谨以此文献给在哲学课堂里受着古典文献煎熬的学生们J---R Dai 黑格尔的哲学以它的本体论而著称。而黑格尔的本体论被有些人称为是转化生成的本体论（Ontology of Becoming）。而黑格尔并非象古希腊赫拉克利特提出“人不能两次进入同一条河”那样地以诗歌的形式提出他的转化生成的哲学理念，而是通过寻找哲学的起点方式，用了洋洋万字的论述推导出这一概念的。但正是在这洋洋万字的推导过程中我们可以看到黑格尔本体论的逻辑缺陷。为了找出黑格尔本体论的逻辑缺陷，这里有必要来与大家一起复习一下黑格尔在《逻辑学》中是如何通过对哲学起点的探索来认识有与无的意义的。这样做所面临的一个挑战就是黑格尔的论述风格，黑格尔哲学以其语言之晦涩难懂而著称，他在进行哲学论述时经常不是择要而论或平铺直叙，而是习惯於铺展很广甚至绕著弯子来说话，他的这一风格曾引来包括叔本华在内的一些人的不满，叔本华甚至为此而对黑格尔的哲学进行过严厉的抨击[1],[2]。 本文将要讨论的是黑格尔在他的传世名著《逻辑学》中建构他的本体论过程中所存在的逻辑缺陷，而他的本体论建构也是他将传统的形上学与传统的逻辑学用被后人称为辩证逻辑的框架来统一表述[3]的关键核心内容。虽然过去两个世纪里有包括前面提到的叔本华以及罗素和波普尔在内的不少人对黑格尔的辩证逻辑提出批评，但是却没有人指出本文所讨论的黑格尔在构建他的本体论时所存在的逻辑缺陷。实际上，由於黑格尔《逻辑学》中的本体思想对於黑格尔逻辑学之重要性，日后人们在运用黑格尔的辩证逻辑（或辩证法）时所遭遇的许多问题都源自本文所讨论的黑格尔构建本体论时的逻辑缺陷。 黑格尔本体论的核心概念是纯无（pure nothing）和纯有（pure being）以及它们之间的统一和转化（becoming），而黑格尔是通过对於哲学起点的探索来推出纯无与纯有的特性以及它们之间的统一和转化的。因此，为了要更好地了解黑格尔本体论的建构逻辑，我们有必要结合著《逻辑学》原文的内容，逐步查考他的逻辑论证过程；但是另一方面，鉴於黑格尔的哲学论述的冗长特征，我们也有必要按照黑格尔的逻辑线条将黑格尔的论述简化为一些要点。 www.marxists.org网站所提供的A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin於1969年出版的黑格尔《逻辑学》[4]的英译本不但原译本的语句通顺而且网站的组织也很有条理，非常便於阅读及查考，本文接下来对於黑格尔《逻辑学》的讨论将以该网站的英译本为参照。本文所需引用的《逻辑学》原文部分的中文内容均为由上述网站的英文直接翻译而来，相关的英文内容在《逻辑学》中具体位置及网上的链接都作为参考文献标示出来；另外，为兼顾方便读者查考和节省正文版面，本文还将所引用的英文原文放在文章后面的附录里。 接下来我们依据黑格尔的思路从“哲学起点的存在性”，“什么是哲学的起点”，“从无到有的跳跃”，和“黑格尔本体论构建的完成”这样四个方面来对黑格尔本体论的构建进行查考分析。 二． 哲学起点的存在性 如果要通过寻求哲学的起点来推出纯无与纯有的意义，那么从逻辑上来说，首先第一个问题就是哲学是否有起点。在这个问题上黑格尔的处理是相当含糊的。他的思路的第一步是将哲学的起点转化为逻辑的起点来进行讨论，我们从《逻辑学》中的如下内容可以看出这一点： §62 … §90 黑格尔先是在上面的第一段里指出哲学的方法一定属於逻辑的范围，然后在上面的第二段里指出方法与内容是统一的，思维对像的起点也应该是思维过程的起点，这样就暗含了哲学的起点应该是逻辑学的起点的意思。在接下来的几段里黑格尔更是明确地指出哲学的起点其实就是逻辑的起点： §91 我们在这里（即对於哲学起点的讨论---本文作者注）只需考虑逻辑的起点是如何发生的；这个起点的两边是已命名的，也就是说，或者是作为推论的结果，或者是作为一般意义上的起点，即可直接感受点。 … §93 之所以是逻辑的起点是因为它是作為自由和自为的思想的元素產生的，处於纯粹的知道之中。 §94 逻辑是纯科学，也就是在他自身发展的整个范围内的纯知识。 … §98 但是如果没有任何一个预设前提而起点本身又是一个可直接感受的，那麼它的唯一的确定特性就是它将是逻辑的起点，是思想自身的起点。
黑格尔的这种处理方法会给读者带来这样的疑问：既然这是一部讨论逻辑学的书，为什么不直接讨论逻辑的起点而要绕个弯子从哲学的起点来过渡到逻辑的起点？黑格尔这样做对他来说有一个便利，那就是他可以借助当时的历史背景来很自然地引出哲学的起点这个议题： 这一看来并不起眼的便利对於黑格尔来说恐怕并非只是顺便之举而是特意而为。我们知道，如果要对不论是逻辑的起点还是哲学的起点进行讨论，首先面临的一个问题应该是逻辑（哲学）是否有起点？思维缜密的黑格尔应该是考虑到这个问题的，但是他显然没有找到一个逻辑严格的答案或者他可能根本找不到这样一个逻辑严格的答案。因此，在这一点上他不得不采取一些技术性地绕弯子的做法将它含糊过去，上面提到的用历史的背景来引出这个问题是他的这个含糊措施的一部分，在接下来的§89里我们可以看到他的这个含糊措施的下一步： 这段话通过以对比的方式映衬出寻找哲学起点的重要性，其本身仍然是暗示着这一起点的存在，但是在随后的讨论中他却从未严格论证这一起点一定是存在的，尽管他确实解释和反思了历史上有关如何寻找这一起点的不同说法。他在后面的第§95到§116 似乎以严格的逻辑从正反两面论证了逻辑学的起点是存在的，但实际上他的所有论证都是建立在逻辑学（哲学）的起点一定存在这个预设前提之下的，然后在这个前提下找到了他的逻辑学的起点[5]，那就是纯无与纯有的统一体。所以说，黑格尔对於逻辑学的起点的论证存在一个逻辑漏洞，那就是他没有真正证明这个起点一定是存在的。 三． 什么是哲学的起点 接下来我们择要复习一下黑格尔如何（在起点一定存在的隐含前提下）从正反两面来论证逻辑的起点就是纯无（pure nothing）与纯有（pure being）的统一体的。首先，继前面§93所说的逻辑的起点是纯知道（pure knowing）之后，他在§96，§97以及§99中指出，纯知道只包含单纯的可直接感受性（immediacy）因而就是一个什么都不包含的纯有，所以逻辑的起点一定是一个纯有。 然后从§101到§116这几节中，黑格尔进一步对於逻辑（哲学）的起点是什么进行了论述，值得指出的是这个过程所进行的论证是逻辑严格的。由於他的论述内容比较冗长，我这里不引用原文而是将它简化为如下的要点： 首先，在§101到§102中黑格尔先是借评论他人的观点引出了一个类似於老子所说的“进道若退（《道德经》 第四十一章）”的寻找哲学起点的思路，也就是黑格尔在§102所说的“前进就是回到它的基础（the advance is a retreat into the ground）”。按照这个思路，黑格尔从§102到§104论述了如何从一个任意点出发去找它的原因，然后再找那个原因的原因，一直推到最原始的起点为止。这样找到的起点既是可直接感受的（immediate）又是可推论的（mediated），因为它如果能用来作为原因解释其它的内容那么它一定是直接感受的，但同时因为它是通过倒退回去找到的，那么它一定又是可推论的。§105和§106强调这样找出的起点一定不是假设的而是实实在在的作为真实起点的逻辑内容。 然后，在后面的§107, §109, 以及§113到§116中黑格尔反复地使用了一个反证逻辑，我们可以将这个反证逻辑简化表达为： 当然，上述反证逻辑的成立还需要一个前序铺垫:对内容进行逻辑解释时不能用A=A的循环论证，因为那样的论证给不出任何有意义的新信息。黑格尔已经在《逻辑学》前言的§27 完成了这一逻辑铺垫。 在§108中黑格尔继续前面关於哲学的起点一定是在纯知道（pure knowing）之中因而一定是纯有（pure being）的论述。