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文章评论 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-31 10:14:50 |
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熊猫和狗熊所见略同：
卡爾·特奧多尔·雅斯培（德語：Karl Theodor Jaspers，1883年2月23日－1969年2月26日）是德國著名的哲學家和精神病學家，1967年他成為瑞士公民。
雅斯貝爾斯被看作是存在哲學(Existenzphilosophie)的傑出代表人物，他將存在哲學與讓-保羅·薩特的存在主義進行了嚴格的區分。 |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言时间：2013-03-31 06:34:26 |
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万塔兄博学聪敏，讲得更全面一些。不过黑格尔到雅斯贝尔斯的哲学家对老子有很多误读，虽然说他们承认老子思想是深邃的，但是仍旧站在西方的角度理解“道” 。比如说雅斯贝尔斯是按照西方人的揭弊的逻辑来解释老子的，认为老子自相矛盾，不能理解老子既然认为道不可说，为什么要说，认为老子是玩弄对立字句概念的游戏，尤其是站在基督教的基础上，指责老子“不认识耶稣基督的十字架”是“荒谬的”。 这里可以清楚的看到西方哲学家仍旧是以西方为标准，站在自己的角度指责老子没有西方的东西。 |
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作者：老几 |
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留言时间：2013-03-31 02:00:17 |
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这种题目和讨论才值得老几花时间组织。这里各位特别是万塔和蜉蝣兄的知识和见识给人印象深刻。
兔子今天的讲座要是有这么个提纲和论点，就不会显得那么荒唐可笑了。恕我直言，今天这个“为什么学习哲学”简直是浪费时间。唯一值得肯定的是硬件的改进。
总之，上次讲的好，这次是胡擂。功过相抵。
这么多高手在这儿，今后不能言之无物，不能浪费大家的时间。这是个原则问题，特此警告。 |
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作者：万塔 |
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留言时间：2013-03-30 10:58:03 |
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作者：慕容青草 |
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留言时间：2013-03-30 05:02:48 |
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作者：万塔 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 22:25:58 |
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这一段:
[根据黑格尔，道的学说首先奠基于纯粹抽象之上，也即奠基于无任何反思的纯粹感性知觉之上。经由老子而产生了一种深化，由此，直接的意识（单纯的感性知觉）处在了通向思想的过渡之中。然而这并未进入反思，同时也未进入运动之中。老子的思路甚至走到了“三位一体的规定”中，但从中“并未建立起更高级的精神性宗教”。意识和精神物没有被设立起来去对道做出规定，而是还跌倒在直接的人中。“道的现实性和生活性还是现实的、直接的意识。”[黑格尔：《宗教哲学》（Philosophie der Religion），全集二十卷本，Suhrkamp版，第16卷，第329页。]] |
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作者：万塔 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 22:23:14 |
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以前看过艾尔伯菲特写了一个这方面的详细论文，国内有朱锦良的翻译（网上可以搜着）。
里面说中国哲学早就在莱布尼茨、沃尔夫和伏尔泰那里得到过巨大的尊重，但是那种尊重那时还只朝向孔子和新儒家思想。因此，康德可能是最早介绍老子的人，后面是黑格尔，谢林，布伯，雅斯贝尔斯，海德格尔。
黑格尔是第一位将亚洲思想（印度和中国）笼统地包含进哲学史和历史哲学中的重要西方思想家。对他而言，亚洲是哲学的开端，但这个开端自己还未进入真正的历史，因为在亚洲还没有塑造出真正的主体性。黑格尔一方面是近代主体哲学的完成者，但另一方面也是通向一个新的哲学史时代的一扇门。他的辩证法，也就是他对意识辩证发展的分析，对于德国哲学中出现与“道”（Weg）的思想的接近是有先行指导意义的。如此，黑格尔对于老子的接受就有了双重含义：首先，通过黑格尔，亚洲哲学哪怕只作为初级阶段，也毕竟被包含进了哲学史；其次，在黑格尔那里，现实性是向着某物历史性地发展起来的，在这一点上，它还发生在基督教救世历史的框架里，因此还在普遍神学的框架里。这种时间的历史化马上沦落为历史主义，它为人们在历史的名目下用一概而论的眼光来观察多种多样的文化构建了基础。
黑格尔主要是通过阿贝尔·雷缪萨的描述来了解老子及其“道”的。黑格尔自己是否曾阅读过《道德经》的全译本，已不得而知。如他自己所说，他在维也纳曾“见过”一本。据黑格尔说，雷缪萨给出了希腊语词“逻格斯”来作为对“道”的最佳翻译。于是黑格尔便使用“理性”来翻译它。 |
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作者：慕容青草 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 18:43:50 |
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兔子：
谢谢兔子找出这段来。。。当西方人在中国文化中寻找出路时，中国人自己却一味地想放弃自己的文化是好笑的了吧？
不知各位对于黑格尔对老子是否有涉猎有否了解？他为什么会说“纯粹的无和纯粹的有是一回事”？ |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 18:21:29 |
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确实不知道，因为没有西方人提过，我都是读他们的书，正向上文说的那样。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 18:17:01 |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 18:08:15 |
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兔博称范例哲学“完成”了海氏的存在论，却竟不知道海和老子的关系；不过兔博手脚真快，刚刚还不知道海发现了“道”，现在google 一下就出来了，看来兔博以前google 用的不够啊：） |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 18:02:25 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 18:01:12 |
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我想这篇可以盖棺论定了，到底东方的思想如何影响了他：
=========================================
BEING-IN-THE-WAY
A REVIEW OF HEIDEGGER AND ASIAN THOUGHT
GRAHAM PARKES, ED.
