现象

现象学是从第一人称的角度来研究经验的意识的结构。经验的主要结构是它的意向，

其指向的东西，因为它既然是一个经验，就是一些关于一个对象的经验。一条经验

指向一个对象，凭借其内容或意义（代表对象），连同适当的所有利条件。

现象学作为一门学科是不同于，但又相关的重点学科，如哲学的本体论，认识论，

逻辑和道德。现象学以各种名目，其实已经实行了几百年的，但它在20世纪初它自

己才独立成立，是在胡塞尔，海德格尔，萨特，梅洛 - 庞蒂和其他人的作品中。在

最近的心灵哲学中，现象学的意向，意识，感受性和第一人称视角的问题已经突出。

1。什么是什么现象？

2。现象学的学科

3。从现象到现象学

4。现象学的历史和变化

5。现象学和本体论，认识论，逻辑学，伦理学

6。现象学与哲学的心灵

参考书目

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1。什么是什么现象？

通常理解现象学是从这两种方法之一：在哲学作为一个学科领域，或作为哲学史一

个运动中的哲学。

现象学学科，可以被定义对最初的经验，或意识结构的研究。从字面上看，现象学

研究的“现象”出现的东西，或东西，因为他们出现在我们的经验中，或方面，我

们体验到的东西，这样的事情在我们的经验的意义。现象学研究的意识经验，经历

了从主观或第一人称的角度来看。这个领域的理念，然后加以区分，和相关外，其

他主要领域的哲学本体论（研究什么是），认识论（知识的学习），逻辑（研究有

效的推理）道德正确和错误的行动（研究）等。

历史运动的现象是在20世纪上半年推出莫里斯•梅洛 - 庞蒂，胡塞尔，海德格尔，

萨特等人的哲学传统。适当的基础，所有的哲学运动，是珍贵的纪律的现象 - 而不

是，比方说，以道德或形而上学或认识论。引起广泛争议的方法和特征的学科，胡

塞尔和他的继任者，这些辩论持续到今天。 （提供上述现象学的定义因此是值得商

榷的，例如，海德格尔，但它仍然是在描述这门学科的出发点。）

在最近的心灵哲学中，“现象学”一词往往是仅限于视觉，听觉等感官质量的表征

是什么样子的有各种感觉。然而，我们的经验更丰富的内容比单纯的感觉。因此，

在现象学的现象学传统，被赋予了更广泛的范围内，解决的意义的事情在我们的经

验，特别是对象的意义，活动，工具，时间的流动，自我，他人，这些东西出现在

我们的“生活世界”的经历。

现象学作为一门学科已经在整个20世纪，欧洲大陆哲学的传统，而心灵哲学发展中

奥英美分析哲学的传统，在整个20世纪。然而，我们的心理活动的基本特征是追求

重叠的方式在这两个传统。因此，在这篇文章中得出的现象学的角度，可容纳两个

传统。这里主要关心的是表征纪律的现象，在当代的职权范围内，同时也突出了历

史传统，使自己的纪律。

基本上，现象学研究结构的各类经验，范围从感知，思维，记忆，想象，情感，欲

望和意志的身体意识，体现了行动，和社会活动，包括语言活动。通常涉及到胡塞

尔所谓的“意向性”，也就是directedness的经验，在世界上对事物的意识，这是

一个意识的东西，物业的经验，这些形式的结构。根据胡塞尔现象学经典，我们的

经验是指向 - 代表或“打算” - 只有通过特定的概念，思想，观念，影像等这些

构成了一个给定的经验含义或内容，是不同的东西他们提出的意思。

基本故意的意识结构，我们发现在反射或分析，包括进一步的经验。因此，现象学

发展的时间意识的一个复杂的帐户内的意识流，空间意识（尤其是在感知），注意

（区分重点和边际或“卧式”意识的），一个人的自己的经验，意识（自我意识，

在从某种意义上说），自我意识（认识自己），自不同的角色（如思维，表演等），

具体行动（包括动觉意识的运动），目的或行动的意图（更多或更少显式的），其

他人士（换位思考，主体间性，集体），语言活动的意义，沟通，理解他人，社会

交往（包括集体行动），在我们周围的生活世界和日常活动（在一个特定的文化意

识）。

此外，在不同的层面，我们找各种理由或有利条件 - 条件的可能性 - 的意向，其

中包括实施例中，身体技能，文化背景，语言和其他社会实践，社会背景和上下文

方面的有意活动。因此，现象导致意识的经验的条件，帮助给体验到它的意向。主

观的，实用的和社会条件方面的经验，一直专注于传统的现象。然而，近代哲学的

心态，特别是在注重经验的神经基板，如何有意识的经验和心理表征或意向性接地

的大脑活动。多少秋天的经验，这些理由在全省范围内的现象学作为一门学科，它

仍然是一个棘手的问题。因此，文化条件似乎更接近我们的经验和我们熟悉的自我

认识比的电化学运作，我们的大脑，更不依赖于量子力学的物理系统，这是我们可

能属于国家。谨慎的事情，说的是现象导致至少一些背景条件下，我们的经验在某

些方面，成。

2。现象学的学科

纪律的现象的定义是其领域的研究，它的方法，其主要结果。

现象学研究的意识经验的结构经历了从第一人称的角度来看，随着相关条件的经验。

中央结构的经验是它的意向，定向的方式是通过其内容或向某个对象在世界上的意

义。

我们都经历感知，想象，思维，情感，意志，愿望和行动，包括不同类型的经验。

因此，现象学的领域的经验，包括这些类型（其中包括）的范围内。经验包括相对

被动的经验不仅在视觉或听觉，但也积极经验，在步行或锤击钉子或踢球。 （范围

具体到每个品种的，享有意识;我们的重点是在我们自己的，人力，经验。并非所有

意识的生命，或将能实践现象，因为我们做）。

有意识的经验，有一个独特的功能：我们的经验，我们的生活通过它们或执行。在

世界上的其他东西，我们可以观察和参与。但是，我们没有经历过，在这个意义上

的生活或执行。这种经验或第一人称的功能 - 这是有经验的 - 是有意识的经验的

性质或结构的一个重要组成部分，正如我们所说的，“我看到/想/希望/做......”

