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文章評論 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-31 10:14:50 |
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熊貓和狗熊所見略同：
卡爾·特奧多爾·雅斯培（德語：Karl Theodor Jaspers，1883年2月23日－1969年2月26日）是德國著名的哲學家和精神病學家，1967年他成為瑞士公民。
雅斯貝爾斯被看作是存在哲學(Existenzphilosophie)的傑出代表人物，他將存在哲學與讓-保羅·薩特的存在主義進行了嚴格的區分。 |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言時間：2013-03-31 06:34:26 |
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萬塔兄博學聰敏，講得更全面一些。不過黑格爾到雅斯貝爾斯的哲學家對老子有很多誤讀，雖然說他們承認老子思想是深邃的，但是仍舊站在西方的角度理解“道” 。比如說雅斯貝爾斯是按照西方人的揭弊的邏輯來解釋老子的，認為老子自相矛盾，不能理解老子既然認為道不可說，為什麼要說，認為老子是玩弄對立字句概念的遊戲，尤其是站在基督教的基礎上，指責老子“不認識耶穌基督的十字架”是“荒謬的”。 這裡可以清楚的看到西方哲學家仍舊是以西方為標準，站在自己的角度指責老子沒有西方的東西。 |
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作者：老幾 |
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留言時間：2013-03-31 02:00:17 |
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這種題目和討論才值得老幾花時間組織。這裡各位特別是萬塔和蜉蝣兄的知識和見識給人印象深刻。
兔子今天的講座要是有這麼個提綱和論點，就不會顯得那麼荒唐可笑了。恕我直言，今天這個“為什麼學習哲學”簡直是浪費時間。唯一值得肯定的是硬件的改進。
總之，上次講的好，這次是胡擂。功過相抵。
這麼多高手在這兒，今後不能言之無物，不能浪費大家的時間。這是個原則問題，特此警告。 |
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作者：萬塔 |
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留言時間：2013-03-30 10:58:03 |
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作者：慕容青草 |
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留言時間：2013-03-30 05:02:48 |
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作者：萬塔 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 22:25:58 |
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這一段:
[根據黑格爾，道的學說首先奠基於純粹抽象之上，也即奠基於無任何反思的純粹感性知覺之上。經由老子而產生了一種深化，由此，直接的意識（單純的感性知覺）處在了通向思想的過渡之中。然而這並未進入反思，同時也未進入運動之中。老子的思路甚至走到了“三位一體的規定”中，但從中“並未建立起更高級的精神性宗教”。意識和精神物沒有被設立起來去對道做出規定，而是還跌倒在直接的人中。“道的現實性和生活性還是現實的、直接的意識。”[黑格爾：《宗教哲學》（Philosophie der Religion），全集二十卷本，Suhrkamp版，第16卷，第329頁。]] |
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作者：萬塔 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 22:23:14 |
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以前看過艾爾伯菲特寫了一個這方面的詳細論文，國內有朱錦良的翻譯（網上可以搜着）。
裡面說中國哲學早就在萊布尼茨、沃爾夫和伏爾泰那裡得到過巨大的尊重，但是那種尊重那時還只朝向孔子和新儒家思想。因此，康德可能是最早介紹老子的人，後面是黑格爾，謝林，布伯，雅斯貝爾斯，海德格爾。
黑格爾是第一位將亞洲思想（印度和中國）籠統地包含進哲學史和歷史哲學中的重要西方思想家。對他而言，亞洲是哲學的開端，但這個開端自己還未進入真正的歷史，因為在亞洲還沒有塑造出真正的主體性。黑格爾一方面是近代主體哲學的完成者，但另一方面也是通向一個新的哲學史時代的一扇門。他的辯證法，也就是他對意識辯證發展的分析，對於德國哲學中出現與“道”（Weg）的思想的接近是有先行指導意義的。如此，黑格爾對於老子的接受就有了雙重含義：首先，通過黑格爾，亞洲哲學哪怕只作為初級階段，也畢竟被包含進了哲學史；其次，在黑格爾那裡，現實性是向着某物歷史性地發展起來的，在這一點上，它還發生在基督教救世歷史的框架里，因此還在普遍神學的框架里。這種時間的歷史化馬上淪落為歷史主義，它為人們在歷史的名目下用一概而論的眼光來觀察多種多樣的文化構建了基礎。
黑格爾主要是通過阿貝爾·雷繆薩的描述來了解老子及其“道”的。黑格爾自己是否曾閱讀過《道德經》的全譯本，已不得而知。如他自己所說，他在維也納曾“見過”一本。據黑格爾說，雷繆薩給出了希臘語詞“邏格斯”來作為對“道”的最佳翻譯。於是黑格爾便使用“理性”來翻譯它。 |
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作者：慕容青草 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 18:43:50 |
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兔子：
謝謝兔子找出這段來。。。當西方人在中國文化中尋找出路時，中國人自己卻一味地想放棄自己的文化是好笑的了吧？
不知各位對於黑格爾對老子是否有涉獵有否了解？他為什麼會說“純粹的無和純粹的有是一回事”？ |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 18:21:29 |
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確實不知道，因為沒有西方人提過，我都是讀他們的書，正向上文說的那樣。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 18:17:01 |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 18:08:15 |
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兔博稱範例哲學“完成”了海氏的存在論，卻竟不知道海和老子的關係；不過兔博手腳真快，剛剛還不知道海發現了“道”，現在google 一下就出來了，看來兔博以前google 用的不夠啊：） |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 18:02:25 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 18:01:12 |
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我想這篇可以蓋棺論定了，到底東方的思想如何影響了他：
=========================================
BEING-IN-THE-WAY
A REVIEW OF HEIDEGGER AND ASIAN THOUGHT
GRAHAM PARKES, ED.
