point of view,
as, regarded in a military light, it was untenable. It afforded the Chinese Commander-in-Chief no advantage
whatever as to position, whilst, morally, it must have
had a most prejudicial effect upon the minds of his
Tartar soldiers. The arguments which he urges in
favour of such a step were, that its adoption would
facilitate measures being taken for attacking and destroying the barbarians ; that it would place him at
liberty to choose his own time and place of attack, to advance or retire as events occurred ; that, should any
fighting take place near Tung-chow, the minds of the
people in Pekin would be greatly agitated, and that,
in the event of a reverse, the numerous merchants
there would take to flight. Amidst such a commotion, should the courage of the soldiers fail, the
Emperor's person would not be safe ; and his Majesty's presence in the capital at such a moment
might not only impede the execution of the necessary
defensive arrangements, but even fill with alarm the
Celestial miiid itself. Of his ultimate success he was
still confident ; he had made all the necessary dis- positions of his troops along the road from Tien-tsin
to Tung-chow ; and he hoped, by sweeping from
off the earth the vile brood, to redeem his previous
shortcomings. The forts, he said, he had lost from
the unforeseen explosion of the powder magazines in
them, not from any want of energy in their defence.
In conclusion, he prays that his Majesty may order the
princes of the Six Leagues to repair with their most
efficient troops at once to Pekin.
So peculiar did he evidently consider the advice he was tendering, that he said " he did not venture to forward his memorial by the regular express," but
sent it sealed by the hands of a special messenger, to be delivered in person to his Majesty.
Surely there is much in this letter which will strike even the most superficial reader as suspicious. The
lameness of the arguments urged in favour of the
hunting tour being only equalled by the cleverness
with which he avails himself of the known weakness
and cowardice of his master, to hint in such a marked
manner at the personal danger to which his Majesty
will be exposed, should lie turn a deaf ear to the
advice of " his slave." Unless such was the case, why not send it through
the usual channel of communication ? Why the se- cresy of sending it sealed by a confidential messenger,
to be delivered into the Emperor's own hands ? No man appreciated more the importance attached
by every one in China to the possession of Pekin, than
Sang-ko-lin-sin himself. He must have been aware
that, if once we took it, all China would consider the war over, and hail us as victors ; that, even at the last moment of our assaulting the place (so vast was its circumference, and so numerically weak were we), we
could never block up all the exits from it, and thus
prevent the Emperor's escape ; that nothing would
serve to establish public confidence, or to strengthen
the hearts of its defenders, more than the presence of
the father of his people on the spot. His wished-for
freedom of action was all a myth, as was proved by
his subsequent conduct, when twice he gave us battle
upon the road to Pekin. He was too able a general
not to be aware that if he had fought us twenty
times, instead of twice, it must each time have been on that line, or else at the capital itself. Even granting that his knowledge of war pointed out to him
the advantages which, in a military point of view, he
might gain by forsaking the city and taking up a menacing position upon our line of communications,
as Koutousof did at Moscow, still he must have felt that, politically, such a policy would be fatal to the
cause. China and Russia are totally different countries; nor was the ancient capital of the latter country, like
Pekin, the seat of general government. The loss of
Madrid or Paris has never been considered to involve
the conquest of the country. The possession of European capitals by invaders has never been looked upon
by the population of those countries as the outward
emblem and unanswerable proof of complete conquest,
whilst to every Chinaman the capture of Pekin by any
foreigner would be the most convincing of all other
proofs that the Mantchoo dynasty had ceased to reign.
Under such circumstances the grand struggle must
always have taken place in or about Pekin; his wishedfor " freedom of action " was simply a military phrase
meaning nothing. His insight into human nature was
great, and he seemed to possess a clear idea of the
working of Hien-fung's dastardly mind, when he appealed to his sense of personal risk. This latter consideration seems to have had far greater weight with
him than all the serious objections to his departure
which were raised by every minister to whom at this distressing juncture he appealed for advice. Every
argument which would have had weight with any
ruler but the basest of cowards, was brought forward
by the various ministers of state, who, also appreciating
the power which fear had upon their sovereign's mind,
followed in the summing up of their memorials Sangko-lin-sin's example, and urged in their turn the dangers
to which his Majesty would be exposed personally by
flying from his capital and seeking refuge in Jeho.