这个功能是现象学和本体论的每一个体验的特点：它是它是什么，要经历的经验

（现象学）的一部分，它是干什么用的经验（本体论）的一部分。

我们应如何学习的意识经验吗？就像我们遇到他们，我们反映的各类经验。这是说，

我们继续从第一人称的角度来看。但是，我们不正常特征的经验的时候，我们正在

执行它。在许多情况下，我们没有这样的能力：强烈的愤怒或恐惧的状态，例如，

消耗了所有的时间在一个人的心灵的重点。相反，我们获得了生活的背景下，通过

给定类型的经验，我们期待与我们熟悉这种类型的经验：听一首歌，看日落，爱思

考，打算跳的一道坎。现象学的做法，采取了这种熟悉的经验来表征的类型。同时，

更重要的是，它是类型的经验，现象学追求的，而不是特定的稍纵即逝的经验 - 除

非它的类型是我们感兴趣的。

古典的现象学家实行有区分的方法。 （1）我们描述了一个类型的经验，正如我们

在我们自己的（过去的）经验。因此，胡塞尔和梅洛 - 庞蒂谈到生活经验__的纯粹

的描述。 （2）我们认为一个类型的丰富经验，通过与上下文相关的功能。在这方

面，海德格尔和他的追随者发言解释学，艺术的背景下，尤其是社会和语境的解释。

 （3）我们分析的形式，类型的经验。最后，所有的古典的现象学家实行分析的经

验，保出显着的特点作进一步的阐述。

近几十年来，这些传统的方法已经分枝，扩大现象学的方法。因此：（4）在逻辑语

义模型的现象，我们指定类型的意图的一种思维类型的真相条件（例如，在这里我

想追逐猫，狗）或满意的条件（比如，我打算在哪里或将，跳障碍）。 （5）在认

知神经科学的实验范式中，我们设计了实证实验，证实或反驳方面的经验（例如，

脑部扫描显示在一个特定的大脑区域的电化学活性想...有益视力或情感类型的或电

机控制）。这风格的“neurophenomenology”的假设，是基于神经活动中体现的行

动，在适当的环境意识的经验 - 混合纯粹现象学与生物和物理科学的方式，不能完

全相投传统的现象学家。

是什么让一个经验意识是有一定的认识1的经验，而经历或执行。这种形式的内在意

识一直是一个很大的争议的话题，几个世纪后，问题出现了笛卡尔的意识，意识

（良心，知识）的高跟鞋与洛克的观念的自我意识。这种意识的经验，包括在种内

观察的经验，如果一个人做两件事情吗？ （布伦塔诺认为没有）。它是一个高阶感

知一个人的心灵的工作，或者是它的高阶想过一个人的心理活动？ （最近的理论家

提出。）或不同形式的内在结构是什么？ （萨特了这条线，借鉴布伦塔诺和胡塞尔）。

这些问题超出了本文的范围，但是请注意，这些结果的现象学分析领域的研究和适

当的方法域形状的表征。意识的经验是一个决定性的特点，有意识的经验，特点，

让体验的第一人，寿命字符。它是短命的字符的经验，让一个第一人称视角的研究

对象，即，经验和角度是现象学的方法的特点。

意识经验为出发点的现象，但经验深浅成少明意识的现象。胡塞尔，其他人则强调，

我们只是一知半解的东西在边缘或外围的关注，我们只是含蓄地知道的事情在我们

周围的世界更广泛的视野。此外，由于海德格尔强调，在实践活动中，像路上行走，

或锤击钉子，或者说是我们的母语，我们没有明确的意识，我们习惯性的行为模式。

此外，作为精神分析学家都强调，我们故意的心理活动是不自觉的在所有，但有可

能成为自觉治疗或审讯的过程中，我们认识到我们的感觉或思考的东西。我们应该

允许的话，该域名的现象 - 我们自己的经验 - 从有意识的经验传播到半昏迷，甚

至无意识的心理活动，在我们的经验中隐式调用相关的背景条件。 （这些问题进行

辩论;这里的关键是打开大门的问题在哪里画的边界域的现象。）

要开始一个基本的现象学运动中，考虑到一些可能会在日常生活中的典型经验，其

特征在于第一人：

我看到渔船外海黄昏降落在太平洋上空。

我听到直升机呼呼的开销，因为它靠近医院。

我想，从心理学的现象不同。

我希望来自墨西哥的暖雨像上周下降。

我想一个可怕的生物一样，在我的噩梦。

到了中午，我打算完成我的写作。

我周围仔细地走在人行道上的碎玻璃。

我行程的反手横法院某些underspin。

我正在寻找的话，在谈话中，我的观点。

以下是基本的刻画一些熟悉的类型的经验。每个句子是一个简单的现象学描述，阐

明在日常英语的结构类型的经验使。主题的“I”表示第一人称结构的经验：的主题

意向所得款项。动词表示的类型，有意识的活动。这些活动描述：感知，思维，想

象等中央重要的是意识的对象，或打算在我们的经验，特别是我们看到或怀孕或认

为有关对象的。的直接对象表达式（“该渔船外海”）阐明了模式的经验介绍的对

象的内容或意义的经验，胡塞尔所谓的noema核心。实际上，该对象短语表示noema，

所描述的行为，那就是，语言有适当的表现力的程度。给出的句子的整体形式表达

意向的经验：主体行为的内容对象的基本形式。

丰富的现象的描述或解释，在胡塞尔，梅洛 - 庞蒂等人，将远远逃脱上述这种简单

的现象学描述。但是，这种简单的描述意向的基本形式。正如我们进一步解释现象

学的描述，我们可以评估的相关经验的情况下。我们可以把这种类型的经验的可能

性更广泛的条件。这样一来，我们在实践中的现象，分类，描述，解释，我们自己

的经验，回答的方式和结构的经验分析。

在这种解释性的描述性分析的经验，我们马上就观察到我们熟悉的形式分析的意识，

有意识的经验，或这样或那样的。因此，意向性是我们的经验，突出结构和所得的

现象为研究不同方面的意向。因此，我们探讨的，持久的自我意识，自我和身体动

作，流的结构。此外，当我们反思这些现象是如何工作的，我们把相关条件的分析，

使我们的经验发生，因为他们这样做，并表示打算，因为他们做。现象通向条件的

意向，条件，涉及的运动技能和习惯，社会实践背景，往往语言，有其特殊的地方，

在人类事务的可能性分析。

3。从现象到现象学

“牛津英语词典”给出了以下定义：“现象学。一。 （本体论）不同的科学现象。

二。该部门的任何科学的描述和分类的现象。从希腊的phainomenon，外观。“在哲

学，长期使用的第一感觉，由于辩论的理论和方法。在物理学和哲学的科学，在第

二个意义上使用这个词是，尽管只是偶尔。

在其根的意思，那么，现象学是研究的现象：从字面上，外观，而不是现实。这个

古老的区别推出的理念，我们从柏拉图的洞穴出现。然而，纪律的现象没有开花，

直到20世纪和当代哲学在许多领域仍然知之甚少。什么是纪律？怎么理念现象从根

本概念的纪律的现象呢？

本来，在18世纪，“现象”指的是理论的出场经验知识的基础，尤其是感官的出场。

拉丁词“Phenomenologia”介绍由Christoph弗里德里希•厄廷格在1736年。随后，

德国的“Phanomenologia”由约翰•海因里希•兰伯特，克里斯蒂安•沃尔夫的追

随者。康德偶尔在各种著作中使用的术语，就像约翰•戈特利布•费希特。 1807年，

GWF黑格尔的“现象学德的精神（通常译为”精神现象学）写了一本书。到1889年，

布伦塔诺用这个词来描述他所谓的“描述心理学”。从胡塞尔的期限为他的新的科

学意识，剩下的就是历史。

假设我们说的现象学研究的现象：在我们看来 - 和它的出现。我们应如何理解的现

象？在近几个世纪以来，这个名词有丰富的历史，我们可以看到的现象的一门新兴

学科的痕迹。

在一个严格的经验主义静脉，会出现之前的心态是感官数据或QUALIA：无论是模式

的一个人的自己的感觉（在这里看到红色的现在，感觉这个棘手的感觉，听觉，谐

振低音音）或合理的模式的世俗的东西，说，在外观和气味的鲜花（约翰•洛克称

为第二性的质的东西）。在严格的理性静脉，相反，这似乎之前脑子都是想法，合

理形成“清晰和明确的想法”（笛卡尔的理想）。在康德的理论知识，融合理性主

义和经验主义的目标，什么出现于心灵的现象，随着事态的定义，因为，他们的出

现或事情，为他们是 - 代表（在一个综合的感觉和概念上的对象著名）。奥古斯特

•孔德（Auguste Comte）的科学理论，现象（phenomenes）是一个给定的科学解释

的事实（既成事实，会发生什么）。

在18世纪和19世纪的认识论，那么，现象的建筑知识，特别是科学的出发点。因此，

在一个熟悉感，仍然是当前的现象是，无论我们观察（感知），并寻求解释。

心理学的学科在19世纪后期出现的现象，但是，就有点不同的幌子。在布伦塔诺的

心理学（1874）从实证的立场，现象是出现在脑海中的精神现象的意识行为（或内

容），和物理现象的外部感知的对象，用不同的颜色和形状开始。对于布伦塔诺，

物理现象的存在“故意”行为的意识。这种观点复苏中世纪的概念的布伦塔诺叫做

“故意存在”，但本体仍然是未开发的（什么是它的存在在脑海中，和做物理对象

的存在只是在心里？）。更一般地，我们可以说，现象是什么，我们意识到：我们

周围的物体和事件，其他人在自己面前，甚至在反射我们自己有意识的经验，当我

们遇到这些。在一定的技术意义上的，现象的东西，因为他们给我们的意识，无论

是在知觉或想象或思想或意志。这一概念的现象会很快通知新的纪律的现象。

布伦塔诺区分描述心理学，遗传心理学。遗传心理学的目的不同类型的心理现象的

原因，描述心理学定义和分类，按照布伦塔诺的各种心理现象，包括感知，判断，

情绪等，每一个心理现象或行为的意识，是为了一些对象，只是心理现象是这样的

指示。本论文以故意directedness布伦塔诺的描述心理学的标志。在1889年布伦塔

诺使用的术语“现象学”描述心理学，胡塞尔的现象学新的科学铺平了道路。

现象，因为我们知道它发起了胡塞尔在他的逻辑研究“（1900至1901年）。在这巨

大的工作：心理学理论，对高跟鞋的布伦塔诺（威廉•詹姆斯的心理学原理出现于

1891年，留下了深刻的印象胡塞尔）和逻辑或语义理论的两个重要的不同的理论走

到了一起，对高跟鞋伯纳德•波尔查诺创立了现代逻辑，包括弗雷格和胡塞尔的同

时代人。 （有趣的是，这两条线的研究追溯到亚里士多德，都达到了重要的新成果，

胡塞尔的一天。）

胡塞尔的“逻辑研究”的灵感来自于博尔扎诺的理想，逻辑，，而布伦塔诺的描述

心理学的概念。在他的理论的区分主观和客观的想法或表示（Vorstellungen），科

学（1835）博尔扎诺。实际上博尔扎诺批评康德在他面前的古典经验主义和理性主

义，没有这种区别，从而使现象只是主观。逻辑研究目标的想法，包括命题，这反

过来又使客观科学的理论。相比之下，心理学，研究主观的想法，特别是思想的具

体内容（点）的心理活动在给定的时间。胡塞尔后，在一个单一的学科。因此，现

象必须重新构思为目标故意的主观意识行为的内容（有时也被称为有意的对象）。

现象学将研究这个复杂的意识和相关的现象。在思想I（第一册，1913年）胡塞尔引

入两个希腊字捕捉他的版本的Bolzanoan的区别：意向作用和noema的，请从希腊动

词noe_的（νο_ω），这意味着感知，思考，打算从那里来的名词常识或心灵）。

故意意识过程被称为意向作用，而其理想的内容被称为noema的。胡塞尔的意识行为

的noema的特点是既作为一种理想的意义和“预期”的对象。这样的现象，或对象出

现，成为noema，或对象，它的用意。的胡塞尔的理论noema的诠释不同的发展胡塞

尔的意向性理论的基本数和金额。 （是的noema，预期对象的一个__方面，或者说

媒介的意向？）

，那么，对于胡塞尔的现象学集成了一种心理的一种逻辑。它开发了一个描述性或

分析性心理，它描述和分析类型的主观心理活动或经验，总之，行为意识。然而，

它的发展的一种逻辑 - 一个理论意义（今天我们说的逻辑语义） - 它描述和分析

意识的客观内容是：思想，概念，图像，命题，作为各类总之，理想的含义故意内

容，或noematic含义的各种类型的经验。这些内容由不同的意识行为是可共享的，

在这个意义上，他们是客观的，理想的含义。博尔扎诺（到一定程度的platonistic的

逻辑学家赫尔曼•洛采），胡塞尔反对任何逻辑或数学或科学仅仅是心理的减少，

人们如何忽然想到，以同样的精神，他区别了从单纯的心理现象。对于胡塞尔，现

象学研究的意识不减少的目标和可共享的居住经验的意义，仅仅是主观happenstances。

理想的意义就在发动机中的意向性意识的行为。

一个清晰的概念，现象学，胡塞尔在等待一个明确的意向模型的发展。事实上，现

象学和现代的意向性概念出现在手，在胡塞尔的“逻辑研究”（1900年至1901年）。

在调查的理论基础，胡塞尔将推动激进的新的科学的现象学思想（1913年）。另类

观点的现象将很快跟进。

4。历史和品种的现象

与胡塞尔现象学进入了它自己，就像进入了它自己的笛卡尔认识论，本体论或形而

上学进入了它自己对高跟鞋的柏拉图与亚里士多德。然而，现象学已经实行，带或

不带这个名字，许多世纪。 ，，当印度教和佛教哲学家反映在意识实现的冥想状态

中的各种状态，他们执业的现象。 ，当笛卡尔，休谟，康德状态感知的特点，思想

和想象力，他们执业的现象。布伦塔诺的心理现象（指的directedness意识）分类

品种时，他修炼的现象。威廉•詹姆斯（William James）评价各种流中的心理活动

的意识（包括其实施方式和他们的依赖习惯），他也是练现象。近期的分析哲学家

的头脑，解决问题的意识和意向性的，他们通常会在练习现象。不过，纪律的现象，

其根源追溯穿越百年，在胡塞尔来到花满。

其次是在上半年的20世纪的现象学写作发出一阵胡塞尔的工作。百科全书“的现象

（Kluwer学术出版社，1997年，多德雷赫特，波士顿），设有独立的文章七种现象

的多样性，传统的现象是显而易见的。 （1）超越构现象学的研究对象是如何构成

的纯先验意识，撇开任何关系的问题，在我们身边的自然世界。 （2）自然主义的

构现象研究如何的意识构成或需要的东西在世界上的自然与自然的态度，假设，意

识是自然界的一部分。 （3）存在主义现象学研究具体的人的存在，包括我们的经

验，在具体情况下自由选择或行动。 （4）生成历史主义的现象学研究的意义如何，

在我们的经验中发现，随着时间的推移集体经验的历史进程中产生。 （5）遗传现

象学研究的起源，意义的东西在自己的流经验。 （6）诠释学的现象学研究的经验

解释的结构，我们如何理解和从事的事情在我们身边，在我们人类的世界，包括自

己和他人。 （7）现实的现象学研究的意识和意向性的结构，假设它发生在一个真

实的世界，主要是外部的意识，而不是某种方式带入的意识。

最有名的经典现象学家胡塞尔，海德格尔，萨特和梅洛 - 庞蒂。在这些思想家中，

我们发现的现象不同的概念，不同的方法和不同的结果。简要地勾勒出他们之间的

分歧将捕获的关键时期的历史现象和现象学视域的多样性感。

在他的逻辑研究“（1900-01）胡塞尔提出了一个复__杂的哲学体系，从逻辑到语言

哲学的本体理论的共性和零部件的整体，一个现象学的意向性理论，终于到了唯象