这一节的下面这段话里的逻辑值得注意： 在这里他强调当我们最开始谈论哲学时它只是一个完全没有内容的空概念，我们的知道也是一种没有内容的纯知道；如果非要强调这种纯知道的内容的话，那麼它的内容就是空洞的纯有。我个人认为他这里的论述之合理性是值得存疑的，因为即便是将意识的作用引入到我们对於哲学起点的思考当中来，当我们选择了“哲学”这个名字而不是“飞机”或者其它任何名字的话，我们在意识中已经赋予了这个名字的具体涵义，试图将这个名字与它的涵义分割开来是违背有关语言的心理学原理的。 四． 从无到有的跳跃 从 §110到§112是关键性的三节，这三节的论述中的主要逻辑前提有三点：1）前面的讨论已经显明哲学的起点既是纯有又纯无; 2）纯无与纯有是不同的；3）哲学的起点虽然是纯无但是含有进一步发展的种子或者说作为纯无的起点实际上指向了下一步的发展。 应该说，黑格尔在这三节的论述不象他对於哲学的起点一定是空洞无物的论证那样有著严格的逻辑。首先，他在§110里说了这样一段话： 这里我们需要注意到，黑格尔在这三节之前之后都逻辑严格地反复指出了哲学的起点是空洞的无或纯有，可是当遇到如何从空洞的无进入到不空洞的有的关键点时，他开始说那个起点不是纯无，且将在别的地方所说的起点里的纯有（pure being）改成有（being）。在下面的§111里他又继续说，“在起点里的无与有是不同的。”这与他在其它地方说哲学的起点是什么都没有的空洞的纯有与纯无而且在§134里干脆指出纯有就是纯无的说法是矛盾的。黑格尔肯定意识到了这里的矛盾，但是他并没有努力去从逻辑上解决这个矛盾，而是从文字上将别的地方用的纯有（pure being）改成有（being）纯无（pure nothing）改成无（nothing），然后再说起点里的有与无是不同的。这里我们可以感受到黑格尔试图在理论上从空洞的无向非空洞的有跳跃时所经历的内心挣扎。 而他在这几段的挣扎里面所用到的看似合理的依据就是既然起点是从无到有之点，那么起点里就应该包含从无到有的因素。除了前面§110中给出的相关表述之外，在§111中他又说： 在§112中他对§110和§111中的论述做了总结，指出： 在黑格尔之后的哲学界不但普遍接受了黑格尔这里的看似是逻辑论证的文字说明，还将它的表述作为了被称为黑格尔辩证逻辑的核心内容之一，而人们接受这种说明的主要理由是它符合自然与社会所发生的实际。但问题是，黑格尔这样的说明在逻辑上是不严格的，最多只能算是基於构建理论之需要的权宜之计而已；如果要坚持严格地不违背思维逻辑的话，那么当黑格尔遇到无法从空洞的开端跳跃到不空洞的存在时，他应该醒悟到：这表明他的整个论证的逻辑前提有漏洞，应该推倒从来。我在前面也已经指出了他的一个最基本的逻辑漏洞就是他没有能够证明他所要寻求的哲学的起点是存在的，那是他的整本《逻辑学》的致命缺陷。 可是，如果我们坚持黑格尔在这里的处理是逻辑上不妥的话，又该如何解释后人所说的黑格尔的这种空洞的起点中含有生成不空洞的未来的种子的说法符合自然与社会之现实这一点呢？ 首先，我们应该认识到问题并不出在用一个看似空洞的起点可以含有从无到有的种子这样的命题来解释自然或社会，因为那样的命题是对於自然和社会的合理抽象，比如我们从怀有胚胎的母亲的生产这一类的现象便可抽象出看似空洞的起点可以含有从无到有的种子这样的命题来。但是，相应的现实经验对应的只是看似空无的起点，而不是逻辑上严格的绝对空无的起点。当你把这些经验抽象为绝对空洞的起点中含有生成不空洞的未来的种子的命题时，实际上人为地创造了一个作为严格意义上来使用的逻辑命题。 黑格尔在§110到§112的处理方法实际上是人为地引入了一个预设的逻辑：“哲学的起点是包含了有的种子因而可以发展为有的纯无 。”这样的命题本身不是逻辑自身运行的结果而是人为地抽象制造出来的逻辑。我们来看一下黑格尔自己如何在《逻辑学》的引言中论述为什么他的《逻辑学》不应该用到任何外加的预设前提： §33 没有哪个学科像逻辑学那样地需要直接以它的考察对像而不是一些预设前提来开始的。在任何一个其它的学科里，考察对像和学科的方法彼此之间是不同的；而且学科的内容本身也不构成它的绝对的开端，而是依赖於与之相关的其它各方面的材料。於是那些学科允许以定义的形式来谈论它们的基础和内容及方法，并且就这样（假设為熟知的加以接受，然后就直接运用）配合普通的推理来建立它们的一般概念和基本定论。 §34 但是，逻辑学正相反，它不能以任何上述形式的思考以及思维规律来作为它的前提条件，因为所有这些都是它自身的内容因而必须在它自身内部建立起来。不仅是这个学科的方法，就连这个学科内的概念本身都属於作为这个学科的内容，而且属於它的结果；我们无法预先定义什麼是逻辑，相反有关这个知识应该首先作為结果而出现在这个学科整体的理论之中。类似地，在这个学科里最基本的一点是将思维或者更确切地说是理解性的思维作为逻辑的考察对像；逻辑的概念必须是在这探索过程中产生因而不能预先设定。所以，本引言没有打算如果过去人们习惯的那样来预先建立逻辑学的概念或设定它的方法；这里仅是通过一些说理和对历史的反思及解释来使得这门学科更容易被一般的思维所理解。
在这一段里，黑格尔指出了因为逻辑是用来解释所有存在的内容的，包括逻辑本身，因此对於逻辑的研究不能从任何诸如公理体系那样的预设前提出发，而只能运用逻辑本身一步步地展开论述。如果我们允许直接从类似怀有胚胎的母亲的生产的实际经验里抽象出一个逻辑前提然后运用到逻辑学之中的话，那么就与黑格尔在引言第§34中说的逻辑学的内容只能依靠逻辑自身的运行而不能预设前提的说法相矛盾, 因为那样的前提就不是如黑格尔试图表明的由纯粹的逻辑运行所产生的结果。 其次，更为严重的是黑格尔人为地引入的上述那个附加命题显然在形式逻辑上与黑格尔在其它地方得出哲学的起点是空洞的纯无与纯有的统一这一结论的论证逻辑相矛盾；而之所以会出现这个矛盾的根本原因在於黑格尔其实在一开始就没有能够做到引言§34中的不预设任何前提的说法，因为他的《逻辑学》显然是有一个隐含的前提假设的，那就是哲学的起点是存在的。可以看出，黑格尔在如何处理由无到有的跳跃这一点上是有过内心的挣扎的，但是他显然没有意识到作为他挣扎的结果所引入的逻辑命题不是逻辑体系自身运行的结果，而是人为的附加品。之所以说他挣扎是因为他在《逻辑学》不同的地方为了引入及论证从空洞的无到不空洞的有的跳跃的逻辑采用了各种不同的并不属於逻辑论证的理由；之所以说他没有意识到这一点是因为他并没有因此而回去修改引言中的§33-§34。 另一方面，我们也有必要认识到引入上述的人为抽象出的逻辑命题对於黑格尔的《逻辑学》后面内容的构建所具有的重要性：这一附加逻辑使他实现了无法由逻辑的自身运行来实现的从无到有的跳跃。缺少了这一跳跃他不但无法通过寻找哲学起点来建构他的本体论，更重要的是他根本就无法实现将形上学（metaphysics）作为客观逻辑（objective logic）与传统的逻辑统一为一个新的哲学体系的雄心。因此，本文上述的讨论实际上向我们指出了黑格尔将形上学与传统的逻辑进行统一的关键性前提条件是通过形而上的抽象来引入一个非逻辑自然运行结果的人造逻辑命题而实现的。这就是为什么黑格尔的貌似逻辑严格的辩证逻辑体系在日后的运用会有时出现一些似是而非的结果的原因。 五． 黑格尔本体论核心建构的完成 在§110到§112这个关键性处理完成之后，如前面提到的，黑格尔在§113到§116中又回到用严格的逻辑对哲学的起点一定是空无的论证之中，这样一来他之后在§121和§122中做出哲学起点应该是空无的结论就要比直接在§110到§112的讨论后面来下这一结论显得自然的多。从§117到§120是他对其他人的观点一些反驳，在这反驳上黑格尔是有的放矢的，但因为他所反驳的观点不是我们目前所面临的问题，我们就没有必要在这里讨论了。 