中日“国家正常化”课题与路径比较

A Comparison of the Tasks and Paths of “National Normalization” in China and Japan

钱宏（Archer Hong Qian）
2026年2月13日·Vancouver心约开关居

引言：两种国家正常化进程的结构性不匹配

所谓“国家正常化”，并非简单的经济增长或政策调整，而是指国家权力结构、主权归属与国家能力之间形成稳定、可持续且可问责的制度均衡。当这种均衡长期缺失，国家便处于某种“非正常状态”。

2026年前后的中日两国，恰呈现出两条高度不匹配的路径：
日本已将“国家正常化”作为核心议程并获得选举授权，进入以重大政策转向推动制度重构的阶段；中国则仍处于既有体制框架内的政策性微调与工具性修补阶段，尚未将国家正常化作为明确议事日程。

换言之，日本正在走向“国家正常化的重大政策转向正道”，而中国仍停留在“殖官主义框架下的小打小闹式政策工具化调适”。这构成当代东亚政治经济结构中最具深层意义的分野之一。

一、“非正常国家”的两条判准

从制度政治与国家能力角度，可将“非正常国家”界定为同时或部分符合下列两项特征的国家形态：

判准一：主权与责任不对称

国家权力的实际运行结构与其名义上的责任主体之间存在制度性错位，导致国家行为难以对社会整体负责。

判准二：国家能力与社会活力失衡

国家能力要么被外部法理结构压制，要么通过内部制度性汲取过度扩张，从而无法形成国家—社会之间的动态共生均衡。

据此，中日两国分别呈现两种不同类型的“非正常国家”：

日本型非正常：国家能力长期受战后法理结构限制，国际空间与安全能力被压缩，主权完整性与国家能力之间存在结构性不对称。

中国型非正常：国家能力高度集中并向官僚体系内部自我复制，社会活力被制度性汲取，形成“主权在官”的内殖化治理结构。

因此，两国的国家正常化路径必然不同：

日本需要“解除外在法理压制”， 恢复国家能力与权责的对称；

中国则需要“重构内在权利结构”，实现从“主权在官”向“主权在民”的历史性转变。

二、日本路径：以选举授权推动国家能力正常化

日本近年来的政策转向，本质上构成一种“国家能力再正常化”的制度过程。其核心不在单一政策，而在三项相互咬合的制度杠杆：

1. 财政—安全一体化的国家动员模式

日本正在将财政政策，由单纯经济稳定工具，转向兼具安全与产业战略功能的国家动员机制。财政不再只是调节经济周期，而成为国家能力重塑与战略重构的重要支点。以“负责任的积极财政”为导向，在控制债务风险的前提下，将国防投资、产业升级与社会稳定纳入同一政策框架之中。

2. 安全政策的主动化

从被动和平主义转向“以能力重塑和平”，意味着日本试图使国家能力与国家责任重新匹配，从而摆脱战后长期存在的主权能力不完整状态。这一转向不仅涉及防务投入增加，更涉及国家战略自我定位的重构。

3. 情报与国家能力中枢化

强化情报、反间谍与国家安全统筹能力，本质上是将国家能力的“感知系统”集中化、体系化，使国家决策从碎片化走向整体性与前瞻性。情报能力的制度化整合，将成为国家战略执行的重要支撑。

三者共同构成一个制度逻辑：

通过选举授权 → 推动国家能力边界重塑 → 完成国家正常化进程。

从政治社会学角度看，这是典型的“制度性维新”路径，其目标在于使国家能力、国家责任与社会授权之间重新形成对称关系，使国家重新成为能够对本国人民与国际社会负责的正常行为体。

