**Bi Ruixie (Writer, New York)**

History often reveals striking parallels. This essay ventures to compare the **Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere** of the twentieth century with the **Belt and Road Initiative** of the twenty-first, in the hope of stimulating further reflection.

---

## I. Historical Background

In 1853, Commodore **Matthew C. Perry** of the United States Navy forced open Japan’s gates at gunpoint, profoundly altering the trajectory of Japanese history. This national humiliation galvanized Japan’s determination to strengthen itself; “learning from the West” became the consensus among enlightened elites. The **Meiji Restoration** enabled Japan to modernize ahead of its Asian neighbors and rapidly ascend into the ranks of world powers, becoming the only Asian nation capable of standing alongside Western great powers. Yet the Restoration also furnished fertile soil for militarism, planting the seeds for Japan’s later descent into that path.

Japan defeated Qing China in the **First Sino-Japanese War** and vanquished Tsarist Russia in the **Russo-Japanese War**, shattering the myth of the invincibility of both the “Celestial Empire” and the white powers. Emperor **Emperor Meiji** became synonymous with Japan’s modern rise. As Japan’s geopolitical ambitions expanded, national psychology grew increasingly arrogant and self-assured; nationalism flourished, and fascist currents swept the archipelago. Civilian and military fascists differed mainly in attire, not conviction.

In 1978, **Deng Xiaoping** initiated a strategic transformation that reshaped China’s historical course. By opening China’s doors to mature Western market economies, he facilitated a massive inflow of American capital. Benefiting from the U.S.-led international economic order, China achieved extraordinary growth and lifted itself rapidly out of poverty, astonishing the world. Prosperity bred confidence—then overconfidence. Nationalist sentiment surged, and strategic ambitions became increasingly explicit.

After assuming power, President **Xi Jinping** shifted course from the previous emphasis on “integrating with international rules” to advocating the “reshaping of international rules” and promoting “Chinese solutions.” China’s rapid ascent surprised the West. President **Barack Obama** observed pointedly that China sought to write the rules of international trade. Chinese state media openly proclaimed China’s ambition to become a new leader of globalization.

---

## II. The Supreme Leaders

Emperor **Emperor Hirohito**, known posthumously as the Shōwa Emperor, inherited the throne by bloodline. Xi Jinping rose through a system combining lineage and political positioning within the Chinese Communist Party. Neither Hirohito nor Xi was originally central to the grand designs of his predecessor—Hirohito to Emperor Meiji, Xi to Deng Xiaoping. Both were, in a sense, beneficiaries of historical momentum.

Hirohito inherited a Japan on the rise after the Meiji Restoration; Xi inherited the vast economic foundation built during decades of reform and opening, particularly under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Both leaders maintained relatively low profiles before assuming supreme power. Hirohito was known for his interest in marine biology before ascending the throne, yet later presided over Japan’s wars of aggression. Xi, long perceived as a cautious political figure, consolidated authority after taking office, launching sweeping anti-corruption campaigns and centralizing power.

Neither Hirohito nor Xi can be classified among history’s transformative statesmen. Both lacked extensive overseas experience and, arguably, broad international strategic exposure. Yet both displayed strong confidence in their missions, aspiring to achievements surpassing those of their predecessors.

Hirohito ultimately confronted President **Franklin D. Roosevelt**, whose resolve proved decisive in World War II. Xi has faced renewed rivalry with the United States under leaders such as **Donald Trump**, whose assertive stance reshaped bilateral relations. History often arranges such confrontations with ironic precision.

Hirohito wielded supreme authority; during the Tokyo Trials, former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo testified that no policy could be enacted against the emperor’s will. Xi, through institutional restructuring and ideological elevation, has consolidated a similarly commanding position within China’s political system. In both systems, mechanisms for policy correction have been limited.

---

## III. Historical Logic and Strategic Parallels

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Belt and Road Initiative each reflect a certain historical logic. Just as President James Monroe articulated the Monroe Doctrine—“the Americas for the Americans”—both initiatives implicitly advanced the notion that Asia should be led by Asians.

In the 1930s, Western democracies pursued appeasement toward fascist powers. Japan promoted the concept of an “East Asian New Order,” later aligning with Germany and Italy to expand southward. As European colonial powers weakened during World War II, Japan seized opportunities in Southeast Asia, briefly achieving remarkable military victories and expanding the Co-Prosperity Sphere across vast territories.

Japan replicated Western imperial models, establishing its own sphere of influence to challenge Western dominance in Asia.

Decades later, the United States—through engagement policies—facilitated China’s economic rise. Xi Jinping launched the **Belt and Road Initiative**, invoking the historical Silk Road to frame a sweeping geopolitical and economic vision. While presented as infrastructure cooperation and capacity export, it also carries strategic implications. Complementing this effort was the creation of the **Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank**, positioning China at the center of a new multilateral institution.

Geographically, the two initiatives overlap significantly across East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. Differences in emphasis reflect geography: Japan, a maritime nation, turned southward; China, a continental power, looks westward into Eurasia. Yet their strategic impulses—seeking regional centrality—bear resemblance.

Japan proclaimed “coexistence and co-prosperity”; China promotes “win-win cooperation,” “non-interference,” and a “community of shared future for mankind.” The rhetoric differs in tone but shares aspirational themes of regional solidarity and alternative leadership.

Yet important contrasts remain. Japan allied formally with Germany and Italy; China today lacks equivalent treaty allies. Moreover, Japan’s fascist theorists articulated an ideological framework grounded in claims of international justice and racial liberation. China’s ideological narrative relies more on pragmatic development discourse than systematic theoretical innovation.

---

## IV. Underestimating the United States

Early Meiji Japan admired the West; monuments were erected to Commodore Perry. But as Japan rose, admiration gave way to overconfidence, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor and catastrophic war.

Similarly, early reform-era China widely admired Western models. With success came assertiveness—sometimes veering into triumphalism. Public discourse began to emphasize systemic superiority and imminent surpassing of the United States. Such rhetoric heightened tensions and sharpened strategic rivalry.

Japan paid dearly for underestimating American industrial and military capacity. The question remains: how will contemporary China’s strategic competition with the United States unfold?

---

## V. Conclusion

Montesquieu once wrote: “There is no greater tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of law and in the name of justice.”

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere collapsed with Japan’s defeat in World War II. The ultimate fate of the Belt and Road Initiative remains to be determined by history.

As the Chinese playwright Kong Shangren lamented in *The Peach Blossom Fan*:

“I once saw the jeweled halls of Jinling at dawn, the Qinhuai River blooming in early spring—

Who could foresee how swiftly ice would melt?

I watched him build crimson towers,

I watched him host grand banquets,

I watched the towers crumble.”

History’s verdict is patient, but inexorable.