現象

現象學是從第一人稱的角度來研究經驗的意識的結構。經驗的主要結構是它的意向，

其指向的東西，因為它既然是一個經驗，就是一些關於一個對象的經驗。一條經驗

指向一個對象，憑藉其內容或意義（代表對象），連同適當的所有利條件。

現象學作為一門學科是不同於，但又相關的重點學科，如哲學的本體論，認識論，

邏輯和道德。現象學以各種名目，其實已經實行了幾百年的，但它在20世紀初它自

己才獨立成立，是在胡塞爾，海德格爾，薩特，梅洛 - 龐蒂和其他人的作品中。在

最近的心靈哲學中，現象學的意向，意識，感受性和第一人稱視角的問題已經突出。

1。什麼是什麼現象？

2。現象學的學科

3。從現象到現象學

4。現象學的歷史和變化

5。現象學和本體論，認識論，邏輯學，倫理學

6。現象學與哲學的心靈

參考書目

其他互聯網資源

相關文章

=================================================================

1。什麼是什麼現象？

通常理解現象學是從這兩種方法之一：在哲學作為一個學科領域，或作為哲學史一

個運動中的哲學。

現象學學科，可以被定義對最初的經驗，或意識結構的研究。從字面上看，現象學

研究的“現象”出現的東西，或東西，因為他們出現在我們的經驗中，或方面，我

們體驗到的東西，這樣的事情在我們的經驗的意義。現象學研究的意識經驗，經歷

了從主觀或第一人稱的角度來看。這個領域的理念，然後加以區分，和相關外，其

他主要領域的哲學本體論（研究什麼是），認識論（知識的學習），邏輯（研究有

效的推理）道德正確和錯誤的行動（研究）等。

歷史運動的現象是在20世紀上半年推出莫里斯•梅洛 - 龐蒂，胡塞爾，海德格爾，

薩特等人的哲學傳統。適當的基礎，所有的哲學運動，是珍貴的紀律的現象 - 而不

是，比方說，以道德或形而上學或認識論。引起廣泛爭議的方法和特徵的學科，胡

塞爾和他的繼任者，這些辯論持續到今天。 （提供上述現象學的定義因此是值得商

榷的，例如，海德格爾，但它仍然是在描述這門學科的出發點。）

在最近的心靈哲學中，“現象學”一詞往往是僅限於視覺，聽覺等感官質量的表徵

是什麼樣子的有各種感覺。然而，我們的經驗更豐富的內容比單純的感覺。因此，

在現象學的現象學傳統，被賦予了更廣泛的範圍內，解決的意義的事情在我們的經

驗，特別是對象的意義，活動，工具，時間的流動，自我，他人，這些東西出現在

我們的“生活世界”的經歷。

現象學作為一門學科已經在整個20世紀，歐洲大陸哲學的傳統，而心靈哲學發展中

奧英美分析哲學的傳統，在整個20世紀。然而，我們的心理活動的基本特徵是追求

重疊的方式在這兩個傳統。因此，在這篇文章中得出的現象學的角度，可容納兩個

傳統。這裡主要關心的是表徵紀律的現象，在當代的職權範圍內，同時也突出了歷

史傳統，使自己的紀律。

基本上，現象學研究結構的各類經驗，範圍從感知，思維，記憶，想象，情感，欲

望和意志的身體意識，體現了行動，和社會活動，包括語言活動。通常涉及到胡塞

爾所謂的“意向性”，也就是directedness的經驗，在世界上對事物的意識，這是

一個意識的東西，物業的經驗，這些形式的結構。根據胡塞爾現象學經典，我們的

經驗是指向 - 代表或“打算” - 只有通過特定的概念，思想，觀念，影像等這些

構成了一個給定的經驗含義或內容，是不同的東西他們提出的意思。

基本故意的意識結構，我們發現在反射或分析，包括進一步的經驗。因此，現象學

發展的時間意識的一個複雜的帳戶內的意識流，空間意識（尤其是在感知），注意

（區分重點和邊際或“臥式”意識的），一個人的自己的經驗，意識（自我意識，

在從某種意義上說），自我意識（認識自己），自不同的角色（如思維，表演等），

具體行動（包括動覺意識的運動），目的或行動的意圖（更多或更少顯式的），其

他人士（換位思考，主體間性，集體），語言活動的意義，溝通，理解他人，社會

交往（包括集體行動），在我們周圍的生活世界和日常活動（在一個特定的文化意

識）。

此外，在不同的層面，我們找各種理由或有利條件 - 條件的可能性 - 的意向，其

中包括實施例中，身體技能，文化背景，語言和其他社會實踐，社會背景和上下文

方面的有意活動。因此，現象導致意識的經驗的條件，幫助給體驗到它的意向。主

觀的，實用的和社會條件方面的經驗，一直專注於傳統的現象。然而，近代哲學的

心態，特別是在注重經驗的神經基板，如何有意識的經驗和心理表徵或意向性接地

的大腦活動。多少秋天的經驗，這些理由在全省範圍內的現象學作為一門學科，它

仍然是一個棘手的問題。因此，文化條件似乎更接近我們的經驗和我們熟悉的自我

認識比的電化學運作，我們的大腦，更不依賴於量子力學的物理系統，這是我們可

能屬於國家。謹慎的事情，說的是現象導致至少一些背景條件下，我們的經驗在某

些方面，成。

2。現象學的學科

紀律的現象的定義是其領域的研究，它的方法，其主要結果。

現象學研究的意識經驗的結構經歷了從第一人稱的角度來看，隨着相關條件的經驗。

中央結構的經驗是它的意向，定向的方式是通過其內容或向某個對象在世界上的意

義。

我們都經歷感知，想象，思維，情感，意志，願望和行動，包括不同類型的經驗。

因此，現象學的領域的經驗，包括這些類型（其中包括）的範圍內。經驗包括相對

被動的經驗不僅在視覺或聽覺，但也積極經驗，在步行或錘擊釘子或踢球。 （範圍

具體到每個品種的，享有意識;我們的重點是在我們自己的，人力，經驗。並非所有

意識的生命，或將能實踐現象，因為我們做）。

有意識的經驗，有一個獨特的功能：我們的經驗，我們的生活通過它們或執行。在

世界上的其他東西，我們可以觀察和參與。但是，我們沒有經歷過，在這個意義上

的生活或執行。這種經驗或第一人稱的功能 - 這是有經驗的 - 是有意識的經驗的

性質或結構的一個重要組成部分，正如我們所說的，“我看到/想/希望/做......”

