向越南革新学习细节上的彻底性

Learning from Vietnam’s Đổi Mới: Thoroughness in the Details

——从身份制度化的历史悲剧，到权力交互与组织信托重建

— From the Historical Tragedy of Institutionalized Identity Labels to the Reconstruction of Power Relations and Organizational Trust

钱宏  Archer Hong Qian

2025年11月，我到越南南北走访，写下《越南国运处上升态势——基于亚当·斯密“繁荣三原素”与共生经济学的结构性观察》。今天凌晨醒来，忽然又想起越南这个奉行“革新开放”的邻居。眼下，正值中共二十届五中全会召开之际，不觉回望中国大陆1949年以来七十七年的身份标签制度化历史，脑际浮现一个问题：身份标签摘掉了，制造标签的权力收手了吗？

我想到的是，制度性身份歧视与所有制差序，是现代经济社会繁荣的深层障碍。

    一个国家曾经按照所谓家庭出身把人民划分三六九等。革命军人、革命干部、工人、贫农、下中农被称作出身好的“红五类”，地、富、反、坏、右标签为“黑五类”。一个人还没有学会说话，政治档案就直接影响他今后的升学、就业、婚姻与命运。

后来，标签摘掉了。可是，制造标签的权力机制呢？

这依然是今天我们讨论产权、民间信心与资本流动时，必须面对的历史之问。2026年诺贝尔经济学奖得主关心的是“预期”，而预期背后是信（Confidence）。信的背后，是承诺能否真正约束掌握权力的人。

一、摘掉划分阶级的标签，制造标签的权力受到约束了吗？

二十世纪五十年代至七十年代中期，阶级斗争被广泛运用于和平时期的社会治理，形成了以政治成分、家庭出身和社会关系区别对待人的等级实践。“老子英雄儿好汉，老子反动儿混蛋”，把个人权利与祖辈身份捆绑，损害了数代人的机会与尊严。

声称要消灭阶级差别的革命，却在继续革命的政治身份上制造了新的差别。城乡户籍、统购统销、资源配置及知识分子接受“再教育”等实践，又与工农、城乡、脑体劳动的分隔交织。政治身份审查压倒人的能力与创造，亲友之间被迫划清界限，社会信任耗散于防范与揭发。

改革开放以后，平反冤假错案、为地富分子摘帽、恢复高考和开放经营空间，让亿万个具体的个人重新获得行动机会。创造活力随之涌现。这段历史昭示：身份制度化的代价，包括权利受损、创造力埋没，更包括整个社会组织信托的流失与恢复。

但取消一种身份标签，与取消随意制造身份等级的权力，是两个不同层次的改革或革新。谁有权划分？谁决定不同身份的待遇？受损者能够向谁申诉，又由谁约束最后的裁决者？这几个问题，今天仍然值得追问。

二、制度的底层代码：从阶级成分到所有制差序 

现行宪法（以《八二宪法》为基础）确认中国共产党的领导地位、公有制的主体地位和国有经济的主导作用，同时承认、保护非公有制经济和合法私有财产，同时取消《七八宪法》罢工自由，并规定城市土地归国家所有、农村土地归集体所有。2025年《民营经济促进法》进一步提出平等保护、公平竞争，并同时重申坚持党的领导。

阶级出身与所有制属于不同性质的分类，不能直接混同。然而，当经济分类在实际运行中转换成政策优先、信贷准入、司法保护与公共资源配置上的主体身份差序时，就会再次出现“谁赋有主体平等资格”的差序问题。

发文件、作承诺、出台促进条例能够改善一时的经营条件，却未必改变决定承诺能否兑现的权力结构。当承诺者同时握有解释、修改和最终裁决承诺的权力，而缺少有效的独立约束，产权安全便面临可信承诺（Credible Commitment）难题。

这不意味着所有产权保护必定失效，也不意味着任何一笔资本外流都是逃避政治风险。但在利差、汇率、回报率和国际配置之外，经济预期，确实会进入资本的风险判断。人们可以为更高收益迁移财富，也可能为了免受不可预期的权利损失，而付出迁移成本。最后，就是人们现在看到的消费和投资市场双重萎缩。

问题的要害已经明确：保护合法产权的政策由谁制定固然重要，谁能够约束改变规则的权力更加重要。

三、据何判断越南国运呈上升态势？

去年那篇文章观察越南“革新开放”以来的社会活力与发展势头，探寻亚当·斯密所说的繁荣三原素在现实中的生成。今天重读，问题又向前推进了一步：人民自己生长出来的繁荣，如何获得持续的制度承兑？