REVIEWED BY
TAYLOR CARMAN
AND
BRYAN VAN NORDEN
*****************************************************************************************************
BEING-IN-THE-WAY
A Review of Heidegger and Asian Thought
Graham Parkes, ed.
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987),
282 pages (paperback 1990)
Graham Parkes is a professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii. He has published extensively on Nietzsche, Japanese philosophy, and most recently on Japanese gardens. His treatment of "The Role of Rock in the Japanese Dry Landscape Garden," can be found in Francois Berthier Reading Zen in the Rocks, (University of Chicago Press, 2001)
REVIEWED BY
TAYLOR CARMAN BARNARD COLLEGE
AND
BRYAN VAN NORDEN VASSAR COLLEGE
Version of July 22, 1997.
1 Introduction
Some time following the publication of his 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time, Heidegger grew more and more inclined to the kind of historicism that regards philosophy itself as "its own time comprehended in thought," as Hegel put it. [G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), 26.] Unlike Hegel, though, Heidegger saw the history of philosophy not as the progressive self- realization of spirit, but as Western civilization's ever-deepening forgetfulness or oblivion of being. For Heidegger, the history of metaphysics amounts to a history of eclipses or withdrawals of being behind various explicit interpretations of the nature of entities. The understanding of being that currently reigns in modern industrialized society, though still tacitly, is a technological interpretation of entities as pure resource material
(Bestand), available on demand for manipulation and exploitation, but inconspicuous in its very accessibility. Heidegger regarded this technological understanding of being as at once the most dangerous and the most decisive epoch in the history of metaphysics, for the sheer immanence of things made increasingly available by technological means not only tends to obscure the fact that we live with an interpretation of being at all, in so doing it also promises the very possibility of our coming to realize that we do.
Given this interpretation of Western philosophy, it is understandable that Heidegger would occasionally entertain the notion that intellectual traditions in the East might afford some hint of what awaits us once we step outside the circle of metaphysics and the technological understanding of being. In what was perhaps his most enthusiastic moment, upon reading a book by D. T. Suzuki, Heidegger is reported to have said, "If I understand this man correctly, this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings." [See W. Barrett, "Zen for the West," in Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, W. Barrett, ed. (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), xi.] On another occasion, in the summer of 1946, Heidegger undertook a collaborative translation of the Tao Te Ching with a Chinese scholar, Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, who recounts the story in his contribution to the present volume of essays. [Unmarked page references in the text are to this book.] As it turned out, Hsiao and Heidegger had settled on renderings of only eight of the 81 chapters by the end of the summer, after which Hsiao politely withdrew from the project. He reports feeling "a slight anxiety" (98) about how far Heidegger was departing from the text, something he is famous for doing in his readings of Western philosophers too. Heidegger's conversations and seminars contain other passing references to Taoist texts, and one of his most famous works, On the Way to Language begins with "A Dialogue on Language (between a Japanese and an Inquirer)." [Heidegger, On the Way to Language, P. D. Hertz, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Hereafter OWL.]
These interesting but inconclusive incidents were the inspiration for a symposium on "Heidegger and Eastern Thought," held in 1969 at the University of Hawaii, and they are the motivation of the present volume edited by Graham Parkes. Tellingly, however, one of Heidegger's last and most interesting remarks about the relation between Eastern and Western thought does not appear in the book at all. In his famous 1966 interview with the German magazine, Der Spiegel, Heidegger said:
I am convinced that a change can only be prepared from the same place in the world where the modern technological world originated. It cannot come about by the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world. The help of the European tradition and a new appropriation of that tradition are needed for a change in thinking. Thinking will only be transformed by a thinking that has the same origin and destiny. [The technological world] ... must be superseded (aufgehoben ) in the Hegelian sense, not removed, superseded, but not by human beings alone. [In Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers, G. Neske and E. Kettering, eds., L. Harries, trans. (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 62-63 (translation modified).]
Far more than any of the foregoing texts, we want to suggest, this is the passage that represents Heidegger's most deeply felt and most carefully considered assessment of the predicament of Western philosophy vis-à-vis Asian thought. It is not insignificant that Heidegger was fascinated with Taoist and Zen thinking. On the other hand, Heidegger had and maintained a highly internal interpretation of the tradition to which he himself belonged, and his interest in things Eastern rather pales in comparison with his immersion in things Western. Heidegger claims to describe and interpret what he calls the "history of being" only in metaphysical cultures that have articulated a unified, or even totalizing conception of what it means to be. It is unfortunate, then, that the authors featured in Heidegger and Asian Thought seem to elide or ignore the pervasively Western orientation and of Heidegger's philosophy, not to mention his own evident skepticism concerning the prospects of any synthesis of Asian and European thought. Moreover, the book's contributors seem to us to underestimate the difficulties facing such comparitive scholarship at the outset, and the book suffers as a result.