這個功能是現象學和本體論的每一個體驗的特點：它是它是什麼，要經歷的經驗

（現象學）的一部分，它是幹什麼用的經驗（本體論）的一部分。

我們應如何學習的意識經驗嗎？就像我們遇到他們，我們反映的各類經驗。這是說，

我們繼續從第一人稱的角度來看。但是，我們不正常特徵的經驗的時候，我們正在

執行它。在許多情況下，我們沒有這樣的能力：強烈的憤怒或恐懼的狀態，例如，

消耗了所有的時間在一個人的心靈的重點。相反，我們獲得了生活的背景下，通過

給定類型的經驗，我們期待與我們熟悉這種類型的經驗：聽一首歌，看日落，愛思

考，打算跳的一道坎。現象學的做法，採取了這種熟悉的經驗來表徵的類型。同時，

更重要的是，它是類型的經驗，現象學追求的，而不是特定的稍縱即逝的經驗 - 除

非它的類型是我們感興趣的。

古典的現象學家實行有區分的方法。 （1）我們描述了一個類型的經驗，正如我們

在我們自己的（過去的）經驗。因此，胡塞爾和梅洛 - 龐蒂談到生活經驗__的純粹

的描述。 （2）我們認為一個類型的豐富經驗，通過與上下文相關的功能。在這方

面，海德格爾和他的追隨者發言解釋學，藝術的背景下，尤其是社會和語境的解釋。

 （3）我們分析的形式，類型的經驗。最後，所有的古典的現象學家實行分析的經

驗，保出顯着的特點作進一步的闡述。

近幾十年來，這些傳統的方法已經分枝，擴大現象學的方法。因此：（4）在邏輯語

義模型的現象，我們指定類型的意圖的一種思維類型的真相條件（例如，在這裡我

想追逐貓，狗）或滿意的條件（比如，我打算在哪裡或將，跳障礙）。 （5）在認

知神經科學的實驗範式中，我們設計了實證實驗，證實或反駁方面的經驗（例如，

腦部掃描顯示在一個特定的大腦區域的電化學活性想...有益視力或情感類型的或電

機控制）。這風格的“neurophenomenology”的假設，是基於神經活動中體現的行

動，在適當的環境意識的經驗 - 混合純粹現象學與生物和物理科學的方式，不能完

全相投傳統的現象學家。

是什麼讓一個經驗意識是有一定的認識1的經驗，而經歷或執行。這種形式的內在意

識一直是一個很大的爭議的話題，幾個世紀後，問題出現了笛卡爾的意識，意識

（良心，知識）的高跟鞋與洛克的觀念的自我意識。這種意識的經驗，包括在種內

觀察的經驗，如果一個人做兩件事情嗎？ （布倫塔諾認為沒有）。它是一個高階感

知一個人的心靈的工作，或者是它的高階想過一個人的心理活動？ （最近的理論家

提出。）或不同形式的內在結構是什麼？ （薩特了這條線，借鑑布倫塔諾和胡塞爾）。

這些問題超出了本文的範圍，但是請注意，這些結果的現象學分析領域的研究和適

當的方法域形狀的表徵。意識的經驗是一個決定性的特點，有意識的經驗，特點，

讓體驗的第一人，壽命字符。它是短命的字符的經驗，讓一個第一人稱視角的研究

對象，即，經驗和角度是現象學的方法的特點。

意識經驗為出發點的現象，但經驗深淺成少明意識的現象。胡塞爾，其他人則強調，

我們只是一知半解的東西在邊緣或外圍的關注，我們只是含蓄地知道的事情在我們

周圍的世界更廣泛的視野。此外，由於海德格爾強調，在實踐活動中，像路上行走，

或錘擊釘子，或者說是我們的母語，我們沒有明確的意識，我們習慣性的行為模式。

此外，作為精神分析學家都強調，我們故意的心理活動是不自覺的在所有，但有可

能成為自覺治療或審訊的過程中，我們認識到我們的感覺或思考的東西。我們應該

允許的話，該域名的現象 - 我們自己的經驗 - 從有意識的經驗傳播到半昏迷，甚

至無意識的心理活動，在我們的經驗中隱式調用相關的背景條件。 （這些問題進行

辯論;這裡的關鍵是打開大門的問題在哪裡畫的邊界域的現象。）

要開始一個基本的現象學運動中，考慮到一些可能會在日常生活中的典型經驗，其

特徵在於第一人：

我看到漁船外海黃昏降落在太平洋上空。

我聽到直升機呼呼的開銷，因為它靠近醫院。

我想，從心理學的現象不同。

我希望來自墨西哥的暖雨像上周下降。

我想一個可怕的生物一樣，在我的噩夢。

到了中午，我打算完成我的寫作。

我周圍仔細地走在人行道上的碎玻璃。

我行程的反手橫法院某些underspin。

我正在尋找的話，在談話中，我的觀點。

以下是基本的刻畫一些熟悉的類型的經驗。每個句子是一個簡單的現象學描述，闡

明在日常英語的結構類型的經驗使。主題的“I”表示第一人稱結構的經驗：的主題

意向所得款項。動詞表示的類型，有意識的活動。這些活動描述：感知，思維，想

象等中央重要的是意識的對象，或打算在我們的經驗，特別是我們看到或懷孕或認

為有關對象的。的直接對象表達式（“該漁船外海”）闡明了模式的經驗介紹的對

象的內容或意義的經驗，胡塞爾所謂的noema核心。實際上，該對象短語表示noema，

所描述的行為，那就是，語言有適當的表現力的程度。給出的句子的整體形式表達

意向的經驗：主體行為的內容對象的基本形式。

豐富的現象的描述或解釋，在胡塞爾，梅洛 - 龐蒂等人，將遠遠逃脫上述這種簡單

的現象學描述。但是，這種簡單的描述意向的基本形式。正如我們進一步解釋現象

學的描述，我們可以評估的相關經驗的情況下。我們可以把這種類型的經驗的可能

性更廣泛的條件。這樣一來，我們在實踐中的現象，分類，描述，解釋，我們自己

的經驗，回答的方式和結構的經驗分析。

在這種解釋性的描述性分析的經驗，我們馬上就觀察到我們熟悉的形式分析的意識，

有意識的經驗，或這樣或那樣的。因此，意向性是我們的經驗，突出結構和所得的

現象為研究不同方面的意向。因此，我們探討的，持久的自我意識，自我和身體動

作，流的結構。此外，當我們反思這些現象是如何工作的，我們把相關條件的分析，

使我們的經驗發生，因為他們這樣做，並表示打算，因為他們做。現象通向條件的

意向，條件，涉及的運動技能和習慣，社會實踐背景，往往語言，有其特殊的地方，

在人類事務的可能性分析。

3。從現象到現象學

“牛津英語詞典”給出了以下定義：“現象學。一。 （本體論）不同的科學現象。

二。該部門的任何科學的描述和分類的現象。從希臘的phainomenon，外觀。“在哲

學，長期使用的第一感覺，由於辯論的理論和方法。在物理學和哲學的科學，在第

二個意義上使用這個詞是，儘管只是偶爾。

在其根的意思，那麼，現象學是研究的現象：從字面上，外觀，而不是現實。這個

古老的區別推出的理念，我們從柏拉圖的洞穴出現。然而，紀律的現象沒有開花，

直到20世紀和當代哲學在許多領域仍然知之甚少。什麼是紀律？怎麼理念現象從根

本概念的紀律的現象呢？

本來，在18世紀，“現象”指的是理論的出場經驗知識的基礎，尤其是感官的出場。

拉丁詞“Phenomenologia”介紹由Christoph弗里德里希•厄廷格在1736年。隨後，

德國的“Phanomenologia”由約翰•海因里希•蘭伯特，克里斯蒂安•沃爾夫的追

隨者。康德偶爾在各種著作中使用的術語，就像約翰•戈特利布•費希特。 1807年，

GWF黑格爾的“現象學德的精神（通常譯為”精神現象學）寫了一本書。到1889年，

布倫塔諾用這個詞來描述他所謂的“描述心理學”。從胡塞爾的期限為他的新的科

學意識，剩下的就是歷史。

假設我們說的現象學研究的現象：在我們看來 - 和它的出現。我們應如何理解的現

象？在近幾個世紀以來，這個名詞有豐富的歷史，我們可以看到的現象的一門新興

學科的痕跡。

在一個嚴格的經驗主義靜脈，會出現之前的心態是感官數據或QUALIA：無論是模式

的一個人的自己的感覺（在這裡看到紅色的現在，感覺這個棘手的感覺，聽覺，諧

振低音音）或合理的模式的世俗的東西，說，在外觀和氣味的鮮花（約翰•洛克稱

為第二性的質的東西）。在嚴格的理性靜脈，相反，這似乎之前腦子都是想法，合

理形成“清晰和明確的想法”（笛卡爾的理想）。在康德的理論知識，融合理性主

義和經驗主義的目標，什麼出現於心靈的現象，隨着事態的定義，因為，他們的出

現或事情，為他們是 - 代表（在一個綜合的感覺和概念上的對象著名）。奧古斯特

•孔德（Auguste Comte）的科學理論，現象（phenomenes）是一個給定的科學解釋

的事實（既成事實，會發生什麼）。

在18世紀和19世紀的認識論，那麼，現象的建築知識，特別是科學的出發點。因此，

在一個熟悉感，仍然是當前的現象是，無論我們觀察（感知），並尋求解釋。

心理學的學科在19世紀後期出現的現象，但是，就有點不同的幌子。在布倫塔諾的

心理學（1874）從實證的立場，現象是出現在腦海中的精神現象的意識行為（或內

容），和物理現象的外部感知的對象，用不同的顏色和形狀開始。對於布倫塔諾，

物理現象的存在“故意”行為的意識。這種觀點復甦中世紀的概念的布倫塔諾叫做

“故意存在”，但本體仍然是未開發的（什麼是它的存在在腦海中，和做物理對象

的存在只是在心裡？）。更一般地，我們可以說，現象是什麼，我們意識到：我們

周圍的物體和事件，其他人在自己面前，甚至在反射我們自己有意識的經驗，當我

們遇到這些。在一定的技術意義上的，現象的東西，因為他們給我們的意識，無論

是在知覺或想象或思想或意志。這一概念的現象會很快通知新的紀律的現象。

布倫塔諾區分描述心理學，遺傳心理學。遺傳心理學的目的不同類型的心理現象的

原因，描述心理學定義和分類，按照布倫塔諾的各種心理現象，包括感知，判斷，

情緒等，每一個心理現象或行為的意識，是為了一些對象，只是心理現象是這樣的

指示。本論文以故意directedness布倫塔諾的描述心理學的標誌。在1889年布倫塔

諾使用的術語“現象學”描述心理學，胡塞爾的現象學新的科學鋪平了道路。

現象，因為我們知道它發起了胡塞爾在他的邏輯研究“（1900至1901年）。在這巨

大的工作：心理學理論，對高跟鞋的布倫塔諾（威廉•詹姆斯的心理學原理出現於

1891年，留下了深刻的印象胡塞爾）和邏輯或語義理論的兩個重要的不同的理論走

到了一起，對高跟鞋伯納德•波爾查諾創立了現代邏輯，包括弗雷格和胡塞爾的同

時代人。 （有趣的是，這兩條線的研究追溯到亞里士多德，都達到了重要的新成果，

胡塞爾的一天。）

胡塞爾的“邏輯研究”的靈感來自於博爾扎諾的理想，邏輯，，而布倫塔諾的描述

心理學的概念。在他的理論的區分主觀和客觀的想法或表示（Vorstellungen），科

學（1835）博爾扎諾。實際上博爾扎諾批評康德在他面前的古典經驗主義和理性主

義，沒有這種區別，從而使現象只是主觀。邏輯研究目標的想法，包括命題，這反

過來又使客觀科學的理論。相比之下，心理學，研究主觀的想法，特別是思想的具

體內容（點）的心理活動在給定的時間。胡塞爾後，在一個單一的學科。因此，現

象必須重新構思為目標故意的主觀意識行為的內容（有時也被稱為有意的對象）。

現象學將研究這個複雜的意識和相關的現象。在思想I（第一冊，1913年）胡塞爾引

入兩個希臘字捕捉他的版本的Bolzanoan的區別：意向作用和noema的，請從希臘動

詞noe_的（νο_ω），這意味着感知，思考，打算從那裡來的名詞常識或心靈）。

故意意識過程被稱為意向作用，而其理想的內容被稱為noema的。胡塞爾的意識行為

的noema的特點是既作為一種理想的意義和“預期”的對象。這樣的現象，或對象出

現，成為noema，或對象，它的用意。的胡塞爾的理論noema的詮釋不同的發展胡塞

爾的意向性理論的基本數和金額。 （是的noema，預期對象的一個__方面，或者說

媒介的意向？）

，那麼，對於胡塞爾的現象學集成了一種心理的一種邏輯。它開發了一個描述性或

分析性心理，它描述和分析類型的主觀心理活動或經驗，總之，行為意識。然而，

它的發展的一種邏輯 - 一個理論意義（今天我們說的邏輯語義） - 它描述和分析

意識的客觀內容是：思想，概念，圖像，命題，作為各類總之，理想的含義故意內

容，或noematic含義的各種類型的經驗。這些內容由不同的意識行為是可共享的，

在這個意義上，他們是客觀的，理想的含義。博爾扎諾（到一定程度的platonistic的

邏輯學家赫爾曼•洛采），胡塞爾反對任何邏輯或數學或科學僅僅是心理的減少，

人們如何忽然想到，以同樣的精神，他區別了從單純的心理現象。對於胡塞爾，現

象學研究的意識不減少的目標和可共享的居住經驗的意義，僅僅是主觀happenstances。

理想的意義就在發動機中的意向性意識的行為。

一個清晰的概念，現象學，胡塞爾在等待一個明確的意向模型的發展。事實上，現

象學和現代的意向性概念出現在手，在胡塞爾的“邏輯研究”（1900年至1901年）。

在調查的理論基礎，胡塞爾將推動激進的新的科學的現象學思想（1913年）。另類

觀點的現象將很快跟進。

4。歷史和品種的現象

與胡塞爾現象學進入了它自己，就像進入了它自己的笛卡爾認識論，本體論或形而

上學進入了它自己對高跟鞋的柏拉圖與亞里士多德。然而，現象學已經實行，帶或

不帶這個名字，許多世紀。 ，，當印度教和佛教哲學家反映在意識實現的冥想狀態

中的各種狀態，他們執業的現象。 ，當笛卡爾，休謨，康德狀態感知的特點，思想

和想象力，他們執業的現象。布倫塔諾的心理現象（指的directedness意識）分類

品種時，他修煉的現象。威廉•詹姆斯（William James）評價各種流中的心理活動

的意識（包括其實施方式和他們的依賴習慣），他也是練現象。近期的分析哲學家

的頭腦，解決問題的意識和意向性的，他們通常會在練習現象。不過，紀律的現象，

其根源追溯穿越百年，在胡塞爾來到花滿。

其次是在上半年的20世紀的現象學寫作發出一陣胡塞爾的工作。百科全書“的現象

（Kluwer學術出版社，1997年，多德雷赫特，波士頓），設有獨立的文章七種現象

的多樣性，傳統的現象是顯而易見的。 （1）超越構現象學的研究對象是如何構成

的純先驗意識，撇開任何關係的問題，在我們身邊的自然世界。 （2）自然主義的

構現象研究如何的意識構成或需要的東西在世界上的自然與自然的態度，假設，意

識是自然界的一部分。 （3）存在主義現象學研究具體的人的存在，包括我們的經