三、中国路径：殖官主义框架内的政策工具化调适

与日本形成鲜明对照的是，中国当前政策体系仍主要运行于既有权力结构内部，其特征可概括为：

政策层面活跃，制度层面静止。

当增长进一步放缓，乃至L字型停滞、官民关系紧张和地缘政治压力的挑战，“十五五”规划所体现的主轴，依旧是在既有治理框架内通过政策工具进行优化与调整：

1. 产业升级，从刺激增长转向“新质生产力”（破坏性创新驱动），包括产业升级、数字化转型和绿色发展。2026年GDP目标预计4.5%-5%，强调“投资于人”与“投资于物”结合，应对外部挑战如中美贸易摩擦。2. 绿色转型，推出“零碳工厂”框架，到2030年覆盖钢铁、化工等行业，这是对双碳目标（2030峰值、2060中和）的深化，但非根基性变革。3. 技术自立，强调能源安全、供应链韧性、维稳和空泛的“人民为中心”的发展。

但这些政策工具，总体上大多属于功能性修补，更多体现在继续剥离政治-经济关联的所谓渐进式“优化”，而非触及国民、社会、国家权利结构的制度性重构——不是朝着现代正常国家方向性转变。仍然延续“半管制半市场”的双轨结构惯习：

在宏观层面强化政治调控与资源配置权；在微观层面释放有限市场活力以维持增长与稳定。

其结果是政策频繁调整，但制度结构基本保持不变。由此可见，只要中国当局者思想意识，依然深受传统“殖官主义”（Reproductive Officialdom）宗法逻辑支配，中国就不可能有重大改变。

四、“殖官主义”概念的学术界定与表征

所谓“殖官主义”， 作为中国特有的制度类型，是指一种以官僚体系自我复制与资源垄断“利出/入一孔”为核心的治理结构。

殖官主义表征，在于官僚体系的“多、横、贪、满”。这不是个人道德问题，而是宗法文化以大欺小制造等级内殖，帮派政治成王败寇强化派系再生产，刑徒经济赢者通吃确保资源掠夺三位一体机制的外在显现。这些表征充斥社会各组织细胞，窒息“有生命的个人”（马恩，1845）自组织连接平衡生机，导致循环苦难。

“多”体现在冗官规模：从秦汉数万官僚，到明清数十万，再到当代数千万（含事业单位），远超必要治理需求。

“横”体现在专断权力：官员依附派系，行政横行，压制异议，如历史“东厂西厂”、当代维稳体系。

“贪”体现在资源掠夺：官阶绑定待遇，灰色收入与腐败并存，赢者通吃劳工价值。

“满”体现在官满为患：官僚充斥社会细胞，基层网格化、家庭教育官本位化，个人创新被扼杀，导致“三冗”（冗官、冗兵、冗费）慢性积累。

导致殖官主义官僚体系的“多、横、贪、满”动力学机制，是派官机制的 5 个必备条件：

1、任命权高度集中；

2、官阶与待遇刚性绑定；

3、官位可作为稀缺资源再生产；

4、社会问题→机构化→官位化的自动转译；

5、官僚群体具有跨代延续的独立利益函数；

殖官主义中官员“多横贪满”导致的单向榨取，主体（殖官者）支配、操纵、掠夺客体（民众），循环苦难。只有从“主权在官”转向“主权在民”的正常国家，实现交互主体共生权契约，才能医治这一顽疾。

这一结构可被视为“内部殖民”的制度形态，其结果是：国家能力持续扩张，社会活力持续受限，国家与社会之间难以形成共生型均衡。

在此框架下，即使政策频繁调整，也往往难以触及国家正常化所需的主权结构重构。所谓“以人民为中心”的政策叙述，若缺乏主权结构与权利责任的制度性转变，便容易流于政治意象的口号与话术层面，而难以形成真实有效的社会赋权。