Heidegger also frequently expressed doubts about whether thinkers in very different cultures were really in a position to understand one another, indeed he voiced his doubts to the organizers of the Honolulu conference itself (12-13). [See also "A Dialogue on Language," in OWL, 3.] Nevertheless Parkes's introduction and nearly all the essays that follow, including his own, sidestep a number of basic methodogical problems. Parkes avers that "comparative philosophy is most fruitful between unconnected philosophies" (2), only to retreat in a brief interlude later in the book to the much less daring observation that although "the Western and East Asian houses of Being are set apart," nonetheless "one can, with time and effort, come to feel at home in another house" (216). But while the first proposition is dubious, the second is trivial. Much of the book seems to rest on the assumption that "overcoming metaphysics" must go hand-in-hand with a closer approximation to Eastern philosophical sensibilities. But there is scant evidence that Heidegger himself ever thought so, in fact in the passage from the Spiegel interview quoted above he denies it explicitly. The prospect of "superseding" our current technological understanding of being holds no promise whatever that Western post-metaphysical thinking will bear any resemblance to cultural traditions that were to all appearances never metaphysical or technological to begin with.
Finally, the ambitious title of the anthology itself betrays a lack of focus. "Asian thought" is a broad category indeed, covering the intellectual histories of several great traditions in India, China, and Japan, not to mention others that the book neglects entirely. While the authors in the volume are generally careful to limit their discussions to either Indian, Chinese, or Japanese contexts, they show less care in distinguishing among thinkers and concepts internal to any one of them. And yet there is significant variety and discord within those traditions. Chu Hsi (1130-1200) does not simply recapitulate the thought of Mencius (4th century B. C.), and in spite of their many similarities the Chuang-tzu (c. 300 B. C.) and the Tao Te Ching are subtly yet crucially different. Finally, Zen and Ch'an Buddhism were influenced by but not identical with the early Taoist tradition. Any paths the authors purport to find or forge between Heidegger and the East would look far more passable if the points on their map had been more precisely drawn from the outset.
Having said this, one cannot but be struck by certain paralells between Heidegger and the early Taoist tradition. According to Otto Pöggeler's article -- one of the anthology's best -- Heidegger himself confided that, notwithstanding his interaction with Japanese scholars over the years, he "had learned more from Chinese" (50). It is undoubtedly Taoism that promises the most significant points of contact with Heidegger's anti-mentalist, anti-subjectivist conception of human existence and practice. Other essays in the volume that touch on this potentially fruitful philosophical affinity unfortunately fail to shed much light on it.
Before making a few remarks on the subject ourselves, however, we shall begin by discussing two other groups of essays in the book. The collection itself bites off a bit more than even it can chew, so our survey will be admittedly selective. On the one hand there are several articles that treat of the Japanese reception of Heidegger's philosophy, either historically or systematically. On the other hand there are the more speculative articles that attempt -- with varying degrees of implausibility -- to use Heideggerian and Asian texts as vehicles to lead us out of the maze of Western philosophy altogether. To conclude, we shall return to the relation between Heideggerian and Taoist themes, and the question concerning what unites and divides them.
2 Heidegger, the Japanese, and metaphysics
In his "Reflections on Two Addresses by Martin Heidegger," Keiji Nishitani comments eloquently on the impossibility of mediating between traditions as removed from one another as Buddhism and Christianity on the basis of either pure conceptuality or religious dogma, alternatives that tend to be, respectively, either misleadingly transparent or in principle opaque. Nishitani advocates instead moving to "some deeper plane," where man "is thoroughly bare" (146):
in the innermost kernel of man's mind ... through candid self-exposure to the deep complexities of the actual world ... That would mean, in truth, to delve into the basis of existence itself through and through until we reach the hidden source (147).
Nishitani has put his finger on an interesting parallel between the image of Christ as "the son of man" and Buddha's exhortation to "transcend all attachments." And these themes resonate with some of Heidegger's own talk of anxiety and man's essential homelessness in the world. But it is at this point that one wants to know more specifically what the deeper plane, the innermost kernel, and the "bare man" amount to. Such formulations could be genuinely Heideggerian only with the added claim that there are no bare facts about human beings beneath our clothing of self-interpretation, and that human beings are one sense "at home" in the world precisely by carrying on that -- albeit groundless -- self-interpretive activity. Since Nishitani does not articulate this point explicitly, he has difficulty locating the relevance of Heidegger's philosophy outside the context of the confrontation between Christianity and Buddhism. The point is crucial, however, since Heidegger was adamant about sharply distinguishing philosophy from religion, or ontology from what he called "onto-theology."
Yasuo Yuasa offers a very interesting history of "The Encounter of Modern Japanese Philosophy with Heidegger." The article covers more material than we can discuss here, but there is one point that deserves special notice. Western readers brought up in the European philosophical tradition are typically struck by the way in which Heidegger tried to break out of the individualism inherent in Cartesian- Kantian epistemology. Rather than attempt to justify the knowledge claims of an isolated subject, Heidegger describes the way in which knowledge itself is founded on social practices carried out in a shared world constituted by anonymous public norms. Whether one views these innovations as compelling or implausible, the contrast to the subjectivist tradition is clear.