亚当·斯密谈国家繁荣，提出“和平、轻税和过得去的司法行政”三个要素。我由此观察越南的“三重和平”：人民之间可以自由交换、形成信任；制度安排给予经营与分工以稳定的预期；国家之间通过基于规则的贸易往来减少冲突，增进合作。和平不是软弱，而是国家最硬的基础设施。

越南的产业承接、国际贸易、旅游活力与民间经营，当然受到地缘位置、人口结构和国际投资等条件影响。更值得注意的是：革新开放不断扩大了普通人经营、交换和自组织的空间。这些活力无法仅凭国家命令创造，它们从人民的生活实践中生长出来。

当时我关心：越南的国运何以上升？今天进一步追问：这种上升能否长久，依据何在？和平带来安全，安全促进投资，投资扩展分工，分工激发创新；但是，任何一个环节都需要可靠的产权预期和组织信托。没有制度承兑，发展的动能仍可能被权力任意性消耗。

于是，两年的观察在这里交汇：前一篇从繁荣的生成条件切入，今天则要走进繁荣的制度保障。CPTPP及其劳工、投资规则，与国内职权分置及公开质询，正是检验权力能否接受规则约束的两个具体交互点。

“革新开放”与“改革开放”，一字之差，值得琢磨。越南所称 Đổi Mới，本义是革新、更新；中国称改革开放。“改革”着眼于既有规则的调整（如历史上王莽、王安石、张居正“变法”），“革新”更鲜明地指向原则与组织关系的更新。词义不能决定成败，却能启发我们追问改革究竟触及了什么。

仅凭译名当然不能判定制度成败，但“革新”提醒人们：既然决定打开某一领域，就要敢于更新支配它的基本原则。改革可以分阶段；每一步都要在已经开放的部分确认主体资格，不把根本权利悬置为日后恩准。

四、第一交互点：外部契约，怎样使国内权力接受国际约束？

这种细节上的彻底性，早于CPTPP。越南1986年启动革新开放，1987年通过《外国投资法》（1988年生效），第四条明确允许设立外资100%持股企业，第十四条规定这类企业自行负责经营管理，并依法承担义务。彼时审批和行业限制仍然存在，实践也需要逐步推进；但允许外资进入的领域，法律已经承认外资企业可以成为完整持股、独立经营的主体。

改革可以一步一步来，但决定做的那一步，应先在思想理论和法律原则上做彻底。 今天明确这一部分的主体资格，明天再完善它的执行条件。历史总有过程；原则的确立与实践的完成也有先后。

越南2019年加入《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（CPTPP）；与欧盟签订的自由贸易协定（EVFTA）于2020年生效。通过国际经济契约，越南将劳工权利、市场开放和投资保护与国内法律调整连接起来。

越南2019年《劳动法典》在法律上允许企业内部设立不隶属于官方工会总联合会的劳动者代表组织。它意味着劳动者利益表达有望获得原有单一工会渠道之外的组织空间。这一步触及社会主体的独立表达权。但是，法律认可不等于现实中已能自由运作；截至2026年，独立劳动组织的落实仍受到严格限制。

CPTPP第九章则为合格跨境投资规定了征收条件、补偿要求以及符合条约条件的投资者—国家争端解决途径（ISDS）。政府承担条约义务，违约可能引发仲裁责任、赔偿与国际信誉成本。部分产权保护因此获得超出单方面行政承诺的外部约束。

这里必须分清法律边界：国际投资仲裁并不覆盖越南所有本国私人财产。截至2026年10月27日，越欧投资保护协定（EVIPA）已有20个欧盟成员国提交批准通知，尚有7国未完成，协定尚未生效。越南自由贸易协定（EVFTA）于2020年8月1日生效。

外部条约既不是万能锁，也不是一纸空文，它的作用要看适用范围、执行条件和实际履约。值得借鉴的制度原理，是一国政府自愿接受自己不能完全单方面改变的契约义务，让“取信于国际”进入可以检验、可以追责的法律程序。

五、第二交互点：内部职权分置与公开质询

越南长期存在总书记、国家主席、总理、国会主席分别担任不同职位的“四柱”领导格局。职位分置能够为党务、国家代表、行政和立法监督之间留下组织交互的空间。国会公开质询政府官员，更把这种空间带入可观察的公共程序。