理论的知识。然后在想法我（1913年），他的重点落在现象本身。胡塞尔的定义

“的科学意识的本质”的现象，集中在确定的意向性的特点，走近明确的“第一人”。

 （见胡塞尔的想法我，__33ff。）本着这种精神，我们可以说，现象学是研究意识

 - 也就是有意识的经验的不同类型 - 经历了从第一人称的角度来看。在这门学科

中，我们研究不同形式的经验，就像我们遇到他们，从生活的主题，通过或执行他

们的角度来看。因此，我们描述的经验看，听，想象，思维，感觉（即情感），希

望，渴望，愿意，也作用，就是体现意志活动的行走，说话，的烹饪，carpentering，

等等。但是，没有任何特征的经验就行了。一个给定类型的经验的现象学分析将采

用的方法，使我们自己会遇到这种形式的有意识的活动。我们熟悉的类型的经验和

领先的财产是他们的意向，他们或一些东西，一些经历过或以某种方式或从事的意

识。我看还是概念化或了解的对象，我处理的定义，在我目前的经验对象的意义。

因此，现象学具有意义的研究，在广泛的意义上说，包括多语言表达。

在提出的想法，我胡塞尔现象学与先验转向。

胡塞尔的“逻辑研究”的灵感来自于博尔扎诺的理想，逻辑，，而布伦塔诺的描述

心理学的概念。在他的理论的区分主观和客观的想法或表示（Vorstellungen），科

学（1835）博尔扎诺。实际上博尔扎诺批评康德在他面前的古典经验主义和理性主

义，没有这种区别，从而使现象只是主观。逻辑研究目标的想法，包括命题，这反

过来又使客观科学的理论。相比之下，心理学，研究主观的想法，特别是思想的具

体内容（点）的心理活动在给定的时间。胡塞尔后，在一个单一的学科。因此，现

象必须重新构思为目标故意的主观意识行为的内容（有时也被称为有意的对象）。

现象学将研究这个复杂的意识和相关的现象。在思想I（第一册，1913年）胡塞尔引

入两个希腊字捕捉他的版本的Bolzanoan的区别：意向作用和noema的，请从希腊动

词noe_的（νο_ω），这意味着感知，思考，打算从那里来的名词常识或心灵）。

故意意识过程被称为意向作用，而其理想的内容被称为noema的。胡塞尔的意识行为

的noema的特点是既作为一种理想的意义和“预期”的对象。这样的现象，或对象出

现，成为noema，或对象，它的用意。的胡塞尔的理论noema的诠释不同的发展胡塞

尔的意向性理论的基本数和金额。 （是的noema，预期对象的一个__方面，或者说

媒介的意向？）

，那么，对于胡塞尔的现象学集成了一种心理的一种逻辑。它开发了一个描述性或

分析性心理，它描述和分析类型的主观心理活动或经验，总之，行为意识。然而，

它的发展的一种逻辑 - 一个理论意义（今天我们说的逻辑语义） - 它描述和分析

意识的客观内容是：思想，概念，图像，命题，作为各类总之，理想的含义故意内

容，或noematic含义的各种类型的经验。这些内容由不同的意识行为是可共享的，

在这个意义上，他们是客观的，理想的含义。博尔扎诺（到一定程度的platonistic的

逻辑学家赫尔曼•洛采），胡塞尔反对任何逻辑或数学或科学仅仅是心理的减少，

人们如何忽然想到，以同样的精神，他区别了从单纯的心理现象。对于胡塞尔，现

象学研究的意识不减少的目标和可共享的居住经验的意义，仅仅是主观happenstances。

理想的意义就在发动机中的意向性意识的行为。

一个清晰的概念，现象学，胡塞尔在等待一个明确的意向模型的发展。事实上，现

象学和现代的意向性概念出现在手，在胡塞尔的“逻辑研究”（1900年至1901年）。

在调查的理论基础，胡塞尔将推动激进的新的科学的现象学思想（1913年）。另类

观点的现象将很快跟进。

4。历史和品种的现象

与胡塞尔现象学进入了它自己，就像进入了它自己的笛卡尔认识论，本体论或形而

上学进入了它自己对高跟鞋的柏拉图与亚里士多德。然而，现象学已经实行，带或

不带这个名字，许多世纪。 ，，当印度教和佛教哲学家反映在意识实现的冥想状态

中的各种状态，他们执业的现象。 ，当笛卡尔，休谟，康德状态感知的特点，思想

和想象力，他们执业的现象。布伦塔诺的心理现象（指的directedness意识）分类

品种时，他修炼的现象。威廉•詹姆斯（William James）评价各种流中的心理活动

的意识（包括其实施方式和他们的依赖习惯），他也是练现象。近期的分析哲学家

的头脑，解决问题的意识和意向性的，他们通常会在练习现象。不过，纪律的现象，

其根源追溯穿越百年，在胡塞尔来到花满。

其次是在上半年的20世纪的现象学写作发出一阵胡塞尔的工作。百科全书“的现象

（Kluwer学术出版社，1997年，多德雷赫特，波士顿），设有独立的文章七种现象

的多样性，传统的现象是显而易见的。 （1）超越构现象学的研究对象是如何构成

的纯先验意识，撇开任何关系的问题，在我们身边的自然世界。 （2）自然主义的

构现象研究如何的意识构成或需要的东西在世界上的自然与自然的态度，假设，意

识是自然界的一部分。 （3）存在主义现象学研究具体的人的存在，包括我们的经

验，在具体情况下自由选择或行动。 （4）生成历史主义的现象学研究的意义如何，

在我们的经验中发现，随着时间的推移集体经验的历史进程中产生。 （5）遗传现

象学研究的起源，意义的东西在自己的流经验。 （6）诠释学的现象学研究的经验

解释的结构，我们如何理解和从事的事情在我们身边，在我们人类的世界，包括自

己和他人。 （7）现实的现象学研究的意识和意向性的结构，假设它发生在一个真

实的世界，主要是外部的意识，而不是某种方式带入的意识。

最有名的经典现象学家胡塞尔，海德格尔，萨特和梅洛 - 庞蒂。在这些思想家中，

我们发现的现象不同的概念，不同的方法和不同的结果。简要地勾勒出他们之间的

分歧将捕获的关键时期的历史现象和现象学视域的多样性感。

在他的逻辑研究“（1900-01）胡塞尔提出了一个复__杂的哲学体系，从逻辑到语言

哲学的本体理论的共性和零部件的整体，一个现象学的意向性理论，终于到了唯象

理论的知识。然后在想法我（1913年），他的重点落在现象本身。胡塞尔的定义

“的科学意识的本质”的现象，集中在确定的意向性的特点，走近明确的“第一人”。

 （见胡塞尔的想法我，__33ff。）本着这种精神，我们可以说，现象学是研究意识

 - 也就是有意识的经验的不同类型 - 经历了从第一人称的角度来看。在这门学科

中，我们研究不同形式的经验，就像我们遇到他们，从生活的主题，通过或执行他

们的角度来看。因此，我们描述的经验看，听，想象，思维，感觉（即情感），希

望，渴望，愿意，也作用，就是体现意志活动的行走，说话，的烹饪，carpentering，

等等。但是，没有任何特征的经验就行了。一个给定类型的经验的现象学分析将采

用的方法，使我们自己会遇到这种形式的有意识的活动。我们熟悉的类型的经验和

领先的财产是他们的意向，他们或一些东西，一些经历过或以某种方式或从事的意

识。我看还是概念化或了解的对象，我处理的定义，在我目前的经验对象的意义。

因此，现象学具有意义的研究，在广泛的意义上说，包括多语言表达。

在提出的想法，我胡塞尔现象学与先验转向。的一部分，这意味着，胡塞尔把康德

的“先验唯心论”的成语，寻找知识的可能性的条件，或意识普遍，可以说是远离

任何超越现实的现象。但是，胡塞尔的先验反过来也涉及发现悬置（从希腊持怀疑

态度的概念，放弃从信仰）的方法。我们练习的现象学，胡塞尔提出，“包围”问

题的存在在我们身边的自然世界。因此，我们把我们的注意力，在思考，我们自己

有意识的经验的结构。我们的第一个关键的观察结果是，每一个行为的意识是一个

意识的东西，那就是故意的，或指向的东西。考虑我的视觉体验，其中我看到了广

场对面的树。在现象学反思，我们不必关心自己与树是否存在：我的经验是，是否

存在这样的树的树。但是，我们需要关心对象是如何的意思或意图。我看到了桉树，

而不是丝兰树，我看到对象的桉树，具有一定形状，树皮剥离等，因此，包围在树

的本身，我们把我们的注意力的树，以我的经验，和具体的内容或含义在我的经验。

这棵树认为胡塞尔的体验感调用noema或noematic的的。

接替胡塞尔的哲学家辩论适当的表征现象，其业绩及方法的争论。阿道夫•雷纳克，

早期胡塞尔的（谁死在第一次世界大战中）的学生，认为现象应保持与现实主义的

本体论结盟，在胡塞尔的“逻辑研究”。 ，波兰现象学家的下一代，英伽登继续抵

抗胡塞尔转向先验唯心论。对于这样的哲学家，现象学不应该托架的问题或本体悬

置的方法，将建议。而且他们并不孤单。马丁•海德格尔研究胡塞尔的早期著作，，

担任助理胡塞尔在1916年，并于1928年成功胡塞尔在弗赖堡大学久负盛名的椅子上。

海德格尔现象学有他自己的想法。

在“存在与时间”（1927年）海德格尔的现象招展他的翻译。对海德格尔来说，我

们和我们的活动都是“世界”，我们的存在是世界的，所以我们不研究我们的活动

包围的世界，而我们解释我们的活动和意义的事情对我们希望我们的上下文关系在

世界上的事情。事实上，海德格尔，现象解析成他所谓的“基础本体论”。我们必

须区分他们是人类，我们开始调查的意义是在我们自己的情况，研究我们自己的存

在，在“此在”的活动（说是在每一种情况下，其存在是我自己的）。海德格尔反

对胡塞尔的新笛卡尔强调意识和主体性，包括如何感知周围的事物我们。与此相反，

海德格尔认为，我们有关的事情是更基本的方式在锤击的现象，其中显示在上下文

中的设备和我们的情况，是与其他的实践活动，如。

在“存在与时间”，海德格尔接触现象，在准诗意的成语，通过根的“标志”和

“现象”的含义，这样的现象被定义为“无为展示自己”的艺术或实践的。在海德

格尔的独特的语言发挥的希腊根“，”现象“是指... - 到让，这表明本身可以看

出，从本身的非常方式中，它显示了自身从自身。”（参见海德格尔，“存在与时

间”，1927年， | 7C。）在这里海德格尔明确地模仿胡塞尔的呼叫，“要的东西自

己！”，或“现象本身！”海德格尔去上，以强调实用的形式comportment或更好的

相关（Verhalten）锤打一颗钉子，而不是的意向表达形式，在看到或想到锤子。大

部分的“存在与时间”的发展，我们的模式是存在的解释，包括著名的，我们正在

向死的。

在一个非常不同的风格，清晰的分析散文，在文本的讲座叫，海德格尔的现象学的

基本问题“（1927）追踪到问题的含义是通过其他许多思想家从亚里士多德到问题

的现象。我们所理解的人类和他们的存在，最终通过现象学。在这里，与经典的本

体论问题更加明显，和辅音与胡塞尔的视觉逻辑研究“（海德格尔早期的灵感之源）。

海德格尔的最具创新性的想法是他的构想的是“地面”，寻找到更基本的事情在我

们身边（从树上锤）模式。 ，海德格尔提出质疑，当代与技术的关注，他的写作可

能表明，我们的科学理论，技术实践中，我们使用的历史文物，而不是系统的理想

的真理（如胡塞尔举行了）。我们深刻理解的是，在我们自己的情况，来，而不是

从现象学，海德格尔举行。

在20世纪30年代从奥地利和德国到法国哲学理念迁移的现象。已经铺设了马塞尔•

普鲁斯特的“寻找失去的时间，在叙述者，叙述密切的细节，他的生动回忆过去的

经历，包括他的著名协会的气味，新鲜出炉的玛德琳蛋糕的方式。这对笛卡尔的工

作，和法国现象学的感性体验的痕迹一直努力维护的身心二元论的核心动力，笛卡

尔的观点，而拒绝。的经验，自己的身体，或一个人的生活或生命体，在许多20世

纪的法国哲学家一直是一个重要的主题。

在小说恶心让 - 保罗•萨特（1936）描述了一个离奇的经验，在其中的主角，以第

一人称写作，描述了普通的对象失去了意义，直到他遇到了纯净的板栗树脚下，并

在那一刻，恢复他自己的自由感。萨特在“存在与虚无”（1943年，写的部分，而

战俘），发展了他的现象学本体论的概念。意识是意识的对象，，胡塞尔曾强调。

在萨特的意向性模型，的中心角色意识是一种现象，一种现象的发生仅仅是一个意

识，一个对象。萨特的板栗树，我看到的是，这样的现象在我的意识。事实上，在

世界上所有的东西，我们通常会遇到他们，是现象，下面或后面就在于他们的“是

本身”。相反，有意识，不仅是自为“，因为每一个意识是一个意识的，其对象，

而且还预先反思意识本身（良心的SOI）。然而，萨特，胡塞尔不同的是，“我”或

自我不过是一个序列意识的行为，特别是从根本上自由选择像休谟的看法束。

对于萨特的做法是故意的现象进行反思的意识结构。萨特的方法实际上是一种文学

风格，不同类型的解释性说明有关情况的经验 - 这种做法并不真正适合的方法的建

议，胡塞尔和海德格尔，但萨特的伟大的文学技巧。 （萨特写了许多戏剧和小说，

被授予诺贝尔文学奖。）

萨特在“存在与虚无”的现象，成为他的“大众哲学”的存在主义，勾勒出在他的

著名演讲“存在主义的哲学基础，是一个以人为本”（1945年）。在“存在与虚无”

萨特强调自由选择的经验，特别是项目选择一个人的自我，定义一个人的过去的行

为模式。通过“看”的其他生动的描述，萨特奠定基础的其他（如在其他群体或民

族）的概念，为当代的政治意义。事实上，在“第二性”（1949年），西蒙娜•德

•波伏娃，萨特的终生伴侣，推出当代女性主义与她细致入微地考虑为其他妇女的

作用。

巴黎在20世纪40年代，莫里斯•梅洛 - 庞蒂与萨特和波伏瓦的发展现象。在“知觉

现象学”（1945年），梅洛 - 庞蒂开发了丰富多样的现象，强调身体在人类经验中

的作用。与胡塞尔，海德格尔，萨特，梅洛 - 庞蒂看实验心理学，分析经验的截肢

者觉得在幻肢的感觉。梅洛 - 庞蒂拒绝了联想心理学的心理，集中在感觉和刺激之

间的关系，知识分子的心理，侧重于结构合理的世界在脑海中。 （想想在近数十年

的经验心理学的行为主义和computationalist模型的心态。），而是集中在梅洛 - 

庞蒂的“身体意象”，我们的经验，我们自己的身体，它的意义在我们的活动。扩

展胡塞尔的考虑反对的身体的生命体（），梅洛 - 庞蒂的身体和精神顶住了传统的

直角分离。对于身体形象，无论是在精神境界，也不是在机械物理领域。相反，我

的身体，因为它是，我在我从事的事情我的看法，包括其他人的行动。

“知觉现象学”的范围，是典型的古典现象的广度，这不仅是因为梅洛 - 庞蒂杜尔

（慷慨），胡塞尔，海德格尔，萨特，同时塑造自己的创新远见的现象。他的现象

学解决的现象领域中的作用的关注，经验的身体，身体的空间感，身体的运动性，

身体性的存在，并在讲话，其他自我，时间性，自由的性格，所以在法国存在主义

的重要。快结束时的一章，对我思（笛卡尔的“我思，故我在”），梅洛 - 庞蒂简

洁地抓住他的体现，现象学，存在形式，写道：

至于主体性的本质，当我反映，我发现它的身体和世界联系在一起，这是因为我的

存在的主观性[=意识仅仅是一个与我的存在，作为一个机构存在的世界，因为我的

主题，采取具体，从这个身体，这个世界是分不开的。 [408]