It is fascinating, then, that Kiyoshi Miki and Tetsuroo Watsuji, students of German philosophy and original thinkers in their own right, both found Being and Time disturbingly egocentric. One is stunned to read that in his 1930 essay on "Heidegger's Ontology,"
Miki goes on to criticize Heidegger by contending that his philosophy cannot be "contemporary" because his [notion of] Dasein remains in the standpoint of individual subjective life without a social aspect
(160).
Miki also criticized Heidegger for straying "from that which is Greek to what is originally Christian." One gathers from Yuasa's account that what Miki often took to be Heidegger's position was in fact Kierkegaard's. Yuasa says convincingly that "The discrepancy between Heidegger's and Miki's concerns is clearly manifest" (ibid. ), and that in the case of his own original contributions to the philosophy of history, "the sophisticated terminologies favored in German philosophy obscure Miki's intent" (164). Watsuji, too, concluded that Heidegger's "Dasein was the Dasein of the individual only. He treated human existence in the world as being the existence of an individual (hito "... he did not advance beyond an abstraction of a single aspect (167)." [From a quoted passage of Watsuji's Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study, Geoffrey Bownas, trans. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), preface.] According to Watsuji, Yuasa tells us,
Heidegger treated the mode of being-in-the-world only from the aspect of temporality and took lightly the aspect of spatiality. ... Dasein is grasped with an emphasis on its individuality and without sufficiently considering the social relationship between the self and others (169).
That Heidegger placed too much emphasis on time at the expense of space is an intriguing if somewhat inchoate idea, and Yuasa's own discussion makes it seem at least plausible. Yuasa is right to point out, however, that as a criticism it is undermined by much of Heidegger's later work, according to which the technological understanding of being levels the distinction between nearness and farness (television being one of Heidegger's favorite examples). As Yuasa correctly observes, Watsuji's own philosophical concern with the phenomena of climate and geography has much more in common with the Annales historians than with Heidegger. In the end, as in the case of Miki, "his system differs completely in substance from Heidegger's thought, in spite of the fact that he employs a seemingly Heideggerian terminology" (169). These cases, then, seem to confirm Heidegger's suspicion that Japanese thinkers might lose their voice in the foreign idiom of German philosophy, his own especially. In "A Dialogue on Language," Heidegger tempers his notion of "overcoming metaphysics" by characterizing it as "neither a destruction nor even a denial of metaphysics. To intend anything else would be childish presumption and a demeaning of history." [OWL, 20.] It is an unfortunate habit of some scholars of European philosophy that they often underestimate their attachment to the intellectual history from which they would like to declare independence. But as Heidegger himself suggests, if overcoming a tradition is possible at all, one must remain peculiarly indebted to the tradition into which one is originally thrown. As we have said, it is a general weakness of the present anthology that it underestimates the weight, perhaps the impenetrability, of tradition. The contributions of Graham Parkes, Joan Stambaugh, and David Levin are particularly ambivalent about the metaphysical tradition as it bears upon Heidegger's thinking, and of the peculiar way in which Heidegger venerated that tradition while at once criticizing it to the core.
The volume might strike some readers as overwhelmingly Heideggerian in style and content, but this is rather a misleading appearance. The true inspiration behind the philosophical content of many of the essays is not Heidegger but Derrida, whose name is hardly mentioned. Many of the authors habitually conflate Heidegger's Destruktion of ontology with Derrida's concept of deconstruction, which is significantly different. [Cf. Jung, 217, 237, and Levin, 256.] For whereas Heidegger early on sought simply to "destroy" traditional ontology by tracing familiar metaphysical notions back to practical, existential contexts, Derrida attempts to show all texts, and a fortiori all metaphysical discourse, to be in principle indeterminate, undecidable, and self-undermining.
3 Heidegger and the Taoists
Finally, we would like to explore very briefly a few of the most promising connections that might obtain between Heidegger and the Taoists, Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu. Otto Pöggeler's essay, though it often wanders well off the subject, offers the most substantial textual support for the various possible influences and analogies.
In chapter 17 of the Chuang-tzu Hui Shih puts forward a challenge: "You are not a fish. Whence do you know that the fish are happy?" Chuang-tzu replies, famously, "You aren't me, whence do you know that I don't know the fish are happy?" [Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters, A. C. Graham, ed. and trans. (Boston: Unwin Paperbacks, 1986),
123.] Heidegger is known to have been fond of this passage and to have read aloud from it in 1930 during a discussion of intersubjectivity and empathy (Pöggeler, 52). It is easier to see what divides Heidegger and Chuang-tzu than what unites them, however, since, as Pöggeler says, the moral of the story has to do with "the universal sympathy which joins together all the things of nature -- such as men and fishes" (53). For Heidegger, on the contrary, other living creatures are "separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss." [Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings, D. F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977),
206.]
Or consider chapter 11 of the Lao-tzu:
Clay is molded to make a pot In its emptiness [lit., nothing] Is the usefulness of the pot.