五、“举球体制”与“举国体制”：全球化3.0的外部压力

当前关键矿产联盟等跨国合作网络，呈现出一种新的国家能力组织形态：

举球体制（Global-sphere mobilization system）= 联盟网络 + 资本工具 + 规则设计 + 平行供应链

它并非单一国家力量的延伸，而是多国协同形成的“网络型国家能力”。

这种模式恰与传统“举国体制”形成结构性对比：

当“举球体制”逐渐形成时，其外部效率与资本动员能力，往往会对内向型官僚动员结构形成压力，从而放大后者的制度成本与结构局限——或可倒逼“举国体制”进行彻底变革！

六、结论：国家正常化的议程差距

综合上述分析，可以得出一个具有学术可引用价值的判断：

当一个国家把“国家能力正常化”上升为核心议程并通过选举或制度授权推动结构性转向时，其国家正常化进程便进入可见轨道；

当一个国家仍主要依赖既有官僚结构内的政策工具进行调适，而未触及主权结构与权力配置方式时，其国家正常化仍未真正进入议事日程。

以此衡量：

日本已进入国家正常化的重大政策转向阶段；

中国尚处于殖官主义框架内的政策工具化调整阶段，而且国家正常化的议程似乎依旧远没有形成当权者的认知。

这两种路径并非简单快慢早晚之别，而是是否将国家正常化本身，确立为最高层级议程的根本差异。

未来东亚政治经济格局的关键变量，已然并不在增长速度、质量或产业规模，而在于：

哪个国家能够率先完成从“非正常国家”向“正常国家”的制度性跃迁。

A Comparison of the Tasks and Paths of “National Normalization” in China and Japan

By Archer Hong Qian
February 13, 2026 · Vancouver · Xin-Yue Kai-Guan Residence

Introduction: A Structural Mismatch in the Processes of National Normalization

“National normalization” is not simply economic growth or policy adjustment. Rather, it refers to a stable, sustainable, and accountable institutional equilibrium among a country’s power structure, the locus of sovereignty, and its national capacity. When such an equilibrium is absent for a long time, a country enters a certain kind of “non-normal state.”

Around 2026, China and Japan happen to present two highly mismatched paths:

Japan has already made “national normalization” a core agenda and obtained electoral authorization, entering a stage in which major policy shifts are used to drive institutional restructuring; by contrast, China still remains within an existing structural framework of incremental policy tweaks and tool-like repairs, and has not yet placed national normalization on the agenda as a clear governing task.

In other words, Japan is moving onto the “right track of major policy shifts toward national normalization,” while China still stays in “piecemeal, tool-based adjustments within the framework of Reproductive Officialdom.” This constitutes one of the most profound fault lines in the political-economic structure of contemporary East Asia.

I. Two Criteria for a “Non-Normal State” 

From the perspective of institutional politics and national capacity, a “non-normal state” may be defined as a state that simultaneously meets—or partially meets—the following two characteristics:

Criterion 1: Asymmetry between sovereignty and responsibility
A structural misalignment exists between the actual operating structure of state power and the nominal subject of responsibility, making it difficult for state actions to be accountable to society as a whole.

Criterion 2: Imbalance between national capacity and social vitality
National capacity is either suppressed by external legal-institutional structures, or over-expanded through internal systemic extraction, such that a dynamic symbiotic equilibrium between state and society cannot be formed.

Accordingly, China and Japan respectively display two different types of “non-normal states”:

The Japanese-type non-normal state: national capacity has long been constrained by postwar legal-institutional structures; international space and security capacity are compressed; and a structural asymmetry exists between sovereign integrity and national capacity.

The Chinese-type non-normal state: national capacity is highly concentrated and reproduces itself within the bureaucratic system; social vitality is extracted institutionally, forming an internally colonizing governance structure in which “sovereignty is vested in officials.”

Therefore, the paths of national normalization in the two countries must differ:

Japan needs to “remove external legal-institutional constraints” and restore symmetry between national capacity and rights-and-responsibility;

China, by contrast, needs to “reconstruct the internal rights structure,” achieving a historic transition from “sovereignty vested in officials” to “sovereignty vested in the people.”

II. The Japanese Path: Advancing the Renormalization of National Capacity through Electoral Authorization

Japan’s policy shifts in recent years essentially constitute an institutional process of “re-normalizing national capacity.” Its core does not lie in any single policy, but in three mutually interlocking institutional levers:

1. A fiscal–security integrated national mobilization model

Japan is transforming fiscal policy from a mere tool of macroeconomic stabilization into a national mobilization mechanism that also serves security and industrial strategy. Fiscal policy is no longer merely about smoothing the business cycle; it has become an important pivot for reshaping national capacity and reconstructing strategy. Guided by “responsible proactive fiscal policy,” and on the premise of controlling debt risks, Japan incorporates defense investment, industrial upgrading, and social stability into a single policy framework.