REVIEWED BY
TAYLOR CARMAN
AND
BRYAN VAN NORDEN
*****************************************************************************************************
BEING-IN-THE-WAY
A Review of Heidegger and Asian Thought
Graham Parkes, ed.
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987),
282 pages (paperback 1990)
Graham Parkes is a professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii. He has published extensively on Nietzsche, Japanese philosophy, and most recently on Japanese gardens. His treatment of "The Role of Rock in the Japanese Dry Landscape Garden," can be found in Francois Berthier Reading Zen in the Rocks, (University of Chicago Press, 2001)
REVIEWED BY
TAYLOR CARMAN BARNARD COLLEGE
AND
BRYAN VAN NORDEN VASSAR COLLEGE
Version of July 22, 1997.
1 Introduction
Some time following the publication of his 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time, Heidegger grew more and more inclined to the kind of historicism that regards philosophy itself as "its own time comprehended in thought," as Hegel put it. [G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), 26.] Unlike Hegel, though, Heidegger saw the history of philosophy not as the progressive self- realization of spirit, but as Western civilization's ever-deepening forgetfulness or oblivion of being. For Heidegger, the history of metaphysics amounts to a history of eclipses or withdrawals of being behind various explicit interpretations of the nature of entities. The understanding of being that currently reigns in modern industrialized society, though still tacitly, is a technological interpretation of entities as pure resource material
(Bestand), available on demand for manipulation and exploitation, but inconspicuous in its very accessibility. Heidegger regarded this technological understanding of being as at once the most dangerous and the most decisive epoch in the history of metaphysics, for the sheer immanence of things made increasingly available by technological means not only tends to obscure the fact that we live with an interpretation of being at all, in so doing it also promises the very possibility of our coming to realize that we do.
Given this interpretation of Western philosophy, it is understandable that Heidegger would occasionally entertain the notion that intellectual traditions in the East might afford some hint of what awaits us once we step outside the circle of metaphysics and the technological understanding of being. In what was perhaps his most enthusiastic moment, upon reading a book by D. T. Suzuki, Heidegger is reported to have said, "If I understand this man correctly, this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings." [See W. Barrett, "Zen for the West," in Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, W. Barrett, ed. (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), xi.] On another occasion, in the summer of 1946, Heidegger undertook a collaborative translation of the Tao Te Ching with a Chinese scholar, Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, who recounts the story in his contribution to the present volume of essays. [Unmarked page references in the text are to this book.] As it turned out, Hsiao and Heidegger had settled on renderings of only eight of the 81 chapters by the end of the summer, after which Hsiao politely withdrew from the project. He reports feeling "a slight anxiety" (98) about how far Heidegger was departing from the text, something he is famous for doing in his readings of Western philosophers too. Heidegger's conversations and seminars contain other passing references to Taoist texts, and one of his most famous works, On the Way to Language begins with "A Dialogue on Language (between a Japanese and an Inquirer)." [Heidegger, On the Way to Language, P. D. Hertz, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Hereafter OWL.]
These interesting but inconclusive incidents were the inspiration for a symposium on "Heidegger and Eastern Thought," held in 1969 at the University of Hawaii, and they are the motivation of the present volume edited by Graham Parkes. Tellingly, however, one of Heidegger's last and most interesting remarks about the relation between Eastern and Western thought does not appear in the book at all. In his famous 1966 interview with the German magazine, Der Spiegel, Heidegger said:
I am convinced that a change can only be prepared from the same place in the world where the modern technological world originated. It cannot come about by the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world. The help of the European tradition and a new appropriation of that tradition are needed for a change in thinking. Thinking will only be transformed by a thinking that has the same origin and destiny. [The technological world] ... must be superseded (aufgehoben ) in the Hegelian sense, not removed, superseded, but not by human beings alone. [In Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers, G. Neske and E. Kettering, eds., L. Harries, trans. (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 62-63 (translation modified).]
Far more than any of the foregoing texts, we want to suggest, this is the passage that represents Heidegger's most deeply felt and most carefully considered assessment of the predicament of Western philosophy vis-à-vis Asian thought. It is not insignificant that Heidegger was fascinated with Taoist and Zen thinking. On the other hand, Heidegger had and maintained a highly internal interpretation of the tradition to which he himself belonged, and his interest in things Eastern rather pales in comparison with his immersion in things Western. Heidegger claims to describe and interpret what he calls the "history of being" only in metaphysical cultures that have articulated a unified, or even totalizing conception of what it means to be. It is unfortunate, then, that the authors featured in Heidegger and Asian Thought seem to elide or ignore the pervasively Western orientation and of Heidegger's philosophy, not to mention his own evident skepticism concerning the prospects of any synthesis of Asian and European thought. Moreover, the book's contributors seem to us to underestimate the difficulties facing such comparitive scholarship at the outset, and the book suffers as a result.