接下来值得一看的是黑格尔在《逻辑学》的第一捲第一部第一节的第一章的A到C（§132到§134 ）这三节里对於纯有，纯无，及它们之间的转化生成（becoming）的讨论和总结。在其中的A他说道： 在其中的B他说道： 在C节里他说道： 至此黑格尔实际上完成了他的所谓辩证逻辑中的关键性的人工逻辑的初步建构，之后他在紧接下来的几个注释（Remark ）里又进一步对上面的建构进行补充解释。其中比较有意思的是在§164里他通过对词汇的双关语义的运用再次论证了哲学的起点一定是什么都没有的无： 上面那段话的意思是如果其它一切都被排除在起点之外的话，那么起点就只能是什么都没有的无。那段中译文原本应该在“什么也没有剩下了”那里结束。但是那样的话，原文中通过语义的运用来表达的意思就消失了。所以我特意在原文的基础上补充了“所以那个在所有存在之外的开头就一定是什么也没有了，也就是无”这句话。但是，在“什么也没有剩下了”那里黑格尔显然又遇到前面在§110-§112那里所面临的如何从纯无跳到不是无的有的挑战，所以在§164接下来他又再从不同的角度来进行处理。这一次比较有意思的是他居然提到中国哲学里的无中生有来作为他的理论的佐证： 另外，他在之前的§136里也用到古希腊的赫拉克利特的哲学来作为他自己的有无转成的本体观的佐证： 但是，虽然黑格尔对於哲学起点的寻找以及最后得出的关於纯有（pure being），纯无（pure nothing），和转成（becoming）的理论被认为是黑格尔的本体论的核心也是他的逻辑学的基本，他在《逻辑学》一书中并没有单纯地从这个起点出发推导出任何内容来；尽管有无转化的思想贯穿著他的整本书，后人也仅是将黑格尔的转化生成的理论当作一个理念来解释现象或指导实践，而无法用作逻辑推导的基本出发点。我们可以泛泛地用本体论的口吻说，转化生成是宇宙间一切存在的基本，我们却无法象推导公式那样地单单从转化生成来推出任何结论来，它只能作为解释现象的一个基本条件而已。 一个一开始似乎是要作为一切逻辑的起点的内容，最后只能用作泛泛的哲学理念；而另一方面，不论是要提出纯有的概念还是纯无的概念或是转化生成的概念，都没有必要以那种貌似严格的逻辑推理的方式来进行。不但可以象老子以形而上的经验抽象的方式用“天下万物生於有，有生於无”，“有无相生”，“归於无极”，“无有入无间”，“故有之以为利，无之以为用”那样直接地表达出有与无的本体意义来，也可以如巴门尼德和赫拉克利特那样以诗歌的形式表达出来。我们甚至可以把黑格尔的建立在有无及其相互转化基础上的本体论看成是将巴门尼德与柏拉图关於有无的论述与赫拉克利特关於有无及其转变的思想的结合，完全没有必要象黑格尔那样大费周章。 最后必须指出，本文所讨论的是黑格尔对於他的本体论的核心概念的论证过程。而黑格尔的本体思想实际上贯穿於他的整本《逻辑学》之中，是它的被称之为辩证逻辑的有机组成部分。黑格尔在《逻辑学》中将本文前面提到的转化生成的本体思想运用於对千百年来人们所熟悉的一些形上学的概念的分析讨论，并在分析中形成了一个被称为黑格尔的辩证法的哲学方法。因为它不但具有一个比较完整的体系，而且可以用比较简单的形式总结表达出来（与黑格尔理论本身的繁复冗长形成对比），所以得到哲学界及非哲学界的广泛接受和运用，对过去两个世纪里的地球文明产生了巨大的影响。另外，本体论及与之相关的辩证逻辑只是黑格尔哲学的一部分，他的现象学突破了在真理形成过程中隔在人类主观与客观之间的帷幔，他关於绝对理念在自然与精神上的表现的论述也继柏拉图强调绝对理念之后再次引起世界对於绝对理念的意义的重视（尽管如他自己一再强调的，他的绝对理念的意义与柏拉图的不同）。总之，黑格尔的哲学在人类哲学的发展史上有著里程碑式的重大影响。 六． 结束语 通过对於名著《逻辑学》的一些具体细节的查考我们可以看到德国哲学巨匠黑格尔在他的哲学论述中的一些逻辑上的欠缺；这些欠缺并不会减损黑格尔因其对於人类哲学进步所做的无可否认的巨大贡献而拥有的在世界哲学界的崇高地位。对於这些欠缺的识别可以帮助我们更加准确地在人类整体文明中对庞大的黑格尔哲学体系进行定位，帮助解释过去许久以来人们在应用黑格尔哲学时存在的一些疑问，而不是试图对黑格尔哲学体系进行否认。 ------ 附录 本文所引用的黑格尔《逻辑学》内容之英译文 §33 In no science is the need to begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary reflections, felt more strongly than in the science of logic. In every other science the subject matter and the scientific method are distinguished from each other; also the content does not make an absolute beginning but is dependent on other concepts and is connected on all sides with other material. These other sciences are, therefore, permitted to speak of their ground and its context and also of their method, only as premises taken for granted which, as forms of definitions and such-like presupposed as familiar and accepted, are to be applied straight-way, and also to employ the usual kind of reasoning for the establishment of their general concepts and fundamental determinations. §34 Logic on the contrary, cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the science. But not only the account of scientific method, but even the Notion itself of the science as such belongs to its content, and in fact constitutes its final result; what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition. Similarly, it is essentially within the science that the subject matter of logic, namely, thinking or more specifically comprehensive thinking is considered; the Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of exposition and cannot therefore be premised. Consequently, what is premised in this Introduction is not intended, as it were, to