驗，在具體情況下自由選擇或行動。 （4）生成歷史主義的現象學研究的意義如何，

在我們的經驗中發現，隨着時間的推移集體經驗的歷史進程中產生。 （5）遺傳現

象學研究的起源，意義的東西在自己的流經驗。 （6）詮釋學的現象學研究的經驗

解釋的結構，我們如何理解和從事的事情在我們身邊，在我們人類的世界，包括自

己和他人。 （7）現實的現象學研究的意識和意向性的結構，假設它發生在一個真

實的世界，主要是外部的意識，而不是某種方式帶入的意識。

最有名的經典現象學家胡塞爾，海德格爾，薩特和梅洛 - 龐蒂。在這些思想家中，

我們發現的現象不同的概念，不同的方法和不同的結果。簡要地勾勒出他們之間的

分歧將捕獲的關鍵時期的歷史現象和現象學視域的多樣性感。

在他的邏輯研究“（1900-01）胡塞爾提出了一個復__雜的哲學體系，從邏輯到語言

哲學的本體理論的共性和零部件的整體，一個現象學的意向性理論，終於到了唯象

理論的知識。然後在想法我（1913年），他的重點落在現象本身。胡塞爾的定義

“的科學意識的本質”的現象，集中在確定的意向性的特點，走近明確的“第一人”。

 （見胡塞爾的想法我，__33ff。）本着這種精神，我們可以說，現象學是研究意識

 - 也就是有意識的經驗的不同類型 - 經歷了從第一人稱的角度來看。在這門學科

中，我們研究不同形式的經驗，就像我們遇到他們，從生活的主題，通過或執行他

們的角度來看。因此，我們描述的經驗看，聽，想象，思維，感覺（即情感），希

望，渴望，願意，也作用，就是體現意志活動的行走，說話，的烹飪，carpentering，

等等。但是，沒有任何特徵的經驗就行了。一個給定類型的經驗的現象學分析將采

用的方法，使我們自己會遇到這種形式的有意識的活動。我們熟悉的類型的經驗和

領先的財產是他們的意向，他們或一些東西，一些經歷過或以某種方式或從事的意

識。我看還是概念化或了解的對象，我處理的定義，在我目前的經驗對象的意義。

因此，現象學具有意義的研究，在廣泛的意義上說，包括多語言表達。

在提出的想法，我胡塞爾現象學與先驗轉向。

胡塞爾的“邏輯研究”的靈感來自於博爾扎諾的理想，邏輯，，而布倫塔諾的描述

心理學的概念。在他的理論的區分主觀和客觀的想法或表示（Vorstellungen），科

學（1835）博爾扎諾。實際上博爾扎諾批評康德在他面前的古典經驗主義和理性主

義，沒有這種區別，從而使現象只是主觀。邏輯研究目標的想法，包括命題，這反

過來又使客觀科學的理論。相比之下，心理學，研究主觀的想法，特別是思想的具

體內容（點）的心理活動在給定的時間。胡塞爾後，在一個單一的學科。因此，現

象必須重新構思為目標故意的主觀意識行為的內容（有時也被稱為有意的對象）。

現象學將研究這個複雜的意識和相關的現象。在思想I（第一冊，1913年）胡塞爾引

入兩個希臘字捕捉他的版本的Bolzanoan的區別：意向作用和noema的，請從希臘動

詞noe_的（νο_ω），這意味着感知，思考，打算從那裡來的名詞常識或心靈）。

故意意識過程被稱為意向作用，而其理想的內容被稱為noema的。胡塞爾的意識行為

的noema的特點是既作為一種理想的意義和“預期”的對象。這樣的現象，或對象出

現，成為noema，或對象，它的用意。的胡塞爾的理論noema的詮釋不同的發展胡塞

爾的意向性理論的基本數和金額。 （是的noema，預期對象的一個__方面，或者說

媒介的意向？）

，那麼，對於胡塞爾的現象學集成了一種心理的一種邏輯。它開發了一個描述性或

分析性心理，它描述和分析類型的主觀心理活動或經驗，總之，行為意識。然而，

它的發展的一種邏輯 - 一個理論意義（今天我們說的邏輯語義） - 它描述和分析

意識的客觀內容是：思想，概念，圖像，命題，作為各類總之，理想的含義故意內

容，或noematic含義的各種類型的經驗。這些內容由不同的意識行為是可共享的，

在這個意義上，他們是客觀的，理想的含義。博爾扎諾（到一定程度的platonistic的

邏輯學家赫爾曼•洛采），胡塞爾反對任何邏輯或數學或科學僅僅是心理的減少，

人們如何忽然想到，以同樣的精神，他區別了從單純的心理現象。對於胡塞爾，現

象學研究的意識不減少的目標和可共享的居住經驗的意義，僅僅是主觀happenstances。

理想的意義就在發動機中的意向性意識的行為。

一個清晰的概念，現象學，胡塞爾在等待一個明確的意向模型的發展。事實上，現

象學和現代的意向性概念出現在手，在胡塞爾的“邏輯研究”（1900年至1901年）。

在調查的理論基礎，胡塞爾將推動激進的新的科學的現象學思想（1913年）。另類

觀點的現象將很快跟進。

4。歷史和品種的現象

與胡塞爾現象學進入了它自己，就像進入了它自己的笛卡爾認識論，本體論或形而

上學進入了它自己對高跟鞋的柏拉圖與亞里士多德。然而，現象學已經實行，帶或

不帶這個名字，許多世紀。 ，，當印度教和佛教哲學家反映在意識實現的冥想狀態

中的各種狀態，他們執業的現象。 ，當笛卡爾，休謨，康德狀態感知的特點，思想

和想象力，他們執業的現象。布倫塔諾的心理現象（指的directedness意識）分類

品種時，他修煉的現象。威廉•詹姆斯（William James）評價各種流中的心理活動

的意識（包括其實施方式和他們的依賴習慣），他也是練現象。近期的分析哲學家

的頭腦，解決問題的意識和意向性的，他們通常會在練習現象。不過，紀律的現象，

其根源追溯穿越百年，在胡塞爾來到花滿。

其次是在上半年的20世紀的現象學寫作發出一陣胡塞爾的工作。百科全書“的現象

（Kluwer學術出版社，1997年，多德雷赫特，波士頓），設有獨立的文章七種現象

的多樣性，傳統的現象是顯而易見的。 （1）超越構現象學的研究對象是如何構成

的純先驗意識，撇開任何關係的問題，在我們身邊的自然世界。 （2）自然主義的

構現象研究如何的意識構成或需要的東西在世界上的自然與自然的態度，假設，意

識是自然界的一部分。 （3）存在主義現象學研究具體的人的存在，包括我們的經

驗，在具體情況下自由選擇或行動。 （4）生成歷史主義的現象學研究的意義如何，

在我們的經驗中發現，隨着時間的推移集體經驗的歷史進程中產生。 （5）遺傳現

象學研究的起源，意義的東西在自己的流經驗。 （6）詮釋學的現象學研究的經驗

解釋的結構，我們如何理解和從事的事情在我們身邊，在我們人類的世界，包括自

己和他人。 （7）現實的現象學研究的意識和意向性的結構，假設它發生在一個真

實的世界，主要是外部的意識，而不是某種方式帶入的意識。

最有名的經典現象學家胡塞爾，海德格爾，薩特和梅洛 - 龐蒂。在這些思想家中，

我們發現的現象不同的概念，不同的方法和不同的結果。簡要地勾勒出他們之間的

分歧將捕獲的關鍵時期的歷史現象和現象學視域的多樣性感。

在他的邏輯研究“（1900-01）胡塞爾提出了一個復__雜的哲學體系，從邏輯到語言

哲學的本體理論的共性和零部件的整體，一個現象學的意向性理論，終於到了唯象

理論的知識。然後在想法我（1913年），他的重點落在現象本身。胡塞爾的定義

“的科學意識的本質”的現象，集中在確定的意向性的特點，走近明確的“第一人”。

 （見胡塞爾的想法我，__33ff。）本着這種精神，我們可以說，現象學是研究意識

 - 也就是有意識的經驗的不同類型 - 經歷了從第一人稱的角度來看。在這門學科

中，我們研究不同形式的經驗，就像我們遇到他們，從生活的主題，通過或執行他

們的角度來看。因此，我們描述的經驗看，聽，想象，思維，感覺（即情感），希

望，渴望，願意，也作用，就是體現意志活動的行走，說話，的烹飪，carpentering，

等等。但是，沒有任何特徵的經驗就行了。一個給定類型的經驗的現象學分析將采

用的方法，使我們自己會遇到這種形式的有意識的活動。我們熟悉的類型的經驗和

領先的財產是他們的意向，他們或一些東西，一些經歷過或以某種方式或從事的意

識。我看還是概念化或了解的對象，我處理的定義，在我目前的經驗對象的意義。

因此，現象學具有意義的研究，在廣泛的意義上說，包括多語言表達。

在提出的想法，我胡塞爾現象學與先驗轉向。的一部分，這意味着，胡塞爾把康德

的“先驗唯心論”的成語，尋找知識的可能性的條件，或意識普遍，可以說是遠離

任何超越現實的現象。但是，胡塞爾的先驗反過來也涉及發現懸置（從希臘持懷疑

態度的概念，放棄從信仰）的方法。我們練習的現象學，胡塞爾提出，“包圍”問

題的存在在我們身邊的自然世界。因此，我們把我們的注意力，在思考，我們自己

有意識的經驗的結構。我們的第一個關鍵的觀察結果是，每一個行為的意識是一個

意識的東西，那就是故意的，或指向的東西。考慮我的視覺體驗，其中我看到了廣

場對面的樹。在現象學反思，我們不必關心自己與樹是否存在：我的經驗是，是否

存在這樣的樹的樹。但是，我們需要關心對象是如何的意思或意圖。我看到了桉樹，

而不是絲蘭樹，我看到對象的桉樹，具有一定形狀，樹皮剝離等，因此，包圍在樹

的本身，我們把我們的注意力的樹，以我的經驗，和具體的內容或含義在我的經驗。

這棵樹認為胡塞爾的體驗感調用noema或noematic的的。

接替胡塞爾的哲學家辯論適當的表徵現象，其業績及方法的爭論。阿道夫•雷納克，

早期胡塞爾的（誰死在第一次世界大戰中）的學生，認為現象應保持與現實主義的

本體論結盟，在胡塞爾的“邏輯研究”。 ，波蘭現象學家的下一代，英伽登繼續抵

抗胡塞爾轉向先驗唯心論。對於這樣的哲學家，現象學不應該托架的問題或本體懸

置的方法，將建議。而且他們並不孤單。馬丁•海德格爾研究胡塞爾的早期著作，，

擔任助理胡塞爾在1916年，並於1928年成功胡塞爾在弗賴堡大學久負盛名的椅子上。

海德格爾現象學有他自己的想法。

在“存在與時間”（1927年）海德格爾的現象招展他的翻譯。對海德格爾來說，我

們和我們的活動都是“世界”，我們的存在是世界的，所以我們不研究我們的活動

包圍的世界，而我們解釋我們的活動和意義的事情對我們希望我們的上下文關係在

世界上的事情。事實上，海德格爾，現象解析成他所謂的“基礎本體論”。我們必

須區分他們是人類，我們開始調查的意義是在我們自己的情況，研究我們自己的存

在，在“此在”的活動（說是在每一種情況下，其存在是我自己的）。海德格爾反

對胡塞爾的新笛卡爾強調意識和主體性，包括如何感知周圍的事物我們。與此相反，

海德格爾認為，我們有關的事情是更基本的方式在錘擊的現象，其中顯示在上下文

中的設備和我們的情況，是與其他的實踐活動，如。

在“存在與時間”，海德格爾接觸現象，在准詩意的成語，通過根的“標誌”和

“現象”的含義，這樣的現象被定義為“無為展示自己”的藝術或實踐的。在海德

格爾的獨特的語言發揮的希臘根“，”現象“是指... - 到讓，這表明本身可以看

出，從本身的非常方式中，它顯示了自身從自身。”（參見海德格爾，“存在與時

間”，1927年， | 7C。）在這裏海德格爾明確地模仿胡塞爾的呼叫，“要的東西自

己！”，或“現象本身！”海德格爾去上，以強調實用的形式comportment或更好的

相關（Verhalten）錘打一顆釘子，而不是的意向表達形式，在看到或想到錘子。大

部分的“存在與時間”的發展，我們的模式是存在的解釋，包括著名的，我們正在

向死的。

在一個非常不同的風格，清晰的分析散文，在文本的講座叫，海德格爾的現象學的

基本問題“（1927）追蹤到問題的含義是通過其他許多思想家從亞里士多德到問題

的現象。我們所理解的人類和他們的存在，最終通過現象學。在這裡，與經典的本

體論問題更加明顯，和輔音與胡塞爾的視覺邏輯研究“（海德格爾早期的靈感之源）。

海德格爾的最具創新性的想法是他的構想的是“地面”，尋找到更基本的事情在我

們身邊（從樹上錘）模式。 ，海德格爾提出質疑，當代與技術的關注，他的寫作可

能表明，我們的科學理論，技術實踐中，我們使用的歷史文物，而不是系統的理想

的真理（如胡塞爾舉行了）。我們深刻理解的是，在我們自己的情況，來，而不是

從現象學，海德格爾舉行。

在20世紀30年代從奧地利和德國到法國哲學理念遷移的現象。已經鋪設了馬塞爾•

普魯斯特的“尋找失去的時間，在敘述者，敘述密切的細節，他的生動回憶過去的

經歷，包括他的著名協會的氣味，新鮮出爐的瑪德琳蛋糕的方式。這對笛卡爾的工

作，和法國現象學的感性體驗的痕跡一直努力維護的身心二元論的核心動力，笛卡

爾的觀點，而拒絕。的經驗，自己的身體，或一個人的生活或生命體，在許多20世

紀的法國哲學家一直是一個重要的主題。

在小說噁心讓 - 保羅•薩特（1936）描述了一個離奇的經驗，在其中的主角，以第

一人稱寫作，描述了普通的對象失去了意義，直到他遇到了純淨的板栗樹腳下，並

在那一刻，恢復他自己的自由感。薩特在“存在與虛無”（1943年，寫的部分，而

戰俘），發展了他的現象學本體論的概念。意識是意識的對象，，胡塞爾曾強調。

在薩特的意向性模型，的中心角色意識是一種現象，一種現象的發生僅僅是一個意

識，一個對象。薩特的板栗樹，我看到的是，這樣的現象在我的意識。事實上，在

世界上所有的東西，我們通常會遇到他們，是現象，下面或後面就在於他們的“是

本身”。相反，有意識，不僅是自為“，因為每一個意識是一個意識的，其對象，

而且還預先反思意識本身（良心的SOI）。然而，薩特，胡塞爾不同的是，“我”或

自我不過是一個序列意識的行為，特別是從根本上自由選擇像休謨的看法束。

對於薩特的做法是故意的現象進行反思的意識結構。薩特的方法實際上是一種文學

風格，不同類型的解釋性說明有關情況的經驗 - 這種做法並不真正適合的方法的建

議，胡塞爾和海德格爾，但薩特的偉大的文學技巧。 （薩特寫了許多戲劇和小說，

被授予諾貝爾文學獎。）

薩特在“存在與虛無”的現象，成為他的“大眾哲學”的存在主義，勾勒出在他的

著名演講“存在主義的哲學基礎，是一個以人為本”（1945年）。在“存在與虛無”