[Cf. Pöggeler, 61, and Parkes, 120-121. Translations from the Tao Te Ching are by Bryan Van Norden.]
In what might appear to be a strikingly analogous passage, Heidegger describes a jug as a paradigmatic "thing," that is, an artifact that holds human practices together and makes them intelligible. He writes:
When we fill the jug, the pouring that fills it flows into the empty jug. The emptiness, the void, is what does the vessel's holding. The empty space, this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel. ... But if the holding is done by the jug's void, then the potter who forms sides and bottom on his wheel does not, strictly speaking, make the jug. He only shapes the clay. No -- he shapes the void. ... The vessel's thingness does not lie at all in the material of which it consists, but in the void that holds. [Heidegger, "The Thing," in Poetry, Language, Thought, A. Hofstadter, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 169.]
The point of this passage is that we cannot understand what a "thing" is, in Heidegger's special sense of the word, by means of a mental representation of the object as "occurrent" (vorhanden), that is, as a substance with properties. Heidegger may be alluding to Lao-tzu here, but the fact that he chooses the jug as an example is not essential to his point. The jug merely provides a vivid illustration of a general point about the role of focal practices in human understanding. The Tao Te Ching, by contrast, shows almost no philosophical interest in the relationship between mental representation and understanding. The notion that the potter merely "shapes the void," however, draws attention to the peculiar passivity that Heidegger takes to be essential to human productivity in general. The importance of passivity is indeed a Taoist theme as well, and this parallel warrants further study. Chapter 15 of the Lao-tzu is of particular interest since, upon Heidegger's request, his would-be co-translator, Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, wrote out two of its lines as a gift of decorative calligraphy (cf. 100, 102-3). The lines read, literally:
Who is able to settle the turbid [so that] it gradually becomes clear? Who is able to stimulate the peaceful [so that] it gradually comes alive? [This translation deletes the character chiu in order to restore the parallelism of the two sentences. The Ma-wang-tui manuscripts (to which Heidegger did not have access) have an interestingly different version: "If one settles the turbid it gradually ....]
With Hsiao's assistance, Heidegger translated these lines as follows:
Wer kann still sein and aus der Stille durch sie auf den Weg bringen (be-wegen) etwas so, daß es zum Erscheinen kommt? Wer vermag es, stillend etwas so ins Sein zu bringen?
(Who can be still and out of the stillness, through it, bring (move) something along the way so that it becomes manifest? Who is able, through stillness, to bring something into being?)
In the first line, Heidegger's phrase, "bring (move) something along the way," is entirely his own interpolation, and he has replaced "clear" with "manifestation" or "appearance" (Erscheinen). The fluid metaphor that is invoked by the word "turbid" (cho) is thereby dropped altogether. In the second line Heidegger replaces "alive" with "being," which again reflects his own ontological concerns and perhaps a desire to avoid connotations of vitalism or Lebensphilosophie. The nearest point of contact between Heidegger and the Tao Te Ching in all this is undoubtedly the term tao itself. This is why, in spite of the lack of textual justification, Heidegger inserts Weg and be-wegen into the first line. Finally, it useful to consider Heidegger's apparent fondness for chapter 18: "When the great tao falls into disuse, there are humanheartedness and righteousness" (75). The Chinese text does not identify the tao with righteousness in the sense of self-conscious cultivation of ethical correctness or ritual. Equally, for Heidegger, human understanding and practice are essentially situational and context-dependent, always outrunning abstract principles purporting to apply generalized conceptions of human nature or moral goodness to all situations, in all settings.
This opposition between the tao and moral correctness raises what is perhaps the most conspicuous theme common to Heideggerians, Taoists, and even Confucians, namely, craftsmanship as a paradigm of authentic human activity. A craftsman does not rely on rules, representations, or deliberate intentions in carrying out skilled action. To use Heidegger's own example from Being and Time, one does not confront a hammer as a bare object with properties but rather as equipment already familiar and integrated into one's practical activities. Very similar craftsmanship metaphors are to be found throughout Taoist and Confucian texts.
As Pöggeler points out in this connection, however, "In the far East Lao-tzu is not Confucius" (75). Confucians generally maintain that ritual and ethics are crucial to human cultivation. Hsün-tzu, moreover, believed that ethical perfection can only be the result of years of ritual practice, reading canonical literature and studying under a teacher. Taoists like Lao-tzu, by contrast, emphasize the return to a state of simplicity before the development of ritual. One is reminded of the early Heidegger: ethics, understood as the formulation of general rules of conduct or character, goes against the grain of authentic action precisely because of its insistence upon self-consciousness, as opposed to intuition and skill.
