藤儿点评：《平安保险》完全不必对纽约时报采取任何法律行动，只要适当延伸现有的保险业务，就可以为温家宝总理保平安。

平安保险的口号：买保险，就是买平安

现在是平安保险公司提升公司业务的大好时机！建议平安保险公司设立一个全新的保险项目——国家总理意外精神伤害保险（适用于任职于全球任何国家的总理，因此，它并非为了温家宝总理一个人而设立）。

产品名称：国家总理意外精神伤害保险。

保险期限：限总理任期内直至寿终正寝。

意外精神伤害保险金：$2,700,000,000 USD

主要特点：

来源：美国之音  2012-11-26

温家贪腐大起底 平安老总曾与张培莉共赴饭局

纽约时报周末再发长篇报道，继续披露温家宝家族财富。中国大公司《平安保险》回应说，报道有内容“严重失实”，给平安造成“严重伤害。”该公司还说，将根据情况，采取法律行动。还有报道说，温家宝对此将有“大动作”回应。

纽时再报温家财富

纽约时报周五发表驻上海记者张大卫撰写的第二篇长篇报道，继续披露温家宝家族和中国平安的关系。一个月前，纽约时报曾发表了第一篇报道说温家聚敛了27亿美元的财富，引起温家强烈不满，通过两名北京律师发出声明，予以否认，并表示要根据情况采取法律行动。这次纽约时报再度曝光温家财产情况，纽约时报上次报道出来后，中国外交部洪磊说，这种报道是给“给中国抹黑”，“有不可告人的目的”。

而报道中涉及到的 平安保险也在星期六发表书面声明说，部分涉及中国平安的内容严重失实，同时，文章采用歪曲事实、断章取义的方式以及错误逻辑，严重误导投资人和社会公众，给中国平安造成严重伤害。上次纽时报道出来后，该公司也给纽时发文称：该公司严格按照章程办事，不了解股民背景。“股民有合法权利相互买卖其股票。”

平安一度山穷水尽，温总帮助柳暗花明？

温家宝日前在泰国说“希望人们把我忘记”。纽约时报周末报道，主要追踪平安公司和温家的关系。报道说，1999年金融风暴平安面临解体之际，平安老总马明哲 给温家宝副总理写信，恳求帮忙。结果，平安柳暗花明，不仅没倒而且到香港上市。路透社10月估计，平安市值接近540亿美元，是全球第二大寿险集团。

报 道说，曾在平安工作的胡坤（1997-2000）说，马明哲1999年曾和温家宝的夫人张蓓莉面谈。胡坤回忆说，会谈内容不得而知，但是，马明哲在会后 “兴高采烈”。纽时找到的公司文件证实，马明哲是1999年6月17号下午和张培莉共赴同此“饭局”的，参加者还有该公司北京办事处负责人李春岩（音 译）。李春岩后来跟纽时证实，他的确陪马总和张培莉吃过饭。

纽时报道说，不知这些人在饭局上都说了些什么，但双方关系的确得到发展。大约就是在那个时候，部分是张培莉亲戚控制的戴梦得公司，开始进驻平安公司在北京的大厦。后来，温家宝和张蓓莉的儿子温云松，和平安签了一份利润丰厚的技术合 同。平安2002年10月得到香港汇丰6亿美元入股。2003年，中国证监当局批准平安香港上市。

纽时报道说，平安是全球最大的金融公司之一，市值已超过美国的许多着名大公司（AIG, Metlife or Prudential）。温家的人曾拥有起死回生后的平安公司的价值亿万（Billions of dollars）的股票。

当时当局曾要求平安保险必须解体，并作出相关规定。但是，马明哲给温总写信后，这些规定并没有执行，平安得以生存。八个月之后，温家的人得到了大量股票，而这些股票正是温家人的主要财富来源。

纽时：平安股票是温家主要财富来源

温家宝是2003年正式当总理的，其家人财富急剧积累膨胀，也正是在他当总理的那头几年。2004年，温家人在平安还没到香港上市前，其所持股票已经翻了两番（quadrupled）。报道说，据称利用温家人“名头”筹股的大商人段伟红的《泰鸿》公司几年前曾耗资6千7百万美金购买的平安股票，到了2007年，已经市值37亿美金，