薩特強調自由選擇的經驗，特別是項目選擇一個人的自我，定義一個人的過去的行

為模式。通過“看”的其他生動的描述，薩特奠定基礎的其他（如在其他群體或民

族）的概念，為當代的政治意義。事實上，在“第二性”（1949年），西蒙娜•德

•波伏娃，薩特的終生伴侶，推出當代女性主義與她細緻入微地考慮為其他婦女的

作用。

巴黎在20世紀40年代，莫里斯•梅洛 - 龐蒂與薩特和波伏瓦的發展現象。在“知覺

現象學”（1945年），梅洛 - 龐蒂開發了豐富多樣的現象，強調身體在人類經驗中

的作用。與胡塞爾，海德格爾，薩特，梅洛 - 龐蒂看實驗心理學，分析經驗的截肢

者覺得在幻肢的感覺。梅洛 - 龐蒂拒絕了聯想心理學的心理，集中在感覺和刺激之

間的關係，知識分子的心理，側重於結構合理的世界在腦海中。 （想想在近數十年

的經驗心理學的行為主義和computationalist模型的心態。），而是集中在梅洛 - 

龐蒂的“身體意象”，我們的經驗，我們自己的身體，它的意義在我們的活動。擴

展胡塞爾的考慮反對的身體的生命體（），梅洛 - 龐蒂的身體和精神頂住了傳統的

直角分離。對於身體形象，無論是在精神境界，也不是在機械物理領域。相反，我

的身體，因為它是，我在我從事的事情我的看法，包括其他人的行動。

“知覺現象學”的範圍，是典型的古典現象的廣度，這不僅是因為梅洛 - 龐蒂杜爾

（慷慨），胡塞爾，海德格爾，薩特，同時塑造自己的創新遠見的現象。他的現象

學解決的現象領域中的作用的關注，經驗的身體，身體的空間感，身體的運動性，

身體性的存在，並在講話，其他自我，時間性，自由的性格，所以在法國存在主義

的重要。快結束時的一章，對我思（笛卡爾的“我思，故我在”），梅洛 - 龐蒂簡

潔地抓住他的體現，現象學，存在形式，寫道：

至於主體性的本質，當我反映，我發現它的身體和世界聯繫在一起，這是因為我的

存在的主觀性[=意識僅僅是一個與我的存在，作為一個機構存在的世界，因為我的

主題，採取具體，從這個身體，這個世界是分不開的。 [408]

