动荡莫测的2017年算个球？2040年中国GDP将占全世界的40%！

US$123,000,000,000,000 —— 2040年中国GDP

China’s estimated economy by the year 2040. Be warned.

In 2040, the Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly 

three times the economic output of the entire globe in 2000. 

China’s per capita income will hit $85,000, more than double 

the forecast for the European Union, and also much higher than 

that of India and Japan. In other words, the average Chinese 

megacity dweller will be living twice as well as the average 

Frenchman when China goes from a poor country in 2000 to a 

superrich country in 2040. Although it will not have overtaken 

the United States in per capita wealth, according to my forecasts, 

China’s share of global GDP — 40 percent — will dwarf that of 

the United States (14 percent) and the European Union ( 5 

percent) 30 years from now. This is what economic hegemony 

will look like.

       中国2040年将成为全球唯一超富大国 ！

2010年1月4日，诺贝尔经济学奖得主、芝加哥大学(University 

of Chicago)的福格尔(Robert W。 Fogel)教授在《外交政策》

杂志上发表了一篇文章，题为：123，000，000，000，000美元：

为什么到2040年中国经济总量会达到123万亿美元。

（ 2015中国全年国内生产总值（GDP）67.6708万亿元人民币，

同比增长6.9%，相当于10.42万亿美元。2016年中国GDP预计增长

6.7%, 即为72.2047万亿元人民币，以6.90:1汇率计，相当于10.46

万亿美元。而2015年美国GDP经济总量大约为17.87万亿美元。

分别按汇率法和购买力平价法（相当于剔除了汇率波动的影响）预

测中美两国GDP增长趋势，其中汇率法预测结果是：2019年中国

GDP为19.8万亿美元，美国为18.9万亿美元；购买力平价法预测

结果是：2016年中国GDP为17.1万亿美元，美国为16.8万亿美元。

依据汇率法，多算一点，取一个整数，以2019年中国GDP为20万

亿美元为起点，从2020年1月1日起算，截止2040年12月31日，

共计21年期间，每年不间断地、持续增长百分之九点多，即可胜利

抵达2040年中国国内生产总值占全世界40%的123万亿美元！

如此看来，伟大领袖习近平习主席的正能量，不仅有海内的周小

平周同志、云南新任镇越铁路省省长阮成发阮博士同志代表着，而

且，还有海外的罗伯特·福格尔福同志代表着。其能量之正，亮瞎

左中右各位的昏花老眼；是不是有一点儿正得过了？你说。是不

是头顶1993年诺贝尔经济学五毛大奖，七年前以八十三岁高龄身

躯，也同中国党和政府玩儿起了自带干粮的高级黑、捧起来宰杀

的把戏？）

为什么中国现在那么成功、那么繁荣，而美国却陷入了偏执的自

毁文化，为什么我们那么盲目、无法解决失业率多年居高不下的

困境……我们的自杀式的战时经济还在继续侵吞掉大约50%的税收

……我们的意识形态斗争让我们进一步深陷债务之中……我们的

媒体总是混淆我们的视听，总是把注意力集中于小部分自私好战

的极端分子……两党领导人种种不负责任的举措在我们无知无觉

的情况下帮助着中国实现其取代美国成为世界经济超级大国的宏

大战略……高盛在自挖墙角──搞清楚这一切背后的原因至关重要。

看看这段让人哭泣甚而发狂的文字吧：到2040年，也就是一代人

之后，短短30年的工夫，福格尔预言的迅速形成的新世界格局将

是，中国成为唯一的超级经济大国，昔日世界舞台上的主角美国

则成了老二，而且是远远落后的老二，这其中部分的原因便要归

咎于高盛以及在其影响下近年来的诸多糟糕决断。福格尔警告说：

“2040年，中国的经济总量将达到123万亿美元，是2000年全球经

济总量的将近三倍。中国人均国民收入将达到85，000美元，是欧

盟届时预期人均收入的两倍，比印度和日本也要高出许多。换言之，

在中国从2000年的穷国一跃而为2040年的超级富国之后，中国大

都市普通居民的生活水准将是普通法国人的两倍。”