Heidegger also frequently expressed doubts about whether thinkers in very different cultures were really in a position to understand one another, indeed he voiced his doubts to the organizers of the Honolulu conference itself (12-13). [See also "A Dialogue on Language," in OWL, 3.] Nevertheless Parkes's introduction and nearly all the essays that follow, including his own, sidestep a number of basic methodogical problems. Parkes avers that "comparative philosophy is most fruitful between unconnected philosophies" (2), only to retreat in a brief interlude later in the book to the much less daring observation that although "the Western and East Asian houses of Being are set apart," nonetheless "one can, with time and effort, come to feel at home in another house" (216). But while the first proposition is dubious, the second is trivial. Much of the book seems to rest on the assumption that "overcoming metaphysics" must go hand-in-hand with a closer approximation to Eastern philosophical sensibilities. But there is scant evidence that Heidegger himself ever thought so, in fact in the passage from the Spiegel interview quoted above he denies it explicitly. The prospect of "superseding" our current technological understanding of being holds no promise whatever that Western post-metaphysical thinking will bear any resemblance to cultural traditions that were to all appearances never metaphysical or technological to begin with.
Finally, the ambitious title of the anthology itself betrays a lack of focus. "Asian thought" is a broad category indeed, covering the intellectual histories of several great traditions in India, China, and Japan, not to mention others that the book neglects entirely. While the authors in the volume are generally careful to limit their discussions to either Indian, Chinese, or Japanese contexts, they show less care in distinguishing among thinkers and concepts internal to any one of them. And yet there is significant variety and discord within those traditions. Chu Hsi (1130-1200) does not simply recapitulate the thought of Mencius (4th century B. C.), and in spite of their many similarities the Chuang-tzu (c. 300 B. C.) and the Tao Te Ching are subtly yet crucially different. Finally, Zen and Ch'an Buddhism were influenced by but not identical with the early Taoist tradition. Any paths the authors purport to find or forge between Heidegger and the East would look far more passable if the points on their map had been more precisely drawn from the outset.
Having said this, one cannot but be struck by certain paralells between Heidegger and the early Taoist tradition. According to Otto Pöggeler's article -- one of the anthology's best -- Heidegger himself confided that, notwithstanding his interaction with Japanese scholars over the years, he "had learned more from Chinese" (50). It is undoubtedly Taoism that promises the most significant points of contact with Heidegger's anti-mentalist, anti-subjectivist conception of human existence and practice. Other essays in the volume that touch on this potentially fruitful philosophical affinity unfortunately fail to shed much light on it.
Before making a few remarks on the subject ourselves, however, we shall begin by discussing two other groups of essays in the book. The collection itself bites off a bit more than even it can chew, so our survey will be admittedly selective. On the one hand there are several articles that treat of the Japanese reception of Heidegger's philosophy, either historically or systematically. On the other hand there are the more speculative articles that attempt -- with varying degrees of implausibility -- to use Heideggerian and Asian texts as vehicles to lead us out of the maze of Western philosophy altogether. To conclude, we shall return to the relation between Heideggerian and Taoist themes, and the question concerning what unites and divides them.
2 Heidegger, the Japanese, and metaphysics
In his "Reflections on Two Addresses by Martin Heidegger," Keiji Nishitani comments eloquently on the impossibility of mediating between traditions as removed from one another as Buddhism and Christianity on the basis of either pure conceptuality or religious dogma, alternatives that tend to be, respectively, either misleadingly transparent or in principle opaque. Nishitani advocates instead moving to "some deeper plane," where man "is thoroughly bare" (146):
in the innermost kernel of man's mind ... through candid self-exposure to the deep complexities of the actual world ... That would mean, in truth, to delve into the basis of existence itself through and through until we reach the hidden source (147).
Nishitani has put his finger on an interesting parallel between the image of Christ as "the son of man" and Buddha's exhortation to "transcend all attachments." And these themes resonate with some of Heidegger's own talk of anxiety and man's essential homelessness in the world. But it is at this point that one wants to know more specifically what the deeper plane, the innermost kernel, and the "bare man" amount to. Such formulations could be genuinely Heideggerian only with the added claim that there are no bare facts about human beings beneath our clothing of self-interpretation, and that human beings are one sense "at home" in the world precisely by carrying on that -- albeit groundless -- self-interpretive activity. Since Nishitani does not articulate this point explicitly, he has difficulty locating the relevance of Heidegger's philosophy outside the context of the confrontation between Christianity and Buddhism. The point is crucial, however, since Heidegger was adamant about sharply distinguishing philosophy from religion, or ontology from what he called "onto-theology."
Yasuo Yuasa offers a very interesting history of "The Encounter of Modern Japanese Philosophy with Heidegger." The article covers more material than we can discuss here, but there is one point that deserves special notice. Western readers brought up in the European philosophical tradition are typically struck by the way in which Heidegger tried to break out of the individualism inherent in Cartesian- Kantian epistemology. Rather than attempt to justify the knowledge claims of an isolated subject, Heidegger describes the way in which knowledge itself is founded on social practices carried out in a shared world constituted by anonymous public norms. Whether one views these innovations as compelling or implausible, the contrast to the subjectivist tradition is clear.