總之，意識的體現（在世界上），和同樣的身體充滿了意識與世界的認知。

在未來的幾年，因為胡塞爾，海德格爾等。寫，現象學家已經挖成所有這些經典的

問題，包括意向，時間意識，主體間性，實踐的意向，以及人類活動的社會和語言

環境。胡塞爾等人的歷史文本解讀。已在這項工作中發揮了重要作用，這是因為文

本是豐富和困難，因為歷史的維度是歐洲大陸哲學的實踐的一部分。自20世紀60年

代以來，在分析哲學的方法訓練的哲學家也挖成的基礎現象，在哲學，邏輯，語言

和思想，着眼於20世紀的工作。

已經與胡塞爾的“邏輯研究”的理論在邏輯和語義現象。分析現象在該連接上拿起。

尤其是，，沃爾維克Follesdal和JN莫漢蒂探討胡塞爾的現象學和弗雷格的邏輯語義

（弗雷格的“意義和參考”，1892年）的歷史和概念之間的關係。弗雷格，表達是

指一個對象感：因此，兩個表達式（例如，“早晨之星”和“黃昏之星”）是指同

一個對象（金星），但用不同的方式表達不同的含義的介紹。同樣，對於胡塞爾，

經驗（或行為的意識）有意或指一個對象的一個__noema或noematic感：因此，經驗

可以參考相同的對象，但有不同的noematic的感官涉及不同的方式呈現對象（例如，

在從不同的側面看到的相同的對象）。事實上，胡塞爾的意向性理論是一個概括的

語言參考的理論：語言參考介導的意義上說，故意介導的參考noematic感。

最近，分析哲學家的頭腦重新找回了現象學問題的心理表徵，意向，意識，感官體

驗，故意的內容，以及上下文的思想。一些這些分析哲學家的心態讓人想起威廉•

詹姆斯和布倫塔諾現代心理學的起源，和一些看起來在今天的認知神經科學的實證

研究。一些研究人員已經開始結合，神經科學和行為學研究和數學建模的問題與現

象學的問題。這些研究將延長的方法，傳統的現象，作為時代潮流的移動。下面我

們解決心靈哲學。

5。現象學和本體論，認識論，邏輯學，倫理學

紀律的現象，形成一個基本的理念在其他領域中。的現象區別開來，而相關的，哲

學等領域？

傳統的理念包括至少有四個核心領域或學科的本體論，認識論，倫理學，邏輯。假

設現象將加入該名單。考慮領域的這些基本的定義：

本體論是研究人類或他們的存在 - 是什麼。

認識論的本質是知識的學習 - 我們怎麼知道。

邏輯是研究有效的推理 - 如何講道理。

倫理學是研究的正確和錯誤的 - 應該怎樣做。

現象學是研究我們的經驗 - 我們如何體驗。

研究的領域，在這五個領域有着明顯的不同，他們似乎在呼籲為不同的研究方法。

哲學家們有時認為，這些領域之一是“第一哲學”，最根本的紀律，所有的哲學或

知識或智慧休息。在歷史上（也可以這樣說），蘇格拉底和柏拉圖把道德第一，然

後亞里士多德把形而上學或本體論，然後笛卡爾認識論第一，羅素把邏輯的，然後

胡塞爾（在他後來先驗階段）先放現象。

考慮認識論。正如我們所看到的現象有助於確定知識聲稱其餘的現象，根據現代認

識論。另一方面，現象本身的要求，實現知識，意識的本質，鮮明的種第一人稱的

知識，通過某種形式的直覺。

考慮邏輯。正如我們所看到的，合乎邏輯的理論到的意向性理論的含義LED胡塞爾的

現象學，心臟。一個帳戶，現象__已經清楚的故意或者語義的力量，理想的意義，

命題的含義是邏輯理論的核心。但表達的語言，無論是普通的語言或符號語言，如

謂詞邏輯或數學或計算機系統的邏輯結構。它仍然是一個重要的問題，辯論的位置

和語言的形狀是否具體形式的經驗（思維，感覺，情感），其內容或意義。因此，

有一個重要的（如果有爭議的）現象學與邏輯語言理論之間的關係，尤其是哲學的

邏輯學和哲學的語言（而不是數理邏輯本身）。

考慮本體論。現象學的研究（其中包括）的意識，這是形而上學或本體論的核心問

題，並導致傳統的心 - 身問題的性質。胡塞爾的方法將支架對周圍世界的存在的問

題，從而分離現象世界的本體論。然而，胡塞爾的現象學的前提物種和個體（普遍

性和詳情），局部與整體的關係，理想的含義 - 所有部件的本體論的理論。

現在考慮道德問題。現象可能發揮的作用，在道德，分析結構的意願，重視快樂的

單身漢遲早也會結婚，幸福和照顧他人的同情和慰問。不過，從歷史上看，道德已

經在地平線上的現象。胡塞爾在很大程度上避免道德在他的主要著作，但他的作用

為特色的實際問題，在生活世界的結構或蓋斯特（精神或文化的時代精神），，他

曾經發表了演講過程中給予道德（如邏輯），一個基本的理念，在接地道德的同情

現象的重要性。在“存在與時間”，，海德格爾聲稱不追求道德在討論現象，護理，

良心，內疚的“墮落”和“真實性”（所有的現象與神學相呼應）。在“存在與虛

無”，薩特分析了微妙的“背信棄義”的邏輯問題，但他願意真誠（這聽起來像一

個經修訂的康德的道德基礎），開發了一個價值本體論。波伏瓦勾勒出一個存在主

義的道德，薩特留下了未發表的筆記型電腦上的道德。不過，一個明確的倫理現象

學的方法出現了，誰聽說過立陶宛現象學家胡塞爾和海德格爾在弗賴堡前移居巴黎

Emannuel列維納斯的作品。在總體性和無窮遠（1961），從胡塞爾和海德格爾，列

維納斯修改主題的“臉面”的重要意義集中在其他的理由，明確發展道德在這個范

圍內的現象，寫散文的寫意風格的典故，以宗教經驗。

盟軍有道德的政治和社會哲學。薩特和梅洛 - 龐蒂在20世紀40年代巴黎政治參與，

他們的存在主義哲學（現象學為基礎），建議個人自由的政治理論基礎。薩特的存

在主義與馬克思主義尋求一個明確的混合。不過，政治理論一直保持在邊界上的現

象。社會理論，但是，一直到這樣的現象。胡塞爾分析了現象學的生活世界和Geist一

般結構，包括我們在社會活動中的作用。海德格爾強調社會實踐，他發現更原始的

個體意識。阿爾弗雷德舒茨開發出一種對社會世界的現象學。薩特持續的現象學的

意義，另一方面，形成基本的社會評價。向外移動，從現象學的問題，米歇爾•福

柯研究的起源和意義的社會制度，從監獄到瘋狂的收容所。雅克•德里達長期實行

的一種現象學的語言，尋求廣泛的文本“解構主義”的社會意義。法國“後結構主

義”理論的各個方面有時被解釋為廣泛的現象學，但這些問題都超出了目前的職權

範圍內。

然後，古典現象，關繫到認識論，邏輯和本體論，倫理，社會，政治理論分成幾部

分，並導致某些地區的。

6。現象學與哲學的心靈

這應該是顯而易見的現象有很多說在該地區被稱為心靈哲學。然而，傳統的現象和

分析的心靈哲學緊密相連，，儘管重疊的領域的興趣。因此，它是適當的關閉本次

調查的現象，解決心靈哲學，近代哲學中最激烈辯論的地區之一。

開始分析哲學的傳統，早在20世紀，語言的分析，特別是在弗雷格，羅素和維特根

斯坦的作品。然後在概念記（1949），吉爾伯特•賴爾制定了一系列的語言對不同

的心理狀態，包括感覺，信念，將分析。雖然賴爾通常被視為一個普通語言哲學家，

賴爾自己說的概念可以被稱為現象學的精神。實際上，賴爾分析的現象學理解的心

理狀態，反映在日常語言中的心靈。從這種語言現象賴爾認為，笛卡爾的身心二元

論涉及一類錯誤（心理動詞的邏輯或語法 - “相信”，“看”，等等 - 並不意味

着我們推測，信念，感覺等， “鬼機”）。賴爾的身心二元論的拒絕，心 - 身問

題被重新喚醒：什麼是本體的心態面對面機構，是如何的頭腦和身體相關的嗎？

笛卡爾在他的劃時代的凝思在第一哲學（1641年），曾辯稱，有兩種截然不同的屬

性或模式或物質，精神和身體是兩種截然不同：機構的特點是時空的物理性能，而

頭腦其特徵屬性的思維（包括看到的，感覺等）。幾個世紀以後，現象會發現，與

布倫塔諾和胡塞爾的意識和意向性心理行為的特點，而天然的科學發現，物理系統

的特點是質量和力，最終由引力，電磁學，量子場。我們在哪裡找到在量子電磁引

力場，通過假設，訂單在自然世界中的一切，我們人類和我們的腦海中存在的意識

和意向性？這是今天的心 - 身問題。總之，任何其他名稱的現象學是在當代的心 

- 身問題的心臟。

哲學家賴爾後，尋求一個更加明確的和一般自然本體論的心態。在20世紀50年代的

唯物主義重新有人主張，敦促精神狀態是相同的中樞神經系統的狀態。經典的認同

理論認為，每個令牌的精神狀態（在一個特定的人的心，在一個特定的時間）與令

牌大腦狀態，人的大腦在那個時候是相同的。更強的唯物論持有，而是與大腦狀態

的類型，每種類型的心理狀態是相同的。但的唯物主義不適合舒適與現象學。對於

意識的精神狀態，我們體驗 - 感覺，思想，情感 - 如何可以簡單地將複雜的神經

狀態，不知怎的，...有益或實施並不明顯。如果只是相同的精神狀態和神經狀態，

在令牌的類型，在我們的科學理論的精神現象發生 - 它不是簡單地取代神經科學嗎？

但經驗是什麼來解釋神經科學的一部分。

在20世紀60年代末和70年代的計算機模型的心態，與功能成為主導模式的心態。在

這種模式下，心中是不是大腦是由（電化學交易在巨大的複合物在神經元）。相反，

心中卻是大腦做什麼：他們進入從生物體的生物和行為的訴訟調解之間的信息的功

能。因此，一種精神狀態的大腦功能狀態的人（或動物）的有機體。更具體地說，

最喜歡的機能變化的，頭腦是一個計算系統：心態是大腦的軟件是硬件的想法，只

是運行的程序對大腦的“濕件”。自20世紀70年代以來，認知科學 - 從認知神經科

學的實驗研究 - 趨向物質與功能的組合。漸漸地，然而，哲學家，現象學方面的頭

腦也提出了功能主義範式的問題。

在20世紀70年代初，托馬斯•內格爾認為“是一個蝙蝠是什麼樣子的？”（1974年），

意識本身 - 尤其是主觀的性格有某種類型的經驗是什麼樣的 - 逃脫的物理理論。

許多哲學家壓的情況下，感官的感受性 - 是什麼樣的感覺疼痛，就見紅了，等 - 

都沒有解決或解釋的物理或腦結構和腦功能的帳戶。意識有其自身的屬性。然而，

我們知道，它是密切相關的大腦。而且，在一定程度上說明的，神經元活動實施計

算。

在20世紀80年代，約翰•塞爾認為，意向性（1983）（進一步的重新發現心靈（1991）），

意向性意識的心理狀態是本質屬性。對於塞爾，我們的大腦產生的心理狀態的意識

和意向性的屬性，這是所有的一部分，我們的生物，但意識和意向性要求的“第一

人”的本體論。塞爾也認為，電腦模擬，但沒有特點是意向性的心理狀態。正如塞

爾認為，一個計算機系統語法有（處理某些形狀的符號），但沒有語義（符號缺乏

的含義：我們解釋“符號）。在這種方式中，塞爾拒絕了的唯物論與功能，而堅持

的頭腦是一個像我們這樣的生物的生物學特性：我們的大腦“分泌”的意識。

意識和意向性的分析評估上述現象是中央和塞爾的意向性理論的現代版，倒像是胡

塞爾的。 （現代邏輯理論的形式，的命題說明真相條件的，和塞爾一種精神狀態的

意向性的特點，通過指定其“滿足條件”）。然而，有一個重要的區別在背景理論。

塞爾明確承擔基本的自然科學的世界觀，認為意識是大自然的一部分。但是，胡塞

爾明確括號這樣的假設，以及後來的現象學家 - 包括海德格爾，薩特，梅洛 - 龐

蒂 - 似乎尋求超越了自然的科學現象有一定的庇護所。但現象本身應該是進一步的

經驗如何產生的理論主要是中性的，特別是從大腦的活動。

自20世紀90年代中期，一個作家心靈哲學側重於意識的基本特徵，最終是現象學的

問題。意識始終，基本上涉及自我意識或意識的意識，布倫塔諾，胡塞爾，薩特舉

行（在verying詳細的）？如果是這樣的話，那麼每行為意識包括或毗鄰的意識，意

識。的內部自我監測，自我意識的形式？如果是這樣，是一個更高層次，每個行為

的意識是加入了一個的進一步心理行為監控的基本行為監測？或以相同的順序是這

樣的監測為基礎的行為，正確的行為，如果沒有這些行為不會有意識嗎？已開發出

多種型號的自我意識，一些明確的借鑑或調整的意見，布倫塔諾，胡塞爾，薩特。

最近的兩個系列解決這些問題：大衛•伍德拉夫史密斯和阿米L.的托馬森（編輯），

現象學與哲學的心靈（2005年），和烏利亞Kriegel和Kenneth Williford（編輯），

自我表徵意識（2006）的方法。

整體的理念或理論的精神可能是考慮到以下學科或範圍在腦海中有關的理論：

意識現象學研究的經驗，有經驗的，分析的結構 - 類型，有意的形式和含義，動態，

和（某些）的有利條件 - 感知，思想，想象，情感，意志和行動。

神經科學的研究作為生物基質，不同類型的心理活動，包括有意識的經驗的神經活

動。神經將被框住的進化生物學（神經現象如何解釋發展），最終由基本物理（解

釋生物現象的物理現象接地）。這裡躺着自然科學的複雜性。什麼是科學負責的部

分是結構的經驗，分析現象。

文化的分析研究，塑造或作為栽培基質的心理活動，包括有意識的經驗的各類社會

實踐，幫助。我們在這裡學習語言和其他社會實踐的進口。

心靈本體論的本體論研究型的心理活動，在一般情況下，從感知（其中涉及從環境

中體驗到的因果輸入）意志的行動（其中包括從意志到身體運動的因果輸出）。

在心理理論的勞動分工可以看出，作為一個擴展布倫塔諾的描述和遺傳心理學之間

的區別。現象提供心理現象的描述性分析，而神經科學（和更廣泛的生物學，並最

終物理）模型的解釋是什麼原因導致或引起心理現象。文化理論提供了分析其影響

的社會活動和經驗，包括方法的語言塑造我們的思想，情感，和動機。和本體世界

的結構，包括我們自己的頭腦在基本方案的框架，所有這些結果。

同時，從認識論的角度來看，所有這些心理理論的範圍開始我們如何觀察和推理，

並試圖解釋我們遇到的現象在世界上。而這正是現象學開始。此外，我們了解每一

塊的理論，包括心理理論，是意向性理論的核心，因為它是，在一般的思想和經驗

的語義。這是心的現象。

=============================

Phenomenology

First published Sun Nov 16, 2003; substantive revision Mon Jul 28, 2008

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced 

from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience 

is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an 

experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an 

object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) 

together with appropriate enabling conditions.

Phenomenology as a discipline is distinct from but related to other key 

disciplines in philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics.

 Phenomenology has been practiced in various guises for centuries, but it 

came into its own in the early 20th century in the works of Husserl, Heidegger,

 Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others. Phenomenological issues of intentionality,

 consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent 

in recent philosophy of mind.

1. What is Phenomenology?

2. The Discipline of Phenomenology

3. From Phenomena to Phenomenology

4. The History and Varieties of Phenomenology

5. Phenomenology and Ontology, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics

6. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Bibliography

Other Internet Resources

Related Entries

A

1. What is Phenomenology?

Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary 

field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy.

The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of 

structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is 

the study of ǒphenomenaō: appearances of things, or things as they appear 

in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things 

have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced 

from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy 

is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields 

of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the 

study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study 

of right and wrong action), etc.

The historical movement of phenomenology is the philosophical tradition 

launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin 

Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. In that movement, 

the discipline of phenomenology was prized as the proper foundation of all 

philosophy ─ as opposed, say, to ethics or metaphysics or epistemology. 

The methods and characterization of the discipline were widely debated by 

Husserl and his successors, and these debates continue to the present day. 

(The definition of phenomenology offered above will thus be debatable, for 

example, by Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point in characterizing 

the discipline.)

In recent philosophy of mind, the term ǒphenomenologyō is often restricted 

to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what 

it is like to have sensations of various kinds. However, our experience 

is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Accordingly, in 

the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, 

addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance 

of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these 

things arise and are experienced in our ǒlife-worldō.

Phenomenology as a discipline has been central to the tradition of continental 

European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind 

has evolved in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy 

that developed throughout the 20th century. Yet the fundamental character 

of our mental activity is pursued in overlapping ways within these two traditions.

 Accordingly, the perspective on phenomenology drawn in this article will 

accommodate both traditions. The main concern here will be to characterize 

the discipline of phenomenology, in a contemporary purview, while also highlighting 

the historical tradition that brought the discipline into its own.

Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience 

ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, 

and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, 

including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience 

typically involves what Husserl called ǒintentionalityō, that is, the directedness 

of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness 

that it is a consciousness of or about something. According to classical 

Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward ─ represents 

or ǒintendsō ─ things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, 

images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, 

and are distinct from the things they present or mean.

The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection 

or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus, phenomenology develops 

a complex account of temporal awareness (within the stream of consciousness),

 spatial awareness (notably in perception), attention (distinguishing focal 

and marginal or ǒhorizonalō awareness), awareness of one's own experience 

(self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness (awareness-of-oneself), 

the self in different roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action 

(including kinesthetic awareness of one's movement), purpose or intention 

in action (more or less explicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, 

intersubjectivity, collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, 

communication, understanding others), social interaction (including collective 

action), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in a particular 

culture).

Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds or enabling 

conditions ─ conditions of the possibility ─ of intentionality, including 

embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices,

 social background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities. Thus, 

phenomenology leads from conscious experience into conditions that help 

to give experience its intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused 

on subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy 

of mind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate of experience,

 on how conscious experience and mental representation or intentionality 

are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficult question how much 

of these grounds of experience fall within the province of phenomenology 

as a discipline. Cultural conditions thus seem closer to our experience 

and to our familiar self-understanding than do the electrochemical workings 

of our brain, much less our dependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical 

systems to which we may belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology 

leads in some ways into at least some background conditions of our experience.

2. The Discipline of Phenomenology

The discipline of phenomenology is defined by its domain of study, its methods,

 and its main results.

Phenomenology studies structures of conscious experience as experienced 

from the first-person point of view, along with relevant conditions of experience.

 The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, the way it 

is directed through its content or meaning toward a certain object in the 

world.

We all experience various types of experience including perception, imagination,

 thought, emotion, desire, volition, and action. Thus, the domain of phenomenology 

is the range of experiences including these types (among others). Experience 

includes not only relatively passive experience as in vision or hearing, 

but also active experience as in walking or hammering a nail or kicking 

a ball. (The range will be specific to each species of being that enjoys 

consciousness; our focus is on our own, human, experience. Not all conscious 

beings will, or will be able to, practice phenomenology, as we do.)

Conscious experiences have a unique feature: we experience them, we live 

through them or perform them. Other things in the world we may observe and 

engage. But we do not experience them, in the sense of living through or 

performing them. This experiential or first-person feature ─ that of being 

experienced ─ is an essential part of the nature or structure of conscious 

experience: as we say, ǒI see / think / desire / do àō This feature is both 

a phenomenological and an ontological feature of each experience: it is part 

of what it is for the experience to be experienced (phenomenological) and 

part of what it is for the experience to be (ontological).

How shall we study conscious experience? We reflect on various types of 

experiences just as we experience them. That is to say, we proceed from 

the first-person point of view. However, we do not normally characterize 

an experience at the time we are performing it. In many cases we do not 

have that capability: a state of intense anger or fear, for example, consumes 

all of one's psychic focus at the time. Rather, we acquire a background 

of having lived through a given type of experience, and we look to our familiarity 

with that type of experience: hearing a song, seeing a sunset, thinking about 

love, intending to jump a hurdle. The practice of phenomenology assumes 

such familiarity with the type of experiences to be characterized. Importantly,

 also, it is types of experience that phenomenology pursues, rather than 

a particular fleeting experience ─ unless its type is what interests us.

Classical phenomenologists practiced some three distinguishable methods. 

(1) We describe a type of experience just as we find it in our own (past) 

experience. Thus, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty spoke of pure description of 

lived experience. (2) We interpret a type of experience by relating it to 

relevant features of context. In this vein, Heidegger and his followers 

spoke of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation in context, especially 

social and linguistic context. (3) We analyze the form of a type of experience.

 In the end, all the classical phenomenologists practiced analysis of experience,

 factoring out notable features for further elaboration.

These traditional methods have been ramified in recent decades, expanding 

the methods available to phenomenology. Thus: (4) In a logico-semantic model 

of phenomenology, we specify the truth conditions for a type of thinking 

(say, where I think that dogs chase cats) or the satisfaction conditions 

for a type of intention (say, where I intend or will to jump that hurdle). 

(5) In the experimental paradigm of cognitive neuroscience, we design empirical 

experiments that tend to confirm or refute aspects of experience (say, where 

a brain scan shows electrochemical activity in a specific region of the 

brain thought to subserve a type of vision or emotion or motor control). 

This style of ǒneurophenomenologyō assumes that conscious experience is 

grounded in neural activity in embodied action in appropriate surroundings 

─ mixing pure phenomenology with biological and physical science in a way 

that was not wholly congenial to traditional phenomenologists.

What makes an experience conscious is a certain awareness one has of the 

experience while living through or performing it. This form of inner awareness 

has been a topic of considerable debate, centuries after the issue arose 

with Locke's notion of self-consciousness on the heels of Descartes' sense 

of consciousness (conscience, co-knowledge). Does this awareness-of-experience 

consist in a kind of inner observation of the experience, as if one were 

doing two things at once? (Brentano argued no.) Is it a higher-order perception 

of one's mind's operation, or is it a higher-order thought about one's mental 

activity? (Recent theorists have proposed both.) Or is it a different form 

of inherent structure? (Sartre took this line, drawing on Brentano and Husserl.

) These issues are beyond the scope of this article, but notice that these 

results of phenomenological analysis shape the characterization of the domain 

of study and the methodology appropriate to the domain. For awareness-of-experience 

is a defining trait of conscious experience, the trait that gives experience 

a first-person, lived character. It is that lived character of experience 

that allows a first-person perspective on the object of study, namely, experience,

 and that perspective is characteristic of the methodology of phenomenology.

Conscious experience is the starting point of phenomenology, but experience 

shades off into less overtly conscious phenomena. As Husserl and others 

stressed, we are only vaguely aware of things in the margin or periphery 

of attention, and we are only implicitly aware of the wider horizon of things 

in the world around us. Moreover, as Heidegger stressed, in practical activities 

like walking along, or hammering a nail, or speaking our native tongue, 

we are not explicitly conscious of our habitual patterns of action. Furthermore,

 as psychoanalysts have stressed, much of our intentional mental activity 

is not conscious at all, but may become conscious in the process of therapy 

or interrogation, as we come to realize how we feel or think about something.

 We should allow, then, that the domain of phenomenology ─ our own experience 

─ spreads out from conscious experience into semi-conscious and even unconscious 

mental activity, along with relevant background conditions implicitly invoked 

in our experience. (These issues are subject to debate; the point here is 

to open the door to the question of where to draw the boundary of the domain 

of phenomenology.)

To begin an elementary exercise in phenomenology, consider some typical 

experiences one might have in everyday life, characterized in the first 

person:

I see that fishing boat off the coast as dusk descends over the Pacific.