“即便30年之后中国的人均财富不一定能超过美国，根据我的预计，

中国在全球GDP中的占比（40%）──也会远超美国（14%）和欧盟

（5%）。这就是2040年的世界经济霸权格局。”

没错，一代人之后，中国的经济实力将会是美国的四倍多，而我们

的孩子，下一代的美国人，却还得背负着我们自2000年以来累积下

来的战争赤字。

福格尔认为这一代美国人之所以相比中国会落入下风，有六个原因：

1。 中国正在快速转型为资本主义消费经济

没错，福格尔表示，“中国长期压抑的消费倾向”正在急剧释放，

“从很多方面来看，中国都是目前全球最具资本主义特色的国家。”

看明白了吗？当我们在战场上大肆挥霍钱财、当高盛和华尔街将美

国转变为财富集中极少数人手中的财阀统治之时，中国正在日益资

本主义化（和民主化）。

“在中国的大城市，居民的生活水准和人均收入已经达到世界银行

认定的‘中高收入’水平，服装、电子产品、快餐、汽车的获得都

很便利，而且是越来越便利。”这就是中国的未来。原因何在？因

为他们的新“政府已经认定，国内消费的增长对于中国经济来说至

关重要，政府出台了大量的促进消费者消费欲望的国内政策。"

2。 中国目前的政治体系资本主义化更甚于美国

福格尔说，“中国的政治体制很有可能有别于你的想象。”北京政

府并非事事都是老大，“多数经济改革，包括一些最为成功的改革，

是由地方政府推动、监管的。”如今“在中国针对上层决策的批评

和辩论超出了很多人的想象。”

福格尔参加过多次中国留美经济学会(Chinese Economists 

Society)的会议。该学会很多经济学家公开“批评中国政府”，甚

至会“指出财政部最近的决策有失误，对电力和煤炭的指导调价措

施提出疑虑……甚至在北京的报纸上刊登批评信”。随后会有某位

财政部长来接见这些经济学家，探讨他们的见解。

“比起过去，如今中国的经济计划要顺应民意得多，对新观点也持

更为开放的态度。”对，比我们更资本主义化，甚至可能也更民主。

3。 中国最近对教育的大手笔投入

福格尔着重指出，中国正在对教育做出“大手笔的投入”。“受过

教育的劳动者工作效率就会高很多……受过大学教育的劳动者的工

作效率是受教育年限不满九年的劳动者的三倍……高中毕业生则是

其的1。8倍。”

“下一代中国人将实现100%的高中入学率和大约50%的大学入学

率，此举将为其年度经济增长率贡献大于六个百分点。”与此同时，

美国却把数万亿美元扔进战场、背负上巨额债务、教育也开始糊弄

事，将奔向2040年赛跑的领跑地位拱手让给了中国。

4。 中国七亿人口的农村经济为经济增长添砖加瓦

福格尔说，展望中国未来的时候，我们“总是会想到上海的高楼和

广东的工厂，而往往会忽略一个经济增长引擎：中国乡村发生的

巨变。”

从 1978年到2003年，中国工业及服务业中的劳动生产率平均为每

年6%，而在未来，农村地区的劳动生产率将增长，中国有七亿农民，

占了中国总人口的一半以上。“如今，辽阔的乡村为中国经济增长

做出了大约三分之一的贡献”，随着下一代中国乡村人口增加一亿，

农村对中国经济的贡献率还将进一步增长。

5。 中国政府的数据其实是低报了中国的经济发展

福格尔警告我们不要被那种声称“中国的数据是虚假的，在一些关

键方面故意夸大”的报告所愚弄，事实正好相反：“中国的统计学

家很可能低报了中国的经济发展。”

在服务行业，“小公司通常不会向政府申报盈利数据，政府部门通

常都无法真实地统计到产能提高的真实状况。”和美国一样，“官

方估算的GDP值严重地低估了国内经济的增长”，因为这些估算没

有“把诸如教育、医疗等公共事业机构的发展考虑进去”。

原因何在呢？因为“这些领域的重大发展多数都没有完全计入

GDP”。这是一个全球性的问题，“不过中国服务行业的快速增长

使得这样的低估差距尤为明显。”

