二十一、Moment of truth  大戰開始
    
Things really started to come together. I built the bank pad into one of the biggest on the street and word quickly spread about the aggressive kid from Morgan.
 一切真的開始越來越順。在我的努力下，我所做的業務在華爾街上位居前列，很快消息就傳了開來，摩根斯坦利有個作風犀利的年輕人。
    If a customer had something to do in the sector, I was the call. I traded huge positions and plunked money in Mother Morgan's till. It was a beautiful thing.
如果客戶想作金融板塊的衍生品交易，我是他們的第一選擇。我的交易頭寸很龐大，給“摩根媽媽”(Mother Morgan)的錢罐里添了不少錢，這是一件美好的事情。
     Keefe Bruyette was the biggest player in the financials on the Street and the crown jewel of my customer base. I worked hard to impress their head trader and before long, secured the majority of their flow.    Keefe Bruyette公司是華爾街上從事金融板塊衍生工具交易的最大玩家，也是我最重要的客戶。我竭盡全力給他們的首席交易員留下深刻印象，沒過多久，就把他們絕大多數交易拿到了手。 
    NationsBank, Chemical Bank, Chase Manhattan -- you name it, we traded it. I was only 27 years old but had established myself as a customer-friendly producer. If you wanted to trade a bank, you came to Morgan and you would get taken care of.
國民銀行(NationsBank)、紐約化學銀行(Chemical Bank)、大通銀行(Chase Manhattan)－－只要你能想到的銀行，我們全都負責交易。當時我只有27歲，卻已在業內確立了與客戶關係融洽的名聲。如果你想交易某個銀行的股票期權，那就來找摩根斯坦利，一定會得到滿意的服務。
     The First Interstate position began like any other. The stock was trading near $70 when Keefe's head trader asked Kim Dispigna, his Morgan salesperson, for a market in the 'Jan par leaps,' or January 100 call options that expired the following January.
起初，第一州際銀行(The First Interstate)的期權交易與任何一個普通交易一樣。當時股價接近70美元，Keefe的首席交易員向摩根斯坦利的銷售代表金姆?迪斯匹格納(Kim Dispigna)詢問“1月標準合約”(Jan par leaps)的價格，也就是明年1月到期的100手看漲期權的價格。
     I checked the floor and found that the options were three dollars wide and 50 up, meaning the customer could buy or sell 50 contracts on either side of an illiquid market.
我看了一下掛牌情況，發現這個差價有3美元，掛了50手，也就是說客戶可以在這個流動性不強的市場買入或者賣出50手合約。
     'What odd-lots,' I thought to myself as I tightened the market and increased the size tenfold. 'Whatever he needs,' I remember telling Kim, 'Just get the order.'
“怎麼才這麼一點。”我在心裡想，同時通過做市掛牌降低差價，並把合約數增加10倍。“不管他要買多少，”我記得自己對金姆說，“把指令拿來就行。”
     Keefe built upside exposure for a few days and before long, I had a large position. I had short call options for my customer, which gave them the right to purchase stock, and I also owned equity to hedge my risk.    在接下來的幾天，Keefe公司買入不少看漲期權，很快我手頭就持有一個很大的頭寸。我向客戶賣出看空期權，讓他們有權買入股票，同時我也買入股票對沖自己的風險。
     They became increasingly aggressive and I had trouble keeping up; the floor wouldn't sell any more calls and I was the only means of facilitation.   他們的胃口越來越大，我開始有點跟不上了。市場無法提供更多的看漲期權，我成為唯一的做市商。
     Finally, after several weeks, the customer asked what the position limit was.
     最終，過了幾星期，客戶問我他們能買入的上限是多少。
    'Eighty-five hundred contracts,' I replied, 'That's as many contracts as he's allowed to buy, according the exchange.' We were almost there. “8500手.”
我回答道，“這是證交所允許買入的最高限。”我們距離這個上限已經很近了。
     To say that I was involved in First Interstate is like saying that Google is involved in the Internet. If anyone on Wall Street had something to do in the name, they knew Morgan Stanley was the call.       現在，說我持有第一洲際銀行的股票，就像是在說谷歌(Google)從事的是互聯網業務。華爾街任何一個交易第一洲際銀行股票的人都知道，摩根斯坦利是個大多頭。
     I had a massive position -- short calls to my customer and long everything under the sun against them. I assumed the customer knew something and I went along for the ride.
我持有的頭寸十分龐大－－在向客戶賣出第一洲際銀行股票看空期權時，我自己買入任何可以對沖這一風險的東西。我認為客戶可能知道什麼消息，並準備好搭乘這趟便車。
 I traded that monster for months. When I liked the market, I pressed my upside bet. When I didn't like the tape, I shorted other banks against it. At no point did I waver from my conviction or abandon the position.    我玩弄這個龐然大物好幾個月時間。當我看好市場走勢時，就增加多頭部位，當不看好時，就賣空其他銀行進行對沖，但在任何時候我看多的信念都沒有動搖過，也沒有放棄過自己的多頭部位。
 Everyone in the room knew the story and I was sitting atop the train waiting for it to pull into the Promised Land.     交易大廳里的每個人都知道這件事，知道我現在坐在一列火車的頂上，等待啟程去往夢想之國。
 Stress? Sure, but I had an edge and it was razor sharp. 
有壓力嗎？當然，但我有自己的優勢，而這種優勢就像剃刀邊緣一樣犀利。

二十二、Cuts like a knife  收割時刻
 
It was a slow afternoon when Kim's voice cut through the quiet room.
一個交易清淡的下午，金姆的聲音突然划過寧靜的交易室。
 'How ya makin' Letter I?' she said, referring to First Interstate's old ticker.
 “字母I打頭的能交易嗎？”她問道，指的是第一洲際銀行的交易代碼。
 I looked at her and smiled, assuming she was teasing, as she was apt to do. Keefe was already at its position limit.     我微笑着看她，以為是在開玩笑，因為她經常跟我打趣。Keefe公司的持有部位已經到了上限。
 I looked at my screen, not bothering to call my broker to see what the floor market was. 'There's 50 offered at 23 1/2, I'll make it 500. Whaddya wanna do?' I said, calling her bluff.
我看着自己的交易屏，根本就懶得讓自己的場地經紀人去查市場交易情況。“現在有50手，報價23.5美元，我可以增加到500手，你想怎麼做？”我說，想戳穿她的虛張聲勢。
 'He needs a two-sided market,' she said, meaning Keefe was asking where it could sell.
“他需要一個雙邊市場，”金姆說，意思是Keefe想知道是可以賣空還是買多。
 'Really?' “真的？”
 'Yeah.' “沒錯。”
 I looked her in the eye, a smile no longer on my face. '21 1/2-23 1/2 500 up,' I offered with a slight crack in my voice.  我看着她的眼睛，臉上不再有笑容。“21.5/23.5，500手。”我的嗓音有點沙啞。
 'He'll sell ya 500 at 1/2' she shot back, 'and he's got more behind it.'
“這個價格他願意賣給你500手，”她回擊道，“而且接下來還有更多的賣單。”
 I'm not sure I breathed during the next several minutes. I slapped 500 on the tape and called my floor broker to sell some of my underlying exposure in my long position.    我不敢確定自己在接下來的幾分鐘內是否還有呼吸。我敲下500手的賣單，並讓經紀人賣出一些我持有的多頭股票。
 Unfortunately, every option trader on the floor knew the size of my position and the stock was knocked for a buck before I could blink.     不幸的是，市場上每個期權交易員都知道我持有的龐大部位，第一洲際銀行的股票一眨眼的功夫就暴跌了1美元。
 The closing bell was an hour away and an uneventful session suddenly became the most important day of my career. 離閉市還有一小時，這個本來風平浪靜的交易日突然變成我職業生涯中最重要的一天。
 'Keep reflecting bids,' Kim said, 'I think he wants to get done today.'
“不斷重複這個賣單，”金姆說，“我想他希望在今天全部賣掉。”
 I needed to make sales and asked the customer if I could 'get in shape' and he told me to go for it. 我得促成這些交易，並問客戶能否讓我“減減肥”，他說可以。
  I sold stock, preparing to trade another slug of calls. If the customer was going to sell 8,000 call options -- which represented 800,000 shares -- I knew I would have to buy most of them. With 15 minutes left in the session, I yelled 'Figure bid for 8,000!'        我賣出股票，並準備新一輪賣單的來臨。如果客戶想賣出8000手看漲期權─這代表着80萬股第一洲際銀行的股票─我知道自己必須幾乎照單全收。離閉市還有15分鐘的時候，我大聲喊道：“掛8000手買單！”
 I needed Keefe to sell me the rest of his position so I could unwind my risk and work off my remaining exposure in the marketplace. I watched Kim as she spoke to the head trader, clenching my jaw as I held the phone tightly to my ear. My floor broker was at the ready.         我需要Keefe把剩下的頭寸賣給我，這樣我就可以有時間化解風險，把自己剩餘的頭寸慢慢平掉。我盯着金姆和Keefe的首席交易員商量，話筒緊緊貼着耳邊，下巴咬得死死的，我的市場經紀人在隨時待命。
 'Great bid,' she said. 'He's gonna hold tight and finish up in the morning.'
“成交，”金姆說，“客戶確認了，明天早上完成交易。”
 Our trade would have to wait.  我們的交易只有等待。