报道说，到2007年，温家人持有的股票，起码市值22亿美元。天津商人段伟红后来对明镜网说，纽时的报道（第一篇），完全是“断章取义”。

纽时提出的证据是，温家宝母亲杨志云填写的投资资料和身份证。

不 过，纽时承认，如今泰鸿公司已不在平安股东名册内，所以，温家人是否仍持有该公司股票不得而知。报道说，平安公司如今是中国第二大金融保险公司，年收入为 4百亿美元，在中国各地有50万保险推销员工。2010年，平安用40亿美元购入深圳发展银行的股票，成为其控股人。平安正在深圳兴建115层高的摩天大 厦总部大楼。

纽时周五的报道是引用美国法学专家孔杰融的话作为结尾。纽约大学法学教授孔杰融说，关键是为什么会选中这些人（thesepeople）入股，他们入股的条件又是什么？很显然，在发行原始股之前，每个人都想先买为快。

港商吴康民为温总“出手”？

这次纽时再度报道温家和平安关系后，多维网报道，香港“左派元老”吴康民爆料“出自温家宝之手的近百页‘澄清材料’，说明温家宝早在2004年7月就对相关指控‘有所准备’。”

纽时第一篇报道出来后，吴康民就对香港媒体说，去年4月，他和妻子到北京中南海温家宝家做客，当时温家宝就交给他一个“文件袋”，里面有一些报道和数据。多维的报道没有说明，所谓这些出自温家宝之手的百页材料，是最近刚爆出的，还是上个月吴康民已经“爆料过”的。

从多维报道内容来看，吴康民提供的这些材料，还是上次那些，“一共5叠文件，”大部分是报刊周刊报道，主要分五个部分，被温家宝“分门别类并加上小标题”：

谣言的由来，2004年7月1日，21世纪经济报道；

有关平安保险的“谣言”，各报、杂志、网络的“辟谣”资料；

有关珠宝展台湾代表团的声明；

徐明假冒温云松的报道失实；

近日有关温云松的报道失实。

多维报道说，这些资料不足以证明温家宝家族财富多寡，也非反驳纽时指控，“不过，文件反映出温家宝早在2004年7月就已意识到其家人财富问题将遭到指摘，“并开始有所准备。”

明镜：温家宝将有“大动作”回应

原文欣赏：

Lobbying, a Windfall and a Leader’s Family

By DAVID BARBOZA

Published: November 24, 2012

SHENZHEN,China — The head of a financially troubled insurer was pushing Chineseofficials to relax rules that required breaking up the company in the aftermathof the Asian financial crisis.

The survival of Ping An Insurancewas at stake, officials were told in the fall of 1999. Direct appeals were madeto the vice premier at the time, WenJiabao, as well asthe then-head of China’s central bank — two powerful officials with oversightof the industry.

“I humbly request that the vicepremier lead and coordinate the matter from a higher level,” Ma Mingzhe,chairman of Ping An, implored in a letter to Mr. Wen that was reviewed by TheNew York Times.

Ping An was not broken up.

The successful outcome of thelobbying effort would prove monumental.

Ping An went on to become one ofChina’s largest financial services companies, a $50 billion powerhouse nowworth more than A.I.G., MetLife or Prudential. And behind the scenes, shares inPing An that would be worth billions of dollars once the company rebounded wereacquired by relatives of Mr. Wen.

The Times reported last month thatthe relatives of Mr. Wen, who became prime minister in 2003, had grown extraordinarilywealthy during hisleadership, acquiring stakes in tourist resorts, banks, jewelers,telecommunications companies and other business ventures.

The greatest source of wealth, byfar, The Times investigation has found, came from the shares in Ping An boughtabout eight months after the insurer was granted a waiver to the requirementthat big financial companies be broken up.

Long before most investors couldbuy Ping An stock, Taihong, a company that would soon be controlled by Mr.Wen’s relatives, acquired a large stake in Ping An from state-owned entitiesthat held shares in the insurer, regulatory and corporate records show. And byall appearances, Taihong got a sweet deal. The shares were bought in December2002 for one-quarter of the price that another big investor — the British bankHSBC Holdings — paid for its shares just two months earlier, according tointerviews and public filings.

By June 2004, the shares held bythe Wen relatives had already quadrupled in value, even before the company waslisted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. And by 2007, the initial $65 millioninvestment made by Taihong would be worth $3.7 billion.