总之，意识的体现（在世界上），和同样的身体充满了意识与世界的认知。

在未来的几年，因为胡塞尔，海德格尔等。写，现象学家已经挖成所有这些经典的

问题，包括意向，时间意识，主体间性，实践的意向，以及人类活动的社会和语言

环境。胡塞尔等人的历史文本解读。已在这项工作中发挥了重要作用，这是因为文

本是丰富和困难，因为历史的维度是欧洲大陆哲学的实践的一部分。自20世纪60年

代以来，在分析哲学的方法训练的哲学家也挖成的基础现象，在哲学，逻辑，语言

和思想，着眼于20世纪的工作。

已经与胡塞尔的“逻辑研究”的理论在逻辑和语义现象。分析现象在该连接上拿起。

尤其是，，沃尔维克Follesdal和JN莫汉蒂探讨胡塞尔的现象学和弗雷格的逻辑语义

（弗雷格的“意义和参考”，1892年）的历史和概念之间的关系。弗雷格，表达是

指一个对象感：因此，两个表达式（例如，“早晨之星”和“黄昏之星”）是指同

一个对象（金星），但用不同的方式表达不同的含义的介绍。同样，对于胡塞尔，

经验（或行为的意识）有意或指一个对象的一个__noema或noematic感：因此，经验

可以参考相同的对象，但有不同的noematic的感官涉及不同的方式呈现对象（例如，

在从不同的侧面看到的相同的对象）。事实上，胡塞尔的意向性理论是一个概括的

语言参考的理论：语言参考介导的意义上说，故意介导的参考noematic感。

最近，分析哲学家的头脑重新找回了现象学问题的心理表征，意向，意识，感官体

验，故意的内容，以及上下文的思想。一些这些分析哲学家的心态让人想起威廉•

詹姆斯和布伦塔诺现代心理学的起源，和一些看起来在今天的认知神经科学的实证

研究。一些研究人员已经开始结合，神经科学和行为学研究和数学建模的问题与现

象学的问题。这些研究将延长的方法，传统的现象，作为时代潮流的移动。下面我

们解决心灵哲学。

5。现象学和本体论，认识论，逻辑学，伦理学

纪律的现象，形成一个基本的理念在其他领域中。的现象区别开来，而相关的，哲

学等领域？

传统的理念包括至少有四个核心领域或学科的本体论，认识论，伦理学，逻辑。假

设现象将加入该名单。考虑领域的这些基本的定义：

本体论是研究人类或他们的存在 - 是什么。

认识论的本质是知识的学习 - 我们怎么知道。

逻辑是研究有效的推理 - 如何讲道理。

伦理学是研究的正确和错误的 - 应该怎样做。

现象学是研究我们的经验 - 我们如何体验。

研究的领域，在这五个领域有着明显的不同，他们似乎在呼吁为不同的研究方法。

哲学家们有时认为，这些领域之一是“第一哲学”，最根本的纪律，所有的哲学或

知识或智慧休息。在历史上（也可以这样说），苏格拉底和柏拉图把道德第一，然

后亚里士多德把形而上学或本体论，然后笛卡尔认识论第一，罗素把逻辑的，然后

胡塞尔（在他后来先验阶段）先放现象。

考虑认识论。正如我们所看到的现象有助于确定知识声称其余的现象，根据现代认

识论。另一方面，现象本身的要求，实现知识，意识的本质，鲜明的种第一人称的

知识，通过某种形式的直觉。

考虑逻辑。正如我们所看到的，合乎逻辑的理论到的意向性理论的含义LED胡塞尔的

现象学，心脏。一个帐户，现象__已经清楚的故意或者语义的力量，理想的意义，

命题的含义是逻辑理论的核心。但表达的语言，无论是普通的语言或符号语言，如

谓词逻辑或数学或计算机系统的逻辑结构。它仍然是一个重要的问题，辩论的位置

和语言的形状是否具体形式的经验（思维，感觉，情感），其内容或意义。因此，

有一个重要的（如果有争议的）现象学与逻辑语言理论之间的关系，尤其是哲学的

逻辑学和哲学的语言（而不是数理逻辑本身）。

考虑本体论。现象学的研究（其中包括）的意识，这是形而上学或本体论的核心问

题，并导致传统的心 - 身问题的性质。胡塞尔的方法将支架对周围世界的存在的问

题，从而分离现象世界的本体论。然而，胡塞尔的现象学的前提物种和个体（普遍

性和详情），局部与整体的关系，理想的含义 - 所有部件的本体论的理论。

现在考虑道德问题。现象可能发挥的作用，在道德，分析结构的意愿，重视快乐的

单身汉迟早也会结婚，幸福和照顾他人的同情和慰问。不过，从历史上看，道德已

经在地平线上的现象。胡塞尔在很大程度上避免道德在他的主要著作，但他的作用

为特色的实际问题，在生活世界的结构或盖斯特（精神或文化的时代精神），，他

曾经发表了演讲过程中给予道德（如逻辑），一个基本的理念，在接地道德的同情

现象的重要性。在“存在与时间”，，海德格尔声称不追求道德在讨论现象，护理，

良心，内疚的“堕落”和“真实性”（所有的现象与神学相呼应）。在“存在与虚

无”，萨特分析了微妙的“背信弃义”的逻辑问题，但他愿意真诚（这听起来像一

个经修订的康德的道德基础），开发了一个价值本体论。波伏瓦勾勒出一个存在主

义的道德，萨特留下了未发表的笔记型电脑上的道德。不过，一个明确的伦理现象

学的方法出现了，谁听说过立陶宛现象学家胡塞尔和海德格尔在弗赖堡前移居巴黎

Emannuel列维纳斯的作品。在总体性和无穷远（1961），从胡塞尔和海德格尔，列

维纳斯修改主题的“脸面”的重要意义集中在其他的理由，明确发展道德在这个范

围内的现象，写散文的写意风格的典故，以宗教经验。

盟军有道德的政治和社会哲学。萨特和梅洛 - 庞蒂在20世纪40年代巴黎政治参与，

他们的存在主义哲学（现象学为基础），建议个人自由的政治理论基础。萨特的存

在主义与马克思主义寻求一个明确的混合。不过，政治理论一直保持在边界上的现

象。社会理论，但是，一直到这样的现象。胡塞尔分析了现象学的生活世界和Geist一

般结构，包括我们在社会活动中的作用。海德格尔强调社会实践，他发现更原始的

个体意识。阿尔弗雷德舒茨开发出一种对社会世界的现象学。萨特持续的现象学的

意义，另一方面，形成基本的社会评价。向外移动，从现象学的问题，米歇尔•福

柯研究的起源和意义的社会制度，从监狱到疯狂的收容所。雅克•德里达长期实行

的一种现象学的语言，寻求广泛的文本“解构主义”的社会意义。法国“后结构主

义”理论的各个方面有时被解释为广泛的现象学，但这些问题都超出了目前的职权

范围内。

然后，古典现象，关系到认识论，逻辑和本体论，伦理，社会，政治理论分成几部

分，并导致某些地区的。

6。现象学与哲学的心灵

这应该是显而易见的现象有很多说在该地区被称为心灵哲学。然而，传统的现象和

分析的心灵哲学紧密相连，，尽管重叠的领域的兴趣。因此，它是适当的关闭本次

调查的现象，解决心灵哲学，近代哲学中最激烈辩论的地区之一。

开始分析哲学的传统，早在20世纪，语言的分析，特别是在弗雷格，罗素和维特根

斯坦的作品。然后在概念记（1949），吉尔伯特•赖尔制定了一系列的语言对不同

的心理状态，包括感觉，信念，将分析。虽然赖尔通常被视为一个普通语言哲学家，

赖尔自己说的概念可以被称为现象学的精神。实际上，赖尔分析的现象学理解的心

理状态，反映在日常语言中的心灵。从这种语言现象赖尔认为，笛卡尔的身心二元

论涉及一类错误（心理动词的逻辑或语法 - “相信”，“看”，等等 - 并不意味

着我们推测，信念，感觉等， “鬼机”）。赖尔的身心二元论的拒绝，心 - 身问

题被重新唤醒：什么是本体的心态面对面机构，是如何的头脑和身体相关的吗？

笛卡尔在他的划时代的凝思在第一哲学（1641年），曾辩称，有两种截然不同的属

性或模式或物质，精神和身体是两种截然不同：机构的特点是时空的物理性能，而

头脑其特征属性的思维（包括看到的，感觉等）。几个世纪以后，现象会发现，与

布伦塔诺和胡塞尔的意识和意向性心理行为的特点，而天然的科学发现，物理系统

的特点是质量和力，最终由引力，电磁学，量子场。我们在哪里找到在量子电磁引

力场，通过假设，订单在自然世界中的一切，我们人类和我们的脑海中存在的意识

和意向性？这是今天的心 - 身问题。总之，任何其他名称的现象学是在当代的心 

- 身问题的心脏。

哲学家赖尔后，寻求一个更加明确的和一般自然本体论的心态。在20世纪50年代的

唯物主义重新有人主张，敦促精神状态是相同的中枢神经系统的状态。经典的认同

理论认为，每个令牌的精神状态（在一个特定的人的心，在一个特定的时间）与令

牌大脑状态，人的大脑在那个时候是相同的。更强的唯物论持有，而是与大脑状态

的类型，每种类型的心理状态是相同的。但的唯物主义不适合舒适与现象学。对于

意识的精神状态，我们体验 - 感觉，思想，情感 - 如何可以简单地将复杂的神经

状态，不知怎的，...有益或实施并不明显。如果只是相同的精神状态和神经状态，

在令牌的类型，在我们的科学理论的精神现象发生 - 它不是简单地取代神经科学吗？

但经验是什么来解释神经科学的一部分。

在20世纪60年代末和70年代的计算机模型的心态，与功能成为主导模式的心态。在

这种模式下，心中是不是大脑是由（电化学交易在巨大的复合物在神经元）。相反，

心中却是大脑做什么：他们进入从生物体的生物和行为的诉讼调解之间的信息的功

能。因此，一种精神状态的大脑功能状态的人（或动物）的有机体。更具体地说，

最喜欢的机能变化的，头脑是一个计算系统：心态是大脑的软件是硬件的想法，只

是运行的程序对大脑的“湿件”。自20世纪70年代以来，认知科学 - 从认知神经科

学的实验研究 - 趋向物质与功能的组合。渐渐地，然而，哲学家，现象学方面的头

脑也提出了功能主义范式的问题。

在20世纪70年代初，托马斯•内格尔认为“是一个蝙蝠是什么样子的？”（1974年），

意识本身 - 尤其是主观的性格有某种类型的经验是什么样的 - 逃脱的物理理论。

许多哲学家压的情况下，感官的感受性 - 是什么样的感觉疼痛，就见红了，等 - 

都没有解决或解释的物理或脑结构和脑功能的帐户。意识有其自身的属性。然而，

我们知道，它是密切相关的大脑。而且，在一定程度上说明的，神经元活动实施计

算。

在20世纪80年代，约翰•塞尔认为，意向性（1983）（进一步的重新发现心灵（1991）），

意向性意识的心理状态是本质属性。对于塞尔，我们的大脑产生的心理状态的意识

和意向性的属性，这是所有的一部分，我们的生物，但意识和意向性要求的“第一

人”的本体论。塞尔也认为，电脑模拟，但没有特点是意向性的心理状态。正如塞

尔认为，一个计算机系统语法有（处理某些形状的符号），但没有语义（符号缺乏

的含义：我们解释“符号）。在这种方式中，塞尔拒绝了的唯物论与功能，而坚持

的头脑是一个像我们这样的生物的生物学特性：我们的大脑“分泌”的意识。

意识和意向性的分析评估上述现象是中央和塞尔的意向性理论的现代版，倒像是胡

塞尔的。 （现代逻辑理论的形式，的命题说明真相条件的，和塞尔一种精神状态的

意向性的特点，通过指定其“满足条件”）。然而，有一个重要的区别在背景理论。

塞尔明确承担基本的自然科学的世界观，认为意识是大自然的一部分。但是，胡塞

尔明确括号这样的假设，以及后来的现象学家 - 包括海德格尔，萨特，梅洛 - 庞

蒂 - 似乎寻求超越了自然的科学现象有一定的庇护所。但现象本身应该是进一步的

经验如何产生的理论主要是中性的，特别是从大脑的活动。

自20世纪90年代中期，一个作家心灵哲学侧重于意识的基本特征，最终是现象学的

问题。意识始终，基本上涉及自我意识或意识的意识，布伦塔诺，胡塞尔，萨特举

行（在verying详细的）？如果是这样的话，那么每行为意识包括或毗邻的意识，意

识。的内部自我监测，自我意识的形式？如果是这样，是一个更高层次，每个行为

的意识是加入了一个的进一步心理行为监控的基本行为监测？或以相同的顺序是这

样的监测为基础的行为，正确的行为，如果没有这些行为不会有意识吗？已开发出

多种型号的自我意识，一些明确的借鉴或调整的意见，布伦塔诺，胡塞尔，萨特。

最近的两个系列解决这些问题：大卫•伍德拉夫史密斯和阿米L.的托马森（编辑），

现象学与哲学的心灵（2005年），和乌利亚Kriegel和Kenneth Williford（编辑），

自我表征意识（2006）的方法。

整体的理念或理论的精神可能是考虑到以下学科或范围在脑海中有关的理论：

意识现象学研究的经验，有经验的，分析的结构 - 类型，有意的形式和含义，动态，

和（某些）的有利条件 - 感知，思想，想象，情感，意志和行动。

神经科学的研究作为生物基质，不同类型的心理活动，包括有意识的经验的神经活

动。神经将被框住的进化生物学（神经现象如何解释发展），最终由基本物理（解

释生物现象的物理现象接地）。这里躺着自然科学的复杂性。什么是科学负责的部

分是结构的经验，分析现象。

文化的分析研究，塑造或作为栽培基质的心理活动，包括有意识的经验的各类社会

实践，帮助。我们在这里学习语言和其他社会实践的进口。

心灵本体论的本体论研究型的心理活动，在一般情况下，从感知（其中涉及从环境

中体验到的因果输入）意志的行动（其中包括从意志到身体运动的因果输出）。

在心理理论的劳动分工可以看出，作为一个扩展布伦塔诺的描述和遗传心理学之间

的区别。现象提供心理现象的描述性分析，而神经科学（和更广泛的生物学，并最

终物理）模型的解释是什么原因导致或引起心理现象。文化理论提供了分析其影响

的社会活动和经验，包括方法的语言塑造我们的思想，情感，和动机。和本体世界

的结构，包括我们自己的头脑在基本方案的框架，所有这些结果。

同时，从认识论的角度来看，所有这些心理理论的范围开始我们如何观察和推理，

并试图解释我们遇到的现象在世界上。而这正是现象学开始。此外，我们了解每一

块的理论，包括心理理论，是意向性理论的核心，因为它是，在一般的思想和经验

的语义。这是心的现象。

=============================

Phenomenology

First published Sun Nov 16, 2003; substantive revision Mon Jul 28, 2008

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced 

from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience 

is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an 

experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an 

object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) 

together with appropriate enabling conditions.

Phenomenology as a discipline is distinct from but related to other key 

disciplines in philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics.

 Phenomenology has been practiced in various guises for centuries, but it 

came into its own in the early 20th century in the works of Husserl, Heidegger,

 Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others. Phenomenological issues of intentionality,

 consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent 

in recent philosophy of mind.

1. What is Phenomenology?

2. The Discipline of Phenomenology

3. From Phenomena to Phenomenology

4. The History and Varieties of Phenomenology

5. Phenomenology and Ontology, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics

6. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Bibliography

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1. What is Phenomenology?

Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary 

field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy.

The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of 

structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is 

the study of ǒphenomenaō: appearances of things, or things as they appear 

in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things 

have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced 

from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy 

is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields 

of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the 

study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study 

of right and wrong action), etc.

The historical movement of phenomenology is the philosophical tradition 

launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin 

Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. In that movement, 

the discipline of phenomenology was prized as the proper foundation of all 

philosophy ─ as opposed, say, to ethics or metaphysics or epistemology. 

The methods and characterization of the discipline were widely debated by 

Husserl and his successors, and these debates continue to the present day. 

(The definition of phenomenology offered above will thus be debatable, for 

example, by Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point in characterizing 

the discipline.)

In recent philosophy of mind, the term ǒphenomenologyō is often restricted 

to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what 

it is like to have sensations of various kinds. However, our experience 

is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Accordingly, in 

the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, 

addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance 

of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these 

things arise and are experienced in our ǒlife-worldō.

Phenomenology as a discipline has been central to the tradition of continental 

European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind 

has evolved in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy 

that developed throughout the 20th century. Yet the fundamental character 

of our mental activity is pursued in overlapping ways within these two traditions.

 Accordingly, the perspective on phenomenology drawn in this article will 

accommodate both traditions. The main concern here will be to characterize 

the discipline of phenomenology, in a contemporary purview, while also highlighting 

the historical tradition that brought the discipline into its own.

Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience 

ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, 

and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, 

including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience 

typically involves what Husserl called ǒintentionalityō, that is, the directedness 

of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness 

that it is a consciousness of or about something. According to classical 

Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward ─ represents 

or ǒintendsō ─ things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, 