Chuang-tzu goes further in this direction than Heidegger, however, since he seems to advocate unselfconscious craft-activity as an end in itself. For him, enlightenment consists in overcoming reflectivity altogether. Sages achieving this condition, while not concerned with bettering the world, are at any rate harmless; they injure no one while carving ox carcasses, catching cicadas, or swimming down waterfalls. Heidegger, by contrast, places no special premium on harmlessness or tranquility. Authentic action, for him, does not aim at achieving an indifferent attitude toward death, but rather an active acceptance of finitude and the anxiety attending it. Contrary to the tenor of much Asian thought, Heidegger's philosophy almost never envisages an equalization or homogenization of anxiety-causing oppositions, for example between human beings and the world of things, or between life and death. If Heidegger undermines such dualisms on a metaphysical level, it is only by way of preserving many of their dramatic implications in existential contexts. |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 17:57:11 |
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所附英文最后一句提到的正是说海德格尔曾经试图翻译老子的《道德经》啊，后来据说因为和萧师毅的解读不同，萧中断了合作。兔博刚说不知道，怎么一下就找到了，是google 的吧？：） |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 17:38:32 |
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暮博，
看这个：
“Heidegger died in Frieburg on May 26th, 1976. In the United States, the news of his death went largely unheeded. Interestingly, the news of Heidegger's death was received with widespread coverage in Japan. The connection of Heidegger' s thought to the East has not received much attention over the years. But it is clear that he first had his greatest impact in Japan with the writings of Count Kuki Shuzo. Further, Heidegger carried on a relationship with D.T. Suzuki, whom he met with on several occassions. Further, Heidegger at one time attempted to translate Lao Tzu into German, but never finished the project.”
http://www.mythosandlogos.com/heidegger.html |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 17:11:39 |
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呵呵，兔博，涉猎（不能说全懂）中国哲学的人西方还真有几个，雅斯贝尔斯就写过专门著述介绍老子（当然很多理解是不对的），并在《大哲学家》中把老子，苏格拉底，佛陀，孔子成为轴心时代的大哲学家，其中老子被称为“原創性形而上學家”。海德格尔和雅斯贝尔斯的通信中，引用过几次老子的原话，海还和中国的保罗。萧师毅合作翻译过老子的《道德经》，这些都是喜欢海的人知道的常识啊：） |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 16:42:19 |
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老万你行啊！说得很不错，很靠谱。我无法跟你解释完，我写了40万字。你可以找一个版本看看（hare)有。如有问题我们再讨论。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 16:34:14 |
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老万的马列哲学基础不错，即使是错的也比没有强！我当年也是这样过了的 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 16:31:22 |
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在海的形而上的讨论中，他特别提到在30年代，他的主要经历放在找＂das Ding en sich", 但他没找到。他从语言的词根上挖掘了很多基本定义，觉得该说得都说了。但我不知道他找到了中国的道，你能给出出处吗？据我所知，西方哲学大家唯一对东方哲学造诣深的是叔本华，但是印度哲学。对中国的哲学，我没听到说西方人懂。我可能孤陋寡闻 |
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作者：万塔 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 16:22:05 |
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兔子，
你说你的范例哲学将海德格尔的存在哲学体系给＂完成＂了，还说那是你的看法。
别去纠缠哲学名词，你来简单说说你是怎么把他的体系给完成的? 你是发展了他的＂个体就是世界的存在＂理论，还是把它们引入了存在主义心理学?
海德格尔的存在哲学有广泛影响，是因为人们从社会现象中找到了共鸣，现象学最后进入生活实践，与人类在社会生活中的存在危机相面对，带来对存在感悟，让在社会生活压力之下的个体通过存在来感受他的哲学，也让平均的日常状态成为Ontology的一层。他虽然没有对《存在与时间的》的第二部分再写下去，但是没有写完著作的人历来不少，那不代表他＂趴下了爬不起来＂，他的后期的思索不是照样对自己的哲学进行补充?
你是根据什么说你自己发展完成了海的哲学理论? |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 15:44:52 |
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海是没有把《存在和时间》继续下去，一是因为碰到了诸多的困难，二是海后期把注意力转向“道”，道说， 尔后转向言说和语言对存在的“去蔽”，海认为找到了这个言说，存在的家，就能够揭示存在的本质。有趣的是，海对去弊的言说或道说的追求却把他引向了老子“不可言说的道”，但最终还是限于语言放弃了。 |
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作者：万塔 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 15:40:49 |
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兔子，这不大家还是可以讨论的嘛，你不该连那个也需要放狗去帮你找。我们中学不是逐字学过道德经开篇那些文字么，中大不讲古代哲学?
那你需要表扬俺当时一字之师的作用。对吧?
现在我自然不是一字之师了。但是你回头得允许我发贴时称呼你＂徒子＂一次。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 15:34:14 |
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其实你说的用”分析方法“的办法，真是对的。不过我不认为其他人知道你在说神马。看你的了，你逃不过我的眼睛。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 15:31:51 |
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万同志，
这个态度就对了。
据我所知，与你商榷，是汉（献）帝？为避讳”恒“字改的。因为没空古狗，你可补充。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 15:27:58 |
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暮博，
因为海对很多人都很深，我觉得不懂前苏格拉底时期的哲学，很难弄懂海。我以后会讲到他。
海基本上是个搞了一个”unfinished project“。因为他涉及到人之后，这即是他的聪明，又是他的失落，他没能再爬出来。从他写了存在与时间多年后，（那是当时为申请教职而作），当他在课堂上，谈形而上时，他坦承他没有完成，太困难了。
范例哲学将其”完成“了-当然这是我的看法。是否得到承认，也许还要一段时间。
我很惊讶你涉及了海的东西。你的理解也许于我不一样，但已经很不简单了。共同切磋。 |
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作者：万塔 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 15:17:44 |
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兔子，你叫大家叫你徒子，怎么又不干了?