1. The proactiveness of security policy

The shift from passive pacifism to “reshaping peace through capability” means that Japan is attempting to re-match national capacity with national responsibility, thereby shaking off the long-standing incompleteness of sovereign capability in the postwar period. This shift involves not only increased defense inputs, but also a restructuring of Japan’s strategic self-positioning.

1. The centralization of intelligence and national capacity

Strengthening intelligence, counterintelligence, and national-security coordination is, in essence, the centralization and systematization of the state’s “perception system,” enabling national decision-making to move from fragmentation toward overall coherence and forward-looking capacity. The institutional integration of intelligence capabilities will become a crucial support for the execution of national strategy.

These three levers together constitute an institutional logic:

Electoral authorization → reshaping the boundaries of national capacity → completing the process of national normalization.

From the perspective of political sociology, this is a typical path of “institutional renovation.” Its aim is to re-establish symmetry among national capacity, national responsibility, and social authorization—so that the state once again becomes a normal actor capable of being responsible to its own people and to the international community.

III. The Chinese Path: Tool-Based Policy Adjustments within the Framework of Reproductive Officialdom

In sharp contrast with Japan, China’s current policy system still operates mainly within its existing power structure. Its characteristics may be summarized as:

Active at the level of policy, static at the level of institutions.

As growth slows further—possibly even facing L-shaped stagnation, heightened official–people tensions, and geopolitical pressures—the main axis embodied in the “15th Five-Year Plan” still lies in optimizing and adjusting through policy instruments within the existing governance framework:

1. Industrial upgrading: shifting from growth stimulus to “new quality productive forces” (disruptive innovation-driven), including industrial upgrading, digital transformation, and green development. The 2026 GDP target is projected at 4.5%–5%, emphasizing a combination of “investment in people” and “investment in things,” in response to external challenges such as China–U.S. trade frictions.

2. Green transition: introducing a “zero-carbon factory” framework, to cover industries such as steel and chemicals by 2030. This deepens the dual-carbon goals (peak in 2030, neutrality in 2060), but is not a root-level transformation.

3. Technological self-reliance: emphasizing energy security, supply-chain resilience, stability maintenance, and a hollow “people-centered” development narrative.

Yet these policy instruments, on the whole, mostly amount to functional patchwork. They are more a matter of so-called incremental “optimization” that continues to peel apart politics and economics, rather than an institutional reconstruction that touches the rights structure of citizens, society, and the state—i.e., not a directional transition toward a modern normal state. China still continues the entrenched dual-track habit of “semi-control, semi-market”:

At the macro level, political control and centralized resource-allocation power are reinforced; at the micro level, limited market vitality is released to sustain growth and stability.

The result is frequent policy adjustment, while the institutional structure basically remains unchanged. From this it can be seen that as long as the mindset of China’s ruling authorities remains deeply dominated by the traditional clan-based logic of “Reproductive Officialdom,” China cannot undergo major change.

IV. The Academic Definition and Manifestations of “Reproductive Officialdom”

“Reproductive Officialdom,” as a China-specific institutional type, refers to a governance structure whose core is the bureaucratic system’s self-reproduction and its monopoly over resources through “a single channel of extraction/redistribution.”

The manifestations of Reproductive Officialdom lie in the bureaucratic system’s “many, overbearing, greedy, and pervasive” traits. This is not a matter of individual morality. It is the external expression of a three-in-one mechanism: clan culture uses the strong to bully the weak and produces hierarchical internal colonization; gang politics of winner-takes-all reinforces factional reproduction; and a penal-labor-style economy of winner-takes-all ensures resource predation. These manifestations permeate the cellular tissue of all social organizations, suffocating the self-organizing, connection-based, balanced vitality of the “living individual” (Marx & Engels, 1845), and producing recurrent suffering.