images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, 

and are distinct from the things they present or mean.

The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection 

or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus, phenomenology develops 

a complex account of temporal awareness (within the stream of consciousness),

 spatial awareness (notably in perception), attention (distinguishing focal 

and marginal or ǒhorizonalō awareness), awareness of one's own experience 

(self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness (awareness-of-oneself), 

the self in different roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action 

(including kinesthetic awareness of one's movement), purpose or intention 

in action (more or less explicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, 

intersubjectivity, collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, 

communication, understanding others), social interaction (including collective 

action), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in a particular 

culture).

Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds or enabling 

conditions ─ conditions of the possibility ─ of intentionality, including 

embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices,

 social background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities. Thus, 

phenomenology leads from conscious experience into conditions that help 

to give experience its intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused 

on subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy 

of mind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate of experience,

 on how conscious experience and mental representation or intentionality 

are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficult question how much 

of these grounds of experience fall within the province of phenomenology 

as a discipline. Cultural conditions thus seem closer to our experience 

and to our familiar self-understanding than do the electrochemical workings 

of our brain, much less our dependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical 

systems to which we may belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology 

leads in some ways into at least some background conditions of our experience.

2. The Discipline of Phenomenology

The discipline of phenomenology is defined by its domain of study, its methods,

 and its main results.

Phenomenology studies structures of conscious experience as experienced 

from the first-person point of view, along with relevant conditions of experience.

 The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, the way it 

is directed through its content or meaning toward a certain object in the 

world.

We all experience various types of experience including perception, imagination,

 thought, emotion, desire, volition, and action. Thus, the domain of phenomenology 

is the range of experiences including these types (among others). Experience 

includes not only relatively passive experience as in vision or hearing, 

but also active experience as in walking or hammering a nail or kicking 

a ball. (The range will be specific to each species of being that enjoys 

consciousness; our focus is on our own, human, experience. Not all conscious 

beings will, or will be able to, practice phenomenology, as we do.)

Conscious experiences have a unique feature: we experience them, we live 

through them or perform them. Other things in the world we may observe and 

engage. But we do not experience them, in the sense of living through or 

performing them. This experiential or first-person feature ─ that of being 

experienced ─ is an essential part of the nature or structure of conscious 

experience: as we say, ǒI see / think / desire / do àō This feature is both 

a phenomenological and an ontological feature of each experience: it is part 

of what it is for the experience to be experienced (phenomenological) and 

part of what it is for the experience to be (ontological).

How shall we study conscious experience? We reflect on various types of 

experiences just as we experience them. That is to say, we proceed from 

the first-person point of view. However, we do not normally characterize 

an experience at the time we are performing it. In many cases we do not 

have that capability: a state of intense anger or fear, for example, consumes 

all of one's psychic focus at the time. Rather, we acquire a background 

of having lived through a given type of experience, and we look to our familiarity 

with that type of experience: hearing a song, seeing a sunset, thinking about 

love, intending to jump a hurdle. The practice of phenomenology assumes 

such familiarity with the type of experiences to be characterized. Importantly,

 also, it is types of experience that phenomenology pursues, rather than 

a particular fleeting experience ─ unless its type is what interests us.

Classical phenomenologists practiced some three distinguishable methods. 

(1) We describe a type of experience just as we find it in our own (past) 

experience. Thus, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty spoke of pure description of 

lived experience. (2) We interpret a type of experience by relating it to 

relevant features of context. In this vein, Heidegger and his followers 

spoke of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation in context, especially 

social and linguistic context. (3) We analyze the form of a type of experience.

 In the end, all the classical phenomenologists practiced analysis of experience,

 factoring out notable features for further elaboration.

These traditional methods have been ramified in recent decades, expanding 

the methods available to phenomenology. Thus: (4) In a logico-semantic model 

of phenomenology, we specify the truth conditions for a type of thinking 

(say, where I think that dogs chase cats) or the satisfaction conditions 

for a type of intention (say, where I intend or will to jump that hurdle). 

(5) In the experimental paradigm of cognitive neuroscience, we design empirical 

experiments that tend to confirm or refute aspects of experience (say, where 

a brain scan shows electrochemical activity in a specific region of the 

brain thought to subserve a type of vision or emotion or motor control). 

This style of ǒneurophenomenologyō assumes that conscious experience is 

grounded in neural activity in embodied action in appropriate surroundings 

─ mixing pure phenomenology with biological and physical science in a way 

that was not wholly congenial to traditional phenomenologists.

What makes an experience conscious is a certain awareness one has of the 

experience while living through or performing it. This form of inner awareness 

has been a topic of considerable debate, centuries after the issue arose 

with Locke's notion of self-consciousness on the heels of Descartes' sense 

of consciousness (conscience, co-knowledge). Does this awareness-of-experience 

consist in a kind of inner observation of the experience, as if one were 

doing two things at once? (Brentano argued no.) Is it a higher-order perception 

of one's mind's operation, or is it a higher-order thought about one's mental 

activity? (Recent theorists have proposed both.) Or is it a different form 

of inherent structure? (Sartre took this line, drawing on Brentano and Husserl.

) These issues are beyond the scope of this article, but notice that these 

results of phenomenological analysis shape the characterization of the domain 

of study and the methodology appropriate to the domain. For awareness-of-experience 

is a defining trait of conscious experience, the trait that gives experience 

a first-person, lived character. It is that lived character of experience 

that allows a first-person perspective on the object of study, namely, experience,

 and that perspective is characteristic of the methodology of phenomenology.

Conscious experience is the starting point of phenomenology, but experience 

shades off into less overtly conscious phenomena. As Husserl and others 

stressed, we are only vaguely aware of things in the margin or periphery 

of attention, and we are only implicitly aware of the wider horizon of things 

in the world around us. Moreover, as Heidegger stressed, in practical activities 

like walking along, or hammering a nail, or speaking our native tongue, 

we are not explicitly conscious of our habitual patterns of action. Furthermore,

 as psychoanalysts have stressed, much of our intentional mental activity 

is not conscious at all, but may become conscious in the process of therapy 

or interrogation, as we come to realize how we feel or think about something.

 We should allow, then, that the domain of phenomenology ─ our own experience 

─ spreads out from conscious experience into semi-conscious and even unconscious 

mental activity, along with relevant background conditions implicitly invoked 

in our experience. (These issues are subject to debate; the point here is 

to open the door to the question of where to draw the boundary of the domain 

of phenomenology.)

To begin an elementary exercise in phenomenology, consider some typical 

experiences one might have in everyday life, characterized in the first 

person:

I see that fishing boat off the coast as dusk descends over the Pacific.

I hear that helicopter whirring overhead as it approaches the hospital.

I am thinking that phenomenology differs from psychology.

I wish that warm rain from Mexico were falling like last week.

I imagine a fearsome creature like that in my nightmare.

I intend to finish my writing by noon.

I walk carefully around the broken glass on the sidewalk.

I stroke a backhand cross-court with that certain underspin.

I am searching for the words to make my point in conversation.

Here are rudimentary characterizations of some familiar types of experience. 

Each sentence is a simple form of phenomenological description, articulating 

in everyday English the structure of the type of experience so described. 

The subject term ǒIō indicates the first-person structure of the experience: 

the intentionality proceeds from the subject. The verb indicates the type 

of intentional activity described: perception, thought, imagination, etc. 