I hear that helicopter whirring overhead as it approaches the hospital.

I am thinking that phenomenology differs from psychology.

I wish that warm rain from Mexico were falling like last week.

I imagine a fearsome creature like that in my nightmare.

I intend to finish my writing by noon.

I walk carefully around the broken glass on the sidewalk.

I stroke a backhand cross-court with that certain underspin.

I am searching for the words to make my point in conversation.

Here are rudimentary characterizations of some familiar types of experience. 

Each sentence is a simple form of phenomenological description, articulating 

in everyday English the structure of the type of experience so described. 

The subject term ǒIō indicates the first-person structure of the experience: 

the intentionality proceeds from the subject. The verb indicates the type 

of intentional activity described: perception, thought, imagination, etc. 

Of central importance is the way that objects of awareness are presented 

or intended in our experiences, especially, the way we see or conceive or 

think about objects. The direct-object expression (ǒthat fishing boat off 

the coastō) articulates the mode of presentation of the object in the experience: 

the content or meaning of the experience, the core of what Husserl called 

noema. In effect, the object-phrase expresses the noema of the act described,

 that is, to the extent that language has appropriate expressive power. 

The overall form of the given sentence articulates the basic form of intentionality 

in the experience: subject-act-content-object.

Rich phenomenological description or interpretation, as in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty 

et al., will far outrun such simple phenomenological descriptions as above. 

But such simple descriptions bring out the basic form of intentionality. 

As we interpret the phenomenological description further, we may assess 

the relevance of the context of experience. And we may turn to wider conditions 

of the possibility of that type of experience. In this way, in the practice 

of phenomenology, we classify, describe, interpret, and analyze structures 

of experiences in ways that answer to our own experience.

In such interpretive-descriptive analyses of experience, we immediately 

observe that we are analyzing familiar forms of consciousness, conscious 

experience of or about this or that. Intentionality is thus the salient 

structure of our experience, and much of phenomenology proceeds as the study 

of different aspects of intentionality. Thus, we explore structures of the 

stream of consciousness, the enduring self, the embodied self, and bodily 

action. Furthermore, as we reflect on how these phenomena work, we turn to 

the analysis of relevant conditions that enable our experiences to occur 

as they do, and to represent or intend as they do. Phenomenology then leads 

into analyses of conditions of the possibility of intentionality, conditions 

involving motor skills and habits, background social practices, and often 

language, with its special place in human affairs.

3. From Phenomena to Phenomenology

The Oxford English Dictionary presents the following definition: ǒPhenomenology.

 a. The science of phenomena as distinct from being (ontology). b. That 

division of any science which describes and classifies its phenomena. From 

the Greek phainomenon, appearance.ō In philosophy, the term is used in the 

first sense, amid debates of theory and methodology. In physics and philosophy 

of science, the term is used in the second sense, albeit only occasionally.

In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: literally,

 appearances as opposed to reality. This ancient distinction launched philosophy 

as we emerged from Plato's cave. Yet the discipline of phenomenology did 

not blossom until the 20th century and remains poorly understood in many 

circles of contemporary philosophy. What is that discipline? How did philosophy 

move from a root concept of phenomena to the discipline of phenomenology?

Originally, in the 18th century, ǒphenomenologyō meant the theory of appearances 

fundamental to empirical knowledge, especially sensory appearances. The 

Latin term ǒPhenomenologiaō was introduced by Christoph Friedrich Oetinger 

in 1736. Subsequently, the German term ǒPh□omenologiaō was used by Johann 

Heinrich Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff. Immanuel Kant used the 

term occasionally in various writings, as did Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In 

1807, G. W. F. Hegel wrote a book titled Ph□omenologie des Geistes (usually 

translated as Phenomenology of Spirit). By 1889 Franz Brentano used the 

term to characterize what he called ǒdescriptive psychologyō. From there 

Edmund Husserl took up the term for his new science of consciousness, and 

the rest is history.

Suppose we say phenomenology studies phenomena: what appears to us ─ and 

its appearing. How shall we understand phenomena? The term has a rich history 

in recent centuries, in which we can see traces of the emerging discipline 

of phenomenology.

In a strict empiricist vein, what appears before the mind are sensory data 

or qualia: either patterns of one's own sensations (seeing red here now, 

feeling this ticklish feeling, hearing that resonant bass tone) or sensible 

patterns of worldly things, say, the looks and smells of flowers (what John 

Locke called secondary qualities of things). In a strict rationalist vein, 

by contrast, what appears before the mind are ideas, rationally formed ǒclear 

and distinct ideasō (in Ren□Descartes' ideal). In Immanuel Kant's theory 

of knowledge, fusing rationalist and empiricist aims, what appears to the 

mind are phenomena defined as things-as-they-appear or things-as-they-are-represented 

(in a synthesis of sensory and conceptual forms of objects-as-known). In 

Auguste Comte's theory of science, phenomena (phenomenes) are the facts 

(faits, what occurs) that a given science would explain.

In 18th and 19th century epistemology, then, phenomena are the starting 

points in building knowledge, especially science. Accordingly, in a familiar 

and still current sense, phenomena are whatever we observe (perceive) and 

seek to explain.

As the discipline of psychology emerged late in the 19th century, however, 

phenomena took on a somewhat different guise. In Franz Brentano's Psychology 

from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), phenomena are what occur in the mind: 

mental phenomena are acts of consciousness (or their contents), and physical 

phenomena are objects of external perception starting with colors and shapes.

 For Brentano, physical phenomena exist ǒintentionallyō in acts of consciousness.

 This view revives a Medieval notion Brentano called ǒintentional in-existenceō,

 but the ontology remains undeveloped (what is it to exist in the mind, 

and do physical objects exist only in the mind?). More generally, we might 

say, phenomena are whatever we are conscious of: objects and events around 

us, other people, ourselves, even (in reflection) our own conscious experiences,

 as we experience these. In a certain technical sense, phenomena are thingsas 

they are given to our consciousness, whether in perception or imagination 

or thought or volition. This conception of phenomena would soon inform the 

new discipline of phenomenology.

Brentano distinguished descriptive psychology from genetic psychology. Where 

genetic psychology seeks the causes of various types of mental phenomena, 

descriptive psychology defines and classifies the various types of mental 

phenomena, including perception, judgment, emotion, etc. According to Brentano,

 every mental phenomenon, or act of consciousness, is directed toward some 

object, and only mental phenomena are so directed. This thesis of intentional 

directedness was the hallmark of Brentano's descriptive psychology. In 1889 

Brentano used the term ǒphenomenologyō for descriptive psychology, and the 

way was paved for Husserl's new science of phenomenology.

Phenomenology as we know it was launched by Edmund Husserl in his Logical 

Investigations (1900-01). Two importantly different lines of theory came 

together in that monumental work: psychological theory, on the heels of 

Franz Brentano (and also William James, whosePrinciples of Psychology appeared 

in 1891 and greatly impressed Husserl); and logical or semantic theory, 

on the heels of Bernard Bolzano and Husserl's contemporaries who founded 

modern logic, including Gottlob Frege. (Interestingly, both lines of research 

trace back to Aristotle, and both reached importantly new results in Husserl'

s day.)

Husserl's Logical Investigations was inspired by Bolzano's ideal of logic, 

while taking up Brentano's conception of descriptive psychology. In his 

Theory of Science (1835) Bolzano distinguished between subjective and objective 

ideas or representations (Vorstellungen). In effect Bolzano criticized Kant 

and before him the classical empiricists and rationalists for failing to 

make this sort of distinction, thereby rendering phenomena merely subjective.

 Logic studies objective ideas, including propositions, which in turn make 

up objective theories as in the sciences. Psychology would, by contrast, 

study subjective ideas, the concrete contents (occurrences) of mental activities 

in particular minds at a given time. Husserl was after both, within a single 

discipline. So phenomena must be reconceived as objective intentional contents 

(sometimes called intentional objects) of subjective acts of consciousness. 

Phenomenology would then study this complex of consciousness and correlated 

phenomena. In Ideas I (Book One, 1913) Husserl introduced two Greek words 

to capture his version of the Bolzanoan distinction: noesis and noema, from 

the Greek verb no□ (□□), meaning to perceive, think, intend, whence the 

noun nous or mind). The intentional process of consciousness is called noesis,

 while its ideal content is called noema. The noema of an act of consciousness 

Husserl characterized both as an ideal meaning and as ǒthe object as intendedō.

 Thus the phenomenon, or object-as-it-appears, becomes the noema, or object-as-

it-is-intended. The interpretations of Husserl's theory of noema have been 

several and amount to different developments of Husserl's basic theory of 

intentionality. (Is the noema an aspect of the object intended, or rather 

a medium of intention?)

For Husserl, then, phenomenology integrates a kind of psychology with a 

kind of logic. It develops a descriptive or analytic psychology in that 

it describes and analyzes types of subjective mental activity or experience, 

in short, acts of consciousness. Yet it develops a kind of logic ─ a theory 

of meaning (today we say logical semantics) ─ in that it describes and 

analyzes objective contents of consciousness: ideas, concepts, images, propositions,

 in short, ideal meanings of various types that serve as intentional contents,

 or noematic meanings, of various types of experience. These contents are 

shareable by different acts of consciousness, and in that sense they are 

objective, ideal meanings. Following Bolzano (and to some extent the platonistic 

logician Hermann Lotze), Husserl opposed any reduction of logic or mathematics 

or science to mere psychology, to how people happen to think, and in the 

same spirit he distinguished phenomenology from mere psychology. For Husserl,

 phenomenology would study consciousness without reducing the objective 

and shareable meanings that inhabit experience to merely subjective happenstances.

 Ideal meaning would be the engine of intentionality in acts of consciousness.

A clear conception of phenomenology awaited Husserl's development of a clear 

model of intentionality. Indeed, phenomenology and the modern concept of 

intentionality emerged hand-in-hand in Husserl's Logical Investigations 

(1900-01). With theoretical foundations laid in the Investigations, Husserl 

would then promote the radical new science of phenomenology in Ideas I (1913)

. And alternative visions of phenomenology would soon follow.

4. The History and Varieties of Phenomenology

Phenomenology came into its own with Husserl, much as epistemology came 

into its own with Descartes, and ontology or metaphysics came into its own 

with Aristotle on the heels of Plato. Yet phenomenology has been practiced, 

with or without the name, for many centuries. When Hindu and Buddhist philosophers 

reflected on states of consciousness achieved in a variety of meditative 

states, they were practicing phenomenology. When Descartes, Hume, and Kant 

characterized states of perception, thought, and imagination, they were 

practicing phenomenology. When Brentano classified varieties of mental phenomena 

(defined by the directedness of consciousness), he was practicing phenomenology.

 When William James appraised kinds of mental activity in the stream of 

consciousness (including their embodiment and their dependence on habit), 

he too was practicing phenomenology. And when recent analytic philosophers 

of mind have addressed issues of consciousness and intentionality, they 

have often been practicing phenomenology. Still, the discipline of phenomenology,

 its roots tracing back through the centuries, came to full flower in Husserl.

Husserl's work was followed by a flurry of phenomenological writing in the 

first half of the 20th century. The diversity of traditional phenomenology 

is apparent in the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Kluwer Academic Publishers,

 1997, Dordrecht and Boston), which features separate articles on some seven 

types of phenomenology. (1) Transcendental constitutive phenomenology studies 

how objects are constituted in pure or transcendental consciousness, setting 

aside questions of any relation to the natural world around us. (2) Naturalistic 

constitutive phenomenology studies how consciousness constitutes or takes 

things in the world of nature, assuming with the natural attitude that consciousness 

is part of nature. (3) Existential phenomenology studies concrete human existence,

 including our experience of free choice or action in concrete situations. 

(4) Generative historicist phenomenology studies how meaning, as found in 

our experience, is generated in historical processes of collective experience 

over time. (5) Genetic phenomenology studies the genesis of meanings of 

things within one's own stream of experience. (6) Hermeneutical phenomenology 

studies interpretive structures of experience, how we understand and engage 

things around us in our human world, including ourselves and others. (7) 

Realistic phenomenology studies the structure of consciousness and intentionality,

 assuming it occurs in a real world that is largely external to consciousness 

and not somehow brought into being by consciousness.

The most famous of the classical phenomenologists were Husserl, Heidegger, 

Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. In these four thinkers we find different conceptions 

of phenomenology, different methods, and different results. A brief sketch 

of their differences will capture both a crucial period in the history of 

phenomenology and a sense of the diversity of the field of phenomenology.

In his Logical Investigations (1900-01) Husserl outlined a complex system 

of philosophy, moving from logic to philosophy of language, to ontology 

(theory of universals and parts of wholes), to a phenomenological theory 

of intentionality, and finally to a phenomenological theory of knowledge. 

