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事实与原则(1)-事实的定义
事实，是最简单的概念，人人都懂。一般来说，事实用来表示1)已经发生的事情；
2)或存在的状态。作为哲学家的休莫在<人类理智论>这有一段著名的句子(Hume famously
writes at the beginning of Section IV of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding)
: “All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided
into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact”。也就是，
他认为，人类理智的对象和概念的联系，是事实唯一的来源。我将事实定义为简单
事实和复杂事实两种，区别它们如下：
I：简单事实
现象 = 本质
时空在一点
非过程
非人为
可重复
II：复杂事实
现象！= 本质
时空限定
人为
过程
不可重复
从另一个角度看，事实又可从自然科学的对象和社会人文学科的对象两种。必须注
意的是，凡是事实，其根本的特征是其“条件性”，即所有事实都是“偶然性”的，
因而是有缺陷和不完美的 - 由此引伸到“原则”的重要，以后会涉及。复杂的事实
(Compound Facts)和摸态逻辑的事实，又引入了假设的概念，将“已知的事实和将
要发生的事实”联系起来了。举两个例子。
如，“如果你喝下毒药，你就会丧命。”。事实是，你在听我讲话时，你没有喝下
毒药(否则你就听不见我的话了)。但如果你这样作，你的死亡就是事实了。这谁也
不会怀疑。再有，<论范例>说：“人生兽始”。如果发展这个思想，我可以说，
“群生兽国”。这是什么意思？它是说，一群人，一个部落，一个山头，一个种族，
甚至一个国家，都像一个人生来必然与动物无大的区别一样：这是事实。无论“兽”，
还是“兽国”，都是原始的，未开化的，野蛮的，还没开始被“文明感化”的人群。
在个人，就是没有文化，没有科学知识，没有现代社会的人文理念。在集体，就是
“Law of Jungle”，弱肉强食，以强躏弱，政府欺压个人，社会的强势集团压迫弱
小集团。中国五千年的历史到今天，仍然没有摆脱这种未开化的“丛林法则”。人
民大众仍然被自己组织的政府所“管辖”-用黑格尔的话(Philosophy of History)是，
这个集体仍然没有摆脱“异化”造成的恶果，因为在中国近代史上，从来没有类似
欧洲近代“启蒙”之类的，大众的文明进化的思想运动。
这些例子都是事实。但它们是“有过程，有结构，有系统”的“人为”事实。在没
有完成这个过程前，是粗糙，原始，简单，未开化的事实。它们区别与简单的事实。
简单的事实，其特点是与人的行为，“毫无干系”。这样的事实，基本等于“客观
真理”。在中国传统文化中，没有客观真理的概念。鸡叫与太阳升，不存在本质的
联系，即没有因果关系。很多人不懂这个“客观真理”的概念，正如许多网友表现
的。如果我说“范例哲学是如何不得了！”，他们立刻火冒三丈，我的祖宗三代立
刻被牵到了我的面前。如果有人说，推崇范例的人“不具备基本的逻辑思维能力”，
他们就会立刻弹冠相庆手舞足蹈，好像“范例”一眨眼就变成了“馊饭粒”了。他
们不会学着西方人那样，轻描淡写地说一句，“That's just your personal opinion.”，
无论别人怎么看。但从另一方面看，他们也许没想到，观点的产生，还真不是“废
话一堆”。这是因为事实的过程是：“存在-心动-念生-事实”。
(待续)
事实与原则
ps.
Any comment pls publish on your own, I will reply only if relevant.
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FYI：
维基百科关于事实的一段：
Etymology and usage
The word fact derives from the Latin factum, and was first used in English
with the same meaning: "a thing done or performed", a use that is now obsolete.