6。 到2040年，中国将再次成为全球唯一的一个超级经济大国

“在西方人看来，全球经济中心位于亚洲的世界格局是难以想象的。

不过这种情况并非前所未有……在过去2000年的1800年中，中国一

直都是全球最强大的经济体……当欧洲还处于黑暗时代、陷于宗教

战争的纷飞战火之时，中国却滋养出了全世界最高的生活水准。如

今，在中国人眼里，中国的崛起不过是一次辉煌的回归而已。”

到2040年，中国将成为全世界唯一的超级经济大国，拥有四倍于

美国的经济总量，这在很大程度上要归功于高盛阴谋──这边厢，

高盛在大肆开挖美国的资本主义和民主墙角，那边厢，高盛的资

本、人才和人脉也正在被中国一点一点给吸干。

Most accounts of China’s economic ascent offer little but vague or threatening generalities, and they usually grossly underestimate the extent of the rise — and how fast it’s coming. (For instance, a recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace predicts that by 2050, China’seconomy will be just 20 percent larger than that of the United States.) Such accounts fail to fully credit the forces at work behind China’s recent successor understand how those trends will shape the future. Even China’s own economic data in some ways actually underestimate economic outputs.

It’s the same story with the relative decline of a Europe plagued by falling fertility as its era of global economic clout finally ends. Here, too, the trajectory will be more sudden and stark than most reporting suggests. Europe’s low birthrate and its muted consumerism mean its contribution to global GDP will tumble to a quarter of its current share within 30 years. At that point, the economy of the 15 earliest EU countries combined will be an eighth the size of China’s.

This is what the future will look like in a generation. It’s coming sooner than we think.

What, precisely, does China have going so right for it?

The first essential factor that is often overlooked: the enormous investment China is making in education. More educated workers are much more productive workers. (As I have reported elsewhere, U.S. data indicate that college-educated workers are three times as productive, and a high school graduate is 1.8 times as productive, as a worker with less than a ninth-grade education.) In China, high school and college enrollments are rising steeply due to significant state investment. In 1998, then-President Jiang Zemin called for a massive increase in enrollment in higher education. At the time, just 3.4 million students were enrolled in China’s colleges and universities. The response was swift: Over the next four years, enrollment in higher education increased 165 percent, and the number of Chinese studying abroad rose 152 percent. Between 2000 and 2004, university enrollment continued to rise steeply, by about 50 percent. I forecast that China will be able to increase its high school enrollment rate to the neighborhood of 100 percent and the college rate to about 50 percent over the next generation, which would by itself add more than 6 percentage points to the country’s annual economic growth rate. These targets for higher education are not out of reach. It should be remembered that several Western European countries saw college enrollment rates climb from about 25 to 50 percent in just the last two decades of the 20th century.

And it’s not just individual workers whose productivityjumps significantly as a result of more education; it’s true of firms as well,according to work by economist Edwin Mansfield. In a remarkable 1971 study,Mansfield found that the presidents of companies that have been early adoptersof complex new technologies were on average younger and better educated thanheads of firms that were slower to innovate.

The second thing many underestimate when making projections for China’s economy is the continued role of the rural sector. When we imaginethe future, we tend to picture Shanghai high-rises and Guangdong factories, butchanges afoot in the Chinese countryside have made it an underappreciatedeconomic engine. In analyzing economic growth, it is useful to divide aneconomy into three sectors: agriculture, services, and industry. Over thequarter-century between 1978 and 2003, the growth of labor productivity in Chinahas been high in each of these sectors, averaging about 6 percent annually. Thelevel of output per worker has been much higher in industry and services, andthose sectors have received the most analysis and attention. (I estimate thatChina’s rapid urbanization, which shifts workers to industry and services,added 3 percentage points to the annual national growth rate.) However,productivity is increasing even for those who remain in rural areas. In 2009,about 55 percent of China’s population, or 700 million people, still lived inthe countryside. That large rural sector is responsible for about a third ofChinese economic growth today, and it will not disappear in the next 30 years.