Of central importance is the way that objects of awareness are presented 

or intended in our experiences, especially, the way we see or conceive or 

think about objects. The direct-object expression (ǒthat fishing boat off 

the coastō) articulates the mode of presentation of the object in the experience: 

the content or meaning of the experience, the core of what Husserl called 

noema. In effect, the object-phrase expresses the noema of the act described,

 that is, to the extent that language has appropriate expressive power. 

The overall form of the given sentence articulates the basic form of intentionality 

in the experience: subject-act-content-object.

Rich phenomenological description or interpretation, as in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty 

et al., will far outrun such simple phenomenological descriptions as above. 

But such simple descriptions bring out the basic form of intentionality. 

As we interpret the phenomenological description further, we may assess 

the relevance of the context of experience. And we may turn to wider conditions 

of the possibility of that type of experience. In this way, in the practice 

of phenomenology, we classify, describe, interpret, and analyze structures 

of experiences in ways that answer to our own experience.

In such interpretive-descriptive analyses of experience, we immediately 

observe that we are analyzing familiar forms of consciousness, conscious 

experience of or about this or that. Intentionality is thus the salient 

structure of our experience, and much of phenomenology proceeds as the study 

of different aspects of intentionality. Thus, we explore structures of the 

stream of consciousness, the enduring self, the embodied self, and bodily 

action. Furthermore, as we reflect on how these phenomena work, we turn to 

the analysis of relevant conditions that enable our experiences to occur 

as they do, and to represent or intend as they do. Phenomenology then leads 

into analyses of conditions of the possibility of intentionality, conditions 

involving motor skills and habits, background social practices, and often 

language, with its special place in human affairs.

3. From Phenomena to Phenomenology

The Oxford English Dictionary presents the following definition: ǒPhenomenology.

 a. The science of phenomena as distinct from being (ontology). b. That 

division of any science which describes and classifies its phenomena. From 

the Greek phainomenon, appearance.ō In philosophy, the term is used in the 

first sense, amid debates of theory and methodology. In physics and philosophy 

of science, the term is used in the second sense, albeit only occasionally.

In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: literally,

 appearances as opposed to reality. This ancient distinction launched philosophy 

as we emerged from Plato's cave. Yet the discipline of phenomenology did 

not blossom until the 20th century and remains poorly understood in many 

circles of contemporary philosophy. What is that discipline? How did philosophy 

move from a root concept of phenomena to the discipline of phenomenology?

Originally, in the 18th century, ǒphenomenologyō meant the theory of appearances 

fundamental to empirical knowledge, especially sensory appearances. The 

Latin term ǒPhenomenologiaō was introduced by Christoph Friedrich Oetinger 

in 1736. Subsequently, the German term ǒPh□omenologiaō was used by Johann 

Heinrich Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff. Immanuel Kant used the 

term occasionally in various writings, as did Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In 

1807, G. W. F. Hegel wrote a book titled Ph□omenologie des Geistes (usually 

translated as Phenomenology of Spirit). By 1889 Franz Brentano used the 

term to characterize what he called ǒdescriptive psychologyō. From there 

Edmund Husserl took up the term for his new science of consciousness, and 

the rest is history.

Suppose we say phenomenology studies phenomena: what appears to us ─ and 

its appearing. How shall we understand phenomena? The term has a rich history 

in recent centuries, in which we can see traces of the emerging discipline 

of phenomenology.

In a strict empiricist vein, what appears before the mind are sensory data 

or qualia: either patterns of one's own sensations (seeing red here now, 

feeling this ticklish feeling, hearing that resonant bass tone) or sensible 

patterns of worldly things, say, the looks and smells of flowers (what John 

Locke called secondary qualities of things). In a strict rationalist vein, 

by contrast, what appears before the mind are ideas, rationally formed ǒclear 

and distinct ideasō (in Ren□Descartes' ideal). In Immanuel Kant's theory 

of knowledge, fusing rationalist and empiricist aims, what appears to the 

mind are phenomena defined as things-as-they-appear or things-as-they-are-represented 

(in a synthesis of sensory and conceptual forms of objects-as-known). In 

Auguste Comte's theory of science, phenomena (phenomenes) are the facts 

(faits, what occurs) that a given science would explain.

In 18th and 19th century epistemology, then, phenomena are the starting 

points in building knowledge, especially science. Accordingly, in a familiar 

and still current sense, phenomena are whatever we observe (perceive) and 

seek to explain.

As the discipline of psychology emerged late in the 19th century, however, 

phenomena took on a somewhat different guise. In Franz Brentano's Psychology 

from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), phenomena are what occur in the mind: 

mental phenomena are acts of consciousness (or their contents), and physical 

phenomena are objects of external perception starting with colors and shapes.

 For Brentano, physical phenomena exist ǒintentionallyō in acts of consciousness.

 This view revives a Medieval notion Brentano called ǒintentional in-existenceō,

 but the ontology remains undeveloped (what is it to exist in the mind, 

and do physical objects exist only in the mind?). More generally, we might 

say, phenomena are whatever we are conscious of: objects and events around 

us, other people, ourselves, even (in reflection) our own conscious experiences,

 as we experience these. In a certain technical sense, phenomena are thingsas 

they are given to our consciousness, whether in perception or imagination 

or thought or volition. This conception of phenomena would soon inform the 

new discipline of phenomenology.

Brentano distinguished descriptive psychology from genetic psychology. Where 

genetic psychology seeks the causes of various types of mental phenomena, 

descriptive psychology defines and classifies the various types of mental 

phenomena, including perception, judgment, emotion, etc. According to Brentano,

 every mental phenomenon, or act of consciousness, is directed toward some 

object, and only mental phenomena are so directed. This thesis of intentional 

directedness was the hallmark of Brentano's descriptive psychology. In 1889 

Brentano used the term ǒphenomenologyō for descriptive psychology, and the 

way was paved for Husserl's new science of phenomenology.

Phenomenology as we know it was launched by Edmund Husserl in his Logical 

Investigations (1900-01). Two importantly different lines of theory came 

together in that monumental work: psychological theory, on the heels of 

Franz Brentano (and also William James, whosePrinciples of Psychology appeared 

in 1891 and greatly impressed Husserl); and logical or semantic theory, 

on the heels of Bernard Bolzano and Husserl's contemporaries who founded 

modern logic, including Gottlob Frege. (Interestingly, both lines of research 

trace back to Aristotle, and both reached importantly new results in Husserl'

s day.)

Husserl's Logical Investigations was inspired by Bolzano's ideal of logic, 

while taking up Brentano's conception of descriptive psychology. In his 

Theory of Science (1835) Bolzano distinguished between subjective and objective 

ideas or representations (Vorstellungen). In effect Bolzano criticized Kant 

and before him the classical empiricists and rationalists for failing to 

make this sort of distinction, thereby rendering phenomena merely subjective.

 Logic studies objective ideas, including propositions, which in turn make 

up objective theories as in the sciences. Psychology would, by contrast, 

study subjective ideas, the concrete contents (occurrences) of mental activities 

in particular minds at a given time. Husserl was after both, within a single 

discipline. So phenomena must be reconceived as objective intentional contents 

(sometimes called intentional objects) of subjective acts of consciousness. 

Phenomenology would then study this complex of consciousness and correlated 

phenomena. In Ideas I (Book One, 1913) Husserl introduced two Greek words 

to capture his version of the Bolzanoan distinction: noesis and noema, from 

the Greek verb no□ (□□), meaning to perceive, think, intend, whence the 

noun nous or mind). The intentional process of consciousness is called noesis,

 while its ideal content is called noema. The noema of an act of consciousness 

Husserl characterized both as an ideal meaning and as ǒthe object as intendedō.

 Thus the phenomenon, or object-as-it-appears, becomes the noema, or object-as-

it-is-intended. The interpretations of Husserl's theory of noema have been 

several and amount to different developments of Husserl's basic theory of 

intentionality. (Is the noema an aspect of the object intended, or rather 

a medium of intention?)

For Husserl, then, phenomenology integrates a kind of psychology with a 

kind of logic. It develops a descriptive or analytic psychology in that 

it describes and analyzes types of subjective mental activity or experience, 

in short, acts of consciousness. Yet it develops a kind of logic ─ a theory 

of meaning (today we say logical semantics) ─ in that it describes and 

analyzes objective contents of consciousness: ideas, concepts, images, propositions,

 in short, ideal meanings of various types that serve as intentional contents,

 or noematic meanings, of various types of experience. These contents are 

shareable by different acts of consciousness, and in that sense they are 

objective, ideal meanings. Following Bolzano (and to some extent the platonistic 

logician Hermann Lotze), Husserl opposed any reduction of logic or mathematics 

or science to mere psychology, to how people happen to think, and in the 

same spirit he distinguished phenomenology from mere psychology. For Husserl,

 phenomenology would study consciousness without reducing the objective 

and shareable meanings that inhabit experience to merely subjective happenstances.

 Ideal meaning would be the engine of intentionality in acts of consciousness.

A clear conception of phenomenology awaited Husserl's development of a clear 

model of intentionality. Indeed, phenomenology and the modern concept of 

intentionality emerged hand-in-hand in Husserl's Logical Investigations 

(1900-01). With theoretical foundations laid in the Investigations, Husserl 

would then promote the radical new science of phenomenology in Ideas I (1913)

. And alternative visions of phenomenology would soon follow.

4. The History and Varieties of Phenomenology

Phenomenology came into its own with Husserl, much as epistemology came 

into its own with Descartes, and ontology or metaphysics came into its own 

with Aristotle on the heels of Plato. Yet phenomenology has been practiced, 

with or without the name, for many centuries. When Hindu and Buddhist philosophers 

reflected on states of consciousness achieved in a variety of meditative 

states, they were practicing phenomenology. When Descartes, Hume, and Kant 

characterized states of perception, thought, and imagination, they were 

practicing phenomenology. When Brentano classified varieties of mental phenomena 

(defined by the directedness of consciousness), he was practicing phenomenology.

 When William James appraised kinds of mental activity in the stream of 

consciousness (including their embodiment and their dependence on habit), 

he too was practicing phenomenology. And when recent analytic philosophers 

of mind have addressed issues of consciousness and intentionality, they 

have often been practicing phenomenology. Still, the discipline of phenomenology,

 its roots tracing back through the centuries, came to full flower in Husserl.

Husserl's work was followed by a flurry of phenomenological writing in the 

first half of the 20th century. The diversity of traditional phenomenology 

is apparent in the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Kluwer Academic Publishers,

 1997, Dordrecht and Boston), which features separate articles on some seven 

types of phenomenology. (1) Transcendental constitutive phenomenology studies 

how objects are constituted in pure or transcendental consciousness, setting 

aside questions of any relation to the natural world around us. (2) Naturalistic 

constitutive phenomenology studies how consciousness constitutes or takes 

things in the world of nature, assuming with the natural attitude that consciousness 

is part of nature. (3) Existential phenomenology studies concrete human existence,

 including our experience of free choice or action in concrete situations. 

(4) Generative historicist phenomenology studies how meaning, as found in 

our experience, is generated in historical processes of collective experience 

over time. (5) Genetic phenomenology studies the genesis of meanings of 

things within one's own stream of experience. (6) Hermeneutical phenomenology 

studies interpretive structures of experience, how we understand and engage 

things around us in our human world, including ourselves and others. (7) 

Realistic phenomenology studies the structure of consciousness and intentionality,

 assuming it occurs in a real world that is largely external to consciousness 

and not somehow brought into being by consciousness.

The most famous of the classical phenomenologists were Husserl, Heidegger, 

Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. In these four thinkers we find different conceptions 

of phenomenology, different methods, and different results. A brief sketch 

of their differences will capture both a crucial period in the history of 

phenomenology and a sense of the diversity of the field of phenomenology.

In his Logical Investigations (1900-01) Husserl outlined a complex system 

of philosophy, moving from logic to philosophy of language, to ontology 

(theory of universals and parts of wholes), to a phenomenological theory 

of intentionality, and finally to a phenomenological theory of knowledge. 