Corporate records show that therelatives’ stake of that investment most likely peaked at $2.2 billion in late2007, the last year in which Taihong’s shareholder records were publiclyavailable. Because the company is no longer listed in Ping An’s public filings,it is unclear if the relatives continue to hold shares.

It is also not known whether Mr.Wen or the central bank chief at the time, Dai Xianglong, personally intervenedon behalf of Ping An’s request for a waiver, or if Mr. Wen was even aware ofthe stakes held by his relatives.

But internal Ping An documents,government filings and interviews with bankers and former senior executives atPing An indicate that both the vice premier’s office and the central bank wereamong the regulators involved in the Ping An waiver meetings and who had theauthority to sign off on the waiver.

Only two large state-run financialinstitutions were granted similar waivers, filings show, while three of China’sbig state-run insurance companies were forced to break up. Many of thecountry’s big banks complied with the breakup requirement — enforced after thefinancial crisis because of concerns about the stability of the financialsystem — by selling their assets in other institutions.

Ping An issued a statement to TheTimes saying the company strictly complies with rules and regulations, but doesnot know the backgrounds of all entities behind shareholders. The company alsosaid “it is the legitimate right of shareholders to buy and sell shares betweenthemselves.”

In Beijing, China’s foreignministry did not return calls seeking comment for this article. Earlier, aForeign Ministry spokesman sharply criticized the investigation by The Timesinto the finances of Mr. Wen’s relatives, saying it “smears China and hasulterior motives.”

After TheTimes reported last month on the family’s wealth, lawyers representing thefamily said the article contained unspecified errors and that the familyreserved the right to take legal action.

In addition, the Chinesegovernment blocked access to the English-language and Chinese-language Web sites of The Times inChina — and continues to do so — saying the action was “in accordance with lawsand rules.”

Neither Mr. Wen, who is expectedto retire in March, nor Mr. Dai, who is now the head of the National SocialSecurity Fund, could be reached for comment.

Western and Chinese bankers andlawyers involved in Ping An’s 2004 Hong Kong stock listing and a subsequent2007 listing in Shanghai said they did not know that relatives of Mr. Wen hadacquired large stakes in the company.

Executives at Morgan Stanley andGoldman Sachs, which once held sizable stakes in Ping An and served as leadunderwriters for the Hong Kong public offering, also said they were never toldof the holdings. At Ping An’s urging, the two investment banks had alsoappealed in 2000 to Mr. Wen and other regulators for the waiver from thebreakup rule. The privateequity divisions ofthe two investment banks sold their combined stakes to HSBC in 2005 for about$1 billion — a 14-fold increase on their initial investment.

Thousands of pages of publiclyavailable corporate documents reviewed by The Times suggest that the Ping Anstakes held by the prime minister’s relatives were concealed behind layers ofobscure partnerships rather than being held directly in their names.

In an interview last month, DuanWeihong, a wealthy Wen family friend, said that the shares in Ping An actuallybelonged to her and that it was an accident that Mr. Wen’s relatives appearedin shareholding records. The process involved borrowing their governmentidentity cards and obtaining their signatures.

China and Hong Kong have detailedregulations on the disclosure of corporate information deemed material to apublicly listed company’s operation, like the identities of large shareholdersand details about whether companies controlling large stakes are relatedparties. But legal experts say enforcement is often lax, particularly insideChina. There is also, they say, a culture of nominee shareholders — when oneperson holds shares on behalf of someone else — that is difficult for even themost seasoned lawyers and accountants to penetrate.

The Times found no indication suchregulations or any law was broken, nor any evidence that Mr. Wen held shares inPing An under his own name.

After reviewing questions from TheTimes, the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong and the Hong KongStock Exchange declined to comment. The China Securities Regulatory Commissionin Beijing did not respond to inquiries.

HSBC, today Ping An’s largestshareholder with about 15.5 percent of its stock, declined to comment. Thecompany announced last week that it is considering selling its stake in Ping Anas part of a broad effort to raise capital.

Ping An today is a hugelysuccessful conglomerate with revenue of $40 billion last year and about 500,000insurance agents across China. It is China’s only fully integrated financialinstitution, with the second largest insurer, a trust company and brokeragehouse.

In late 2010, Ping An added more firepower,announcing a $4 billion deal that has since given it control of the ShenzhenDevelopment Bank, one of China’s midsize commercial banks. Ping An is nowbuilding a new headquarters here in Shenzhen, a spectacular 115-story office tower that was designed by the New Yorkarchitectural firm Kohn Pedersen Fox.