我是不是你的老师不重要(真是了我也就混不下去了:-)。
可是你最好先老实说一下:
<b>［＂道可道，非常道＂，意思是平常可道的都不是道］这句话是不是呢的道德经研究一文一开始的话? 我是不是当时给你讲解了恒字的避讳历史? </b>
是的话，你恐怕至少在那件事上得认我这个＂一字之师＂。 |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 15:11:33 |
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兔博，我看的译本译为“能在”，可能的存在，并且在书中提到了筹划的存在，存在之存在，先于存在的存在，我印象很深，等等，并且觉得很震撼（那是二十多年前了），我不知别的译本怎样翻译，当时都说此书是不可翻译的“天书”，因为翻译出的译本比较起来完全象不同的理论。
你查到的是海氏对死亡的解释，海氏认为人是向死而生的，就是认为可能的存在（将来）一旦沉沦到此在（现在），真正的存在的可能性就死亡了，最终成为（过去）。海氏对死亡的理解正是建立在“存在的可能性”之沉沦，或者死去是不可避免的。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 14:59:24 |
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老万啊，
你那点糊糊就别逗了。
如果你想讨论，咱们就平等探讨。如果想做我老师，不是不可以，但必须先晾你的资格，否则我如何相信你？公平吗？ |
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作者：stinger |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 14:55:06 |
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抱歉暮博，是我对中文翻译的无知，因为没看过中文的版本。我查了一下，这可能是你的意思：
”
第一节一、整体能在
海德格尔指出，死亡是此在存在的别具一格的现象，它是此在整体能在的确证。对这一现象也必须从此在的基本机制的整体性——操心来进行考察。
死亡是一种“终结”，此在在死亡中丧失了此之在。但是，死亡这种“终结”与果实的成熟却完全不是一回事。的确，此在随着它的死亡而结束了它的行程，但此在并不是随着它的死亡而就穷尽了它特有的种种可能性，恰恰相反，是死亡取走了此在生存的种种可能性。
死亡又总是此在自己的死亡，即死亡具有向来我属性。每一此在向来都必须自己接受自己的死，这是任何人都无法代理的。死亡在本质上无代理。
死亡这样一种属于此在而标志着此在之终结的现象，同样是从此在的基本机制——操心的整体中得到规定的。操心的结构表明了此在之存在的诸种基础性质：在先行于自身的存在之中——生存；在已经在一个世界之中的存在中——实际性；在寓于世内照面存在者的存在中——沉沦。
首先，死亡作为此在本身向来不得不承担下来的存在可能性，是此在本身在其最本己的能在中来临（bevorsteht）到自身，这种特殊的来临在生存论上的可能性根据即在于此在的先行于自身的展开——生存。死亡不是尚未现成的东西，不是减缩到极小值的最后欠缺，而是一种来临。由于死亡是此在的不再能此在的可能性，所以当此在作为这种可能性来临到它自身之前时，它就被充分地指向最本己的能在。在此之际，此在对其他此在的一切关联都解除了。同时死亡又是此在这种能在所超不过的可能性。它既然是一种来临，因而也就是此在的向终结存在。这种来临、这种向终结存在也正是先行于自身的一种形式。
其次，死亡又是此在能在的实际性，这是操心的第二个环节的一种具体形式。死亡这种可能性不是此在在它的存在过程中偶然产生出来的，而是此在已经被抛入这种可能性之中。此在委托给了死亡，尽管此在首先和通常对此没有明确的知，更没有理论的知。这就是说，此在总已生存在死亡之中。死亡是一种此在刚一存在就承担起来的去存在的方式。
最后，此在首先和通常以在死亡之前逃避的方式掩蔽着最本己的向死亡存在，即此在“首先和通常是以沉沦的方式死着”
［德］马丁•海德格尔：《存在与时间》，中译本，302页，1987；德文本，251页。
这是因为，实际的生存活动不仅仅一般地和无所谓地是一种被抛的能在世，而总已经是消融于操劳所及的“世界”，总已经是寓于世内照面者的存在。这即是沉沦。在这种沉沦中，就有在最本己的死亡存在面前逃避这种情形。
总之，操心的结构整体——“先行于自身的——已经在世界之中的——寓于世内照面者的存在”——规定了死亡的特征，因此，“死亡，就其存在论的可能性着眼，奠基在操心之中”
［德］马丁•海德格尔：《存在与时间》，德文本，252页。
向死亡存在首先是日常此在在死亡之前闪避着的这种非本真的向死亡存在。非本真的向死亡存在在常人的闲谈中有其线索：人总有一天要死，但暂时尚未。这种说法遮蔽了死亡这种极端的可能性，以减轻被抛入死亡的状态。因此，非本真的向死亡存在标示出了此在通常已经错置自身于其中的一种存在方式。