establish the Notion of Logic or to justify its method scientifically in advance, but rather by the aid of some reasoned and historical explanations and reflections to make more accessible to ordinary thinking the point of view from which this science is to be considered. §62 ... However, the exposition of what alone can be the true method of philosophical science falls within the treatment of logic itself; for the method is the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic. §88 It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty and also the possibility of resolving it has been much discussed… §89 The principle of a philosophy does, of course, also express a beginning, but not so much a subjective as an objective one, the beginning of everything. The principle is a particular determinate content — water, the one, nous, idea, substance, monad, etc. Or, if it refers to the nature of cognition and consequently is supposed to be only a criterion rather than an objective determination — thought, intuition, sensation, ego, subjectivity itself. Then here too it is the nature of the content which is the point of interest. The beginning as such, on the other hand, as something subjective in the sense of being a particular, inessential way of introducing the discourse, remains unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and so too the need to find an answer to the question, With what should the beginning be made? remains of no importance in face of the need for a principle in which alone the interest of the matter in hand seems to lie, the interest as to what is the truth, the absolute ground. §90 …If earlier abstract thought was interested in the principle only as content, but in the course of philosophical development has been impelled to pay attention to the other side, to the behaviour of the cognitive process, this implies that the subjective act has also been grasped as an essential moment of objective truth, and this brings with it the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle. Thus the principle ought also to be the beginning, and what is the first for thought ought also to be the first in the process of thinking. §91 Here we have only to consider how the logical beginning appears; the two sides from which it can be taken have already been named, to wit, either as a mediated result or as a beginning proper, as an immediacy. §93 The beginning is logical in that it is to be made in the element of thought that is free and for itself, in pure knowing. §94 Logic is pure science, that is, pure knowledge in the entire range of its development. §98 … But if no presupposition is to be made and the beginning itself is taken immediately, then its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such… §101 The insight that absolute truth must be a result, and conversely, that a result presupposes a prior truth which, however, because it is a first, objectively considered is unnecessary and from the subjective side is not known — this insight has recently given rise to the thought that philosophy can only begin with a hypothetical and problematical truth and therefore philosophising can at first be only a quest. This view was much stressed by Reinhold in his later philosophical work and one