It is fascinating, then, that Kiyoshi Miki and Tetsuroo Watsuji, students of German philosophy and original thinkers in their own right, both found Being and Time disturbingly egocentric. One is stunned to read that in his 1930 essay on "Heidegger's Ontology,"
Miki goes on to criticize Heidegger by contending that his philosophy cannot be "contemporary" because his [notion of] Dasein remains in the standpoint of individual subjective life without a social aspect
(160).
Miki also criticized Heidegger for straying "from that which is Greek to what is originally Christian." One gathers from Yuasa's account that what Miki often took to be Heidegger's position was in fact Kierkegaard's. Yuasa says convincingly that "The discrepancy between Heidegger's and Miki's concerns is clearly manifest" (ibid. ), and that in the case of his own original contributions to the philosophy of history, "the sophisticated terminologies favored in German philosophy obscure Miki's intent" (164). Watsuji, too, concluded that Heidegger's "Dasein was the Dasein of the individual only. He treated human existence in the world as being the existence of an individual (hito "... he did not advance beyond an abstraction of a single aspect (167)." [From a quoted passage of Watsuji's Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study, Geoffrey Bownas, trans. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), preface.] According to Watsuji, Yuasa tells us,
Heidegger treated the mode of being-in-the-world only from the aspect of temporality and took lightly the aspect of spatiality. ... Dasein is grasped with an emphasis on its individuality and without sufficiently considering the social relationship between the self and others (169).
That Heidegger placed too much emphasis on time at the expense of space is an intriguing if somewhat inchoate idea, and Yuasa's own discussion makes it seem at least plausible. Yuasa is right to point out, however, that as a criticism it is undermined by much of Heidegger's later work, according to which the technological understanding of being levels the distinction between nearness and farness (television being one of Heidegger's favorite examples). As Yuasa correctly observes, Watsuji's own philosophical concern with the phenomena of climate and geography has much more in common with the Annales historians than with Heidegger. In the end, as in the case of Miki, "his system differs completely in substance from Heidegger's thought, in spite of the fact that he employs a seemingly Heideggerian terminology" (169). These cases, then, seem to confirm Heidegger's suspicion that Japanese thinkers might lose their voice in the foreign idiom of German philosophy, his own especially. In "A Dialogue on Language," Heidegger tempers his notion of "overcoming metaphysics" by characterizing it as "neither a destruction nor even a denial of metaphysics. To intend anything else would be childish presumption and a demeaning of history." [OWL, 20.] It is an unfortunate habit of some scholars of European philosophy that they often underestimate their attachment to the intellectual history from which they would like to declare independence. But as Heidegger himself suggests, if overcoming a tradition is possible at all, one must remain peculiarly indebted to the tradition into which one is originally thrown. As we have said, it is a general weakness of the present anthology that it underestimates the weight, perhaps the impenetrability, of tradition. The contributions of Graham Parkes, Joan Stambaugh, and David Levin are particularly ambivalent about the metaphysical tradition as it bears upon Heidegger's thinking, and of the peculiar way in which Heidegger venerated that tradition while at once criticizing it to the core.
The volume might strike some readers as overwhelmingly Heideggerian in style and content, but this is rather a misleading appearance. The true inspiration behind the philosophical content of many of the essays is not Heidegger but Derrida, whose name is hardly mentioned. Many of the authors habitually conflate Heidegger's Destruktion of ontology with Derrida's concept of deconstruction, which is significantly different. [Cf. Jung, 217, 237, and Levin, 256.] For whereas Heidegger early on sought simply to "destroy" traditional ontology by tracing familiar metaphysical notions back to practical, existential contexts, Derrida attempts to show all texts, and a fortiori all metaphysical discourse, to be in principle indeterminate, undecidable, and self-undermining.
3 Heidegger and the Taoists
Finally, we would like to explore very briefly a few of the most promising connections that might obtain between Heidegger and the Taoists, Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu. Otto Pöggeler's essay, though it often wanders well off the subject, offers the most substantial textual support for the various possible influences and analogies.
In chapter 17 of the Chuang-tzu Hui Shih puts forward a challenge: "You are not a fish. Whence do you know that the fish are happy?" Chuang-tzu replies, famously, "You aren't me, whence do you know that I don't know the fish are happy?" [Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters, A. C. Graham, ed. and trans. (Boston: Unwin Paperbacks, 1986),
123.] Heidegger is known to have been fond of this passage and to have read aloud from it in 1930 during a discussion of intersubjectivity and empathy (Pöggeler, 52). It is easier to see what divides Heidegger and Chuang-tzu than what unites them, however, since, as Pöggeler says, the moral of the story has to do with "the universal sympathy which joins together all the things of nature -- such as men and fishes" (53). For Heidegger, on the contrary, other living creatures are "separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss." [Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings, D. F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977),
206.]
Or consider chapter 11 of the Lao-tzu:
Clay is molded to make a pot In its emptiness [lit., nothing] Is the usefulness of the pot.
[Cf. Pöggeler, 61, and Parkes, 120-121. Translations from the Tao Te Ching are by Bryan Van Norden.]