二十三、Sleepless in Manhattan  曼哈頓不眠夜
    
I was the first person on the trading floor the next day for no other reason than I hadn't been able to sleep.     第二天早上，我第一個來到交易室；不為別的，因為我根本就睡不着。
     At 6 a.m., the bank trader from the listed stock desk walked over to me, smiled and said 'You're still involved in Letter I, right?' My heart froze. 凌晨6點，上市公司股票交易席位的銀行類股票交易員向我走來，笑着說：“你還有I打頭的股票，對嗎？”我的心一下子揪了起來。
     'Yeah...?' “嗯…？”
     'You're...you're still long it, right? Please tell me you're still long it.'
“你…你還是看多，對嗎？請跟我說你還是看多。”
   My mouth opened but nothing came out. The trader turned and walked away without saying a word. 我的嘴巴張大，但什麼也說不出來。交易員轉身走開，一句話也沒留下。
     I grabbed the Journal, went to the men's room and stepped in to the far stall. Three minutes later, the entire trading floor erupted. I'm not sure how long I sat there. But it didn't matter; I desperately wanted to stay. 我抓起《華爾街日報》，走進洗手間最裡頭的一個隔間。三分鐘後，我覺得整個交易大廳天崩地裂。我不知道自己在那裡呆了多久，但沒關係，我很想多呆一會兒。
     I took several deep breaths, left the Journal on the floor and stepped out the door.
     我深深地吸了幾口氣，把《華爾街日報》放在地板上，走出洗手間。
     You would have thought that I hit a walk-off home run and teammates were waiting for me at the home plate of Yankee Stadium.    你可能會想，人們對我的歡迎程度，彷佛就像自己在揚基棒球隊的主場擊出一個本壘打，隊員們在本壘無比熱烈地迎接我。
    Salespeople patted me on the back, traders gave me the thumbs up and friends from the Street left messages to congratulate me. The head of the department walked up to me with a sparkle in his eye and almost hugged me.    銷售代表拍我的背，交易員對我翹起大拇指，華爾街上的朋友們給我發來信息表示祝賀，部門負責人兩眼放光地沖我走來，幾乎就要和我擁抱到一起。
     'Way to go, Todd-o, way to stick it out!' “幹得漂亮，托德，幹得漂亮！”
     There was only one small problem -- I was short, very short. Through my trades the day before with Keefe, I bet that the stock would decline and I would be able to cover the rest of my position for a profit.    但有個小問題─我已經轉為看空，非常看空。通過昨天和Keefe達成的交易，我押賭今天股票會下跌，所以大筆做空，希望通過多空的切換來實現盈利。
     Instead, the stock traded 35 points higher and what would have been a seven-figure win suddenly morphed into a multiple seven-figure loss.   然而，今天的股價比昨天收盤價高出35個點，本來可以有七位數的盈利，現在卻突然變成幾個七位數的虧損。
     Wells Fargo had been in talks with First Interstate and the deal fell apart. That may or may not be the reason Keefe tried to sell his position. I didn't know and it didn't matter. Wells Fargo made a hostile bid, which at the time was unheard of in the banking sector.    富國銀行(Wells Fargo)一直在和第一洲際銀行商談購併計劃，但這筆交易流產了。這可能就是，也可能不是Keefe試圖平掉其頭寸的原因。我不知道真相是什麼，但這並不重要。富國銀行發起一場敵意收購，這在當時的銀行業可謂史無前例。
     To add insult to injury, Morgan Stanley was the banker on the deal and I was restricted from trading either stock. My position was taken from me on the opening. In other words, I was completely screwed.    雪上加霜的是，摩根斯坦利為這筆購併交易提供投行服務，我受到限制，根本不能買賣兩家銀行的股票。我的頭寸一開盤就被人接走，也就是說，我徹底搞砸了。
     I didn't move from my turret all day. I didn't go to the bathroom. I didn't eat lunch. I didn't make outgoing calls. I didn't do anything but stare at the flickering 'I' that continued to wink and blink and taunt me so.     我在自己的座位上呆着，一整天都沒有挪窩，洗手間沒去，午飯沒吃，不打任何電話，只是呆呆地看着屏幕，上面閃爍跳動的第一洲際銀行的股價彷佛在不斷嘲笑着我。
     Around 7 p.m., Ralph Reynolds, the head of our department, called me into his office. Here we go, I thought, the end of my world as I knew it.   晚上7點左右，部門負責人拉夫.雷諾德(Ralph Reynolds)把我叫進辦公室。完了，我想，這下子徹底完蛋了。
     Someone once told me that on Wall Street, you're only as good as your last trade. I assumed that spoke to the general direction of performance, not the literal interpretation that suddenly sank in.     有人曾對我說過一句話，一個人在華爾街的價值是以最後一筆交易來衡量的。我以為這是對業績為王現象的一種比喻，而不應從字面上來理解，但我突然理解了這層意思。
    I was so close to the cash register. Yet after a single trade, my career was over. I would have banked millions of dollars if the deal were announced a day earlier. Instead, I was going to be a sacrificial lamb. My confidence and self-esteem were shattered as I prepared myself for the inevitable news.
我離華爾街的收款機近在咫尺，但一個交易過後，我的職業生涯就此結束。如果敵意收購的消息早一天傳出，我就可以賺到成百上千萬美元，但現在，自己卻成為一隻可憐的替罪羊。我的自信和自尊已經蕩然無存，準備迎接無法躲避的壞消息。
     I explained the sequence of events to my boss as he stared deep into my eyes. My trading account was still up substantially for the year but I was certain it wouldn't matter. He measured me as if he was judging my soul. After a long pause, he spoke.         我把事情的來龍去脈向老闆說了一遍，他一直盯着我的眼睛看。我今年的交易情況還是給公司賺了不少錢，但我想這一定無濟於事。他在考量着我，就像要審判我的靈魂一樣。經過長時間的沉默，他終於說話了。
    'Go home, get some rest and come ready to play the next day.'    “回家，休息一下，明天再來上班。”
 He wasn't happy about the loss but he wasn't going to spike my career over it. The mechanics of my swing, he decided, outweighed the results of the at-bat.     他對虧損並不滿意，但不打算對我毀了我的事業。他做出的結論是，我揮拍的動作比擊球的結果更重要。
 I walked from the office, took the elevator downstairs, exited Morgan Stanley's offices and turned the corner.    我從辦公室走出來，坐電梯下樓，走出摩根斯坦利的辦公大樓，繞過街道的拐角。
 There, as I leaned against a neighboring building, surrounded by strangers making their way to the theater, I began to laugh.
在那裡，我靠在一棟樓的 上，周圍都是去看活劇的陌生人。我開始大笑起來。
 Within a few minutes, tears were streaming down the sides of my cheeks.
 幾分鐘後，我的兩頰上掛滿了眼淚。

二十四、重拾自信

   我在第一洲際銀行(First Interstate)的交易中遭遇滑鐵盧之後，摩根斯坦利的管理層密切關注我的交易方式，就像棒球隊教練關注一個被快球擊中頭部的強擊手一樣。我花了一段時間才撿回自信，但做過幾筆漂亮的交易後，我又重新找回了工作節奏。
   有件事我一直沒想明白，是患有注意力缺失症的人適合做交易員，還是交易員的工作壓力大所以很容易注意力缺失。不管怎麼說，這次慘敗經歷很快就被我拋在腦後了。
   幾個月後，發獎金的日子又來了，我的年薪再次翻倍，達到30萬美元。26歲的我還獲得晉升，成為公司最年輕的副總裁。
   冥冥中自有天意。13歲的時候，我站在收銀台後，把麵包圈賣給小鎮另一邊家境殷實的同學們。13年後，我已經有錢買下整個麵包圈店。
   “托德.哈里森，摩根斯坦利公司全球股票衍生品副總裁。”
   我的名片成為我最愛的財產。這就是我命中注定的職業生涯，財富決定個人價值，金錢代表事業成功。當時的我並不傲慢自大，但回過頭來看，自己確實有點找不到北了。
   在工作之餘，你們可以想象得到，一個二十多歲的年輕人揣着一大筆錢會找些什麼樂子。我去漢普頓(Hamptons)度假消夏，買了幾輛保時捷跑車，不停地換女朋友，有找老婆的打算，但並不是太着急。
   在辦公室，我注意到別人對我的看法發生了微妙的變化。那些年紀大一些的未被提升的銷售代表和交易員態度為之一變。我早上帶着宿醉跌跌撞撞地來上班不再是件可笑或可愛的事，現在我是管理層的一員，從公司利潤大餅中切下較大的一塊帶回家，這種舉動屬於失態，顯得很不專業。
   我第一次真正品嘗到摩根斯坦利內部政治鬥爭的滋味，這是絕大多數巨頭企業存在的齷齪潛規則。我清楚，如果自己繼續有上佳表現，批評的聲音很快就會平息下來。天真的我一去不復返，取而代之的是對權力的渴望，這筆交易我心甘情願。
   經過多年的不懈努力，我牢牢地抓住了成功，感覺非常棒。我讓衣櫥里的服裝煥然一新，去高尚餐廳吃晚飯，照顧好自己的家人。生活如此美好，至少我這麼認為，自己多年來渴望得到的，已經成為現實。
    也許，對美好前程的憧憬讓我昏了頭，但這並不重要。1996年轉瞬即逝，我確信成功就在下一個拐角處。

Following the First Interstate fiasco, Morgan Stanley management watched the way I traded like a baseball manager watches a slugger beaned by a fastball. It took a while to regain my confidence but after a few solid strokes, I found my rhythm.
I've never figured out if people with attention deficit disorder made good traders or if the assimilation of a sensory overload environment gave traders that affliction. Either way, the debacle quickly faded in my rear-view mirror.
    When bonus season rolled around a few months later, my compensation again doubled to $300,000. I was also promoted, becoming the youngest vice president in the firm at the age of 26.
I couldn't help notice the symmetry. At 13, I was standing behind a counter serving bagels to affluent classmates from the other side of town. Thirteen years later, I could afford to buy the bagel store.
'Todd A. Harrison, Vice-President, Global Equity Derivatives, Morgan Stanley.'
    My business card became my favorite possession. That was the way I was programmed; my net worth dictated self-worth and money defined success. I wasn't arrogant or cocky, but in hindsight my sensibilities were surely skewed.
    Outside the office, I had the type of fun you might expect a twenty-something making a lot of money to have. I summered in the Hamptons, treated myself to a few Porsches and migrated from one girlfriend to the next, keeping an eye out for a wife but not looking particularly hard.
Inside the office, I noticed a subtle shift in the general perception. Older salesmen and traders who were passed over for a promotion adopted a different attitude. The mornings I rumbled in with a hangover were no longer cute or funny. I was an officer of the firm that took home a larger slice of the bonus pie; it was suddenly considered unprofessional.
It was my first real taste of Morgan Stanley politics, the nasty subculture that exists in most big companies. I knew if I continued to produce, the critics would be silenced. The innocence was gone but it was replaced with power. That trade I was willing to make.
After years of reaching for the brass ring, my grasp around it firmed and I liked the way it felt. I upgraded my wardrobe, dined at fine restaurants and took care of my family. Life was good or so I thought, as I had the types of things I was conditioned to aspire to.
    Perhaps I was blinded by the promise of bigger and better things but I didn't care. As 1996 rolled around, I was certain they were right around the corner. 