Third, though it’s a common refrain that Chinese data areflawed or deliberately inflated in key ways, Chinese statisticians may well be underestimating economic progress. This is especially true in the servicesector because small firms often don’t report their numbers to the governmentand officials often fail to adequately account for improvements in the qualityof output. In the United States as well as China, official estimates of GDP badly underestimate national growth if they do not take into accountimprovements in services such as education and health care. (Most greatadvances in these areas aren’t fully counted in GDP because the values of thesesectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An hour of a doctor’s timeis considered no more valuable today than an hour of a doctor’s time was beforethe age of antibiotics and modern surgery.) Other countries have a similarnational accounting problem, but the rapid growth of China’s service sectormakes the underestimation more pronounced.

Fourth, and most surprising to some, the Chinese politicalsystem is likely not what you think. Although outside observers often assumethat Beijing is always at the helm, most economic reforms, including the mostsuccessful ones, have been locally driven and overseen. And though China mostcertainly is not an open democracy, there’s more criticism and debate in upperechelons of policymaking than many realize. Unchecked mandates can of courselead to disaster, but there’s a reason Beijing has avoided any repeats of theGreat Leap Forward in recent years.

For instance, there is an annual meeting of Chineseeconomists called the Chinese Economists Society. I have participated in manyof them. There are people in attendance who are very critical of the Chinesegovernment — and very openly so. Of course, they are not going to say "down withHu Jintao," but they may point out that the latest decision by the financeministry is flawed or raise concerns about a proposed adjustment to the pricesof electricity and coal, or call attention to issues of equity. They might evenpublish a critical letter in a Beijing newspaper. Then the Chinese financeminister might actually call them up and say: "Will you get some of your peopletogether? We would like to have some of our people meet with you and find outmore about what you are thinking." Many people don’t realize suchback-and-forth occurs in Beijing. In this sense, Chinese economic planning hasbecome much more responsive and open to new ideas than it was in the past.

Finally, people don’t give enough credit to China’slong-repressed consumerist tendencies. In many ways, China is the mostcapitalist country in the world right now. In the big Chinese cities, livingstandards and per capita income are at the level of countries the World Bankwould deem "high middle income," already higher, for example, than that of theCzech Republic. In those cities there is already a high standard of living, andeven alongside the vaunted Chinese propensity for saving, a clear and growingaffinity for acquiring clothes, electronics, fast food, automobiles — all aglimpse into China’s future. Indeed, the government has made the judgment thatincreasing domestic consumption will be critical to China’s economy, and a hostof domestic policies now aim to increase Chinese consumers’ appetite foracquisitions.

And Europe? Europe, by which I mean the 15 earliest EUmembers, faces twin challenges of demography and culture, its economic futureburdened by a mix of reproductive habits and consumer restraint.

Europeans, of course, won’t be eating grass in 2040. Theireconomic decline over the next 30 years will be relative, not absolute, astechnological advances and other factors should allow Europe’s overall laborproductivity to continue to grow about 1.8 percent annually. Yet theirpercentage contribution to global GDP will tumble, shrinking by a factor offour, from 21 percent to 5 percent, in a generation.

Demography is the first key issue. The population of WesternEuropean countries has been aging rapidly, and that is likely to continue overthe next several decades. The basic reason: European couples aren’t producingenough babies. Europe’s total fertility rate has been below the level needed toreplace the population for about 34 years, according to a 2005 Rand Corp.study. As a result, the percentage of women of childbearing age will decline,in the earliest 15 EU countries, from about 50 percent in 2000 (it was alsoabout 50 percent in 1950) to the U.N. projection of about 35 percent in 2040.So we have a double whammy: Not only will reproductive-age women have sharplyreduced fertility rates, but the proportion of women who are in theirchildbearing years will also have declined sharply. By 2040, almost a third ofWestern Europe’s population may be over age 65.