Then in Ideas I (1913) he focused squarely on phenomenology itself. Husserl 

defined phenomenology as ǒthe science of the essence of consciousnessō, 

centered on the defining trait of intentionality, approached explicitly 

ǒin the first personō. (See Husserl, Ideas I, 中33ff.) In this spirit, we 

may say phenomenology is the study of consciousness ─ that is, conscious 

experience of various types ─ as experienced from the first-person point 

of view. In this discipline we study different forms of experience just 

as we experience them, from the perspective of the subject living through 

or performing them. Thus, we characterize experiences of seeing, hearing, 

imagining, thinking, feeling (i.e., emotion), wishing, desiring, willing, 

and also acting, that is, embodied volitional activities of walking, talking,

 cooking, carpentering, etc. However, not just any characterization of an 

experience will do. Phenomenological analysis of a given type of experience 

will feature the ways in which we ourselves would experience that form of 

conscious activity. And the leading property of our familiar types of experience 

is their intentionality, their being a consciousness of or about something, 

something experienced or presented or engaged in a certain way. How I see 

or conceptualize or understand the object I am dealing with defines the 

meaning of that object in my current experience. Thus, phenomenology features 

a study of meaning, in a wide sense that includes more than what is expressed 

in language.

In Ideas I Husserl presented phenomenology with a transcendental turn. In 

part this means that Husserl took on the Kantian idiom of ǒtranscendental 

idealismō, looking for conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or of 

consciousness generally, and arguably turning away from any reality beyond 

phenomena. But Husserl's transcendental turn also involved his discovery 

of the method of epoch□(from the Greek skeptics' notion of abstaining from 

belief). We are to practice phenomenology, Husserl proposed, by ǒbracketingō 

the question of the existence of the natural world around us. We thereby 

turn our attention, in reflection, to the structure of our own conscious 

experience. Our first key result is the observation that each act of consciousness 

is a consciousness of something, that is, intentional, or directed toward 

something. Consider my visual experience wherein I see a tree across the 

square. In phenomenological reflection, we need not concern ourselves with 

whether the tree exists: my experience is of a tree whether or not such 

a tree exists. However, we do need to concern ourselves with how the object 

is meant or intended. I see a Eucalyptus tree, not a Yucca tree; I see that 

object as a Eucalyptus, with a certain shape, with bark stripping off, etc. 

Thus, bracketing the tree itself, we turn our attention to my experience 

of the tree, and specifically to the content or meaning in my experience. 

This tree-as-perceived Husserl calls the noema or noematic sense of the 

experience.

Philosophers succeeding Husserl debated the proper characterization of phenomenology,

 arguing over its results and its methods. Adolf Reinach, an early student 

of Husserl's (who died in World War I), argued that phenomenology should 

remain allied with a realist ontology, as in Husserl's Logical Investigations.

 Roman Ingarden, a Polish phenomenologist of the next generation, continued 

the resistance to Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism. For such philosophers,

 phenomenology should not bracket questions of being or ontology, as the 

method of epoch□would suggest. And they were not alone. Martin Heidegger 

studied Husserl's early writings, worked as Assistant to Husserl in 1916, 

and in 1928 succeeded Husserl in the prestigious chair at the University 

of Freiburg. Heidegger had his own ideas about phenomenology.

In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger unfurled his rendition of phenomenology. 

For Heidegger, we and our activities are always ǒin the worldō, our being 

is being-in-the-world, so we do not study our activities by bracketing the 

world, rather we interpret our activities and the meaning things have for 

us by looking to our contextual relations to things in the world. Indeed, 

for Heidegger, phenomenology resolves into what he called ǒfundamental ontologyō.

 We must distinguish beings from their being, and we begin our investigation 

of the meaning of being in our own case, examining our own existence in 

the activity of ǒDaseinō (that being whose being is in each case my own). 

Heidegger resisted Husserl's neo-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness and 

subjectivity, including how perception presents things around us. By contrast,

 Heidegger held that our more basic ways of relating to things are in practical 

activities like hammering, where the phenomenology reveals our situation 

in a context of equipment and in being-with-others.

In Being and Time Heidegger approached phenomenology, in a quasi-poetic 

idiom, through the root meanings of ǒlogosō and ǒphenomenaō, so that phenomenology 

is defined as the art or practice of ǒletting things show themselvesō. In 

Heidegger's inimitable linguistic play on the Greek roots, ǒ ‘phenomenology’

 means à ─ to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very 

way in which it shows itself from itself.ō (See Heidegger, Being and Time, 

1927, □7C.) Here Heidegger explicitly parodies Husserl's call, ǒTo the 

things themselves!ō, or ǒTo the phenomena themselves!ō Heidegger went on 

to emphasize practical forms of comportment or better relating (Verhalten) 

as in hammering a nail, as opposed to representational forms of intentionality 

as in seeing or thinking about a hammer. Much of Being and Time develops 

an existential interpretation of our modes of being including, famously, 

our being-toward-death.

In a very different style, in clear analytical prose, in the text of a lecture 

course called The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger traced 

the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle through many other thinkers 

into the issues of phenomenology. Our understanding of beings and their 

being comes ultimately through phenomenology. Here the connection with classical 

issues of ontology is more apparent, and consonant with Husserl's vision 

in the Logical Investigations (an early source of inspiration for Heidegger).

 One of Heidegger's most innovative ideas was his conception of the ǒgroundō 

of being, looking to modes of being more fundamental than the things around 

us (from trees to hammers). Heidegger questioned the contemporary concern 

with technology, and his writing might suggest that our scientific theories 

are historical artifacts that we use in technological practice, rather than 

systems of ideal truth (as Husserl had held). Our deep understanding of 

being, in our own case, comes rather from phenomenology, Heidegger held.

In the 1930s phenomenology migrated from Austrian and then German philosophy 

into French philosophy. The way had been paved in Marcel Proust's In Search 

of Lost Time, in which the narrator recounts in close detail his vivid recollections 

of past experiences, including his famous associations with the smell of 

freshly baked madeleines. This sensibility to experience traces to Descartes'

 work, and French phenomenology has been an effort to preserve the central 

thrust of Descartes' insights while rejecting mind-body dualism. The experience 

of one's own body, or one's lived or living body, has been an important 

motif in many French philosophers of the 20th century.

In the novel Nausea (1936) Jean-Paul Sartre described a bizarre course of 

experience in which the protagonist, writing in the first person, describes 

how ordinary objects lose their meaning until he encounters pure being at 

the foot of a chestnut tree, and in that moment recovers his sense of his 

own freedom. In Being and Nothingness (1943, written partly while a prisoner 

of war), Sartre developed his conception of phenomenological ontology. Consciousness 

is a consciousness of objects, as Husserl had stressed. In Sartre's model 

of intentionality, the central player in consciousness is a phenomenon, and 

the occurrence of a phenomenon just is a consciousness-of-an-object. The 

chestnut tree I see is, for Sartre, such a phenomenon in my consciousness. 

Indeed, all things in the world, as we normally experience them, are phenomena,

 beneath or behind which lies their ǒbeing-in-itselfō. Consciousness, by 

contrast, has ǒbeing-for-itselfō, since each consciousness is not only a 

consciousness-of-its-object but also a pre-reflective consciousness-of-itself 

(conscience de soi). Yet for Sartre, unlike Husserl, the ǒIō or self is 

nothing but a sequence of acts of consciousness, notably including radically 

free choices (like a Humean bundle of perceptions).

For Sartre, the practice of phenomenology proceeds by a deliberate reflection 

on the structure of consciousness. Sartre's method is in effect a literary 

style of interpretive description of different types of experience in relevant 

situations ─ a practice that does not really fit the methodological proposals 

of either Husserl or Heidegger, but makes use of Sartre's great literary 

skill. (Sartre wrote many plays and novels and was awarded the Nobel Prize 

in Literature.)

Sartre's phenomenology in Being and Nothingness became the philosophical 

foundation for his popular philosophy of existentialism, sketched in his 

famous lecture ǒExistentialism is a Humanismō (1945). In Being and Nothingness 

Sartre emphasized the experience of freedom of choice, especially the project 

of choosing one's self, the defining pattern of one's past actions. Through 

vivid description of the ǒlookō of the Other, Sartre laid groundwork for 

the contemporary political significance of the concept of the Other (as 

in other groups or ethnicities). Indeed, in The Second Sex (1949) Simone 

de Beauvoir, Sartre's life-long companion, launched contemporary feminism 

with her nuanced account of the perceived role of women as Other.

In 1940s Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty joined with Sartre and Beauvoir in 

developing phenomenology. In Phenomenology of Perception(1945) Merleau-Ponty 

developed a rich variety of phenomenology emphasizing the role of the body 

in human experience. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty 

looked to experimental psychology, analyzing the reported experience of 

amputees who felt sensations in a phantom limb. Merleau-Ponty rejected both 

associationist psychology, focused on correlations between sensation and 

stimulus, and intellectualist psychology, focused on rational construction 

of the world in the mind. (Think of the behaviorist and computationalist 

models of mind in more recent decades of empirical psychology.) Instead, 

Merleau-Ponty focused on the ǒbody imageō, our experience of our own body 

and its significance in our activities. Extending Husserl's account of the 

lived body (as opposed to the physical body), Merleau-Ponty resisted the 

traditional Cartesian separation of mind and body. For the body image is 

neither in the mental realm nor in the mechanical-physical realm. Rather, 

my body is, as it were, me in my engaged action with things I perceive including 

other people.

The scope of Phenomenology of Perception is characteristic of the breadth 

of classical phenomenology, not least because Merleau-Ponty drew (with generosity)

 on Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre while fashioning his own innovative vision 

of phenomenology. His phenomenology addressed the role of attention in the 

phenomenal field, the experience of the body, the spatiality of the body, 

the motility of the body, the body in sexual being and in speech, other 

selves, temporality, and the character of freedom so important in French 

existentialism. Near the end of a chapter on the cogito (Descartes' ǒI think,

 therefore I amō), Merleau-Ponty succinctly captures his embodied, existential 

form of phenomenology, writing:

Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound 

up with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence 

as subjectivity [= consciousness] is merely one with my existence as a body 

and with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, 

when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world. [408]

In short, consciousness is embodied (in the world), and equally body is 

infused with consciousness (with cognition of the world).

In the years since Husserl, Heidegger, et al. wrote, phenomenologists have 

dug into all these classical issues, including intentionality, temporal 

awareness, intersubjectivity, practical intentionality, and the social and 

linguistic contexts of human activity. Interpretation of historical texts 

by Husserl et al. has played a prominent role in this work, both because 

the texts are rich and difficult and because the historical dimension is 

itself part of the practice of continental European philosophy. Since the 

1960s, philosophers trained in the methods of analytic philosophy have also 

dug into the foundations of phenomenology, with an eye to 20th century work 

in philosophy of logic, language, and mind.

Phenomenology was already linked with logical and semantic theory in Husserl'

s Logical Investigations. Analytic phenomenology picks up on that connection.

 In particular, Dagfinn F鹫lesdal and J. N. Mohanty have explored historical 

and conceptual relations between Husserl's phenomenology and Frege's logical 

semantics (in Frege's ǒOn Sense and Referenceō, 1892). For Frege, an expression 

refers to an object by way of a sense: thus, two expressions (say, ǒthe 

morning starō and ǒthe evening starō) may refer to the same object (Venus) 

but express different senses with different manners of presentation. For 

Husserl, similarly, an experience (or act of consciousness) intends or refers 

to an object by way of a noema or noematic sense: thus, two experiences 

may refer to the same object but have different noematic senses involving 

different ways of presenting the object (for example, in seeing the same 

object from different sides). Indeed, for Husserl, the theory of intentionality 

is a generalization of the theory of linguistic reference: as linguistic 

reference is mediated by sense, so intentional reference is mediated by noematic 

sense.

More recently, analytic philosophers of mind have rediscovered phenomenological 

issues of mental representation, intentionality, consciousness, sensory 

experience, intentional content, and context-of-thought. Some of these analytic 

philosophers of mind hark back to William James and Franz Brentano at the 

origins of modern psychology, and some look to empirical research in today's 

cognitive neuroscience. Some researchers have begun to combine phenomenological 

issues with issues of neuroscience and behavioral studies and mathematical 

modeling. Such studies will extend the methods of traditional phenomenology 

as the Zeitgeist moves on. We address philosophy of mind below.

5. Phenomenology and Ontology, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics

The discipline of phenomenology forms one basic field in philosophy among 

others. How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields 

in philosophy?

Traditionally, philosophy includes at least four core fields or disciplines: 

ontology, epistemology, ethics, logic. Suppose phenomenology joins that 

list. Consider then these elementary definitions of field:

Ontology is the study of beings or their being ─ what is.

Epistemology is the study of knowledge ─ how we know.

Logic is the study of valid reasoning ─ how to reason.

Ethics is the study of right and wrong ─ how we should act.

Phenomenology is the study of our experience ─ how we experience.

The domains of study in these five fields are clearly different, and they 

seem to call for different methods of study.