Then in Ideas I (1913) he focused squarely on phenomenology itself. Husserl 

defined phenomenology as ǒthe science of the essence of consciousnessō, 

centered on the defining trait of intentionality, approached explicitly 

ǒin the first personō. (See Husserl, Ideas I, 中33ff.) In this spirit, we 

may say phenomenology is the study of consciousness ─ that is, conscious 

experience of various types ─ as experienced from the first-person point 

of view. In this discipline we study different forms of experience just 

as we experience them, from the perspective of the subject living through 

or performing them. Thus, we characterize experiences of seeing, hearing, 

imagining, thinking, feeling (i.e., emotion), wishing, desiring, willing, 

and also acting, that is, embodied volitional activities of walking, talking,

 cooking, carpentering, etc. However, not just any characterization of an 

experience will do. Phenomenological analysis of a given type of experience 

will feature the ways in which we ourselves would experience that form of 

conscious activity. And the leading property of our familiar types of experience 

is their intentionality, their being a consciousness of or about something, 

something experienced or presented or engaged in a certain way. How I see 

or conceptualize or understand the object I am dealing with defines the 

meaning of that object in my current experience. Thus, phenomenology features 

a study of meaning, in a wide sense that includes more than what is expressed 

in language.

In Ideas I Husserl presented phenomenology with a transcendental turn. In 

part this means that Husserl took on the Kantian idiom of ǒtranscendental 

idealismō, looking for conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or of 

consciousness generally, and arguably turning away from any reality beyond 

phenomena. But Husserl's transcendental turn also involved his discovery 

of the method of epoch□(from the Greek skeptics' notion of abstaining from 

belief). We are to practice phenomenology, Husserl proposed, by ǒbracketingō 

the question of the existence of the natural world around us. We thereby 

turn our attention, in reflection, to the structure of our own conscious 

experience. Our first key result is the observation that each act of consciousness 

is a consciousness of something, that is, intentional, or directed toward 

something. Consider my visual experience wherein I see a tree across the 

square. In phenomenological reflection, we need not concern ourselves with 

whether the tree exists: my experience is of a tree whether or not such 

a tree exists. However, we do need to concern ourselves with how the object 

is meant or intended. I see a Eucalyptus tree, not a Yucca tree; I see that 

object as a Eucalyptus, with a certain shape, with bark stripping off, etc. 

Thus, bracketing the tree itself, we turn our attention to my experience 

of the tree, and specifically to the content or meaning in my experience. 

This tree-as-perceived Husserl calls the noema or noematic sense of the 

experience.

Philosophers succeeding Husserl debated the proper characterization of phenomenology,

 arguing over its results and its methods. Adolf Reinach, an early student 

of Husserl's (who died in World War I), argued that phenomenology should 

remain allied with a realist ontology, as in Husserl's Logical Investigations.

 Roman Ingarden, a Polish phenomenologist of the next generation, continued 

the resistance to Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism. For such philosophers,

 phenomenology should not bracket questions of being or ontology, as the 

method of epoch□would suggest. And they were not alone. Martin Heidegger 

studied Husserl's early writings, worked as Assistant to Husserl in 1916, 

and in 1928 succeeded Husserl in the prestigious chair at the University 

of Freiburg. Heidegger had his own ideas about phenomenology.

In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger unfurled his rendition of phenomenology. 

For Heidegger, we and our activities are always ǒin the worldō, our being 

is being-in-the-world, so we do not study our activities by bracketing the 

world, rather we interpret our activities and the meaning things have for 

us by looking to our contextual relations to things in the world. Indeed, 

for Heidegger, phenomenology resolves into what he called ǒfundamental ontologyō.

 We must distinguish beings from their being, and we begin our investigation 

of the meaning of being in our own case, examining our own existence in 

the activity of ǒDaseinō (that being whose being is in each case my own). 

Heidegger resisted Husserl's neo-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness and 

subjectivity, including how perception presents things around us. By contrast,

 Heidegger held that our more basic ways of relating to things are in practical 

activities like hammering, where the phenomenology reveals our situation 

in a context of equipment and in being-with-others.

In Being and Time Heidegger approached phenomenology, in a quasi-poetic 

idiom, through the root meanings of ǒlogosō and ǒphenomenaō, so that phenomenology 

is defined as the art or practice of ǒletting things show themselvesō. In 

Heidegger's inimitable linguistic play on the Greek roots, ǒ ‘phenomenology’

 means à ─ to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very 

way in which it shows itself from itself.ō (See Heidegger, Being and Time, 

1927, □7C.) Here Heidegger explicitly parodies Husserl's call, ǒTo the 

things themselves!ō, or ǒTo the phenomena themselves!ō Heidegger went on 

to emphasize practical forms of comportment or better relating (Verhalten) 

as in hammering a nail, as opposed to representational forms of intentionality 

as in seeing or thinking about a hammer. Much of Being and Time develops 

an existential interpretation of our modes of being including, famously, 

our being-toward-death.

In a very different style, in clear analytical prose, in the text of a lecture 

course called The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger traced 

the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle through many other thinkers 

into the issues of phenomenology. Our understanding of beings and their 

being comes ultimately through phenomenology. Here the connection with classical 

issues of ontology is more apparent, and consonant with Husserl's vision 

in the Logical Investigations (an early source of inspiration for Heidegger).

 One of Heidegger's most innovative ideas was his conception of the ǒgroundō 

of being, looking to modes of being more fundamental than the things around 

us (from trees to hammers). Heidegger questioned the contemporary concern 

with technology, and his writing might suggest that our scientific theories 

are historical artifacts that we use in technological practice, rather than 

systems of ideal truth (as Husserl had held). Our deep understanding of 

being, in our own case, comes rather from phenomenology, Heidegger held.

In the 1930s phenomenology migrated from Austrian and then German philosophy 

into French philosophy. The way had been paved in Marcel Proust's In Search 

of Lost Time, in which the narrator recounts in close detail his vivid recollections 

of past experiences, including his famous associations with the smell of 

freshly baked madeleines. This sensibility to experience traces to Descartes'

 work, and French phenomenology has been an effort to preserve the central 

thrust of Descartes' insights while rejecting mind-body dualism. The experience 

of one's own body, or one's lived or living body, has been an important 

motif in many French philosophers of the 20th century.

In the novel Nausea (1936) Jean-Paul Sartre described a bizarre course of 

experience in which the protagonist, writing in the first person, describes 

how ordinary objects lose their meaning until he encounters pure being at 

the foot of a chestnut tree, and in that moment recovers his sense of his 

own freedom. In Being and Nothingness (1943, written partly while a prisoner 

of war), Sartre developed his conception of phenomenological ontology. Consciousness 

is a consciousness of objects, as Husserl had stressed. In Sartre's model 

of intentionality, the central player in consciousness is a phenomenon, and 

the occurrence of a phenomenon just is a consciousness-of-an-object. The 

chestnut tree I see is, for Sartre, such a phenomenon in my consciousness. 

Indeed, all things in the world, as we normally experience them, are phenomena,

 beneath or behind which lies their ǒbeing-in-itselfō. Consciousness, by 

contrast, has ǒbeing-for-itselfō, since each consciousness is not only a 

consciousness-of-its-object but also a pre-reflective consciousness-of-itself 

(conscience de soi). Yet for Sartre, unlike Husserl, the ǒIō or self is 

nothing but a sequence of acts of consciousness, notably including radically 

free choices (like a Humean bundle of perceptions).

For Sartre, the practice of phenomenology proceeds by a deliberate reflection 

on the structure of consciousness. Sartre's method is in effect a literary 

style of interpretive description of different types of experience in relevant 

situations ─ a practice that does not really fit the methodological proposals 

of either Husserl or Heidegger, but makes use of Sartre's great literary 

skill. (Sartre wrote many plays and novels and was awarded the Nobel Prize 

in Literature.)

Sartre's phenomenology in Being and Nothingness became the philosophical 

foundation for his popular philosophy of existentialism, sketched in his 

famous lecture ǒExistentialism is a Humanismō (1945). In Being and Nothingness 

Sartre emphasized the experience of freedom of choice, especially the project 

of choosing one's self, the defining pattern of one's past actions. Through 

vivid description of the ǒlookō of the Other, Sartre laid groundwork for 

the contemporary political significance of the concept of the Other (as 

in other groups or ethnicities). Indeed, in The Second Sex (1949) Simone 

de Beauvoir, Sartre's life-long companion, launched contemporary feminism 

with her nuanced account of the perceived role of women as Other.

In 1940s Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty joined with Sartre and Beauvoir in 

developing phenomenology. In Phenomenology of Perception(1945) Merleau-Ponty 

developed a rich variety of phenomenology emphasizing the role of the body 

in human experience. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty 

looked to experimental psychology, analyzing the reported experience of 

amputees who felt sensations in a phantom limb. Merleau-Ponty rejected both 

associationist psychology, focused on correlations between sensation and 

stimulus, and intellectualist psychology, focused on rational construction 

of the world in the mind. (Think of the behaviorist and computationalist 

models of mind in more recent decades of empirical psychology.) Instead, 

Merleau-Ponty focused on the ǒbody imageō, our experience of our own body 

and its significance in our activities. Extending Husserl's account of the 

lived body (as opposed to the physical body), Merleau-Ponty resisted the 

traditional Cartesian separation of mind and body. For the body image is 

neither in the mental realm nor in the mechanical-physical realm. Rather, 

my body is, as it were, me in my engaged action with things I perceive including 

other people.

The scope of Phenomenology of Perception is characteristic of the breadth 

of classical phenomenology, not least because Merleau-Ponty drew (with generosity)

 on Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre while fashioning his own innovative vision 

of phenomenology. His phenomenology addressed the role of attention in the 

phenomenal field, the experience of the body, the spatiality of the body, 

the motility of the body, the body in sexual being and in speech, other 

selves, temporality, and the character of freedom so important in French 

existentialism. Near the end of a chapter on the cogito (Descartes' ǒI think,

 therefore I amō), Merleau-Ponty succinctly captures his embodied, existential 

form of phenomenology, writing:

Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound 

up with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence 

as subjectivity [= consciousness] is merely one with my existence as a body 

and with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, 

when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world. [408]

In short, consciousness is embodied (in the world), and equally body is 

infused with consciousness (with cognition of the world).

In the years since Husserl, Heidegger, et al. wrote, phenomenologists have 

dug into all these classical issues, including intentionality, temporal 

awareness, intersubjectivity, practical intentionality, and the social and 

linguistic contexts of human activity. Interpretation of historical texts 

by Husserl et al. has played a prominent role in this work, both because 

the texts are rich and difficult and because the historical dimension is 

itself part of the practice of continental European philosophy. Since the 

1960s, philosophers trained in the methods of analytic philosophy have also 

dug into the foundations of phenomenology, with an eye to 20th century work 

in philosophy of logic, language, and mind.

Phenomenology was already linked with logical and semantic theory in Husserl'

s Logical Investigations. Analytic phenomenology picks up on that connection.

 In particular, Dagfinn F鷲lesdal and J. N. Mohanty have explored historical 

and conceptual relations between Husserl's phenomenology and Frege's logical 

semantics (in Frege's ǒOn Sense and Referenceō, 1892). For Frege, an expression 

refers to an object by way of a sense: thus, two expressions (say, ǒthe 

morning starō and ǒthe evening starō) may refer to the same object (Venus) 

but express different senses with different manners of presentation. For 

Husserl, similarly, an experience (or act of consciousness) intends or refers 

to an object by way of a noema or noematic sense: thus, two experiences 

may refer to the same object but have different noematic senses involving 

different ways of presenting the object (for example, in seeing the same 

object from different sides). Indeed, for Husserl, the theory of intentionality 

is a generalization of the theory of linguistic reference: as linguistic 

reference is mediated by sense, so intentional reference is mediated by noematic 

sense.

More recently, analytic philosophers of mind have rediscovered phenomenological 

issues of mental representation, intentionality, consciousness, sensory 

experience, intentional content, and context-of-thought. Some of these analytic 

philosophers of mind hark back to William James and Franz Brentano at the 

origins of modern psychology, and some look to empirical research in today's 

cognitive neuroscience. Some researchers have begun to combine phenomenological 

issues with issues of neuroscience and behavioral studies and mathematical 

modeling. Such studies will extend the methods of traditional phenomenology 

as the Zeitgeist moves on. We address philosophy of mind below.

5. Phenomenology and Ontology, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics

The discipline of phenomenology forms one basic field in philosophy among 

others. How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields 

in philosophy?

Traditionally, philosophy includes at least four core fields or disciplines: 

ontology, epistemology, ethics, logic. Suppose phenomenology joins that 

list. Consider then these elementary definitions of field:

Ontology is the study of beings or their being ─ what is.

Epistemology is the study of knowledge ─ how we know.

Logic is the study of valid reasoning ─ how to reason.

Ethics is the study of right and wrong ─ how we should act.