must give it credit for the genuine interest on which it is based, an interest which concerns the speculative nature of the philosophical beginning. The detailed discussion of this view is at the same time an occasion for introducing a preliminary understanding of the meaning of progress in logic generally; for that view has a direct bearing on the advance; this it conceives to be such that progress in philosophy is rather a retrogression and a grounding or establishing by means of which we first obtain the result that what we began with is not something merely arbitrarily assumed but is in fact the truth, and also the primary truth. §102 It must be admitted that it is an important consideration — one which will be found in more detail in the logic itself — that the advance is a retreat into the ground, to what is primary and true, on which depends and, in fact, from which originates, that with which the beginning is made. Thus consciousness on its onward path from the immediacy with which it began is led back to absolute knowledge as its innermost truth. This last, the ground, is then also that from which the first proceeds, that which at first appeared as an immediacy. This is true in still greater measure of absolute spirit which reveals itself as the concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the end of the development is known as freely externalising itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate being —opening or unfolding itself [sich entschliessend] into the creation of a world which contains all that fell into the development which preceded that result and which through this reversal of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed into something dependent on the result as principle. The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first. §103 We see therefore that, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to consider as result that into which the movement returns as into its ground. In this respect the first is equally the ground, and the last a derivative; since the movement starts from the first and by correct inferences arrives at the last as the ground, this latter is a result. Further, the progress from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it, hence that which forms the starting point of the development remains at the base of all that follows and does not vanish from it. The progress does not consist merely in the derivation of an other, or in the effected transition into a genuine other; and in so far as this transition does occur it is equally sublated again. Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determinations. §104 Through this progress, then, the beginning loses the one-sidedness which attaches to it as something simply immediate and abstract; it becomes something mediated, and hence the line of the scientific advance becomes a circle. It also follows that because that which forms the beginning is still undeveloped, devoid of content, it is not truly known in the beginning; it is the science of logic in its whole compass which first constitutes the completed knowledge of it with its developed content and first truly grounds that knowledge. §105 But because it is the result which appears as the absolute ground, this