Ping An’s Close Call

Ma Mingzhe, the Ping An chairmanand chief executive, was a high school graduate who got his start as an aide toYuan Geng, a pioneering figure in some of China’s earliest economic reforms andan early leader of Ping An.

Impressed with Mr. Ma’s intellect,Mr. Yuan put him in charge of human resources at a state-managed industrialpark, and eventually at a new insurance firm, Ping An, which took root inShenzhen, a coastal boomtown.

Mr. Ma’s timing was opportune.China was just beginning to restructure its state-led economy. The governmentbegan dismantling the iron rice bowl system, which had guaranteed pensions,social insurance and living quarters to Communist Party cadres.

Although Ping An was founded as astate entity, it was one of the first Chinese insurance companies to experimentwith Western management systems, including the use of actuaries and back-officeoperations, as well as foreign shareholders.

Mr. Ma helped manage the tinycompany when it was founded in 1988. Several years later, he was looking forbig-name shareholders from the United States.

In 1994, theprivate equity divisions of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs each paid about$35 million to acquire 7.5 percent interests in Ping An. At the time, they werethe largest foreign investments ever made in a Chinese financial institution.

Much of the company’s earlysuccess was attributed to Mr. Ma, a hard-charging executive who was admired forhis management and political skills — and for taking risks.

“He had all the qualities of agreat entrepreneur,” says Yan Feng, who helped run Ping An’s Shanghai office inthe 1990s. “He was a quick learner, knew how to adapt to new situations and wasreally determined. He’d do whatever it takes to get what he wants.”

But the company’s growth drive raninto trouble in the late 1990s, when China’s economy weakened after the 1997Asian financial crisis.

The bloated state sector began tocollapse, and by 1998, some of the nation’s biggest banks were nearlyinsolvent.

Ping An’s hard-won fortunes werealso evaporating. Like most big Chinese insurers, Ping An had won new clientswith investment products that guaranteed big returns over long periods based onthe high interest rates banks offered for deposits during a time of inflation.When interest rates plummeted in the mid-1990s, losses piled up.

In 1999, senior executives at PingAn began to acknowledge that the company could soon be insolvent. As ajoint-stockholding company, Ping An had big institutional investors, mostlystate companies. But many of them refused to come to the company’s aid bypurchasing additional shares, which would have provided needed capital.

“They weren’t sure Ping An wouldsurvive,” said one former Ping An executive who spoke on the condition ofanonymity.

There was also mounting pressurefrom the government. Worried about systemic risks to the financial system,regulators in Beijing stepped up their enforcement of laws that requiredfinancial institutions to limit the scope of their business activities.

Banks were told to sell theirstakes in brokerage houses or trust companies; and insurance companies had tochoose to operate in life or property insurance, but not both.

After China’s new insuranceregulatory agency was established in 1998, it began pressing Ping An to shedits trust and securities business, and to split its life and property insurancedivisions into separate companies.

At a news conference in November1999, Ma Yongwei, then the chairman of the China Insurance RegulatoryCommission, said the agency had already drawn up plans to split up Ping An andother insurers.

“The separation plans have beensubmitted to the State Council for approval,” Ma Yongwei told the media, addingthat they would “deepen reform of the insurance system.”

Pushing Back the Regulators

With his company about to bebroken up, Ma Mingzhe, also known as Peter Ma, fired off letters to leaders inBeijing, dictated memos reminding himself to “buy golf clubs” for high-rankingofficials, and kept detailed charts outlining the lobbying responsibilities ofeach top executive at Ping An, according to a copy of those records verified byformer Ping An executives.

Mr. Ma focused much of hispersonal energy on China’s highest government administrative body, the StateCouncil, a 38-member group whose senior leaders were Prime Minister Zhu Rongjiand Wen Jiabao, then vice premier. The company also sought the support of DaiXianglong, the nation’s central bank chief, who also had oversight over theinsurance industry.

Mr. Wen was in a unique position.He was head of China’s powerful Central Financial Work Commission, which hadbeen established in 1998 to oversee the country’s banking, securities andinsurance regulators, as well as China’s biggest financial institutions.

When Mr. Mamet regulators, he told them his company was facing insolvency and asked themto help shore up the company’s balance sheet by approving a Hong Kong stockoffering, according to transcripts of Ping An meetings and interviews withparticipants. When Mr. Ma met regulators, he told them his company was facinginsolvency and asked them to help shore up the company’s balance sheet byapproving a Hong Kong stock offering, according to transcripts of Ping Anmeetings and interviews with participants.