In what might appear to be a strikingly analogous passage, Heidegger describes a jug as a paradigmatic "thing," that is, an artifact that holds human practices together and makes them intelligible. He writes:
When we fill the jug, the pouring that fills it flows into the empty jug. The emptiness, the void, is what does the vessel's holding. The empty space, this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel. ... But if the holding is done by the jug's void, then the potter who forms sides and bottom on his wheel does not, strictly speaking, make the jug. He only shapes the clay. No -- he shapes the void. ... The vessel's thingness does not lie at all in the material of which it consists, but in the void that holds. [Heidegger, "The Thing," in Poetry, Language, Thought, A. Hofstadter, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 169.]
The point of this passage is that we cannot understand what a "thing" is, in Heidegger's special sense of the word, by means of a mental representation of the object as "occurrent" (vorhanden), that is, as a substance with properties. Heidegger may be alluding to Lao-tzu here, but the fact that he chooses the jug as an example is not essential to his point. The jug merely provides a vivid illustration of a general point about the role of focal practices in human understanding. The Tao Te Ching, by contrast, shows almost no philosophical interest in the relationship between mental representation and understanding. The notion that the potter merely "shapes the void," however, draws attention to the peculiar passivity that Heidegger takes to be essential to human productivity in general. The importance of passivity is indeed a Taoist theme as well, and this parallel warrants further study. Chapter 15 of the Lao-tzu is of particular interest since, upon Heidegger's request, his would-be co-translator, Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, wrote out two of its lines as a gift of decorative calligraphy (cf. 100, 102-3). The lines read, literally:
Who is able to settle the turbid [so that] it gradually becomes clear? Who is able to stimulate the peaceful [so that] it gradually comes alive? [This translation deletes the character chiu in order to restore the parallelism of the two sentences. The Ma-wang-tui manuscripts (to which Heidegger did not have access) have an interestingly different version: "If one settles the turbid it gradually ....]
With Hsiao's assistance, Heidegger translated these lines as follows:
Wer kann still sein and aus der Stille durch sie auf den Weg bringen (be-wegen) etwas so, daß es zum Erscheinen kommt? Wer vermag es, stillend etwas so ins Sein zu bringen?
(Who can be still and out of the stillness, through it, bring (move) something along the way so that it becomes manifest? Who is able, through stillness, to bring something into being?)
In the first line, Heidegger's phrase, "bring (move) something along the way," is entirely his own interpolation, and he has replaced "clear" with "manifestation" or "appearance" (Erscheinen). The fluid metaphor that is invoked by the word "turbid" (cho) is thereby dropped altogether. In the second line Heidegger replaces "alive" with "being," which again reflects his own ontological concerns and perhaps a desire to avoid connotations of vitalism or Lebensphilosophie. The nearest point of contact between Heidegger and the Tao Te Ching in all this is undoubtedly the term tao itself. This is why, in spite of the lack of textual justification, Heidegger inserts Weg and be-wegen into the first line. Finally, it useful to consider Heidegger's apparent fondness for chapter 18: "When the great tao falls into disuse, there are humanheartedness and righteousness" (75). The Chinese text does not identify the tao with righteousness in the sense of self-conscious cultivation of ethical correctness or ritual. Equally, for Heidegger, human understanding and practice are essentially situational and context-dependent, always outrunning abstract principles purporting to apply generalized conceptions of human nature or moral goodness to all situations, in all settings.
This opposition between the tao and moral correctness raises what is perhaps the most conspicuous theme common to Heideggerians, Taoists, and even Confucians, namely, craftsmanship as a paradigm of authentic human activity. A craftsman does not rely on rules, representations, or deliberate intentions in carrying out skilled action. To use Heidegger's own example from Being and Time, one does not confront a hammer as a bare object with properties but rather as equipment already familiar and integrated into one's practical activities. Very similar craftsmanship metaphors are to be found throughout Taoist and Confucian texts.
As Pöggeler points out in this connection, however, "In the far East Lao-tzu is not Confucius" (75). Confucians generally maintain that ritual and ethics are crucial to human cultivation. Hsün-tzu, moreover, believed that ethical perfection can only be the result of years of ritual practice, reading canonical literature and studying under a teacher. Taoists like Lao-tzu, by contrast, emphasize the return to a state of simplicity before the development of ritual. One is reminded of the early Heidegger: ethics, understood as the formulation of general rules of conduct or character, goes against the grain of authentic action precisely because of its insistence upon self-consciousness, as opposed to intuition and skill.