[1] The common usage of "something that has really occurred or is the case"
dates from the middle of the sixteenth century.[2]
Fact is sometimes used synonymously with truth, as distinct from opinions,
falsehoods, or matters of taste. This use is found in such phrases as, It
is a fact that the cup is blue or Matter of fact,[3] and "... not history,
nor fact, but imagination." Filmmaker Werner Herzog distinguishes clearly
between the two, claiming that "fact creates norms, and truth illumination".[4]
Fact also indicates a matter under discussion deemed to be true or correct,
such as to emphasize a point or prove a disputed issue; (e.g., "... the
fact of the matter is ...").[5][6]
Alternatively, fact may also indicate an allegation or stipulation of something
that may or may not be a "true fact",[7] (e.g., "the author's facts are
not trustworthy"). This alternate usage, although contested by some, has
a long history in standard English.[8]
Fact may also indicate findings derived through a process of evaluation,
including review of testimony, direct observation, or otherwise; as distinguishable
from matters of inference or speculation.[9] This use is reflected in the
terms "fact-find" and "fact-finder" (e.g., "set up a fact-finding commission"
).[10]
Facts may be checked by reason, experiment, personal experience, or may
be argued from authority. Roger Bacon wrote "If in other sciences we should
arrive at certainty without doubt and truth without error, it behooves us
to place the foundations of knowledge in mathematics."[11]
Fact in philosophy
In philosophy, the concept fact is considered in epistemology and ontology.
Questions of objectivity and truth are closely associated with questions
of fact. A "fact" can be defined as something which is the case, that is,
a state of affairs.[12][13]
Facts may be understood as that which makes a true sentence true.[14] Facts
may also be understood as those things to which a true sentence refers.
The statement "Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system" is about
the fact Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system.[15]
Misunderstanding of the difference between fact and theory sometimes leads
to fallacy in rhetoric,[citation needed] in which one person will say his
or her claim is factual whereas the opponent's claim is just theory. Such
statements indicate confusion as to the meanings of both words, suggesting
the speaker believes that fact means "truth," and theory means "speculation."
[dubious ǔ discuss]
Correspondence and the slingshot argument
Engel's version of the correspondence theory of truth explains that what
makes a sentence true is that it corresponds to a fact.[16] This theory
presupposes the existence of an objective world.
The Slingshot argument claims to show that all true statements stand for
the same thing - the truth value true. If this argument holds, and facts
are taken to be what true statements stand for, then we reach the counter-intuitive
conclusion that there is only one fact - "the truth".[17]
Compound facts
Any non-trivial true statement about reality is necessarily an abstraction
composed of a complex of objects and properties or relations.[18] For example,
the fact described by the true statement "Paris is the capital city of
France" implies that there is such a place as Paris, there is such a place
as France, there are such things as capital cities, as well as that France
has a government, that the government of France has the power to define
its capital city, and that the French government has chosen Paris to be
the capital, that there is such a thing as a "place" or a "government",
etc.. The verifiable accuracy of all of these assertions, if facts themselves,
may coincide to create the fact that Paris is the capital of France.
Difficulties arise, however, in attempting to identify the constituent parts
of negative, modal, disjunctive, or moral facts.[19]
Factǔvalue distinction
Main article: factǔvalue distinction
Moral philosophers since David Hume have debated whether values are objective,
and thus factual. In A Treatise of Human Nature Hume pointed out there
is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ought to be the
case to be derived from a series of statements of what is the case. Those
who insist there is a logical gulf between facts and values, such that it
is fallacious to attempt to derive values from facts, include G. E. Moore,
who called attempting to do so the Naturalistic fallacy.
Factualǔcounterfactual distinction
Main article: counterfactual conditional
Factuality ù what has occurred ù can also be contrasted with counterfactuality
ù what might have occurred, but did not. A counterfactual conditional or
subjunctive conditional is a conditional (or "if-then") statement indicating
what would be the case if events had been other than they actually are.
For example, "If Alexander had lived, his empire would have been greater
than Rome". This is to be contrasted with an indicative conditional, which
indicates what is (in fact) the case if its antecedent is (in fact) true
ù for example, "if you drink this, it will make you well".
Such sentences are important to Modal logic, especially since the development
of Possible world semantics.
Fact in science
Further information: scientific method and philosophy of science
Just as in philosophy, the scientific concept of fact sometimes referred
to as empirical evidence is central to building scientific theories and
fundamental questions regarding the natural phenomena of Nature, scientific
method, scope and validity of scientific reasoning.