二十五、Welcome to the jungle  叢林世界
 
    As I climbed the Morgan totem pole, I took tremendous pride in what I did and how I did it. The equity floor was a financial juggernaut and the derivative desk was at the center of it all. 在攀爬摩根斯坦利的圖騰柱時，我對自己做過的事以及做事的方式抱有極大的自豪感。股票交易場地是金融海洋的漩渦，而衍生品交易席位則是漩渦的最中心。
   We wore 'MORGAN' across our chest like a badge of honor. It was us against Goldman Sachs -- two titans on the street in a rivalry that made the Yanks and Sox look like high-school sweethearts. 我們胸口佩戴着“摩根”(MORGAN)徽章，就像榮譽勳章一樣。摩根斯坦利與高盛(Goldman Sachs)這兩家華爾街巨頭之間的對抗，讓紐約揚基隊和波士頓紅襪隊的爭鬥看上去就像小孩子打架。
   During the several regime changes in my department, I saw bad things happen to good people. The steady stalwarts -- the guys who came to work and produced every day -- were passed over for promotion in favor of politically savvy players. 在衍生品交易團隊的幾次人事更替中，我看到一些好人沒好報的現象。那些工作兢兢業業、每天任勞任怨的人得不到晉升機會，而那些玲瓏八面善於鑽營的人，卻混得風生水起，春風得意。
     I learned a lot during those years, particularly when I was perceived as a threat to the establishment. That never made much sense, as I was a producer on the desk and an ambassador of our institution. 那些年，我學到了很多東西，尤其在別人認為我對即成秩序構成危險那段時間。那種想法根本不合情理，因為我的交易給公司賺了不少錢，而且成為客戶與公司之間良好的溝通橋梁。
    I was asked to recruit on behalf of the firm. They sent me to UCLA and North Carolina, put me up in swanky hotels and told me to interview college co-eds. Morgan's blue blood flowed through my veins and I did what I could to further our cause. 我受命為公司招聘新員工。他們派我去加州大學洛杉磯分校(UCLA)和北卡羅來納(North Carolina)，讓我住豪華酒店，面試那些大學生。摩根斯坦利的藍血在我血管里奔流，我竭盡所能，致力於讓公司更好地發展。
    Agendas abound when money's around and they're not always consistent with the corporate mandate. I never kissed up or played the game and that didn't sit well with Mark Neuberger, the man who deftly navigated the changing landscape to become a managing director in 1996.  錢多的地方是非也多，而且很多事情並不總以公司的利益為先。我從不溜須拍馬，也不拉幫結派，這一點和馬克.努伯格(Mark Neuberger)可謂背道而馳。他善於在人事變更中靈巧地發現機會，並在1996年坐上了董事總經理的寶座。

二十六、The office  辦公室政治
 
    After the second management shakeup of my tenure, Mark was named to run the equity derivative trading operation. He stepped over a lot of people to get there, but did what he had to and got what he wanted. Unfortunately, his plans didn't include room for an up and comer with plans of his own.  入司後，我經歷了第二次管理層大換血，馬克成為股票衍生品交易團隊的負責人。他是踩着很多人才得到這個位置的，為此不惜手段，並終於得償所願。不幸的是，他的發展藍圖並沒有給一個有自己發展規劃的年輕人留下空間。
     When several high-profile traders defected to other firms, Mark put his thumbprint on the operation. He took the most active tech stocks such as Dell, Intel, Microsoft and Cisco. He assigned the less-liquid stocks to others on the desk.  在幾個頗具聲望的交易員倒戈跳槽後，馬克將衍生品團隊攬於自己的控制之下，負責戴爾(Dell)、英特爾(Intel)、微軟(Microsoft)和思科(Cisco)等最活躍的技術股的交易，而把流動性較差的股票品種交給其他交易員去做。
     His strategy was simple: trade the names trafficked by the largest commission-paying customers and leave the other, more difficult trades for others. There were times when one of our customers entered an order in an illiquid stock, and Mark instructed me to facilitate the transaction.     他的策略很簡單，把給佣金最高的客戶所青睞的投資品種掌握在自己手裡，把其他做起來難一些的交易交給別人。有時候我們的客戶會要求交易一個流動性較差的股票，馬克就交給我去安排。
   'One firm firm,' he said as he passed the risk, knowing full well that my profit and loss would bear the brunt of the damage. “這家公司你來做。”他把交易風險傳遞給我，心裡非常清楚，產生的損失都由我給公司創造的利潤來彌補。
    Sometimes I facilitated the orders, other times I refused. One time, when I took down a chunk of calls that moved against me for a six-figure loss, he laughed and said. 'There it goes!'  
有時候我會接受，但有時也會拒絕。一次，我接下一大筆看漲期權的單子，結果遭受了六位數的損失，他大笑着對我說：“搞砸了吧！”
 The writing was on the wall at that very moment. 
在那個時刻，他的意圖已是昭然若顯。
 
二十七、Conduct unbecoming  行為不當
   
One afternoon, towards the end of 1996, I was summoned to human resources high atop our new tower at 1585 Broadway. When I walked into the conference room, several people were seated around a large oak table. Mark Neuberger sat at the far end.     1996年末的一天下午，我被叫到百老匯街1585號新辦公大樓頂層的人力資源部。我走進會議室，看到幾個人圍坐在一張大的橡木辦公桌旁，馬克.努伯格就坐在最遠的位置上。
    They informed me I was being put on probation for conduct unbecoming a Morgan Stanley professional. I studied the room and when my eyes met Mark and he looked away, I knew precisely what was happening.    他們通知我，我因不符合摩根斯坦利專業人員的不當行為而被留職察看。我環視整個房間，目光轉向馬克時，他不敢和我對視。我心裡非常清楚，這到底是怎麼一回事。
    They handed me my annual review and there, on a single piece of paper, it said the other desk heads -- the men who ran the listed and over-the-counter operations -- didn't trust me. 
他們把我的年度考評報告給我看，報告只有一頁紙，上面說其他交易席位─即上市公司股票交易席位和櫃檯外股票交易席位─的負責人不信任我。
    Odd, I thought. Jon Olesky, the managing director of the listed stock desk, was in charge of recruiting and personally picked me to represent the firm. David Slaine ran the OTC desk and was my big brother on the street. It was a power struggle pure and simple, and Mark didn't want me around to challenge his authority.     真邪門，我心裡想。上市公司股票交易席位的董事總經理喬納.奧雷斯基(Jon Olesky)曾負責新員工招聘，親自挑選我代表公司去選人；而櫃檯外股票交易席位的負責人戴維.斯萊恩(David Slaine)則是我在華爾街的老大哥。這純粹是一場權力鬥爭，馬克不想讓我在身邊挑戰他的權威，就這麼簡單。 

    I protested to Mark's boss, Tom Clark, and was told to not rock the boat. He wanted me to sign the review, as we were required to do, and take one for the team.    我向馬克的老闆湯姆.克拉克(Tom Clark)投訴，但他勸我不要搞得公司不和諧，希望我服從要求，在考評報告上簽字，為團隊的全局考慮。
    I was upset but didn't want to leave the only firm I had ever worked for.
    我很沮喪，但不想離開自己的第一份工作。
    I didn't want to leave my brothers. 不想離開在這裡的兄弟們。
    I didn't want to leave the cash register.  不想離開收銀台。
 