Chuang-tzu goes further in this direction than Heidegger, however, since he seems to advocate unselfconscious craft-activity as an end in itself. For him, enlightenment consists in overcoming reflectivity altogether. Sages achieving this condition, while not concerned with bettering the world, are at any rate harmless; they injure no one while carving ox carcasses, catching cicadas, or swimming down waterfalls. Heidegger, by contrast, places no special premium on harmlessness or tranquility. Authentic action, for him, does not aim at achieving an indifferent attitude toward death, but rather an active acceptance of finitude and the anxiety attending it. Contrary to the tenor of much Asian thought, Heidegger's philosophy almost never envisages an equalization or homogenization of anxiety-causing oppositions, for example between human beings and the world of things, or between life and death. If Heidegger undermines such dualisms on a metaphysical level, it is only by way of preserving many of their dramatic implications in existential contexts. |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 17:57:11 |
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所附英文最後一句提到的正是說海德格爾曾經試圖翻譯老子的《道德經》啊，後來據說因為和蕭師毅的解讀不同，蕭中斷了合作。兔博剛說不知道，怎麼一下就找到了，是google 的吧？：） |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 17:38:32 |
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暮博，
看這個：
“Heidegger died in Frieburg on May 26th, 1976. In the United States, the news of his death went largely unheeded. Interestingly, the news of Heidegger's death was received with widespread coverage in Japan. The connection of Heidegger' s thought to the East has not received much attention over the years. But it is clear that he first had his greatest impact in Japan with the writings of Count Kuki Shuzo. Further, Heidegger carried on a relationship with D.T. Suzuki, whom he met with on several occassions. Further, Heidegger at one time attempted to translate Lao Tzu into German, but never finished the project.”
http://www.mythosandlogos.com/heidegger.html |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 17:11:39 |
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呵呵，兔博，涉獵（不能說全懂）中國哲學的人西方還真有幾個，雅斯貝爾斯就寫過專門著述介紹老子（當然很多理解是不對的），並在《大哲學家》中把老子，蘇格拉底，佛陀，孔子成為軸心時代的大哲學家，其中老子被稱為“原創性形而上學家”。海德格爾和雅斯貝爾斯的通信中，引用過幾次老子的原話，海還和中國的保羅。蕭師毅合作翻譯過老子的《道德經》，這些都是喜歡海的人知道的常識啊：） |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 16:42:19 |
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老萬你行啊！說得很不錯，很靠譜。我無法跟你解釋完，我寫了40萬字。你可以找一個版本看看（hare)有。如有問題我們再討論。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 16:34:14 |
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老萬的馬列哲學基礎不錯，即使是錯的也比沒有強！我當年也是這樣過了的 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 16:31:22 |
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在海的形而上的討論中，他特別提到在30年代，他的主要經歷放在找＂das Ding en sich", 但他沒找到。他從語言的詞根上挖掘了很多基本定義，覺得該說得都說了。但我不知道他找到了中國的道，你能給出出處嗎？據我所知，西方哲學大家唯一對東方哲學造詣深的是叔本華，但是印度哲學。對中國的哲學，我沒聽到說西方人懂。我可能孤陋寡聞 |
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作者：萬塔 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 16:22:05 |
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兔子，
你說你的範例哲學將海德格爾的存在哲學體系給＂完成＂了，還說那是你的看法。
別去糾纏哲學名詞，你來簡單說說你是怎麼把他的體系給完成的? 你是發展了他的＂個體就是世界的存在＂理論，還是把它們引入了存在主義心理學?
海德格爾的存在哲學有廣泛影響，是因為人們從社會現象中找到了共鳴，現象學最後進入生活實踐，與人類在社會生活中的存在危機相面對，帶來對存在感悟，讓在社會生活壓力之下的個體通過存在來感受他的哲學，也讓平均的日常狀態成為Ontology的一層。他雖然沒有對《存在與時間的》的第二部分再寫下去，但是沒有寫完著作的人歷來不少，那不代表他＂趴下了爬不起來＂，他的後期的思索不是照樣對自己的哲學進行補充?
你是根據什麼說你自己發展完成了海的哲學理論? |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 15:44:52 |
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海是沒有把《存在和時間》繼續下去，一是因為碰到了諸多的困難，二是海後期把注意力轉向“道”，道說， 爾後轉向言說和語言對存在的“去蔽”，海認為找到了這個言說，存在的家，就能夠揭示存在的本質。有趣的是，海對去弊的言說或道說的追求卻把他引向了老子“不可言說的道”，但最終還是限於語言放棄了。 |
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作者：萬塔 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 15:40:49 |
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兔子，這不大家還是可以討論的嘛，你不該連那個也需要放狗去幫你找。我們中學不是逐字學過道德經開篇那些文字麼，中大不講古代哲學?
那你需要表揚俺當時一字之師的作用。對吧?
現在我自然不是一字之師了。但是你回頭得允許我發貼時稱呼你＂徒子＂一次。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 15:34:14 |
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其實你說的用”分析方法“的辦法，真是對的。不過我不認為其他人知道你在說神馬。看你的了，你逃不過我的眼睛。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 15:31:51 |
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萬同志，
這個態度就對了。
據我所知，與你商榷，是漢（獻）帝？為避諱”恆“字改的。因為沒空古狗，你可補充。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 15:27:58 |
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暮博，
因為海對很多人都很深，我覺得不懂前蘇格拉底時期的哲學，很難弄懂海。我以後會講到他。
海基本上是個搞了一個”unfinished project“。因為他涉及到人之後，這即是他的聰明，又是他的失落，他沒能再爬出來。從他寫了存在與時間多年後，（那是當時為申請教職而作），當他在課堂上，談形而上時，他坦承他沒有完成，太困難了。
範例哲學將其”完成“了-當然這是我的看法。是否得到承認，也許還要一段時間。
我很驚訝你涉及了海的東西。你的理解也許於我不一樣，但已經很不簡單了。共同切磋。 |
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作者：萬塔 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 15:17:44 |
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兔子，你叫大家叫你徒子，怎麼又不幹了?