Why are there fewer babies? One key reason is that Europeanattitudes toward sex have evolved sharply. One-hundred fifty years ago, it wasconsidered a sin to enjoy sex, the only legitimate purpose for which wasprocreation. But today, young women believe that sex is mainly a recreationalactivity. Behind the fertility trend is a vast cultural shift from thegeneration that fought in World War II, which married early and produced thegreat baby boom of 1945 to 1965. The easy availability of birth control and therise of sex as recreation mean that populations are likely to shrink in manyEuropean countries. As early as 2000, the natural rate of increase (birthsminus deaths) was already negative in Germany and Italy. By 2040, it is likelythat the natural increase will be negative in the five largest Europeancountries, except Britain.

So what if Europeans have a little fun now and then? Well,fun has consequences. Declining fertility pushes up the age of the citizenryand shrinks the percentage of people in the workforce, and so impedes growth.Demographic changes also shape the hiring and promotion structures ofindividual companies, and not necessarily for the better; if the elderly clingto the best jobs well past retirement age, younger workers may have to wait anextra decade, perhaps longer, to get their turn. And because younger workersare a major source of new ideas, slowing down the ascendancy of the nextgeneration may retard the pace of technological change. (If fertility ratesremain as low as they have been, Italy’s population will fall by half in 50years. Naturally, politicians are doing everything they can. They are joiningwith the Holy See and telling young women: Please procreate.)

In another way, Europe’s culture confounds economists.Citizens of Europe’s wealthy countries are not working longer hours to makehigher salaries and accumulate more goods. Rather, European culture continuesto prize long vacations, early retirements, and shorter work weeks overacquiring more stuff, at least in comparison to many other developed countries,such as the United States. In my observation, those living in most WesternEuropean countries appear to be more content than Americans with the kind ofcommodities they already have, for example, not aspiring to own more TVs perhousehold. Set aside whether that’s virtuous. A promenade in the Jardin duLuxembourg, as opposed to a trip to Walmart for a flat-screen TV, won’t helpthe European Union’s GDP growth.

Of course, China faces its own demographic nightmares, andskeptics point to many obstacles that could derail the Chinese bullet trainover the next 30 years: rising income inequality, potential social unrest,territorial disputes, fuel scarcity, water shortages, environmental pollution,and a still-rickety banking system. Although the critics have a point, theseconcerns are no secret to China’s leaders; in recent years, Beijing has provenquite adept in tackling problems it has set out to address. Moreover, historyseems to be moving in the right direction for China. The most tumultuous localdispute, over Taiwan’s sovereignty, now appears to be headed toward aresolution. And at home, the government’s increasing sensitivity to publicopinion, combined with improving living standards, has resulted in a level ofpopular confidence in the government that, in my opinion, makes major politicalinstability unlikely.

Could Europe surprise us by growing substantially more thanI have predicted? It seems farfetched, but it could happen, either by Europeanscurtailing vacations and siesta time to adopt a more workaholic ethos, or bymore young women and their partners aligning their views of sex more closelywith those of the pope than those of movie stars. Anything’s possible, butdon’t bet on it — Europeans seem to like their lifestyles just fine, and they’velong since given up their dreams of world domination. An unexpectedtechnological breakthrough could also shake things up, though this isn’t thesort of thing economists can base predictions on.

To the West, the notion of a world in which the center of globaleconomic gravity lies in Asia may seem unimaginable. But it wouldn’t be thefirst time. As China scholars, who take a long view of history, often pointout, China was the world’s largest economy for much of the last two millennia.(Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, reckons China has beenthe globe’s top economy for 18 of the past 20 centuries.) While Europe wasfumbling in the Dark Ages and fighting disastrous religious wars, Chinacultivated the highest standards of living in the world. Today, the notion of arising China is, in Chinese eyes, merely a return to the status quo.

2050年 —— 第三次世界大战爆发

       Scenario:  World War III in 2050

Events Before

2020

Russia accepts Georgia and Azerbaijan as part if it follow by 

their willing request , NATO peacekeeping forces dissolve, and 

Iran becomes a new world power.

China asserts more inlfluence over Asia, economic growth 

slows, but finally collapses and dissolves into many smaller 

countries.

NATO tries to expands to include Ukraine and Poland, but 

dissolves because of internal issues and follows the collapse 

of the USA.