越南2015年《国会和人民议会监督活动法》对质询、公开播送以及监督决议的责任与执行报告作出规定。提出问题、现场回答、确认责任、限期整改、追踪结果：制度细节把权力置于社会可以观看和评价的场景之中。

但“四驾马车”不能神化。2026年4月，苏林兼任越共中央总书记与国家主席，表明原有高层职位分置的安排可以发生变化；国会监督也仍受现行政治组织条件制约。电视直播可以增加透明度，却不能单独替代真正有效的法律救济和权力制衡。

正因为存在这些限制，越南的尝试才值得深入剖析：职位不同，尚需权力边界清楚；质询公开，尚需责任真正兑现；监督程序存在，尚需受监督者无法轻易取消监督。

六、两点交互，怎样通向“消除制造标签的权力”？

外部，国际契约以法律义务、仲裁和违约成本制约权力；内部，机构职权分置、国会质询和追责程序试图约束权力行使。一个形成外部承兑压力，一个形成内部纠错通道。两者若能落实并相互支持，才有条件让人民与企业逐渐摆脱只能寄望于政策恩惠的处境。

这也提供了一个清晰的检验标准：劳动者能否依法表达自身利益？企业遭到不当征收能否获得有效救济？官员能否被公开追问并对违约承担责任？公有与私有企业能否在公平竞争中按贡献而非身份获取机会？

越南并未彻底解决这些问题。它的实践中既有法律上的开放，也有现实中的限制与权力再集中。因而，学习越南应当学习制度细节中可验证的突破，同时看清尚未兑现的承诺。在这个意义上，越南的革新开放，是中国式改革开放的一面镜子。

七、身份制度化怎样吞噬繁荣？

说到底，根子还在主客关系。一个权力组织如果永远以唯一主体（Subject）自居，将劳动者、企业家、投资者和普通人民只当成可以安排、支配与恩准的客体（Object），社会哪里还会有真正的自组织？允许他经营，却不充分承认其产权；允许他发声，却不承认独立表达利益的主体资格；给他部分权利，却保留随时收回的任意权力——主体被削减为客体，何来持久信托与繁荣？

在万事交互主体共生（Everything Intersubjective Symbiosism，EIS）的视野中，每个人、每个企业与社会组织都有自身的禀赋、权利和责任。国家保障公共秩序，劳动者贡献劳动和知识，企业组织生产并承担风险。不同主体通过有益交互生成共生效能。自组织的动能与共生、共襄生成的势能，相应相辅相成。

当某一权力集团把其他主体视为可随意分类、支配和调配的客体，身份审查就容易挤占能力发现，权力偏好挤占公平竞争，避险成本挤占生产投资。多元不共生，就是散乱，甚至冲突；一元压制主体交互，则会不断损耗社会的纠错能力和创新活力。

共生经济学（Symbionomics）提出国内生产效能总值（Gross Domestic Effectiveness，GDE）：GDE＝Σ（GDPᵢ×ηᵢ），η为效能系数（Effectiveness Coefficient）。降本C、赋能E、健康H、信任T、和平P，是理解发展效能的五个重要维度。身份制度化抬高成本、限制赋能、破坏健康、削弱信任并制造冲突，因此可能使GDP增长的相当一部分成果被组织损耗吞噬。

一个国家可以动员大量资本建厂修路，却仍可能因为产权预期不稳，使财富耗费于防范、迁移与短期套利。生产规模可以扩张，信托却可能不断流失。公信力一旦丧失，就很难恢复。

八、细节上的彻底性，通向怎样的制度承兑？

改革的彻底性，需要看规则能否约束制定规则的人。劳动者组织权利写进法律以后，能否真实行使？投资条约签订之后，争端解决能否有效启动？国会质询直播之后，行政部门是否按时整改并承担责任？合法私有产权能否获得稳定、平等和可诉的保障？

这些细节看似细小，却都是权力交界处的硬问题。原则落实为权利，承诺落实为责任，监督落实为可追究的程序，才可能降低制度风险溢价，逐渐重建组织信托。

向越南学习，应当认真研究两项制度实验：一方面以国际契约引入外部法律约束，另一方面以职权分置、公开质询和问责程序推进国内权力交互。其实际局限同样提醒我们：只改变形式、没有改变权力实际受到约束的程度，制度风险仍可能存在。

去年在越南，我看到人民的交换与创造如何汇成国运上升的动能；今天再问，能够让这种动能持续下去的制度势能从何而来？“三重和平”要走向长久繁荣，便须让司法行政的公正、国际契约的履行与国内监督的责任，落进每一个人和企业可以切身检验的细节。