二十八、The good ship  再度啟程
   
Slaino didn't like what he was seeing. He knew I was being sandbagged, and he protested in kind. As he was in a different department -- and as the equity division suffered another wave of defections -- his protests fell on deaf ears.
斯萊恩不喜歡馬克處理這些事情的方式，他知道我是被冤枉的，於是為我出頭提出抗議。但他在別的部門，而且當時整個股票部門正遭受着另一波的跳槽衝擊，因此他的抗議沒有得到任何反響。
    I refused to sign the review. It was fundamentally false and I knew that as soon as I put pen to paper, my days at Mother Morgan would be numbered.
我拒絕在考評報告上簽字，因為報告存在根本性的錯誤，而且我知道一旦簽上名字，自己在“摩根媽媽”的日子就屈指可數了。
    Seven years, I thought to myself. Seven years of blood, sweat and tears. I wasn't going out like that.   七年了，我對自己說，七年的血汗和淚水，我不能就這樣被掃地出門。
    A few months earlier, Raj Rajratanam and Gary Rosenbach, formerly of Needham & Company, created a powerful new hedge fund. The Galleon Group opened for business with roughly $500 million under management and they were the talk of the town.
幾個月前，曾在Needham & Company公司工作的拉吉.拉吉拉塔南姆(Raj Rajratanam) 和蓋瑞.羅森巴赫(Gary Rosenbach)新創建了一個實力很強的對沖基金Galleon Group，剛開業就管理約5億美元的資金，成為華爾街的熱門談資。
    Slaino and Gary were close friends after years on the street, and David made the introduction. I began to facilitate some of Gary's option trades and we developed a healthy rapport. As we made money together, the conversations increased in frequency.     斯萊恩和蓋瑞是在華爾街摸爬滾打多年的好朋友，於是介紹我認識。我開始安排蓋瑞的一些期權交易，建立起很好的默契。在共同賺錢的過程中，我們之間的溝通頻率也不斷增加。
    I didn't want to leave Morgan but I was fighting a losing battle. Every few days, Tom asked me to sign the review and each time I declined. I knew that I couldn't put it off forever.   我不想離開摩根斯坦利，但覺得自己在這場戰爭中必敗無疑。每隔幾天，湯姆就會要求我在考核報告上簽字，每次我都拒絕，但心裡清楚，自己不可能永遠這樣拖下去。
    With David's endorsement, I began discussions with Galleon about moving to their shop. They didn't have a derivative specialist and it was an intuitive fit. As pressure continued to build, I found myself delving deeper into the potential opportunity.    在斯萊恩的推薦下，我開始和Galleon公司商談跳槽過去的事。他們沒有衍生品專家，所以這是想都不用想的事。在公司受到的排擠日增，而我對跳槽機會也開始日漸關注。
    We agreed that I would join them as the managing director of derivatives. I would receive a token salary and derive the lion's share of my compensation as a function of performance.        最後我和Galleon公司談好，去那裡擔任衍生品交易董事總經理，有一個象徵性的底薪，主要收入來自於業績提成。
    I walked into Tom's office and shut the door behind me. I expressed reservations about the falsities contained in the review and he assured me that I would be taken care of.
我走進湯姆的辦公室，把門關上，向他說明我可以簽字，但對考核報告中的錯誤說法持保留意見。他向我保證，會處理好這件事。
    'Will I really be taken care of?' I asked with great concern.
    “你真的會處理好？”我很擔心地問道。
    'You have my word,' he said, pushing the review directly in front of me as he uncapped his pen.       “我向你保證。”他說，把報告直接推到我面前，並把筆帽摘下。
    I signed the review, putting my better judgment aside. When bonus time arrived, I was paid $500,000 for one year's worth of work.    我在報告上簽了字，姑且信他一回。發獎金的時候到了，我的年薪是50萬美元。
    I thanked them and waited patiently for the check to clear. Once it did, I walked into Tom's office and tendered my resignation.   我向他們表示感謝，耐心地等待支票兌現。錢一到手，我走進湯姆的辦公室，交出自己的辭呈。
    They were stuck. Not only had they just paid a half-million dollars to a departing trader, I went to work for the most respected new hedge fund on the street.
   他們驚呆了，不僅是因為剛剛付了50萬美元的巨款給一個即將離職的交易員，而且我去的是華爾街最受人尊重的新對沖基金。
    Vikram Pandit, who eventually became CEO of Citigroup Inc., ran Morgan's equity division and called me to his office to offer congratulations. He said that if there was anything I needed, he would be happy to oblige.      後來成為花旗集團(Citigroup Inc.)首席執行官的潘偉迪(Vikram Pandit)此時負責摩根斯坦利的股票部門，他把我叫進辦公室表示祝賀，並說如果我有什麼需要的，他樂意幫忙。
    I gathered my belongings and said goodbye to the only professional family I ever knew. I felt like I out-traded the best desk on the street.
我收拾好東西，向自己工作過的唯一一個專業投資機構說再見，覺得自己在與華爾街最好的交易席位的博弈中取得了勝利。
    The power shoe was on the other foot, and I liked the way it fit. 
    現在我換上了另一雙好鞋，我喜歡那種合腳的感覺。 

二十九、新開始

   我很想說自己上了對沖基金Galleon Group這條船後一路順風順水，但實際情況是，迎接我的是一場完美風暴。
   泰國解除泰銖與美元之間的聯繫匯率後，一個全球性的金融危機正在醞釀之中，其引發的多米諾骨牌效應波及整個亞洲，並讓資本市場體系陷入癱瘓狀態。
   當時，我還沒注意泰銖的問題，也不關注那個名叫“長期資本管理公司”(Long Term Capital Management)的強大對沖基金。我根本沒有意識到，亞洲彼岸一隻蝴蝶煽動的翅膀可以在紐約57號東大街掀起一場颶風。
   我管理公司整體組合的敞口衍生交易，自己也管理一個組合，後者規模較小，但我可以從利潤中提成。雖然一切聽上去很簡單，但我很快發現，自己在摩根斯坦利學到的技巧在買方投資領域並不是很管用。
   我喜歡當客戶的感覺。摩根斯坦利、高盛、第一波士頓、德意志銀行，以及其他頂尖公司都爭着來拉我們的生意。作為負責執行指令的交易員，我經常決定選擇哪些公司安排交易並向其支付佣金。
   我周圍人才濟濟，但也面對一個現實，即對沖基金的交易員得憑自己的業績吃飯。那裡沒有源源不斷的客戶流，也沒有響噹噹的名聲。一切都完全不同於從前。
   辦公室里坐着八個人，手無寸鐵，只有智慧和信息作為武器。當金融危機逐漸在全世界蔓延時，我根本沒想到要給自己穿上一件防彈衣。
   我在兩個角色間來迴轉換，把主要精力放在公司旗艦基金的衍生品組合上，因為當時我確信這就是自己的飯票。
   蓋瑞.羅森巴赫(Gary Rosenbach) 、拉吉.拉吉拉塔南姆(Raj Rajratanam) 和其他三個合伙人暴風驟雨般地把交易指令發過來，而我則尋找各種方法來把他們的想法付諸實施。
   我在公司整體敞口上花的精力越多，投入自己那個組合的精力就越少。到年底時，自己組合上的虧損堆積起來，飯碗能否保住，完全要看那幾個我幾乎一無所知的人做出的決定。
   最後的結果是不發獎金。事實上，他們告訴我，以交易賬戶的業績來看，我能保住這份工作已經很走運了。
I would love to say it was easy sailing as I reached for the rudder at the hedge fund, Galleon Group. The truth is I navigated directly toward the perfect storm. 
    A global financial contagion began brewing after Thailand cut the peg between the Thai baht and the U.S. dollar. That began a domino effect that spread throughout Asia and crippled the capital market system.
I wasn't thinking about the Thai baht, nor focused on a powerful hedge fund called Long Term Capital Management. I was unaware that a butterfly flapping its wings in Asia could create a hurricane on East 57th Street in New York City.
I managed the derivative exposure for the overall portfolio and traded my own, smaller book, where I would be paid a percentage of the profits. It sounded easy but I quickly discovered that the skills I learned at Morgan Stanley weren't helpful on the buy side.
I enjoyed life as a customer. Morgan, Goldman , First Boston, Deutsche Bank and other top-tier firms all vied for our business. As the trader responsible for executing the orders, I often chose which firms were paid with our commissions.
I was surrounded by tremendous talent, but struggled with the reality that hedge-fund traders eat what they kill. There wasn't customer flow to lean against or a franchise to tap into; it was an entirely different process.
There were about eight of us sitting in a room, armed with nothing but acumen and information. As financial contagion consumed the world, finding a life vest was the last thing on my mind.
I toggled between my two roles, focusing primarily on the derivative portfolio of the flagship fund, as I was certain that was my meal ticket.
Gary Rosenbach, Raj Rajratanam and three other partners slapped on positions at a furious pace and I looked for ways to leverage their ideas into performance.
The more time I spent on the overall exposure, the less I focused on my own trading. By the time the end of the year arrived, losses piled up on my pad and my job security was at the mercy of a select few I barely knew.
    There would be no bonus. In fact, given the performance in my trading account, I was told I was lucky to have a job.
 

三十、The beginning of the bubble  泡沫開始
 
    As the world markets digested the global imbalances, Alan Greenspan slammed his foot on the gas with historic fiscal and monetary stimuli. That planted the seeds of the dot.com bubble that would eventually create the real estate, commodity and debt bubbles behind it.
在全球貿易不平衡的大背景下，艾倫.格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)推出史無前例的財政和貨幣刺激政策，開足馬力促進經濟增長。這埋下了互聯網虛假繁榮的種子，並隨後造成房地產、大宗商品和債務的泡沫。
 David Slaine resigned from Morgan Stanley to join Galleon as a partner in 1998. Assets under management swelled into the billions and our stature grew in kind. 1998年，戴維.斯萊恩(David Slaine)從摩根斯坦利辭職，以合伙人的身份加入Galleon。公司管理的資產膨脹到數十億美元，我們在業界的地位也水漲船高。
 Slaino and I sat next to each other as Galleon grew into one of the most powerful funds on Wall Street. I sharpened my skills and learned how to play the game. 我就坐在斯萊恩旁邊，一起看着Galleon成長為華爾街實力最強的對沖基金之一。我的交易技巧不斷得到提高，並學會了對沖基金的遊戲規則。
 Following the script I wrote at Morgan, I did whatever I could to add value. This time, however, I had a skill set to execute upon. I introduced options that leveraged in-house strategies and offered intricate ways to maximize reward relative to risk.  和在摩根斯坦利一樣，我在Galleon也想方設法增加自己對公司的價值。不過，這次我已經有了一套成型的交易技巧，利用期權手段來實施公司的投資策略，通過錯綜複雜的方式使風險收益最大化。
 I wasn't a partner, however. That was a fact of which I was reminded often. In one of our morning meetings, I noted that Russia imploded and offered that it could pollute the U.S., a thought dismissed by the partners.  然而，我還不是合伙人，這一點我經常提醒自己。有一天，在投資晨會上，我指出俄羅斯市場暴跌，建議說這可能會影響到美國市場，但合伙人並不同意這個觀點。
    A few days later, global markets were infected and stocks began to cascade lower. It was an expensive lesson, as unforeseen systemic forces overwhelmed my stylistic approach to risk management.    幾天后，全球市場都受到影響，股價全面跳水。我們為此付出了高昂的學費，不可預見的系統性洪水衝垮了我的風險管理大壩。
    After the downdraft, the market rallied in response to the coordinated agenda by central banks around the world. That won the battle for Alan Greenspan, and he was lauded as the best Federal Reserve chairman of all time.
市場陷入低谷後，各國央行聯手推出一系列振興計劃，股市開始重整旗鼓。格林斯潘打贏了這場戰役，被譽為有史以來最佳的美聯儲主席。
   History would teach us that his policies forever changed the DNA of the marketplace and laid the seeds of sorrow that eventually collapsed the system. Nobody cared at the time; investors around the world were too busy enjoying the feast before the famine.   歷史會告訴我們，格林斯潘的政策永遠改變了資本市場的基因構成，埋下了苦難的種子，並最終導致金融系統的奔潰。但在當時，沒人關心這個問題，全世界的投資者都在享受饑荒來臨之前的資本市場饕餮大餐。