“Now, Ping An’s life insurance isin a loss, and property insurance and the trust company have thin margins,” Mr.Ma wrote in the Sept. 29, 1999, letter to Mr. Wen. The contents were confirmedby two former top Ping An executives.

Rather than an out-and-outbreakup, Mr. Ma offered a middle road. After seeking advice of other investors,Mr. Ma proposed the formation of a holding company that would effectivelyseparate life insurance from property but keep them under one corporateumbrella, along with the securities and trust division.

The company, he said, wouldre-establish itself as the Ping An Group, according to Ping An documentsreviewed by The Times. He then began looking for allies to promote hisproposal.

In January 2000, with Mr. Ma’sbacking, executives from Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs wrote a joint letterto Mr. Wen arguing that a breakup would “violate China’s policy to encourageand protect foreign investment,” according to a copy of the letter reviewed byThe Times. The letter’s authenticity was verified by former executives at thetwo investment banks.

The American investment bankswarned that “as a listed company in the U.S., we could be required to discloseour losses relating to the investment in Ping An, which would not be helpfulfor the image of China’s policy of reform and opening to the outside.”

The letter came after months ofaggressive lobbying on the part of Ping An executives and the two Americanbanks to persuade other high-ranking officials in Beijing, including thecentral bank and the insurance regulator, to hold Ping An together, accordingto corporate documents reviewed by The Times.

As early as 1999, executives atPing An also began making contact with the relatives of Mr. Wen.

Hu Kun, a former Ping An employeewho served as Mr. Ma’s staff assistant from 1997 to 2000, recalled a 1999meeting between Mr. Ma and Zhang Beili, the wife of Mr. Wen.

Mr. Hu said he was not told whattranspired at the meeting, but he recalled his boss’s reaction. “Because ofthat meeting, Chairman Ma got very excited,” said Mr. Hu, who is now living inthe United States and who has quarreled with Ping An over 52,000 shares heclaimed he was owed.

Corporate records reviewed by TheTimes indicate that Mr. Ma held an afternoon meeting and then dinner with theprime minister’s wife and Li Chunyan, who ran Ping An’s office in Beijing, onJune 17, 1999.

It is not known what theydiscussed, but the relationship seemed to flourish. Around the same time, adiamond company partly controlled by the relatives of Ms. Zhang began occupyingoffice space at the Ping An office tower in Beijing, according to records thediamond company filed with regulators. Later, a start-up co-founded by WenYunsong, the son of Ms. Zhang and the prime minister, won a lucrativetechnology contract from Ping An, according to interviews with former Ping Anexecutives.

Mr. Ma, who is 56 and still runsPing An, declined to comment for this article. Interviews with four seniorexecutives who worked with Mr. Ma and Mr. Hu at the corporate headquarters in Shenzhenduring the same period corroborate Mr. Hu’s recollections and the content ofthe documents reviewed by The Times concerning Ping An’s lobbying efforts andmeetings with the relatives of Mr. Wen.

In addition, Li Chunyan, who ranthe Beijing office, confirmed in a telephone interview that during that periodhe had brought Ms. Zhang to meet the Ping An chairman, Mr. Ma.

The documents and interviews shedno light on whether those meetings played a role in the decision by governmentregulators to abandon plans to split up Ping An. But in April 2002, thenation’s top regulators delivered their verdict. With approval of the StateCouncil and insurance regulators, Ping An began the process of transformingitself into a financial conglomerate.

The companywas not only allowed to retain property and life insurance licenses, but alsolicenses that permitted it to operate a brokerage and a trust company. It wasalso allowed to obtain a bank license.

Together, analysts say, thelicenses were worth a fortune in China’s tightly regulated marketplace.

“They were one of the few who gotto enjoy these gold-digging benefits,” said Bob Leung, a longtime insuranceanalyst at UBS in Hong Kong.

By late 2002, Ping An had notsimply survived the downturn, its prospects had begun to look bright. Thecompany’s restructuring bolstered revenue and profits. In October of that year,one of the world’s biggest banks, HSBC, agreed to pay $600 million to acquire a10 percent stake in the company from Ping An. Just over a year later,regulators approved the company’s application to list and sell shares on theHong Kong Stock Exchange.

