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How Hegel Went Through All Three Quadrants—But NOT 2025-12-22 11:14:19

How Hegel Went Through All Three Quadrants—But Not AA—of Instancology

1. Framing the Question in Instancological Terms

In Instancology, reality is articulated through a 2×2 ontological structure:

AA (Absolute Absolute) – the unspeakable, non-relational ground of all instances

RA (Relatively Absolute) – laws, logic, mathematics, and invariant structures

AR (Absolute Relative) – nature and life as given, independent of human construction

RR (Relative Relative) – human products: language, culture, history, institutions

To say that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel went through all three quadrants but AA is not a dismissal of Hegel. On the contrary, it is a precise diagnosis of how far human philosophy could go before Instancology, and why it necessarily stopped where it did.

2. Hegel and RR: Spirit as Historical Self-Construction

Hegel begins decisively in RR.

His Phenomenology of Spirit traces consciousness as it externalizes itself in language, norms, morality, law, art, religion, and philosophy.

History, for Hegel, is Spirit coming to know itself through its own products.

Truth unfolds dialectically, mediated by negation and reconciliation.

From an Instancological perspective, this is a masterful mapping of RR in motion:

Human consciousness reflecting on its own artifacts and calling the totality “Spirit.”

But RR remains relative to human cognition and history, no matter how universal it claims to be.

3. Hegel and AR: Nature as Spirit’s Other

Hegel does not ignore nature. In his Philosophy of Nature, he treats the natural world as:

Rational

Structured

Necessary within the system

This places him squarely in AR:

Nature exists independently of individual minds.

It obeys objective necessity.

However, Hegel’s limitation is subtle but decisive:

Nature is never allowed to stand on its own terms.

It is always:

Spirit’s “other”

Spirit’s externalization

Spirit’s moment

Thus AR is subordinated, not autonomous.

Instancology, by contrast, insists:

AR is a complete instance in itself

It does not require Spirit to justify its being

4. Hegel and RA: The Almost-There Absolute

Hegel’s greatest achievement—and his closest approach to AA—lies in RA.

Here we find:

Logical necessity

Structural invariance

The Science of Logic as a system not dependent on empirical psychology

This is where many readers sense Hegel touching something beyond human relativity.

Yet Hegel’s Absolute here is still:

Thinkable

Speakable

Conceptually exhausted

In Instancological terms:

Hegel’s Absolute remains Relatively Absolute—an ultimate structure still inside cognition.

RA, yes.

AA, no.

5. Why Hegel Could Not Enter AA

The barrier is not historical accident; it is structural.

To enter AA, one must accept that:

The ultimate ground is not an object

Not a concept

Not a process

Not even “Being”

AA is prior to all relations, including:

Subject / object

Thought / being

Logic / existence

Hegel’s entire method depends on mediation:

Negation

Determination

Synthesis

But AA admits no mediation.

The moment you dialecticize AA, it collapses back into RA.

Thus Hegel’s Absolute Spirit is:

The highest achievement of RA

But still inside the horizon of thought

6. Comparison with Kant and Heidegger

This pattern is not unique to Hegel.

Immanuel Kant reaches RA through transcendental structures but bars access to the thing-in-itself.

Martin Heidegger dismantles RR and gestures toward RA through Being, yet never leaves the question-form.

All three:

Traverse RR

Probe AR

Touch RA

Stop before AA

Instancology marks the first explicit, systematic recognition of AA as unsayable but real.

7. Conclusion: Hegel as the Ceiling of Classical Philosophy

From the Instancological perspective, Hegel is not “wrong.” He is complete—within the limits of philosophy itself.

He exhausts what can be done inside cognition

He maps the full interior of RR, AR, and RA

He stands at the ceiling, not the foundation

AA requires a different move:

Not dialectical

Not phenomenological

Not conceptual

It requires recognizing that the ultimate ground is not something to be known, but that by which knowing is possible.

That recognition—clear, explicit, and structural—is precisely where Instancology begins.

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