progress in knowing is not something provisional, or problematical and hypothetical; it must be determined by the nature of the subject matter itself and its content. §106 The said beginning is neither an arbitrary and merely provisional assumption, nor is it something which appears to be arbitrarily and tentatively presupposed, but which is subsequently shown to have been properly made the beginning; not as is the case with the constructions one is directed to make in connection with the proof of a theorem in geometry, where it becomes apparent only afterwards in the proof that one took the right course in drawing just those lines and then, in the proof itself, in beginning with the comparison of those lines or angles; drawing such lines and comparing them are not an essential part of the proof itself. §107 Thus the ground, the reason, why the beginning is made with pure being in the pure science [of logic] is directly given in the science itself. This pure being is the unity into which pure knowing withdraws, or, if this itself is still to be distinguished as form from its unity, then being is also the content of pure knowing. It is when taken in this way that this pure being, this absolute immediacy has equally the character of something absolutely mediated. But it is equally essential that it be taken only in the one-sided character in which it is pure immediacy, precisely because here it is the beginning. If it were not this pure indeterminateness, if it were determinate, it would have been taken as something mediated, something already carried a stage further: what is determinate implies an other to a first. Therefore, it lies in the very nature of a beginning that it must be being and nothing else. To enter into philosophy, therefore, calls for no other preparations, no further reflections or points of connection. §108 For here at the start, where the subject matter itself is not yet to hand, philosophy is an empty word or some assumed, unjustified conception. Pure knowing yields only this negative determination, that the beginning is to be abstract. If pure being is taken as the content of pure knowing, then the latter must stand back from its content, allowing it to have free play and not determining it further. §109 But the determination of being so far adopted for the beginning could also be omitted, so that the only demand would be that a pure beginning be made. In that case, we have nothing but the beginning itself, and it remains to be seen what this is. This position could also be suggested for the benefit of those who, on the one hand, are dissatisfied for one reason or another with the beginning with being and still more so with the resulting transition of being into nothing, and, on the other hand, simply know no other way of beginning a science than by presupposing some general idea, which is then analysed, the result of such analysis yielding the first specific concept in the science. If we too were to observe this method, then we should be without a particular object, because the beginning, as the beginning of thought, is supposed to be quite abstract, quite general, wholly form without any content; thus we should have nothing at all beyond the general idea of a mere beginning as such. We have therefore