While Ping An was preparing forits listing in Hong Kong, a group of investors with close ties to seniorofficials in Beijing, including Wen Jiabao, were quietly accumulating largeblocks of Ping An stock.

Buying Into Ping An

On Dec. 26, 2002, Ping An filingsshow, a company run by Duan Weihong, a Wen family friend from the primeminister’s hometown, acquired Ping An stock through a company called Taihong.Soon after, the relatives of Mr. Wen and colleagues of his wife took control ofthat investment vehicle, the records show.

According to documents Ping Anfiled ahead of its Hong Kong listing, Taihong acquired 77.7 million shares ofPing An from the China Ocean Shipping Company, a global shipping giant known asCosco, and 2.2 million more shares from Cosco’s Dalian subsidiary. Atwo-for-one stock split doubled the number of shares Taihong owned. So in June2004, just before Ping An’s Hong Kong offering, Taihong held 159.8 millionshares, or about 3.2 percent of Ping An’s stock, according to public filings.

In an interview, Ms. Duan said shehad paid about 40 cents a share at current exchange rates, or a total of $65million, to acquire the shares.

The price seems to have been ahuge and unusual discount, analysts say, since HSBC had two months earlieracquired its 10 percent stake for about $1.60 a share, according to publicfilings.

Cosco did not return calls seekingcomment.

For Taihong, it was a blockbusterpurchase. By 2007, when the price of Ping An’s stock peaked, the 159 millionshares were valued at $3.7 billion — though by 2007 Taihong had alreadysignificantly reduced its stake, according to public filings.

While Taihong was the shareholderof record, the beneficiaries of the Ping An deal were cloaked behind more thana dozen investment vehicles controlled by the relatives of Mr. Wen, includingtwo brothers-in-law, a sister-in-law, as well as several longtime colleaguesand business partners of his wife, Zhang Beili, according to corporate andregulatory documents. All of them were listed, along with Ms. Duan, as theowners of Taihong.

And by 2007, the prime minister’smother, who is now 91, was listed on public documents as holding $120 millionworth of Ping An stock through a pair of investment companies linked toTaihong.

Ms. Duan, who says she got to knowthe prime minister’s family in 2000, said that she bought the Ping An sharesfor her own personal account. The Wen relatives only appear in the Taihongshareholding records, she said, because her company borrowed thegovernment-issued identity cards of other people — mistakenly, she said, fromrelatives of the prime minister — to help mask her own Ping An stake from thepublic.

“In the end,” Ms. Duan said, “Ireceived 100 percent of the returns.”

The Fallout

In 2001, China issued newregulations that put restrictions on trading in listed shares by CommunistParty members and their families.

Forinstance, the rules barred party officials in charge of a state-owned companyfrom using their parents, children — or even their children’s spouse’srelatives — to trade stocks of a listed state-owned company.

The Times found no indication thatMr. Wen shared inside information with family members.

But there are many unansweredquestions about the relatives’ holdings, analysts consulted by The Times said,like who might have known about the relatives’ purchases and whether anyone hada legal obligation to disclose that information.

Executives at Morgan Stanley andGoldman Sachs say they were unaware of the share purchases and were notinvolved in the transactions.

The companies also said that atypical I.P.O. process is unlikely to uncover the ultimate identity ofshareholders who are hiding behind layers of investment vehicles usingunrecognizable names.

According to regulations in HongKong and China, publicly listed companies and their professional partners whohelp sell shares to the public are legally obligated to disclose the identitiesof only those shareholders controlling a stake larger than 5 percent. The Timesfound that at its peak, Taihong, the investment vehicle tied to the Wen family,never held more than a 3.2 percent stake.

Another question that remainsunanswered is how Taihong was able to buy shares of Ping An at a price thatappears to have been highly discounted. By late 2002, Ping An had alreadybecome a hot I.P.O. prospect following a big investment by HSBC.

The answers to some of thequestions, legal experts say, may turn on who was involved in brokering thedeal that led to the relatives’ acquiring shares in Ping An in the periodbefore the company’s public offering in 2004, and whether the deal-makers wereseeking to gain favors from the regulators.

“The key questions are: why werethese people chosen, and on what terms did they get the shares?” said Jerome A.Cohen, a professor at New York University Law School and an expert on China’slegal system. “Obviously, everyone would like to get in before a hot I.P.O.”