Philosophers have sometimes argued that one of these fields is ǒfirst philosophyō,

 the most fundamental discipline, on which all philosophy or all knowledge 

or wisdom rests. Historically (it may be argued), Socrates and Plato put 

ethics first, then Aristotle put metaphysics or ontology first, then Descartes 

put epistemology first, then Russell put logic first, and then Husserl (in 

his later transcendental phase) put phenomenology first.

Consider epistemology. As we saw, phenomenology helps to define the phenomena 

on which knowledge claims rest, according to modern epistemology. On the 

other hand, phenomenology itself claims to achieve knowledge about the nature 

of consciousness, a distinctive kind of first-person knowledge, through 

a form of intuition.

Consider logic. As we saw, logical theory of meaning led Husserl into the 

theory of intentionality, the heart of phenomenology. On one account, phenomenology 

explicates the intentional or semantic force of ideal meanings, and propositional 

meanings are central to logical theory. But logical structure is expressed 

in language, either ordinary language or symbolic languages like those of 

predicate logic or mathematics or computer systems. It remains an important 

issue of debate where and whether language shapes specific forms of experience 

(thought, perception, emotion) and their content or meaning. So there is 

an important (if disputed) relation between phenomenology and logico-linguistic 

theory, especially philosophical logic and philosophy of language (as opposed 

to mathematical logicper se).

Consider ontology. Phenomenology studies (among other things) the nature 

of consciousness, which is a central issue in metaphysics or ontology, and 

one that leads into the traditional mind-body problem. Husserlian methodology 

would bracket the question of the existence of the surrounding world, thereby 

separating phenomenology from the ontology of the world. Yet Husserl's phenomenology 

presupposes theory about species and individuals (universals and particulars)

, relations of part and whole, and ideal meanings ─ all parts of ontology.

Now consider ethics. Phenomenology might play a role in ethics by offering 

analyses of the structure of will, valuing, happiness, and care for others 

(in empathy and sympathy). Historically, though, ethics has been on the 

horizon of phenomenology. Husserl largely avoided ethics in his major works, 

though he featured the role of practical concerns in the structure of the 

life-world or of Geist (spirit, or culture, as in Zeitgeist), and he once 

delivered a course of lectures giving ethics (like logic) a basic place 

in philosophy, indicating the importance of the phenomenology of sympathy 

in grounding ethics. In Being and Time Heidegger claimed not to pursue ethics 

while discussing phenomena ranging from care, conscience, and guilt to ǒfallennessō 

and ǒauthenticityō (all phenomena with theological echoes). In Being and 

Nothingness Sartre analyzed with subtlety the logical problem of ǒbad faithō,

 yet he developed an ontology of value as produced by willing in good faith 

(which sounds like a revised Kantian foundation for morality). Beauvoir 

sketched an existentialist ethics, and Sartre left unpublished notebooks 

on ethics. However, an explicitly phenomenological approach to ethics emerged 

in the works of Emannuel Levinas, a Lithuanian phenomenologist who heard 

Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg before moving to Paris. In Totality and 

Infinity(1961), modifying themes drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas 

focused on the significance of the ǒfaceō of the other, explicitly developing 

grounds for ethics in this range of phenomenology, writing an impressionistic 

style of prose with allusions to religious experience.

Allied with ethics are political and social philosophy. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 

were politically engaged in 1940s Paris, and their existential philosophies 

(phenomenologically based) suggest a political theory based in individual 

freedom. Sartre later sought an explicit blend of existentialism with Marxism.

 Still, political theory has remained on the borders of phenomenology. Social 

theory, however, has been closer to phenomenology as such. Husserl analyzed 

the phenomenological structure of the life-world and Geist generally, including 

our role in social activity. Heidegger stressed social practice, which he 

found more primordial than individual consciousness. Alfred Schutz developed 

a phenomenology of the social world. Sartre continued the phenomenological 

appraisal of the meaning of the other, the fundamental social formation. 

Moving outward from phenomenological issues, Michel Foucault studied the 

genesis and meaning of social institutions, from prisons to insane asylums. 

And Jacques Derrida has long practiced a kind of phenomenology of language, 

seeking social meaning in the ǒdeconstructionō of wide-ranging texts. Aspects 

of French ǒpoststructuralistō theory are sometimes interpreted as broadly 

phenomenological, but such issues are beyond the present purview.

Classical phenomenology, then, ties into certain areas of epistemology, 

logic, and ontology, and leads into parts of ethical, social, and political 

theory.

6. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

It ought to be obvious that phenomenology has a lot to say in the area called 

philosophy of mind. Yet the traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy 

of mind have not been closely joined, despite overlapping areas of interest. 

So it is appropriate to close this survey of phenomenology by addressing 

philosophy of mind, one of the most vigorously debated areas in recent philosophy.

The tradition of analytic philosophy began, early in the 20th century, with 

analyses of language, notably in the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,

 and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then in The Concept of Mind (1949) Gilbert Ryle 

developed a series of analyses of language about different mental states, 

including sensation, belief, and will. Though Ryle is commonly deemed a 

philosopher of ordinary language, Ryle himself said The Concept of Mind 

could be called phenomenology. In effect, Ryle analyzed our phenomenological 

understanding of mental states as reflected in ordinary language about the 

mind. From this linguistic phenomenology Ryle argued that Cartesian mind-body 

dualism involves a category mistake (the logic or grammar of mental verbs 

─ ǒbelieveō, ǒseeō, etc. ─ does not mean that we ascribe belief, sensation,

 etc., to ǒthe ghost in the machineō). With Ryle's rejection of mind-body 

dualism, the mind-body problem was re-awakened: what is the ontology of 

mind vis-□vis body, and how are mind and body related?

Ren□Descartes, in his epoch-making Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), 

had argued that minds and bodies are two distinct kinds of being or substance 

with two distinct kinds of attributes or modes: bodies are characterized 

by spatiotemporal physical properties, while minds are characterized by 

properties of thinking (including seeing, feeling, etc.). Centuries later, 

phenomenology would find, with Brentano and Husserl, that mental acts are 

characterized by consciousness and intentionality, while natural science 

would find that physical systems are characterized by mass and force, ultimately 

by gravitational, electromagnetic, and quantum fields. Where do we find 

consciousness and intentionality in the quantum-electromagnetic-gravitational 

field that, by hypothesis, orders everything in the natural world in which 

we humans and our minds exist? That is the mind-body problem today. In short,

 phenomenology by any other name lies at the heart of the contemporary mind-body 

problem.

After Ryle, philosophers sought a more explicit and generally naturalistic 

ontology of mind. In the 1950s materialism was argued anew, urging that 

mental states are identical with states of the central nervous system. The 

classical identity theory holds that each token mental state (in a particular 

person's mind at a particular time) is identical with a token brain state 

(in that person's brain at that time). A stronger materialism holds, instead,

 that each type of mental state is identical with a type of brain state. 

But materialism does not fit comfortably with phenomenology. For it is not 

obvious how conscious mental states as we experience them ─ sensations, 

thoughts, emotions ─ can simply be the complex neural states that somehow 

subserve or implement them. If mental states and neural states are simply 

identical, in token or in type, where in our scientific theory of mind does 

the phenomenology occur ─ is it not simply replaced by neuroscience? And 

yet experience is part of what is to be explained by neuroscience.

In the late 1960s and 1970s the computer model of mind set in, and functionalism 

became the dominant model of mind. On this model, mind is not what the brain 

consists in (electrochemical transactions in neurons in vast complexes). 

Instead, mind is what brains do: their function of mediating between information 

coming into the organism and behavior proceeding from the organism. Thus, 

a mental state is a functional state of the brain or of the human (or animal)

 organism. More specifically, on a favorite variation of functionalism, 

the mind is a computing system: mind is to brain as software is to hardware; 

thoughts are just programs running on the brain's ǒwetwareō. Since the 1970s 

the cognitive sciences ─ from experimental studies of cognition to neuroscience 

─ have tended toward a mix of materialism and functionalism. Gradually, 

however, philosophers found that phenomenological aspects of the mind pose 

problems for the functionalist paradigm too.

In the early 1970s Thomas Nagel argued in ǒWhat Is It Like to Be a Bat?ō 

(1974) that consciousness itself ─ especially the subjective character 

of what it is like to have a certain type of experience ─ escapes physical 

theory. Many philosophers pressed the case that sensory qualia ─ what it 

is like to feel pain, to see red, etc. ─ are not addressed or explained 

by a physical account of either brain structure or brain function. Consciousness 

has properties of its own. And yet, we know, it is closely tied to the brain. 

And, at some level of description, neural activities implement computation.

In the 1980s John Searle argued in Intentionality (1983) (and further in 

The Rediscovery of the Mind (1991)) that intentionality and consciousness 

are essential properties of mental states. For Searle, our brains produce 

mental states with properties of consciousness and intentionality, and this 

is all part of our biology, yet consciousness and intentionality require 

a ǒfirst-personō ontology. Searle also argued that computers simulate but 

do not have mental states characterized by intentionality. As Searle argued, 

a computer system has a syntax (processing symbols of certain shapes) but 

has no semantics (the symbols lack meaning: we interpret the symbols). In 

this way Searle rejected both materialism and functionalism, while insisting 

that mind is a biological property of organisms like us: our brains ǒsecreteō 

consciousness.

The analysis of consciousness and intentionality is central to phenomenology 

as appraised above, and Searle's theory of intentionality reads like a modernized 

version of Husserl's. (Contemporary logical theory takes the form of stating 

truth conditions for propositions, and Searle characterizes a mental state's 

intentionality by specifying its ǒsatisfaction conditionsō). However, there 

is an important difference in background theory. For Searle explicitly assumes 

the basic worldview of natural science, holding that consciousness is part 

of nature. But Husserl explicitly brackets that assumption, and later phenomenologists 

─ including Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty ─ seem to seek a certain 

sanctuary for phenomenology beyond the natural sciences. And yet phenomenology 

itself should be largely neutral about further theories of how experience 

arises, notably from brain activity.

Since the mid-1990s a variety of writers working in philosophy of mind have 

focused on the fundamental character of consciousness, ultimately a phenomenological 

issue. Does consciousness always and essentially involve self-consciousness, 

or consciousness-of-consciousness, as Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre held 

(in verying detail)? If so, then every act of consciousness either includes 

or is adjoined by a consciousness-of-that-consciousness. Does that self-consciousness 

take the form of an internal self-monitoring? If so, is that monitoring 

of a higher order, where each act of consciousness is joined by a further 

mental act monitoring the base act? Or is such monitoring of the same order 

as the base act, a proper part of the act without which the act would not 

be conscious? A variety of models of this self-consciousness have been developed,

 some explicitly drawing on or adapting views in Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre.

 Two recent collections address these issues: David Woodruff Smith and Amie 

L. Thomasson (editors), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (2005), and 

Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (editors), Self-Representational Approaches 

to Consciousness (2006).

The philosophy or theory of mind overall may be factored into the following 

disciplines or ranges of theory relevant to mind:

Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced, analyzing the 

structure ─ the types, intentional forms and meanings, dynamics, and (certain)

 enabling conditions ─ of perception, thought, imagination, emotion, and 

volition and action.

Neuroscience studies the neural activities that serve as biological substrate 

to the various types of mental activity, including conscious experience. 

Neuroscience will be framed by evolutionary biology (explaining how neural 

phenomena evolved) and ultimately by basic physics (explaining how biological 

phenomena are grounded in physical phenomena). Here lie the intricacies 

of the natural sciences. Part of what the sciences are accountable for is 

the structure of experience, analyzed by phenomenology.

Cultural analysis studies the social practices that help to shape or serve 

as cultural substrate of the various types of mental activity, including 

conscious experience. Here we study the import of language and other social 

practices.

Ontology of mind studies the ontological type of mental activity in general, 

ranging from perception (which involves causal input from environment to 

experience) to volitional action (which involves causal output from volition 

to bodily movement).

This division of labor in the theory of mind can be seen as an extension 

of Brentano's original distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology.

 Phenomenology offers descriptive analyses of mental phenomena, while neuroscience 

(and wider biology and ultimately physics) offers models of explanation 

of what causes or gives rise to mental phenomena. Cultural theory offers 

analyses of social activities and their impact on experience, including 

ways language shapes our thought, emotion, and motivation. And ontology 

frames all these results within a basic scheme of the structure of the world, 

including our own minds.

Meanwhile, from an epistemological standpoint, all these ranges of theory 

about mind begin with how we observe and reason about and seek to explain 

phenomena we encounter in the world. And that is where phenomenology begins. 

Moreover, how we understand each piece of theory, including theory about 

mind, is central to the theory of intentionality, as it were, the semantics 

of thought and experience in general. And that is the heart of phenomenology.