Whole ASIA will be afraid of being controlled by China.

2023

The USA start to recover from a worst crisis in the history, 

and continues to spread its influence in Central Asia, but no 

longer a super power in the world.

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia join Russia.

North and South Korea open a Unification Dialogue after 

years of being used and controlled by China and USA.

2025

Iraq and Afghanistan become fully independent, though 

controlled de facto by the USA.

Chinese's population growth slows further.

Russia is shocked by Chechen uprising.

The USA takes limited military action against Pakistan, 

bombing it.

Pakistan does not respond.

Russian growth booms again after decades of slow growth.

The territory of Greenland joins Russia.

Ireland is invaded by Britain which intends to give it total 

independence immediately after conquering to halt the IRA, 

Ireland joins NATO.

Sweden and Finland, threatened by Russia, join NATO.

Mexico talking with NATO for associate partnership.

Bosnia and Herzegona, Macedonia and Yugoslavia join 

NATO

Isreal ivades Jordan Syria and Lebanon Thacks to use 

weponss

2020-2025

Montenegro and Moldova join NATO.

Russian economy, with Russian peak oil reached and no 

stable income, and with gradual loss of exports to NATO 

economies, stabilizes at a nervously low rate.

Chinese growth slows.

As an experimental action, North and South Korea practice 

a single ideology in a small reigion. It is "hybrid socialisim" 

which includes economic limitations and civic freedoms. 

It is successful.

2016-2020

Korea unites.

Turkey has grown in economic and military power.

Japan abolishes its WWII-age limitations in the ceremonial 

move of intervening with the foreign affairs of Korea, which 

is attacked by far-left guerillas, militarily.

Russia and China have slowed, and nearly stopped, growth.

2020-2030

Russian's population growth is positive due to its policy to 

accept more people from other countries to migrate in.

With decaying influence, Brazil is now nothing more than a 

middle power.

Chinese growth stops.

Poland and Turkey are now developed countries, since they 

exploit the economy of the ex-USSR.

The Russian Federation become a super power once again.

China disbands. It is chaotic.

More than 2/3 of China's population disappears after 

being attacked by a nuke bombs rain by Japan.

Many minor countries attempt to take some profits. Indonesia

becomes a new power, Vietnam becomes bother country to 

Japan and Indonesia, forming a new allies power in Asia 

including Japan, India, Indonesia, Vietnam,....

After North and South unification, Korea is now a powerful 

country. And it may allies with a couple of large countries 

in the old China after the collapse of China.

2030-2040

Japan, Turkey and Poland now world powers.

World economy flourishes without the control of the USA.

Pre-War

All sides make delicate deployments.

Turkey and Poland form the new Central Powers, which 

aims to thrust East and exploit Russia and western China.

The USA and Japan make an alliance named the Pacific 

Alliance, aiming to spread in both directions.

The War

World War Three officially began with Turkey's now-nuclear 

missiles launched at American and British satellites in space, 

on Christmas 2049. Immediately, the USA declares war on 

Turkey once the attack is analyzed.

The Sides

The Eurasian Powers includes Turkey's vast territory, 

stretching from Northern Iraq, Syria, the Caucaucus, up 

to other parts of Central Russia and former Yugoslavia. 

Poland has a large country, from its own to Western Russia. 

The Eastern European states are also members of the 

coalition. Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are military supporters 

of the Powers, as are the other Middle Eastern and North 

African dominions of Turkey. In Asia, Pakistan and 

Afghanistan are military supporters. Many other Islamic 

Asian states are spiritually supportive.

The Pacific Alliance constitutes the Western European 

states, the USA, Mexico and South America as well as J

apan, whose territory consists of Eastern China. Japan 

has dominions in SouthEast Asia as well as the semi-

independent ally of India.

http://future.wikia.com/wiki/Scenario:_World_War_III_in_2050

What If China & Japan Went To War?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OzFcF7s-dD8

USA Vs China In WW3 Secret Plans And Their 

Preparation | Documentary

Crouching Tiger Episode 1: Will There Be War With China?