三十一、Back to life, back in reality  回到現實
 
    The intelligence and information in that small room on East 57th Street was matched only by the size of the egos. They profited in good times and bad as I crafted derivative strategies that maximized gains and stemmed losses.
57號東大街那個小辦公室里匯集的咨訊信息規模之大，只有身處其中之人的自負才堪與相比。無論市場好壞，公司都能賺到錢，而我則在精心安排衍生品交易策略，確保收益最大化，同時避免損失發生。
 I focused more of my attention on the big fund, certain that it was my meal ticket to bigger and better things. As 1998 drew to a close, I was finally going to cash in.      我把更多的精力放在旗艦基金上，認為這是我獲得更大成功的入門券。1998年底，終於又要發獎金了。
 If you told me while I was growing up that I would make six figures in my 20s, I would have been thrilled. But my sights were set on a new benchmark. I wanted to be a millionaire by the time I was 30.    在我年輕時，如果你說我二十多歲就能賺到六位數的年薪，我會激動不已。但現在，我的眼光已經鎖定在更高的標準上，希望在30歲前成為百萬富翁。
 There were six partners at Galleon and more than enough profits to go around. I couldn't help do the math in my head.    Galleon只有六個合伙人，而賺的錢夠很多人分的，我忍不住在腦子裡盤算起來。
 I could smell it -- extreme affluence was right around the corner. I sat down with Gary, exchanged pleasantries and awaited communication of my reward.
我能聞到鈔票的味道─巨大的財富就在下一個拐角處等着我。我和蓋瑞坐了下來，說了幾句打趣的話，等待着關於獎金的消息。
 The terms of my employment were very clear, he explained. While they appreciated the work I did managing the overall derivative risk for the flagship fund, my compensation was based on my smaller trading account. That was my deal, take it or leave it.  蓋瑞說，我的勞動合同上寫得很清楚。雖然他們欣賞我在管理旗艦基金整體衍生品風險方面所付出的勞動，但我的獎金基於那個規模較小的交易賬戶的業績。合同上就是這麼寫的，要就要，不要拉倒。
 My bonus was a big, fat zero.  所以，我的獎金是個大大的零鴨蛋。

三十二、Green with envy  紅眼病
   
I'm not proud to admit this but I began to covet while at Galleon.
我有點羞於承認，但在Galleon工作期間，自己確實開始變得貪婪起來。
    The partners made insane money, the type of money that superstar athletes and famous actors won't see in a lifetime. They were taking it home each year, facilitating lavish lifestyles, enormous homes, private jets and a garage full of expensive cars.     合伙人的收入是個天文數字，連超級體育明星和著名演員一輩子都見不到這麼多錢。他們每年都賺得盆滿缽滿，過着奢華的生活，住着豪宅，坐私人飛機，大車庫裡停滿了豪華汽車。
    Money is tremendous motivation when you're that young, and I've seen it make good people to do bad things. Suddenly, $500,000 seemed like a very small sum. I entered the world of the mega-millions, rainmakers that would make Gordon Gekko blush. I set my sights at joining the ranks of the Wall Street elite. 金錢對我當時那個歲數的人來說具有極大的推動力，我見過一些好人為了錢幹壞事。突然之間，50萬美元對我來說變成一個很小的數字。我進入了超級百萬富翁的世界之中，這些人呼風喚雨的能力，讓電影《華爾街》中邁克爾•道格拉斯扮演的“戈登•蓋柯”(Gordon Gekko)相見形慚。我給自己定下目標，要加入華爾街精英人士的行列。
    The policies introduced by Alan Greenspan kicked in and the stock market furiously climbed the front end of the technology bubble. Fortunes were made on a daily basis as IPO's climbed hundreds of points in a single session.  格林斯潘的刺激政策發揮了作用，股市開始瘋狂攀升，技術股泡沫一發不可收拾。每天都有大量的富翁產生，上市新股在一個交易時間段內就能翻上好幾倍。
    The eyes of the world were on Wall Street and Galleon was humming. The firm paid millions of commission dollars to the street and they were given fat allocations on new issues. 全世界的目光都聚焦到華爾街，Galleon上下一片繁忙景象。公司支付數百萬美元的佣金，換來數額巨大的新股認購權。
      Zing! 25,000 shares of an IPO up $60.
      一轉眼，2.5萬股新股價格漲到60美元。
       Shazzam! 30,000 shares opening $40 higher than where it was priced.
     又一轉眼，3萬股新股開盤比上市定價高出40美元。
      Pow! An oh-by-the way 'kiss' from a second-tier broker looking to get in Galleon's good graces.
      啪啪！某二線券商來拍馬屁，想拉進一些Galleon的交易業務。
    This was my year. It had to be my year. As we edged toward the end of 1999, my relationship with the partners couldn't be better. The firm was killing it, which is to say there was more money than you could shake a stick at.
這一年屬於我，必須屬於我。隨着1999年末的臨近，我與公司合伙人之間的關係處得比蜜還甜。公司成為大贏家，也就是說，賺到的錢連點石成金的魔術棒都比不上。
    The performance of my smaller portfolio lagged but I made up for it in spades. The P&L on the large option bets for the flagship fund spoke for itself and my inclusion in the circle of trust was a mere formality.    我管理的那個規模較小的組合表現不佳，但大組合的業績很好。旗艦基金的期權交易記錄是最好的成績單，我被納入合伙人的小圈子只需走個過場便是。
    Gary sat me down to let me know that I would finally be getting a bonus and my eyes began to spin like a slot machine.    蓋瑞讓我坐下，告訴我今年終於能拿到獎金了，我的眼睛直冒星星，就像玩老虎機中了獎一樣。
    What would it be, a million? Two million? Three million?
    獎金有多少？一百萬？兩百萬？三百萬？
    'Todd,' he began, 'The partners appreciate your efforts this year. We're going to reward you with $50,000.'    “托德，”蓋瑞開始說話，“合伙人們很欣賞你今年做出的努力，將給你5萬美元的獎金。”
    It hit me like a ton of bricks. 我就像被整整一噸磚頭砸到了頭。
    If I was ever going to make real money on Wall Street, I had to step from behind the shadows. If I was going to be a serious player, I had to be a partner. I asked Gary if that was in the cards and he told me that it wasn't.
要想在華爾街賺到大錢，我必須從別人的背後走出來；要想出人頭地，必須成為合伙人。我問蓋瑞公司有沒有計劃讓我做合伙人，他說沒有。
    When I left Morgan Stanley, David told me to make it count because you could only leave a firm that reputable once. 當我離開摩根斯坦利時，戴維對我說，要珍惜這段經歷，因為你只有一次機會離開一家這麼好的公司。
    The same could be said of Galleon -- they were one of the top hedge funds and nobody left on their own volition. I knew what I had to do and understood what was at stake.    同樣的說法也適用於Galleon─它是頂尖的對沖基金，沒人願意主動離開。我知道自己應該做什麼，也知道跳槽的風險所在。
    Once I left, that door would never be open to me again.
    一旦離開，這裡的大門將永遠不會再向我打開。
 

三十三、走進新千年

   股市暴漲，達到不可思議的高位，遍地都是黃金─我只要選好自己的位置就行。日曆翻到了2000年，我走進一個全新的千年紀，眼前彷佛看到一道絢爛的彩虹。
   我跟吉姆•克萊默(Jim Cramer)和傑夫•伯克維茲(Jeff Berkowitz)談過好幾次，彼此似乎已經達成共識。那個公司的交易資金量為4億美元，比Galleon小得多，但他們拋出了一根橄欖枝：合伙人。
   我們見了幾次，討論一些具體事項。我加入該公司後，將負責整個交易業務，底薪30萬美元，這正是我拿了幾年微薄獎金後希望獲得的穩定收入。更誘人的是，我能分到公司利潤蛋糕中很不錯的一塊。
   吉姆這個人容易情緒激動，但在我看來，他也誠實而公正。傑夫成了我的好朋友，他為人務實，不偏不倚。作為合伙人，他們倆很互補，而我掌握的技能也同樣能填補他們的空白。
   當我把跳槽的打算告訴自己的同事兼朋友戴維•斯萊恩(David Slaine)時，他問了我一個很簡單的問題：“你信任他們嗎？”
   這是一個簡單而又至關重要的判斷標準。在危急關頭，他們會為我考慮嗎？會把我的利益看得和他們自己的一樣重要嗎？能不能做正確的事？我相信他們可以。於是，我們在曼哈頓的Gramercy Tavern餐廳會面，仔細敲定最後的細節。
   我們談論市場、生活和世界，氣氛輕鬆活潑。吉姆說起一個名叫TheStreet.com的金融網站，是他在1996年和人共同創立的，並於1999年5月上市。我聽說過這個網站，但不熟悉具體是做什麼事情的，怎麼會和財富管理搭上邊兒。
   不久後，我將有所領悟，無論其好壞。

Whaddya say, Y2K?