No doubt they exaggerated those dangers in order
to strike the greater terror into their pusillanimous
ruler. They dilated upon the vast numbers of robbers,
infesting not only the neighbourhood of Jeho but t he
road to it, where the police could not be expected to be perfect, when such turmoil was rife everywhere
else. They urged that, owing to the falling off in the
yielding of the mines, the people had become so impoverished about Jeho, that they frequently banded
together in very large numbers, and not only robbed
traders and officials, but created great disturbances
in the neighbouring districts ; that beyond the Hoope-kow pass in the Great Wall, there were " numbers
of Eussian barbarians, some of whom have been for a long time pretending to deliver communications
at Pekin for the furtherance of some treacherous
designs
; " that if the strong fortifications of Pekin were not considered sufficient security, surely much
less could any be found in the open and unprotected hunting-grounds beyond the wall ; if the barbarians have been able to reach Tien-tsin, what is to prevent them from penetrating to the Loan river at Jeho? Having thus tried to impress upon the mind
of " the sacred Son of Heaven " the dangers to be en- countered at Jeho, they go on to point out the great
inconvenience and discomfort to which the " Governor
and Tranquilliser of the Universe " would be subject
during his journey in the " still hot weather of au- tumn." As no such journey had been undertaken
for forty years, all the Imperial palaces along the line
of route, having been so long unused, had fallen into
disrepair, and were consequently uninhabitable. An
escort of at least 10,000 persons would be required
for the journey, for whom it would be impossible to provide supplies on the road, and consequently numbers of them would desert, and, falling in with the
numerous banditti who prowl about those regions
wherever they please, would lead to serious disturbances. Jeho was the constant resort of the Mongol
tribes, to whom it had always been customary upon the
visit of former Emperors to bestow presents, amounting
to tens of millions of taels, which the present financial
difficulties would not admit of, and without doing
which it might be difficult to soothe the discontent
of those tributaries.
In this manner they appealed to his Majesty's sense of personal risk and inconvenience, whilst they put
forward, in a startlingly straightforward manner, the
political objections to his journey, urging their arguments upon him with a force and plainness of speech
which few European ministers could presume to use with their sovereigns, and in a manner the very
opposite to all our preconceived notions of Chinese
court etiquette or the style of address usual from the
Mandarins to their despotic Emperor. The papers
which fell into our hands were memorials from various
ministers of state, all signed by several others who
agreed in the substance of them. One was countersigned by as many as seventy-six ministers ; that of
the earliest date was from Kia-ching, and signed by
twenty-five others, dated the 9th September.
It was evidently written in answer to a communication from the Emperor, in which he had demanded an
opinion upon Sang-ko-lin-sin's advice, enclosing a copy
at the same time of the memorial from that general.
Eumours of the intended flight of his Majesty had
been in circulation for some time previous at Pekin ; and so when his Majesty declared that he intended
proceeding to Tung-chow and taking command of the
army in person, the ministers appear to have seen through the artifice, and perceived that such was only an excuse for his departure, and that once on the move
he would follow his general's advice and make quickly
for Jeho.
In another paper from the minister Tsuien-king, dated
four days later, the most sarcastic censure is poured forth
upon a proposed plan which had emanated from the
Celestial mind, which was that, assembling a large force,
he should take up a position to the north of Pekin.
" They admired the awe-inspiring demeanour and the
well-devised strategy thus displayed. But the common
people are extremely slow of comprehension ; they
easily suspect and with difficulty are led to appreciate;
they will say that as the barbarians are to the southeastward of the capital, Tung-chow should be the
position front which to support Sang-ko-lin-sin ; that a
position to the north of Pekin would be without the
general hue of operations ; that what was undertaken
under the semblance of strategy would in reality be
flight. If his Majesty was in such a critical time careless of the preservation of his empire and only re- gardful of his personal safety, where could such be more securely assured to him than within the thick
and lofty walls of Pekin ? " One and all of these
memorials denote with startling plainness what should
be the Emperor's line of conduct at such a critical conjuncture, and urge that at such times of public
danger, " the man of heroic conduct is prepared to
die at his post."— "Your Majesty is well aware of
the maxim, that the prince is bound to sacrifice him-
self for his country ; but far be it from your ministers
at such a time as this to desire to wound your Majesty's feelings by adverting to such thoughts." —"In
what light does your Majesty regard your people,
and the altars of your Gods ? Will you cast away
the inheritance of your ancestors like a damaged shoe ? What would history say of your Majesty for a thousand
future generations." No sovereign hitherto has ever gone on a hunting tour in times of danger. Such a journey would then greatly endanger the whole state,
and compromise the reigning dynasty ; his departure
would occasion the most serious disorders within the
capital and lead to a revolution. All people, they said,
throughout the empire then looked to the throne, as
to the centre from which all plans for safety must emanate ; the minds of people, they added, will become dis- turbed, shaking the courage of the troops and inspiring
the rebels with renewed energy ; the capital " is the
honourable seat of majesty, and at such a moment es- pecially the sovereign ought to remain within it ; " to leave it would embolden the barbarians to make fresh
enterprises, and should peace be negotiated, the great
distance of Jeho from Pekin would cause considerable
delay in communicating with his Majesty there. Although, the barbarians' vessels had reached Tien-tsin,
yet that was a long distance from Pekin ; their force was only 10,000, whilst the army under Sang-ko-lin-sin
numbered 30,000, and men, women, and children were ready to fight for their tutelary gods. " The
danger was most threatening," and " a puff of breath
is now sufficient to decide the balance in which hangs
the loss or preservation of the succession of your ances-