In the most basic sense, a scientific fact is an objective and verifiable
observation, in contrast with a hypothesis or theory, which is intended
to explain or interpret facts.[20]
Various scholars have offered significant refinements to this basic formulation
(details below). Also, rigorous scientific use of the term "fact" is careful
to distinguish: 1) states of affairs in the external world; from 2) assertions
of fact that may be considered relevant in scientific analysis. The term
is used in both senses in the philosophy of science.[21]
Scholarly inquiry regarding scientific fact
Scholars and clinical researchers in both the social and natural sciences
have forwarded numerous questions and theories in clarifying the fundamental
nature of scientific fact.[22] Pertinent issues raised by this inquiry include:
the process by which "established fact" becomes recognized and accepted
as such;[23]
whether and to what extent "fact" and "theoretic explanation" can be considered
truly independent and separable from one another;[24][25]
to what extent are "facts" influenced by the mere act of observation;[25]
and
to what extent are factual conclusions influenced by history and consensus,
rather than a strictly systematic methodology.[26]
Consistent with the theory of confirmation holism, some scholars assert
"fact" to be necessarily "theory-laden" to some degree. Thomas Kuhn points
out that knowing what facts to measure, and how to measure them, requires
the use of other theories. For example, the age of fossils is based on radiometric
dating which is justified by reasoning that radioactive decay follows a
Poisson process rather than a Bernoulli process. Similarly, Percy Williams
Bridgman is credited with the methodological position known as operationalism,
which asserts that all observations are not only influenced, but necessarily
defined by the means and assumptions used to measure them.
Fact and the scientific method
Apart from the fundamental inquiry into the nature of scientific fact, there
remain the practical and social considerations of how fact is investigated,
established, and substantiated through the proper application of the scientific
method.[27] Scientific facts are generally believed to be independent of
the observer: no matter who performs a scientific experiment, all observers
will agree on the outcome.[28] In addition to these considerations, there
are the social and institutional measures, such as peer review and accreditation,
that are intended to promote factual accuracy (among other interests) in
scientific study.[29]
Fact in history
Further information: Historiography
A common rhetorical clich□states, "History is written by the winners".
This phrase suggests but does not examine the use of facts in the writing
of history.
E. H. Carr in his 1961 volume, What is History?, argues that the inherent
biases from the gathering of facts makes the objective truth of any historical
perspective idealistic and impossible. Facts are, "like fish in the Ocean,"
of which we may only happen to catch a few, only an indication of what is
below the surface. Even a dragnet cannot tell us for certain what it would
be like to live below the Ocean's surface. Even if we do not discard any
facts (or fish) presented, we will always miss the majority; the site of
our fishing, the methods undertaken, the weather and even luck play a vital
role in what we will catch. Additionally, the composition of history is inevitably
made up by the compilation of many different bias of fact finding - all compounded
over time. He concludes that for a historian to attempt a more objective
method, one must accept that history can only aspire to a conversation of
the present with the past - and that one's methods of fact gathering should
be openly examined. As with science, historical truth and facts will therefore
change over time and reflect only the present consensus (if that).
Fact in law
Further information: Evidence (law) and Trier of fact
In most common law jurisdictions,[30] the general concept and analysis of
fact reflects fundamental principles of Jurisprudence, and is supported
by several well-established standards.[31][32] Matters of fact have various
formal definitions under common law jurisdictions.
These include:
an element required in legal pleadings to demonstrate a cause of action;[33][34]
the determinations of the finder of fact after evaluating admissible evidence
produced in a trial or hearing;[35]
a potential ground of reversible error forwarded on appeal in an appellate
court;[36] and
any of various matters subject to investigation by official authority to
establish whether a crime has been perpetrated, and to establish culpability.
[37]
Legal pleadings
Main article: Pleading
A party to a civil suit generally must clearly state all relevant allegations
of fact upon which a claim is based. The requisite level of precision and
particularity of these allegations varies depending on the rules of civil
procedure as well as the jurisdiction. Parties who face uncertainties regarding
the facts and circumstances attendant to their side in a dispute may sometimes
invoke alternative pleading.[38] In this situation, a party may plead separate
sets of facts that (when considered together) may be contradictory or mutually
exclusive. This (seemingly) logically-inconsistent presentation of facts
may be necessary as a safeguard against contingencies (such as res judicata)
that would otherwise preclude presenting a claim or defense that depends
on a particular interpretation of the underlying facts.[39]
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