三十四、Lucky charms  幸運徽章
   
The elasticity of the technology bubble shaped the collective mindset into the perceived reality that a new paradigm was upon us.    網絡股的泡泡越吹越大，人們陷入一種集體心理，認為人類已經跨入一個全新的互聯網時代。
    For those managing money at the beginning of 2000, the price action was nothing short of surreal. Each day was a journey unto itself, a volatile manifestation of emotion that somehow morphed net worth into self worth at the end of each session.     對那些在2000年初從事投資管理的人來說，互聯網的估值可謂荒誕不經，超乎想象。每天都有全新的神話上演，情緒上的非理性波動讓人以為在每天股市收盤後，自己的價值就等同於自己的財富。
    I couldn't have scripted a better beginning to my newfound existence running the trading operation at Cramer, Berkowitz. After a flurry of emotional buying following the Y2K scare, the Nasdaq dropped 450 points -- an astounding 11% -- in a matter of days. It was trial by fire and our desk gelled as if we worked together for years.      我在Cramer, Berkowitz公司作為交易負責人的開頭簡直好得無與倫比。出於對千年蟲的恐懼，納斯達克市場在短短幾天內暴跌450點，市值驚人地縮水11%，但隨後又出現狂熱的買盤。這是一場血與火的考驗，我們的交易團隊無比團結，就像在一起共事過很多年一樣。
    They say everything is funny when you're making money, and there were giggles all around as the ink dried on my contract. We were all on our best behavior. But make no mistake, we were a collection of distinctly powerful personalities with proven formulas for success.    人們說，當你在賺錢的時候，什麼事情看上去都很美好。我剛開始在那裡工作的時候，身邊總是一片歡笑聲。大家都很有禮貌，但千萬不要搞錯，我們這幾個人其實個性都很強，每個人都有自己的成功秘訣。
    Jeff had a brilliant analytical mind, research director Matt Jacobs was plugged into the street, Jim played momentum and I used volatility to my advantage. When we were on the same page, it was akin to four chefs mixing the perfect brew. As we captured the violent market swings, we drank the sweet taste of success like nothing I've ever experienced.
傑夫的分析能力超群，研究部主管麥特.傑考伯(Matt Jacobs)對市場的觸覺靈敏無比，吉姆是個動能投資者，而我善於利用市場的波動性。當大家擰成一股繩時，就像一列勢不可擋的戰車。我們捕捉市場的起伏波動，品嘗着成功的甜蜜滋味，我從未享受過這種感覺。
    In February 2000, Cramer penned his infamous 'Winners of the New World' column on TheStreet.com, extolling the virtues of 10 high-flying technology stocks. Each of them sat on a parabolic perch after a massive rally but it didn't matter. He believed they were the winners in the new world and tried to convince us in kind.          2000年2月，克萊默在TheStreet.com開了一個日後聲名狼藉的“新世界贏家”(Winners of the New World)專欄，頌揚10隻表現卓越的網絡股。這些股票都在經歷過大漲之後出現拋物線式的回落，但克萊默並不在意，認為它們都是日後網絡新時代的贏家，還極力想說服我們。
    I tried to separate Jim's online persona from our internal dynamic -- sometimes successfully and other times in vain -- yet our first few months were blissful as profits padded our portfolio. While I struggled when I started at Morgan Stanley and Galleon, I was immediately at ease when I arrived each morning at the head of the desk.    我試圖讓吉姆不要把自己的網絡人格帶入公司的內部管理─這有時候管用，但有時候純屬徒勞。好在頭幾個月我們的運氣不錯，組合的利潤越積越多。我剛開始在摩根斯坦利和Galleon公司工作時，都有些力不從心；而在這裡擔任交易主管時，一開始就感覺得心應手。
    As part of my charge, I was responsible for the implementation of risk management systems, commission allocation to our trading partners and staffing decisions on the desk.      作為職責的一部分，我負責風險管理系統的實施、交易合作夥伴的佣金分配和交易席位的用人決策。
    The status quo that preceded my arrival would quickly change; I was ready to put my fingerprints on the operation.    交易部門的格局即將因我的上任而改變，因為我已準備好在這裡留下自己的烙印。

三十五、New kid in town  新官上任
   
It all seemed very strange. We actively traded $400 million and calculated the profit or loss by hand each day. The actual number, along with trade errors, arrived from Goldman Sachs the very next afternoon.
這裡的一切看上去都很奇怪。我們每天積極地對4億美元的組合進行交易，用手工計算損益, 正式的數字以及交易錯誤記錄將在第二天下午由高盛發過來。
    Our offices were on 40 Fulton Street, adjacent to the Brooklyn Bridge. There were a dozen or so full-time employees, including three clerks directly under my charge. They each made six-figure salaries for executing orders on behalf of Jim and Jeff. That seemed extravagant, given my experience on the street.
我們的辦公室在福爾頓街(Fulton Street)40號，緊鄰布魯克林大橋(Brooklyn Bridge)。公司有十幾個全職員工，其中三個直接歸我管。他們為吉姆和傑夫執行交易指令，每人都有六位數的薪水；以我在華爾街的從業經歷來看，這似乎太揮霍了一點。
    Within a few months, I ushered through several changes. The clerks were replaced with young guns that had skill sets accretive to the trading process. Their base salaries were low, but there was no ceiling if we produced.
在幾個月內，我促成了一些變化。那幾個交易員被更具交易技能的年輕人換掉了，新來的人底薪更低，但只要業績好，上不封頂。
    We installed a state-of-the-art risk management system that allowed us to monitor our performance in real time and 'stress test' various market scenarios. I met with the desk heads of our brokers and told them commission would be correlated to their idea generation and the liquidity they provided.
我們安裝了頂尖的風險管理系統，能夠實時監控交易情況，對各種可能的情況進行“壓力測試”。我和券商的交易負責人見面，說明佣金將與他們的交易建議以及提供的流動性掛鈎起來。
    It was pure meritocracy, within our walls and with regard to our relationships. We were tough but fair and always operated within the letter of the law. Word of our approach quickly spread and our firm hummed like a well-oiled machine.
在公司內部管理和外界關係維護上，我們奉行精英主義，對工作標準的要求高，但對人公平，依法合規辦事。我們的處事方法很快傳了開來，公司高速運轉，就像一台上足了油的機器。
    We got the first call from brokers when analysts changed a rating on a stock. Head traders communicated the directional flow from their most-respected accounts and I was always quick to offer my opinion in an attempt to establish goodwill.   當分析師調整對某隻股票的評級時，券商總是第一個給我們打電話，他們的首席交易員會跟我溝通其主要賬戶的交易趨勢，而我也總是很快地告訴他們自己的市場觀點，從而建立良好的互信關係。
    We treated people the way I wanted to be treated when I was on the other end of the phone. We always told them why we traded and rarely hurt them with our flow. If we ran over them with one of our orders, we adjusted prices as a matter of course.    在溝通時，我儘量做到“己所不欲，勿施於人”，總是說清楚交易原因，很少因為自身的交易給他們造成損失。如果交易指令正好跟他們撞車，我們就會自覺地調整價格。
    My grandfather taught me that all we have is our name and our word. The trading operation at Cramer, Berkowitz evolved into a direct extension of that. 
我的祖父曾經說過，我們唯一擁有的就是自己的名字和承諾。Cramer, Berkowitz公司交易部門就是這一原則的直接延伸。

三十六、揮棒失誤

   2000年春天，我的膽子越來越大，開始敢於對超出自己擊球範圍的來球揮棒。有個經紀人提醒我關注一隻名叫Focus Enhancements的股票，認為這是一匹即將起跑的黑馬。
   我們幾個合伙人親密合作，賺了不少錢，而我的交易表現尤其出色，因此吉姆和傑夫都對我言聽計從。我們評估了這個機會，在股價處於6到8美元的區間買進了六位數的倉位。
   我們處於最佳狀態，自信心隨着行業聲譽的提高而水漲船高。這隻股票來回擺動很大，每個交易時段都有10%到15%的波動─而我們彷佛拿着劇本，每次都能很好地把握交易機會。
   到第一季度中旬，我們已經獲利頗豐，而且對前景信心十足。回過頭來看，這其中已經埋藏了隱患。
   “有Focus Enhancements的新聞！”傑考伯大喊，我們都把目光集中到電視屏幕上。這是一則負面新聞，我們還沒來得及喘上一口氣，Focus Enhancements的股價已經暴跌30%。
   一片沉默。電話在響，但沒人去接，只有CNBC的新聞評論員瑪麗亞.巴蒂洛莫(Maria Bartiromo)在背景中不知說些什麼。我驚呆了，每個人都是。其實，這一損失看似巨大，但和四億美元的組合規模相比微不足道。
   我坐在吉姆對面，看着他的臉由白變紅，由紅變紫，然後就開始抽搐起來。

這種批評的表情今後將變得十分常見。他猛地推開椅子站起來，走進了辦公室。出於一種本能反應，我們也跟着走進去，並隨手把門關上。
   我一直對自己要求很嚴，設定最高的標準。我不需要別人來說我搞砸了，他們知道這一點，我也知道。
   但這只是一筆交易而已，雖然損失巨大，但只是一筆交易，而我之前一系列的交易決策已給公司帶來數百萬美元的利潤。我做好了接受批評的準備，但根本沒料到即將到來的狂風驟雨。
   剛開始的時候，吉姆還比較鎮定─這是相對於他後來的表現而言。大家起初是想討論一下對策，看看應該規避風險斬倉，還是抓住機會補倉，但很快討論就演變成一場大吵大鬧的肥皂劇。
   合伙人之間的正常對話已經不復存在。吉姆以我在整個職業生涯中從未見過的方式向我發泄不滿，翻來覆去地說這件事有多麼可怕，多麼難以接受，一遍又一遍。
   吉姆大喊大叫，大聲咒罵；更奇怪的是，在他發泄完後，我甚至看到他眼角有一滴眼淚。無論在工作場所還是別的地方，我都從沒見過如此離奇的情緒宣泄方式。
   在我離開辦公室時，我沒有考慮該如何處理Focus Enhancements的股票，腦子裡只有一個念頭：“這傢伙是誰，這到底是怎麼回事？”
   這些年來，我跟許多不同性格的人打過交道，但那一天的所見所聞給我留下難以磨滅的印象，也給我上了寶貴的一課。路遙知馬力，日久見人心；在交易失利的時候，最能看出同一戰壕中戰友的真正面目。