但是，向死亡存在还有本真的向死亡存在这种样式。这就是说此在先行着把向死亡存在这种能在揭露出来，为它本身而向着它的这种最极端的可能性开展自身，或把自身筹划到这种最本己的能在上去，也即在揭露出来的这种能在中自由地领会自身。首先，死亡是此在的最本己的可能性，向这种可能性存在，此在就开展出它的最本己的能在——在这种能在中，一切为的都是此在的存在。在这种能在中，此在的领会能够看清楚即能够揭露出已经丧失在常人的日常状态之中的情况。其次，死亡是无所关联的可能性，先行到这种无所关联的可能性中去，就把此在逼入这样一种可能性中：“由它自己出发，从它自己那里，把它的最本己的存在承担起来。”
［德］马丁•海德格尔：《存在与时间》，中译本，316页，1987；德文本，264页。
第三，这种可能性是无可逾越的可能性，向这种可能性存在，就要为自己的死亡而先行着成为自由的，把此在自己从丧失在偶然地拥挤着的各种可能性的情况中解放出来。第四，死亡这种可能性是确知的可能性，因此，此在先行向这种可能性存在，把死亡持以为真，就要求自己有一种与之相应的确定的行为，一种完满的、本真的行为。第五，死亡这种可能性又是不确定的，此在领会着、筹划着向这种可能性存在，会把这种持续的威胁敞开着且不能淡化这威胁，它就不能不培养这确定可知的不确定性。而把这威胁保持在敞开状态中的现身情态就是畏。因此，向死亡存在本质上就是畏。
概括起来说，生存论上的本真的向死亡存在就是：“先行向此在揭露出丧失在常人自己中的情况，并把此在带到主要不依靠操劳操持而是去作为此在自己存在的可能性之前，而这个自己却就在热情的、解脱了常人的幻想的、实际的、确知它自己而又畏着的向死亡的自由之中。”
［德］马丁•海德格尔：《存在与时间》，修订译本，305~306页，1999；德文本，266页。
毫无疑问，海德格尔把死亡现象理解为此在的生存方式，这在西方人学思想史上具有独到性，他对死亡的分析在深刻性上也远超过了前人。但同时，他的这种分析也是建立在以往西方人学对死亡的探索的基础之上的。他自己所提供的注释表明，他至少思考了狄尔泰关于死是生存的界限的观点，雅斯贝尔斯把死亡作为引向“边缘处境”的导索的观点，基督教神学的死亡与来生来世的观点等。这些关于死亡的观点对于海德格尔所作的此在的向死亡存在的生存论分析是有启示作用的。如狄尔泰提出：“归根到底，从生到死，这一关联最深刻而普遍地规定了我们此在的感受，这是因为那由死而来的生存的界限，对于我们生的理解和评价，总是具有决定性的意义。”
［德］马丁•海德格尔：《存在与时间》，中译本，299页，1987；德文本，249页。
死对于人们理解生具有决定性意义，海德格尔对此在的向死亡存在的分析显然也包含了这样的思想。虽然海德格尔是从“此在的‘本质’在于生存”出发来说明问题的，但他用“向死亡存在”这一概念以及由向死亡存在的不同选择来说明此在的生存本质，应该是受到了狄尔泰上述思想的启发的。
海德格尔对向死亡存在的分析的确揭示了此在向死亡存在的动态时间过程，从而从一个方面表明了此在纵向度生存的整体性。向死亡存在（seinzumTode），无论是非本真的向死亡存在，还是本真的向死亡存在，都表明了这一生存论现象的时间性：先行于自身（即将来）同时又已在世界中（即曾在）寓于世内照面者（当前）而存在。
此在的向死亡存在也更加鲜明地表明了此在生存的选择性、能动性、目的性和被制约性、受动性、条件性之间的矛盾。如果说，此在的非本真的向死亡存在所标示的是此在生存的社会历史制约性、受动性、条件性在矛盾双方中占据了主导地位的话，那么，此在的本真的向死亡存在则是此在的选择性、能动性、目的性占了主导地位，此在由此而获得了真正的自由。
“ |
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作者：万塔 |
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留言时间：2013-03-29 14:52:17 |
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徒子，
你折腾到现在多少年了，连一点点哲学的东西都没有，让我如何说你新旧呢? 号称自己是＂哲学专业／研究了几十年＂，你这６０老人除了反华反政府，还好丢人现眼地连番几次地连哲学也一起反。
中国学哲学专业的古文都很强，不少研究生还有一门不错的外语，看看你，中文稀松外语稀烂，两样都闹过笑话，还总拿什么＂欢迎周末来讨论＂欺骗大家，你何时讨论出来东西了?
学了几十年中国哲学的徒子老小子，你上回开张要大讲中国老庄哲学，后来怎么样? 兑现什么了?
我记得白凡和我当时一心想捧个场把你那点初级文化道场支持起来，可是你一开口给大家来了个［＂道可道，非常道＂，意思是平常可道的都不是道］，对吧?
连＂常＂非本义，本义是＂非恒道＂这么基础到没有更低级的入门知识都不懂，古文能力比初中生还差，这样的水平怎么不让你从任何学校哲学老师的职务上失业，就跟你后来那样做了这么多年的寓公宅男。
竟然还不努力！ |
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