我是不是你的老師不重要(真是了我也就混不下去了:-)。
可是你最好先老實說一下:
<b>［＂道可道，非常道＂，意思是平常可道的都不是道］這句話是不是呢的道德經研究一文一開始的話? 我是不是當時給你講解了恆字的避諱歷史? </b>
是的話，你恐怕至少在那件事上得認我這個＂一字之師＂。 |
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作者：蜉蝣之暮 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 15:11:33 |
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兔博，我看的譯本譯為“能在”，可能的存在，並且在書中提到了籌劃的存在，存在之存在，先於存在的存在，我印象很深，等等，並且覺得很震撼（那是二十多年前了），我不知別的譯本怎樣翻譯，當時都說此書是不可翻譯的“天書”，因為翻譯出的譯本比較起來完全象不同的理論。
你查到的是海氏對死亡的解釋，海氏認為人是向死而生的，就是認為可能的存在（將來）一旦沉淪到此在（現在），真正的存在的可能性就死亡了，最終成為（過去）。海氏對死亡的理解正是建立在“存在的可能性”之沉淪，或者死去是不可避免的。 |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 14:59:24 |
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老萬啊，
你那點糊糊就別逗了。
如果你想討論，咱們就平等探討。如果想做我老師，不是不可以，但必須先晾你的資格，否則我如何相信你？公平嗎？ |
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作者：stinger |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 14:55:06 |
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抱歉暮博，是我對中文翻譯的無知，因為沒看過中文的版本。我查了一下，這可能是你的意思：
”
第一節一、整體能在
海德格爾指出，死亡是此在存在的別具一格的現象，它是此在整體能在的確證。對這一現象也必須從此在的基本機制的整體性——操心來進行考察。
死亡是一種“終結”，此在在死亡中喪失了此之在。但是，死亡這種“終結”與果實的成熟卻完全不是一回事。的確，此在隨着它的死亡而結束了它的行程，但此在並不是隨着它的死亡而就窮盡了它特有的種種可能性，恰恰相反，是死亡取走了此在生存的種種可能性。
死亡又總是此在自己的死亡，即死亡具有向來我屬性。每一此在向來都必須自己接受自己的死，這是任何人都無法代理的。死亡在本質上無代理。
死亡這樣一種屬於此在而標誌着此在之終結的現象，同樣是從此在的基本機制——操心的整體中得到規定的。操心的結構表明了此在之存在的諸種基礎性質：在先行於自身的存在之中——生存；在已經在一個世界之中的存在中——實際性；在寓於世內照面存在者的存在中——沉淪。
首先，死亡作為此在本身向來不得不承擔下來的存在可能性，是此在本身在其最本己的能在中來臨（bevorsteht）到自身，這種特殊的來臨在生存論上的可能性根據即在於此在的先行於自身的展開——生存。死亡不是尚未現成的東西，不是減縮到極小值的最後欠缺，而是一種來臨。由於死亡是此在的不再能此在的可能性，所以當此在作為這種可能性來臨到它自身之前時，它就被充分地指向最本己的能在。在此之際，此在對其他此在的一切關聯都解除了。同時死亡又是此在這種能在所超不過的可能性。它既然是一種來臨，因而也就是此在的向終結存在。這種來臨、這種向終結存在也正是先行於自身的一種形式。
其次，死亡又是此在能在的實際性，這是操心的第二個環節的一種具體形式。死亡這種可能性不是此在在它的存在過程中偶然產生出來的，而是此在已經被拋入這種可能性之中。此在委託給了死亡，儘管此在首先和通常對此沒有明確的知，更沒有理論的知。這就是說，此在總已生存在死亡之中。死亡是一種此在剛一存在就承擔起來的去存在的方式。
最後，此在首先和通常以在死亡之前逃避的方式掩蔽着最本己的向死亡存在，即此在“首先和通常是以沉淪的方式死着”
［德］馬丁•海德格爾：《存在與時間》，中譯本，302頁，1987；德文本，251頁。
這是因為，實際的生存活動不僅僅一般地和無所謂地是一種被拋的能在世，而總已經是消融於操勞所及的“世界”，總已經是寓於世內照面者的存在。這即是沉淪。在這種沉淪中，就有在最本己的死亡存在面前逃避這種情形。
總之，操心的結構整體——“先行於自身的——已經在世界之中的——寓於世內照面者的存在”——規定了死亡的特徵，因此，“死亡，就其存在論的可能性着眼，奠基在操心之中”
［德］馬丁•海德格爾：《存在與時間》，德文本，252頁。
向死亡存在首先是日常此在在死亡之前閃避着的這種非本真的向死亡存在。非本真的向死亡存在在常人的閒談中有其線索：人總有一天要死，但暫時尚未。這種說法遮蔽了死亡這種極端的可能性，以減輕被拋入死亡的狀態。因此，非本真的向死亡存在標示出了此在通常已經錯置自身於其中的一種存在方式。