Wild pitches

Feeling emboldened in the spring of 2000, I swung at a pitch outside of my strike zone. One of my brokers alerted me to a special situation, a stock called Focus Enhancements that he believed was ready to run.
We were making money hand over fist and as I was trading particularly well, Jim and Jeff were happy to indulge me. After we weighed the opportunity, we established a six-figure position as it traded between $6 and $8.
We were in a groove and our confidence was matched only by our growing reputation. With the market swinging wildly -- 10 to 15% at a clip -- we seemingly had the script in our hands before it hit the tape.
By the middle of the first quarter, we established a sizable lead on the averages and a boldness that bespoke our performance. In hindsight, that was the first warning.
'[Focus Enhancements] on the tape!' Jacobs screamed as we all trained our eyes on the TV headlines. The news was negative and the stock dropped 30% before we took our next breath.
Nobody said a word as phones rang unanswered and CNBC anchor Maria Bartiromo chattered away in the background. I was frozen -- we all were -- despite the fact that the loss, while substantial, was a pimple in the much broader complexion of our $400 million portfolio.
I sat across from Jim and watched his face turn from white to pink to a sullen shade of red. And then the twitching started, a facial tick that would become all too familiar with time. He pushed back from his turret and walked into his office. Instinctively, we followed and shut the door behind us.
I've always been my harshest critic and hold myself to the highest standards. Nobody needed to tell me I screwed up. They knew it, I knew it.
But this was one trade -- a big trade but one trade -- in the context of a series of profitable decisions that netted our firm millions of dollars. I braced for some backlash but wasn't prepared for the realities that came to bear.
Jim was relatively calm at first -- relative to him, as it turned out. What began as a discussion regarding our alternatives to either mitigate risk or seize an opportunity quickly devolved into a soapbox rant.
It stopped being a dialogue between partners; Jim unloaded on me in a way I've never seen in my entire working life. All he could do was detail how horrible and unacceptable the situation was, over and over and over again.
Jim screamed. He swore. Here's the odd part -- I may have even seen a tear by the time he was done. It was the strangest display of emotion I ever witnessed in a professional setting or otherwise.
By the time I left his office, I wasn't thinking about Focus Enhancements. All I could think of is 'Who is this guy and what the heck just happened?'
I've worked with some serious personalities over the years, but what I witnessed that day set a new standard and produced a valuable lesson. Just as bad seasons point out good fans and bad times produce good friends, bad trades define the true colors of your partners in the pits.

三十七、坐臥不安

   我祖父曾經告訴我，要保持右手抬起，這是前任“金手套”(Golden Gloves)拳王的戰鬥秘籍，進攻的時候，一定要隨時注意保護自己。
   經過那次吉姆.克萊默的宣泄事件，我走進空蕩蕩的公司大廳時，再也沒有以往那種感覺了。我知道那個道理，一個交易員是否優秀取決於其最新的那次交易，但在這家公司，這個說法被上升到一個全新的高度。
   經常做對並不夠，必須保持每天、每時、每刻都做對。
   到了2000年3月，納斯達克市場在短短一個多月時間裡上漲了35%。Focus Enhancements的失利逐漸被大家淡忘。傑夫.伯克維茲和麥特.傑考伯潛心挖掘美國上市企業的投資價值，而吉姆和我則面對面地坐在一起，相隔不過五英尺遠，從早到晚共同在股市的高山和低谷間跋涉。
   雖然我們的目標相同，但交易風格截然不同。吉姆喜歡追漲；對下跌的股票興趣不大。由於在摩根斯坦利的從業經歷，我喜歡“淡化”市場，逢低買入，逢高賣出。這是一個狹路相逢勇者勝的遊戲，有人贏，就有人輸。
   我清楚地記着那個覺醒時刻，就像昨天剛剛發生一樣。網絡股在一天之內上漲了10、30、50個點，而那天晚上，我突然從夢中驚醒，彷佛頓悟一般，感到對網絡股的莫大擔憂。我不是第一次有這種感覺，但這次不一樣，自己從未有過如此清晰的預感，彷佛水晶一樣一覽無遺。這一時刻，決定了我今後的職業生涯發展。
   網絡股泡沫就要破滅了。
   做交易時，最難遵循的投資紀律之一就是賣出正賺錢的股票，而我管理的組合規模如此之大，牽涉的損益數字比別人要多好幾個零，再考慮到辦公室里一些人的情緒波動，可想而知，我手頭的任務有多困難。
   我不想說自己是“眾人皆醉我獨醒”─傑夫對網絡股也有不好的預感─但時機把握的重要性，加上公司內部的敏感氛圍，使任何一個小錯誤都不允許發生。

     吉姆在他的第一本書《一個華爾街癮君子的自白》(Confessions of a Street Addict)里這樣寫道：

   “四月份到了，納斯達克指數還在4500點的區域，托德說，現在市場正處於大崩潰的邊緣，納斯達克的泡沫即將破滅，指數很快就要回到1500點。”   現在，你應該相當了解吉姆這個人了。他有一顆善良的心，但如果你處於他的對立面，他會讓你生不如死。
   傑夫曾經說過，如果吉姆開車撞了人，而你跟他好好說，他會把被撞的人送去醫院檢查，請傷者全家吃晚飯。但如果你指責吉姆，他就會舉起拳頭大喊：“閉嘴，不然連你也撞！”
   這就是金融史上最大一次撞車事件發生前幾周，我在Cramer, Berkowitz公司的真實情況。
   光有金融馬車就要失控的強烈預感是不夠的，我得解釋清楚為什麼時機是正確的，並要有策略地進行操作。畢竟，要是我們在股市上漲趨勢中踏空，就會因持有空頭而損失慘重。
   壓力非常巨大，但作為公司新的一員，我知道忠誠意味着直言不諱。

My grandfather taught me to keep my right hand up. That was the former Golden Gloves boxer's way of telling me to protect myself. 
After Jim Cramer's rant, I never walked through those hallowed halls the same way again. I knew I was only as good as my last trade, but at Cramer, Berkowitz, that expression was taken to an entirely new level.
It wasn't enough to be right. You had to be right all the time, every day.
It was March 2000 and the Nasdaq rallied 35% in a little over a month. As Focus Enhancements faded into the rear-view mirror, Jeff Berkowitz and Matt Jacobs scoured corporate America as Jim and I, sitting five feet apart and facing each other, moved mountains and molehills from dawn to dusk.
While we shared a mission, our styles were diametrically different. Jim warmed to stocks once they rallied, and cooled after they fell. Thanks to my training at Morgan Stanley, I liked to 'fade' the market, nibbling on dips and selling blips. It was a high stakes game of chicken and somebody was bound to blink.
I remember my moment of clarity as if it happened yesterday. Tech stocks were ramping up 10, 30, 50 points in a single day and I awoke in the middle of the night with a disturbing epiphany. It wasn't the first time I had the thought but it was different this time -- a clarity that seemed obvious, a crystallization that would define my career.
The technology bubble was about to burst.
One of the toughest disciplines when trading is to sell a stock that is making money. Multiply that dynamic by a large portfolio, add a slew of zeros and factor in the emotional context of our office and you'll get a sense of the task at hand.
I won't say I was the lone bear -- Jeff also sensed wreckage on the horizon -- but the timing, coupled with the intensely competitive landscape, made for prickly friction with a razor-thin margin of error. I believe Jim summed it up in his first book, 'Confessions of a Street Addict,' when he wrote:
'When April came in, and the Nasdaq was still in the 4,500 area, Todd suggested that we were on the verge of a collapse of titanic proportions, that the whole Nasdaq bubble was about to burst and would shortly be at 1,500.'
Now, you've got to understand Jim. He has a genuinely kind heart but could make your life miserable if you're on the wrong side of his mind.
Jeff used to say that if Jim hit someone with a car and you politely informed him of the accident, he would drive the victim to the hospital and buy the family dinner. If you told Jim he screwed up, he would raise his arms and scream, 'Shut up or I'll hit you too!'
Such was life at Cramer, Berkowitz in the weeks before what proved to be the largest car crash in financial history.
It wasn't enough that I had a strong sense the wheels were going to fall off the financial wagon; I had to explain why the timing was right and do it with tact. Heaven help me if we missed further upside or worse, got squeezed on the short side.
The tension was thick and as the new kid on the block, I knew where loyalties lied. 

三十八、泡沫破滅

    2000年4月，互聯網泡沫應聲破滅，納斯達克在短短幾個交易時段內暴跌20%。更值得一提的是，我們積極利用市場波動性進行交易，抓住了指數下跌後漲回4500點的一波反彈，隨後又在不斷創下新低的市場跌勢中，穩穩站在空頭陣營的一方。
   這一切令人難以置信，但絕對千真萬確。你得相信我的話。整個市場彷佛在我們周圍崩塌了，而我們就處在風暴中心，四周狂風大作，不見天日，而中間這座小島卻寧靜安詳。
   我們賺了一大筆錢，付給華爾街券商巨額佣金，而我一手打造的交易團隊和風險管理團隊也得到很高的獎金。組合的盈利幅度非常巨大，一天就有兩三千萬美元，是那種你根本不想理解的數字。
   我們新上馬的投資監控系統能實時顯示組合的損益情況，每一分每一秒，我們都能知道交易是賺是賠。這既有好處，也有不好的地方。我不需要看交易顯示屏，只要看坐在對桌吉姆的臉色，就能猜個八九不離十。
   任何說自己不那麼關注交易業績的交易員都不該從事這個行業。我們管理着成百上千個交易頭寸，它們是一個整體組合，也有着一個共同的損益底線。我們有各自的分工，有歸屬自己的交易“名字”。我們身處同一團隊，但每天晚上洗澡時，都會回顧自己個人一天來的交易得失。
   我們倆交易方式的風格差異日趨明顯。當市場上漲時，吉姆會大舉買進；當市場轉向時，有時候才過了幾分鐘，交易清單上就會突然出現空頭頭寸。
   我密切關注着他，在交易自己頭寸的同時，也留心組合的整體損益。我並不想冒犯誰，也不想維持現狀。經歷過前兩次跳槽後，我的職業生涯只有兩個目標：一是賺錢，二是保住勝利果實。
   夏天到了，我們近乎狂熱地工作，並把工作熱情轉化為出色的業績。不過，辦公室里還是縈繞着一種說不清道不明的焦慮--只有業績好於華爾街上平均水平，才不枉忍受這種焦慮。
   既有精誠合作，又有磕磕絆絆；既有友誼，又有爭吵；既親近，又疏遠。所有這些極端同時存在。
   這就是Cramer, Berkowitz公司的日子，但我不知道的是，我們就要向外界打開窗戶。