Phenomenology is the study of our experience ─ how we experience.

The domains of study in these five fields are clearly different, and they 

seem to call for different methods of study.

Philosophers have sometimes argued that one of these fields is ǒfirst philosophyō,

 the most fundamental discipline, on which all philosophy or all knowledge 

or wisdom rests. Historically (it may be argued), Socrates and Plato put 

ethics first, then Aristotle put metaphysics or ontology first, then Descartes 

put epistemology first, then Russell put logic first, and then Husserl (in 

his later transcendental phase) put phenomenology first.

Consider epistemology. As we saw, phenomenology helps to define the phenomena 

on which knowledge claims rest, according to modern epistemology. On the 

other hand, phenomenology itself claims to achieve knowledge about the nature 

of consciousness, a distinctive kind of first-person knowledge, through 

a form of intuition.

Consider logic. As we saw, logical theory of meaning led Husserl into the 

theory of intentionality, the heart of phenomenology. On one account, phenomenology 

explicates the intentional or semantic force of ideal meanings, and propositional 

meanings are central to logical theory. But logical structure is expressed 

in language, either ordinary language or symbolic languages like those of 

predicate logic or mathematics or computer systems. It remains an important 

issue of debate where and whether language shapes specific forms of experience 

(thought, perception, emotion) and their content or meaning. So there is 

an important (if disputed) relation between phenomenology and logico-linguistic 

theory, especially philosophical logic and philosophy of language (as opposed 

to mathematical logicper se).

Consider ontology. Phenomenology studies (among other things) the nature 

of consciousness, which is a central issue in metaphysics or ontology, and 

one that leads into the traditional mind-body problem. Husserlian methodology 

would bracket the question of the existence of the surrounding world, thereby 

separating phenomenology from the ontology of the world. Yet Husserl's phenomenology 

presupposes theory about species and individuals (universals and particulars)

, relations of part and whole, and ideal meanings ─ all parts of ontology.

Now consider ethics. Phenomenology might play a role in ethics by offering 

analyses of the structure of will, valuing, happiness, and care for others 

(in empathy and sympathy). Historically, though, ethics has been on the 

horizon of phenomenology. Husserl largely avoided ethics in his major works, 

though he featured the role of practical concerns in the structure of the 

life-world or of Geist (spirit, or culture, as in Zeitgeist), and he once 

delivered a course of lectures giving ethics (like logic) a basic place 

in philosophy, indicating the importance of the phenomenology of sympathy 

in grounding ethics. In Being and Time Heidegger claimed not to pursue ethics 

while discussing phenomena ranging from care, conscience, and guilt to ǒfallennessō 

and ǒauthenticityō (all phenomena with theological echoes). In Being and 

Nothingness Sartre analyzed with subtlety the logical problem of ǒbad faithō,

 yet he developed an ontology of value as produced by willing in good faith 

(which sounds like a revised Kantian foundation for morality). Beauvoir 

sketched an existentialist ethics, and Sartre left unpublished notebooks 

on ethics. However, an explicitly phenomenological approach to ethics emerged 

in the works of Emannuel Levinas, a Lithuanian phenomenologist who heard 

Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg before moving to Paris. In Totality and 

Infinity(1961), modifying themes drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas 

focused on the significance of the ǒfaceō of the other, explicitly developing 

grounds for ethics in this range of phenomenology, writing an impressionistic 

style of prose with allusions to religious experience.

Allied with ethics are political and social philosophy. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 

were politically engaged in 1940s Paris, and their existential philosophies 

(phenomenologically based) suggest a political theory based in individual 

freedom. Sartre later sought an explicit blend of existentialism with Marxism.

 Still, political theory has remained on the borders of phenomenology. Social 

theory, however, has been closer to phenomenology as such. Husserl analyzed 

the phenomenological structure of the life-world and Geist generally, including 

our role in social activity. Heidegger stressed social practice, which he 

found more primordial than individual consciousness. Alfred Schutz developed 

a phenomenology of the social world. Sartre continued the phenomenological 

appraisal of the meaning of the other, the fundamental social formation. 

Moving outward from phenomenological issues, Michel Foucault studied the 

genesis and meaning of social institutions, from prisons to insane asylums. 

And Jacques Derrida has long practiced a kind of phenomenology of language, 

seeking social meaning in the ǒdeconstructionō of wide-ranging texts. Aspects 

of French ǒpoststructuralistō theory are sometimes interpreted as broadly 

phenomenological, but such issues are beyond the present purview.

Classical phenomenology, then, ties into certain areas of epistemology, 

logic, and ontology, and leads into parts of ethical, social, and political 

theory.

6. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

It ought to be obvious that phenomenology has a lot to say in the area called 

philosophy of mind. Yet the traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy 

of mind have not been closely joined, despite overlapping areas of interest. 

So it is appropriate to close this survey of phenomenology by addressing 

philosophy of mind, one of the most vigorously debated areas in recent philosophy.

The tradition of analytic philosophy began, early in the 20th century, with 

analyses of language, notably in the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,

 and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then in The Concept of Mind (1949) Gilbert Ryle 

developed a series of analyses of language about different mental states, 

including sensation, belief, and will. Though Ryle is commonly deemed a 

philosopher of ordinary language, Ryle himself said The Concept of Mind 

could be called phenomenology. In effect, Ryle analyzed our phenomenological 

understanding of mental states as reflected in ordinary language about the 

mind. From this linguistic phenomenology Ryle argued that Cartesian mind-body 

dualism involves a category mistake (the logic or grammar of mental verbs 

─ ǒbelieveō, ǒseeō, etc. ─ does not mean that we ascribe belief, sensation,

 etc., to ǒthe ghost in the machineō). With Ryle's rejection of mind-body 

dualism, the mind-body problem was re-awakened: what is the ontology of 

mind vis-□vis body, and how are mind and body related?

Ren□Descartes, in his epoch-making Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), 

had argued that minds and bodies are two distinct kinds of being or substance 

with two distinct kinds of attributes or modes: bodies are characterized 

by spatiotemporal physical properties, while minds are characterized by 

properties of thinking (including seeing, feeling, etc.). Centuries later, 

phenomenology would find, with Brentano and Husserl, that mental acts are 

characterized by consciousness and intentionality, while natural science 

would find that physical systems are characterized by mass and force, ultimately 

by gravitational, electromagnetic, and quantum fields. Where do we find 

consciousness and intentionality in the quantum-electromagnetic-gravitational 

field that, by hypothesis, orders everything in the natural world in which 

we humans and our minds exist? That is the mind-body problem today. In short,

 phenomenology by any other name lies at the heart of the contemporary mind-body 

problem.

After Ryle, philosophers sought a more explicit and generally naturalistic 

ontology of mind. In the 1950s materialism was argued anew, urging that 

mental states are identical with states of the central nervous system. The 

classical identity theory holds that each token mental state (in a particular 

person's mind at a particular time) is identical with a token brain state 

(in that person's brain at that time). A stronger materialism holds, instead,

 that each type of mental state is identical with a type of brain state. 

But materialism does not fit comfortably with phenomenology. For it is not 

obvious how conscious mental states as we experience them ─ sensations, 

thoughts, emotions ─ can simply be the complex neural states that somehow 

subserve or implement them. If mental states and neural states are simply 

identical, in token or in type, where in our scientific theory of mind does 

the phenomenology occur ─ is it not simply replaced by neuroscience? And 

yet experience is part of what is to be explained by neuroscience.

In the late 1960s and 1970s the computer model of mind set in, and functionalism 

became the dominant model of mind. On this model, mind is not what the brain 

consists in (electrochemical transactions in neurons in vast complexes). 

Instead, mind is what brains do: their function of mediating between information 

coming into the organism and behavior proceeding from the organism. Thus, 

a mental state is a functional state of the brain or of the human (or animal)

 organism. More specifically, on a favorite variation of functionalism, 

the mind is a computing system: mind is to brain as software is to hardware; 

thoughts are just programs running on the brain's ǒwetwareō. Since the 1970s 

the cognitive sciences ─ from experimental studies of cognition to neuroscience 

─ have tended toward a mix of materialism and functionalism. Gradually, 

however, philosophers found that phenomenological aspects of the mind pose 

problems for the functionalist paradigm too.

In the early 1970s Thomas Nagel argued in ǒWhat Is It Like to Be a Bat?ō 

(1974) that consciousness itself ─ especially the subjective character 

of what it is like to have a certain type of experience ─ escapes physical 

theory. Many philosophers pressed the case that sensory qualia ─ what it 

is like to feel pain, to see red, etc. ─ are not addressed or explained 

by a physical account of either brain structure or brain function. Consciousness 

has properties of its own. And yet, we know, it is closely tied to the brain. 

And, at some level of description, neural activities implement computation.

In the 1980s John Searle argued in Intentionality (1983) (and further in 

The Rediscovery of the Mind (1991)) that intentionality and consciousness 

are essential properties of mental states. For Searle, our brains produce 

mental states with properties of consciousness and intentionality, and this 

is all part of our biology, yet consciousness and intentionality require 

a ǒfirst-personō ontology. Searle also argued that computers simulate but 

do not have mental states characterized by intentionality. As Searle argued, 

a computer system has a syntax (processing symbols of certain shapes) but 

has no semantics (the symbols lack meaning: we interpret the symbols). In 

this way Searle rejected both materialism and functionalism, while insisting 

that mind is a biological property of organisms like us: our brains ǒsecreteō 

consciousness.

The analysis of consciousness and intentionality is central to phenomenology 

as appraised above, and Searle's theory of intentionality reads like a modernized 

version of Husserl's. (Contemporary logical theory takes the form of stating 

truth conditions for propositions, and Searle characterizes a mental state's 

intentionality by specifying its ǒsatisfaction conditionsō). However, there 

is an important difference in background theory. For Searle explicitly assumes 

the basic worldview of natural science, holding that consciousness is part 

of nature. But Husserl explicitly brackets that assumption, and later phenomenologists 

─ including Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty ─ seem to seek a certain 

sanctuary for phenomenology beyond the natural sciences. And yet phenomenology 

itself should be largely neutral about further theories of how experience 

arises, notably from brain activity.

Since the mid-1990s a variety of writers working in philosophy of mind have 

focused on the fundamental character of consciousness, ultimately a phenomenological 

issue. Does consciousness always and essentially involve self-consciousness, 

or consciousness-of-consciousness, as Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre held 

(in verying detail)? If so, then every act of consciousness either includes 

or is adjoined by a consciousness-of-that-consciousness. Does that self-consciousness 

take the form of an internal self-monitoring? If so, is that monitoring 

of a higher order, where each act of consciousness is joined by a further 

mental act monitoring the base act? Or is such monitoring of the same order 

as the base act, a proper part of the act without which the act would not 

be conscious? A variety of models of this self-consciousness have been developed,

 some explicitly drawing on or adapting views in Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre.

 Two recent collections address these issues: David Woodruff Smith and Amie 

L. Thomasson (editors), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (2005), and 

Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (editors), Self-Representational Approaches 

to Consciousness (2006).

The philosophy or theory of mind overall may be factored into the following 

disciplines or ranges of theory relevant to mind:

Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced, analyzing the 

structure ─ the types, intentional forms and meanings, dynamics, and (certain)

 enabling conditions ─ of perception, thought, imagination, emotion, and 

volition and action.

Neuroscience studies the neural activities that serve as biological substrate 

to the various types of mental activity, including conscious experience. 

Neuroscience will be framed by evolutionary biology (explaining how neural 

phenomena evolved) and ultimately by basic physics (explaining how biological 

phenomena are grounded in physical phenomena). Here lie the intricacies 

of the natural sciences. Part of what the sciences are accountable for is 

the structure of experience, analyzed by phenomenology.

Cultural analysis studies the social practices that help to shape or serve 

as cultural substrate of the various types of mental activity, including 

conscious experience. Here we study the import of language and other social 

practices.

Ontology of mind studies the ontological type of mental activity in general, 

ranging from perception (which involves causal input from environment to 

experience) to volitional action (which involves causal output from volition 

to bodily movement).

This division of labor in the theory of mind can be seen as an extension 

of Brentano's original distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology.

 Phenomenology offers descriptive analyses of mental phenomena, while neuroscience 

(and wider biology and ultimately physics) offers models of explanation 

of what causes or gives rise to mental phenomena. Cultural theory offers 

analyses of social activities and their impact on experience, including 

ways language shapes our thought, emotion, and motivation. And ontology 

frames all these results within a basic scheme of the structure of the world, 

including our own minds.

Meanwhile, from an epistemological standpoint, all these ranges of theory 

about mind begin with how we observe and reason about and seek to explain 

phenomena we encounter in the world. And that is where phenomenology begins. 

Moreover, how we understand each piece of theory, including theory about 

mind, is central to the theory of intentionality, as it were, the semantics 

of thought and experience in general. And that is the heart of phenomenology.