• “Many” is reflected in redundant officialdom: from tens of thousands of officials in Qin–Han, to hundreds of thousands in Ming–Qing, and to tens of millions today (including public institutions), far exceeding what is necessary for governance.

• “Overbearing” is reflected in arbitrary power: officials attach to factions; administration runs roughshod and suppresses dissent—historically exemplified by the “Eastern Depot and Western Depot,” and today by the stability-maintenance system.

• “Greedy” is reflected in resource predation: official rank is rigidly bound to待遇 (benefits and treatment); gray income coexists with corruption; winner-takes-all devours labor value.

• “Pervasive” is reflected in officials everywhere: bureaucracy saturates the cells of society; grassroots grid-management and official-centered family education; personal innovation is strangled, leading to the chronic accumulation of the “three redundancies” (redundant officials, redundant soldiers, redundant expenditures).

The dynamic mechanism that generates the bureaucratic system’s “many, overbearing, greedy, and pervasive” traits consists of five necessary conditions of the official-appointment mechanism:

1. appointment power is highly centralized;

2. official rank is rigidly bound to待遇 (benefits and treatment);

3. official positions can be reproduced as scarce resources;

4. social problems → institutionalization → official-positionization (an automatic translation);

5. the bureaucratic group possesses an independent interest function that continues across generations.

In Reproductive Officialdom, the one-way extraction produced by officials’ “many/overbearing/greedy/pervasive” traits means the subject (the reproducers of officialdom) dominates, manipulates, and predates upon the object (the people), producing cyclical suffering. Only by shifting from a “sovereignty-in-officials” non-normal state to a “sovereignty-in-the-people” normal state—and realizing a SymbioRights contract of intersubjective symbiosis—can this chronic disease be cured.

This structure may be regarded as an institutional form of “internal colonialism,” whose results are: continuous expansion of state capacity, persistent constraint of social vitality, and the inability to form a symbiotic equilibrium between state and society.

Under such a framework, even frequent policy adjustments often fail to reach the structural reconstruction required for national normalization. The policy narrative of “people-centered development,” if lacking an institutional transition in sovereignty structure and rights-and-responsibility, easily degenerates into slogans and rhetoric at the level of political imagery, and fails to produce genuine and effective social empowerment.

V.  “Global-Sphere Mobilization” vs. “Nationwide Mobilization”: External Pressure from Globalization 3.0

Current transnational cooperative networks such as critical-minerals alliances reveal a new form of organizing national capacity:

Global-sphere mobilization system = alliance networks + capital instruments + rule design + parallel supply chains

It is not an extension of any single state’s power, but a “networked national capacity” formed by multi-state coordination.

This model contrasts sharply with the traditional “nationwide mobilization system”:

As “global-sphere mobilization” takes shape, its external efficiency and capacity for capital mobilization often place pressure on inward-looking bureaucratic mobilization structures, thereby magnifying their institutional costs and structural limitations—possibly forcing “nationwide mobilization” to undergo thorough transformation.

VI.  Conclusion: The Agenda Gap in National Normalization

From the above analysis, one may draw a generalizable judgment of academic referential value:

When a country elevates “the normalization of national capacity” to a core agenda and advances structural shifts through elections or institutional authorization, its process of national normalization enters a visible track;

When a country still relies primarily on policy tools within an existing bureaucratic structure, without touching the sovereignty structure and the allocation of power, national normalization has not yet truly entered its agenda.

By this measure:

Japan has entered a stage of major policy shifts toward national normalization;
China remains in a stage of tool-based policy adjustment within the framework of Reproductive Officialdom—and the agenda of national normalization still seems far from forming a clear cognition among those in power.

The difference between these two paths is not merely one of speed, timing, or sequence; it is the fundamental difference of whether national normalization itself has been established as the highest-level governing agenda.

The decisive variable in East Asia’s future political-economic landscape is no longer primarily growth speed, growth quality, or industrial scale, but rather:

Which country can first complete the institutional transition from a “non-normal state” to a modern “normal state.”