Pop goes the bubble  泡沫破滅
 
    April 2000 arrived with a bang and the Nasdaq dropped 20% in a few short sessions. What's more, as we actively traded the volatility, we caught the counter-trend rally back to Nasdaq 4,500 before again riding the short side to fresh market lows.
I wouldn't believe it either if I wasn't there but you'll have to take me at my word. Markets crashed around us and we were in the epicenter of the storm, an island of clarity in an otherwise unsure world.
We posted huge gains, paid the street insane commissions and the trading staff and risk-management protocol I implemented paid huge dividends. The swings were wild, moving $20 milllion to $30 million in a single day, the type of numbers you didn't want to comprehend.
Our new systems updated our profit and loss dynamically and we knew exactly where we stood with each flickering tick. That was both a blessing and a curse. I didn't need to watch my screens; the look on Jim's face across the desk told the story in real time.
Any trader who says they don't take performance personally shouldn't be managing money. We ran one portfolio -- hundreds of positions that forged a singular bottom line -- but we each had our 'names.' While we played for the same team, we eyeballed our individual stats as we hit the showers each night.
The stylistic dichotomy between our individual trading approaches became increasingly apparent. When the market rallied, Jim tossed fresh long exposure into our portfolio. After it reversed, sometimes minutes later, short positions suddenly appeared on the sheets.
I watched him closely and traded my positions with an eye on the overall portfolio. I wasn't worried about stepping on toes or honoring the status quo. After coming so close in my two previous professional endeavors, I had two missions in life -- to make money and protect those gains.
As the summer approached, we operated at a feverish pitch and harnessed that energy into tremendous performance. Still, there was an unspoken angst in the office -- the type of tension that was only acceptable if we beat the Street.
It was functional, dysfunctional, friendly, heated, seamless and strangely sophomoric all at the same time.
 It was life at Cramer, Berkowitz, and unbeknownst to me, we were about to open our window to the world. 

三十九、一扇大門

   七月的炎熱令人無法忍受，我讓司機凌晨五點就送我去上班。公司的生意不錯，在華爾街，這種說法的意思就是我們在賺錢。
   在外人看來，我們管理的基金就像一架穿越完美風暴而毫髮無損的戰鬥機；而在公司內部，一種不同的氛圍正在醞釀中。
   吉姆計划去漢普頓度假，正和TheStreet.com的編輯通電話，想找人代他寫專欄。當吉姆把目光鎖定在我身上時，我彷佛看到他頭頂上方出現一個閃光的燈泡，他咧嘴笑了起來。
   “就這麼定了，托德幫我寫下周一的文章，然後你再找別人接手。”吉姆說。
   我正交易着200個頭寸，管理4億美元的風險敞口，而且歷史上最大一個泡沫正在破滅。我不想分心干別的事情。
   “夥計，我最後一次寫東西是在夏令營時給媽媽寫信，我沒辦法幫忙。”
   但吉姆和往常一樣，打定了的主意就不會再變。反正他自己的問題解決了，現在燙手的山芋已經拋到我的手上。
   寫第一篇專欄文章時，我沒花很多心思，因為還有更重要的事情要做。我引用了一段“Grateful Dead”樂隊創作的歌詞作為開頭，隨意講了一些對流行文化的看法，回過頭來談現在的熊市思路，最後探討了自己的投資理念和方法。
   我沒覺得這份兼職有什麼意思，但它也沒妨礙我什麼。事實上，寫東西能幫我整理自己的思路，讓我在市場的驚濤駭浪中更能遊刃有餘。
   閉市的鐘聲響起前，我接到TheStreet.com編輯的電話，請我把這周的專欄文章都接下來。
“沒問題，”我對傑夫眨眨眼睛，說，“願意效勞。”

A door opens

The July heat was unbearable as my driver navigated the FDR at 5 a.m. Business was good, which on Wall Street means we were making money.
To the outside looking in, our fund was a fighter jet navigating the perfect storm of a bubble gone awry. Internally, a different dynamic began to take shape.
As Jim readied to vacation in the Hamptons, he was on the phone with his editor at TheStreet.com, looking for someone to write his column. When his eyes locked on mine, I saw the light bulb flash overhead as a grin spread across his face.
'I've got it covered. Todd-o will write on Monday while you find someone for the rest of the week,' he said.
I was trading 200 positions and managing $400 million worth of risk as the biggest bubble in history imploded. I didn't want another job.
'Dude, the last time I wrote something was to my mother while at summer camp. It's not happening.'
In typical Jim fashion, his mind was already made up. His problem was solved and it quickly became mine.
I didn't put much thought into my first column as I had bigger fish to fry. I scribed Grateful Dead lyrics that pertained to the tape, threaded in some levity through pop-culture references and espoused my bearish bent in real-time, delving into the details of my particular approach.
I didn't embrace the double duty but it didn't bother me either. In fact, it helped crystallize my thoughts as I tried to navigate the wicked crosscurrents of the marketplace.
As the closing bell approached at the end of the day, I got a call from the editor asking me to finish the week.
'Sure,' I said as I looked at Jeff and winked. 'Anything I can do to help.'

四十、The switch is flipped  重大變化
   
There was no middle ground with Jim. Every day was either the best ever or the worst imaginable. That applied to his personal relationships as well; you were either his best friend or a sworn enemy.   吉姆是個極端的人，每天的交易業績要麼好得出奇，要麼壞得難以想象。他在人際交往上也是如此，你要麼是他最好的朋友，要麼是他最痛恨的敵人。 

    I toggled between the two, often in the same day, but there was little doubt which side of his emotional chasm I was on when I pulled up to his East End rental that Friday night.
我在這兩個角色之間來迴轉換，有時在同一天就能分飾二角。不過,周五晚上我到他租的東區(East End)公寓時，吉姆的情緒指針明顯處於偏向我的一側。
    'Todd-o!' he screamed as he ran down the driveway and wrapped me in a bear hug, 'We gotta talk!'   “托德！”他狂呼着從門口衝過來，給我一個大大的熊抱，“我們來好好談談！”
    I was with a friend who was stunned by the outburst of emotion. I couldn't blame her -- Hurricane Jim was frenzied energy that swallowed everything in his path. She didn't know the other side of that ride but it's just as well; she wouldn't believe it anyway.    他爆發出的激情讓我身邊的一個朋友驚呆了。這也難怪，她不知道“颶風”吉姆的能量可以席捲沿途所經的一切；而且她也不知道，吉姆發起狂來同樣可怕。不過沒關係，說了她也不會相信。
    He told me that my columns performed fantastically well. That surprised me but I had little time to digest it. He had a plan and his wheels were spinning quickly.    吉姆告訴我，我寫的專欄文章大受歡迎，這讓我相當吃驚。還沒等我回過味來，他已經給我制定了一個計劃，不給我任何喘息的時間。
    'We're going to give you a trading diary on TheStreet.com right next to mine. It'll be great -- Whaddya say?'    “你要在TheStreet.com我的專欄旁邊開一個交易日記，效果一定很好！怎麼樣？”
    What would you say? 我還能說什麼？
    I never shied from a challenge and I'm not sure I could have even if I wanted to. To be honest, I wasn't sure that's what I wanted. I actually enjoyed writing, if only for the opportunity to synthesize my thoughts. Little did I know that Jim opened a door that forever changed my life; little does he know that I remain grateful for that to this day.  
我從沒在挑戰面前退縮過，我也知道，即使打退堂鼓，也不一定管用。說實話，我不覺得寫文章是我想做的事。但我實際上喜歡寫作的過程，因為它能讓我理清思路。我並不知道，吉姆向我打開了一扇大門，並將永遠改變我的生活。吉姆也不知道，直至今日，我還一直為此感激他。
    I swore I wouldn't let the column splinter the focus that was quietly lining my pockets. Writing came naturally, from the heart and from the gut, and it soon became a seamless duopoly that introduced a world I never knew existed.
我對自己發誓，不能被專欄寫作分散精力，同時感覺它已悄悄地占用了我不少時間。我彷佛天生就適合寫作，從骨子裡，在內心中；它和交易工作一起，很快成為我生活中不可或缺的兩大部分，開啟了一個我以往一無所知的新世界。
    At first, I feared the additional responsibility would add tension to an already tense environment. While Jim and I often disagreed on how to approach the market, that dialogue was behind closed doors.
起初，我擔心這一額外職責會讓早已緊張的工作關係繃得更緊。雖然吉姆和我在市場觀點上經常各持己見，但那畢竟是關起門來的意見對立。
    Now, through the power of the Internet, we were at odds for the world to see. 現在，通過互聯網的力量，我們的觀點分歧將天下皆知。
    When trading, one must adapt to the market. Different times require different styles and the choppy cusp of the Internet bubble was a lesson in agility. By the time the crowd got on one side of the market, it viciously shifted, leaving blood in its wake.
做交易時，你必須適應市場的變化。不同的時間需要採取不同的策略，互聯網泡沫的膨脹和破滅就是最好的例證。當大家都相信網絡新時代已經來臨時，市場卻陰險地來了個三百六十度的大轉彎，讓股市哀鴻遍野，血流成河。
    It wasn't an easy tape to trade; in fact, it was brutal even if you were best in breed.       事實上，這不是個容易把握的市場，即使你是其中的佼佼者，也依然要經歷腥風血雨。 

    I began to view Jim's momentum-style approach as a contrary indicator, sub-consciously at first and then with increased regularity. As our fund continued to outperform and I embraced the column he enabled me to attain, I swallowed my tongue and kept the peace.      我開始把吉姆的動能投資風格作為反向指針，起初是下意識的，但後來就習以為常。我們的基金依然業績出眾，我的專欄文章也在繼續，但我避免和吉姆爭論，一切以和為貴。
    I didn't dislike the man; in fact, I had tremendous respect for his intelligence and cared for him as a friend. We all wanted the same thing and tried to push through our problems despite increasingly frequent clashes.
我不是不喜歡吉姆，事實上，我非常尊重他的才智，並以朋友的身份關心他。我們的目標是一致的，雖然衝突日益頻繁，但還是儘量求同存異，共同前進。
    As we edged through the back half of 2000, it was clear something was going to give. 2000年下半年就這樣過去了。我越來越有一種感覺，有什麼事就要發生。
    And that something wasn't going to be me. 而這事對我沒什麼好處。