但是，向死亡存在還有本真的向死亡存在這種樣式。這就是說此在先行着把向死亡存在這種能在揭露出來，為它本身而向着它的這種最極端的可能性開展自身，或把自身籌劃到這種最本己的能在上去，也即在揭露出來的這種能在中自由地領會自身。首先，死亡是此在的最本己的可能性，向這種可能性存在，此在就開展出它的最本己的能在——在這種能在中，一切為的都是此在的存在。在這種能在中，此在的領會能夠看清楚即能夠揭露出已經喪失在常人的日常狀態之中的情況。其次，死亡是無所關聯的可能性，先行到這種無所關聯的可能性中去，就把此在逼入這樣一種可能性中：“由它自己出發，從它自己那裡，把它的最本己的存在承擔起來。”
［德］馬丁•海德格爾：《存在與時間》，中譯本，316頁，1987；德文本，264頁。
第三，這種可能性是無可逾越的可能性，向這種可能性存在，就要為自己的死亡而先行着成為自由的，把此在自己從喪失在偶然地擁擠着的各種可能性的情況中解放出來。第四，死亡這種可能性是確知的可能性，因此，此在先行向這種可能性存在，把死亡持以為真，就要求自己有一種與之相應的確定的行為，一種完滿的、本真的行為。第五，死亡這種可能性又是不確定的，此在領會着、籌劃着向這種可能性存在，會把這種持續的威脅敞開着且不能淡化這威脅，它就不能不培養這確定可知的不確定性。而把這威脅保持在敞開狀態中的現身情態就是畏。因此，向死亡存在本質上就是畏。
概括起來說，生存論上的本真的向死亡存在就是：“先行向此在揭露出喪失在常人自己中的情況，並把此在帶到主要不依靠操勞操持而是去作為此在自己存在的可能性之前，而這個自己卻就在熱情的、解脫了常人的幻想的、實際的、確知它自己而又畏着的向死亡的自由之中。”
［德］馬丁•海德格爾：《存在與時間》，修訂譯本，305~306頁，1999；德文本，266頁。
毫無疑問，海德格爾把死亡現象理解為此在的生存方式，這在西方人學思想史上具有獨到性，他對死亡的分析在深刻性上也遠超過了前人。但同時，他的這種分析也是建立在以往西方人學對死亡的探索的基礎之上的。他自己所提供的注釋表明，他至少思考了狄爾泰關於死是生存的界限的觀點，雅斯貝爾斯把死亡作為引向“邊緣處境”的導索的觀點，基督教神學的死亡與來生來世的觀點等。這些關於死亡的觀點對於海德格爾所作的此在的向死亡存在的生存論分析是有啟示作用的。如狄爾泰提出：“歸根到底，從生到死，這一關聯最深刻而普遍地規定了我們此在的感受，這是因為那由死而來的生存的界限，對於我們生的理解和評價，總是具有決定性的意義。”
［德］馬丁•海德格爾：《存在與時間》，中譯本，299頁，1987；德文本，249頁。
死對於人們理解生具有決定性意義，海德格爾對此在的向死亡存在的分析顯然也包含了這樣的思想。雖然海德格爾是從“此在的‘本質’在於生存”出發來說明問題的，但他用“向死亡存在”這一概念以及由向死亡存在的不同選擇來說明此在的生存本質，應該是受到了狄爾泰上述思想的啟發的。
海德格爾對向死亡存在的分析的確揭示了此在向死亡存在的動態時間過程，從而從一個方面表明了此在縱向度生存的整體性。向死亡存在（seinzumTode），無論是非本真的向死亡存在，還是本真的向死亡存在，都表明了這一生存論現象的時間性：先行於自身（即將來）同時又已在世界中（即曾在）寓於世內照面者（當前）而存在。
此在的向死亡存在也更加鮮明地表明了此在生存的選擇性、能動性、目的性和被制約性、受動性、條件性之間的矛盾。如果說，此在的非本真的向死亡存在所標示的是此在生存的社會歷史制約性、受動性、條件性在矛盾雙方中占據了主導地位的話，那麼，此在的本真的向死亡存在則是此在的選擇性、能動性、目的性占了主導地位，此在由此而獲得了真正的自由。
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作者：萬塔 |
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留言時間：2013-03-29 14:52:17 |
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徒子，
你折騰到現在多少年了，連一點點哲學的東西都沒有，讓我如何說你新舊呢? 號稱自己是＂哲學專業／研究了幾十年＂，你這６０老人除了反華反政府，還好丟人現眼地連番幾次地連哲學也一起反。
中國學哲學專業的古文都很強，不少研究生還有一門不錯的外語，看看你，中文稀鬆外語稀爛，兩樣都鬧過笑話，還總拿什麼＂歡迎周末來討論＂欺騙大家，你何時討論出來東西了?
學了幾十年中國哲學的徒子老小子，你上回開張要大講中國老莊哲學，後來怎麼樣? 兌現什麼了?
我記得白凡和我當時一心想捧個場把你那點初級文化道場支持起來，可是你一開口給大家來了個［＂道可道，非常道＂，意思是平常可道的都不是道］，對吧?
連＂常＂非本義，本義是＂非恆道＂這麼基礎到沒有更低級的入門知識都不懂，古文能力比初中生還差，這樣的水平怎麼不讓你從任何學校哲學老師的職務上失業，就跟你後來那樣做了這麼多年的寓公宅男。
竟然還不努力！ |
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