only to see what is contained in such an idea. §110 As yet there is nothing and there is to become something the beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning therefore contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being. §111 for the beginning points to something else — it is a non-being which carries a reference to being as to an other; that which begins, as yet is not, it is only on the way to being. §112 The analysis of the beginning would thus yield the notion of the unity of being and nothing — or, in a more reflected form, the unity of differentiatedness and non-differentiatedness, or the identity of identity and non-identity. This concept could be regarded as the first, purest, that is, most abstract definition of the absolute — as it would in fact be if we were at all concerned with the form of definitions and with the name of the absolute. In this sense, that abstract concept would be the first definition of this absolute and all further determinations and developments only more specific and richer definitions of it. But let those who are dissatisfied with being as a beginning because it passes over into nothing and so gives rise to the unity of being and nothing, let them see whether they find this beginning which begins with the general idea of a beginning and with its analysis (which, though of course correct, likewise leads to the unity of being and nothing), more satisfactory than the beginning with being. §113 But there is a still further observation to be made about this procedure. The said analysis presupposes as familiar the idea of a beginning, thus following the example of other sciences. These presuppose their subject-matter and take it for granted that everyone has roughly the same general idea of it and can find in it the same determinations as those indicated by the sciences which have obtained them in one way or another through analysis, comparison and other kinds of reasoning. But that which forms the absolute beginning must likewise be something otherwise known; now if it is something concrete and hence is variously determined within itself, then this internal relation is presupposed as something known; it is thus put forward as an immediacy which, however, it is not; for it is a relation only as a relation of distinct moments, and it therefore contains mediation within itself. Further, with a concrete object, the analysis and the ways in which it is determined are affected by contingency and arbitrariness. Which determinations are brought out depends on what each person just finds in his own immediate, contingent idea. The relation contained in something concrete, in a synthetic unity, is necessary only in so far as it is not just given but is produced by the spontaneous return of the moments back into this unity — a movement which is the opposite of the analytical procedure, which is an activity belonging to the subject-thinker and external to the subject matter itself. §114 The foregoing shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot be made with anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition of which the concrete, now become simple, would be the result. But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and an other; for anything which is in its own self a first and an other implies that an advance has already been made. Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty being. §115 If impatience with the consideration of the abstract beginning should provoke anyone to say that the beginning should be made not with the beginning, but straightway with the subject matter itself, well then, this subject matter is nothing else but the said empty being; for what this subject matter is, that will be explicated only in the development of the science and cannot be presupposed by it as known beforehand. §116 Whatever other form the beginning takes in the attempt to begin with something other than empty being, it will suffer from the defects already specified. Let those who are still dissatisfied with this beginning tackle the problem of avoiding these defects by beginning in some other way. §121 …this simple determination which has no other meaning of any kind, this emptiness, is therefore simply as such the beginning of philosophy. §122 This insight is itself so simple that this beginning as such requires no preparation or further introduction; and, indeed, these preliminary, external reflections about it were not so much intended to lead up to it as rather to eliminate all preliminaries. §132 Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself…Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing. §133 Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content — undifferentiatedness in itself…Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being. §134 Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being — does not pass over but has passed over — into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself. §136 Against that simple and one-sided abstraction the deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward the higher, total concept of becoming and said: being as little is, as nothing is, or, all flows, which means, all is a becoming. §164 of course the being which is made the beginning of the science is nothing, for abstraction can be made from everything, and if abstraction is made from everything then nothing is left over. … that now the beginning should be made with nothing (as in Chinese philosophy), need not cause us to lift a finger, for before we could do so this nothing would no less have converted itself into being. 参考文献及尾注
[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality, 1840, trans. Arthur Brodrick Bullock, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1903 [2] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, 1844, trans. K. B. Haldane, M.A. and J. Kemp, M.A., London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1909 [3] 這裏需要強調一點：雖然黑格爾努力將傳統形而上學與傳統邏輯學統一于他的被稱爲辯證邏輯的框架中，他從未如很多人常誤以爲地那樣否認過作爲文明構成部分的傳統形而上學的邏輯地位，這一點從他在《邏輯學》通篇中對于形而上學的內容極其重要性的討論中可以看出。而人們對于這一點的誤解曾導致他們將黑格爾作爲錯誤地批判形而上學的例子。 [4] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 1816, trans. A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, New York: Humanity Books, 1969, 網上鏈接：https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/hl_index.htm [5] 先假設一種答案的存在然後再找出這種答案其實是應用數學上常用的一種方法。從嚴格的邏輯（包括嚴格的數學邏輯）來看，這種方法是有缺陷的，但是在應用數學上卻常常是一種有效地找到正確答案的途徑。不過由于黑格爾這裏的討論的問題涉及到整個人類文明的邏輯基礎，這裏用類似于應用數學的便宜之計所存在的邏輯上的不嚴格其實可以成爲一個致命的缺陷。 | 