越南1987年允许外资独资、后来在劳动法上确认企业内部劳动者代表组织，以及通过国际投资条约接受部分外部约束，分别触及产权、组织和国家行为的主体关系。法律上的突破未必立即在现实中彻底实现，恰恰要求继续检验执行。但思想原则一旦明确，改革才有了可供落实与追责的方向。

细节上的彻底性，就在于让每个获得承认的主体真正有权行动，让承诺者接受约束。改革可以一步一步走，每一步都应走到主体资格的根上。

标签摘掉以后，还要问：制造标签的权力受到约束了吗？

一个国家能够动员多少财富，取决于资源、机会和生产能力；能够长久留住多少人心与资本，则取决于权利、责任和信托如何得到承兑。

预期背后是信。信，最终要由细节中的制度履约来承兑。

 交互主体共生，繁荣才有根基

允许外资100%持股，是一个细节；但背后是承认外国投资者完整的产权主体资格。

CPTPP允许符合条件的投资者通过国际仲裁追究政府责任，是一个细节；但背后是国家权力接受外部法律约束。

国会公开质询，是一个细节；但背后是掌权者必须面对其他主体的质询与监督。

这三个细节共同揭示了一个根本问题：权力能否承认自己之外还有独立的主体？

魔鬼藏在细节中，细节决定成败。改革的彻底性，体现在已经决定改革的每一个细节上。历史可以渐进，原则必须明确；实践可以逐步完善，主体资格不能半给半留。

一个始终把自己当作唯一主体（Subject）、把其他人当作客体（Object）的权力组织，即使给予再多优惠和许可，也难以建立持久的组织信托。

交互主体共生（Intersubjective Symbiosism），繁荣才有根基。

最后，多说一句：要刹住“经济下行”，中国不学日本，学不象新加坡，至少向越南学习吧！

主要参考依据

《中华人民共和国宪法》（2018年修正）；《中华人民共和国民营经济促进法》（2025年）。

越南《外国投资法》（1987年通过，1988年生效），第四条、第十四条；越共第六次全国代表大会（1986年）关于 Đổi Mới 的改革决定。

CPTPP，第九章投资及第十九章劳工；越南《劳动法典》（2019年）。

越南《国会和人民议会监督活动法》（2015年）；越共中央政治局第68号决议（2025年）。

EVFTA（2020年生效）；EVIPA（与EVFTA不同，须核对各批准方进度）。

越南2026年4月领导职务调整的官方报道；2026年关于独立工会实施状况的研究与报道。

钱宏（Archer Hong Qian）：《越南国运处上升态势——基于亚当·斯密“繁荣三原素”与共生经济学的结构性观察》，2025年, http://symbiosism.com.cn/11185.html

钱宏（Archer Hong Qian）：《CPTPP门槛背后的组织信托——当“三十六计”遇到事前可验证、事中可追责、事后可承兑》，2026,http://symbiosism.com.cn/12687.html ；https://www.amorsophia.com/article/10327

钱宏（Archer Hong Qian）：《共生经济学概论（修订版）》Symbionomics: An Overview (Revised Edition)；《将AI升格为AM》／Elevating AI to AM，，2026年。

Learning from Vietnam’s Đổi Mới: Thoroughness in the Details

— From the Historical Tragedy of Institutionalized Identity Labels to the Reconstruction of Power Relations and Organizational Trust

Archer Hong Qian

In November 2025, I traveled across Vietnam, from north to south, observing the country firsthand. That journey led me to write Vietnam’s National Fortunes Are on the Rise: A Structural Observation Based on Adam Smith’s Three Essentials of Prosperity and Symbionomics.

Early this morning, I awoke thinking once again about Vietnam, our neighbor that has pursued Đổi Mới—Renovation and Opening Up.

As the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convenes, I find myself looking back over the seventy-seven years since 1949 and the history of institutionalized identity labeling in mainland China.

One question comes to mind:

The labels have been removed. But has the power to manufacture those labels finally withdrawn?

Institutionalized identity discrimination and ownership-based hierarchies are profound obstacles to lasting prosperity in modern economic society.

There was a time when a country divided its people into rigid social ranks according to their so-called family backgrounds. Revolutionary soldiers, revolutionary cadres, workers, poor peasants, and lower-middle peasants were classified among the politically privileged "Five Red Categories." Landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists were assigned to the "Five Black Categories."

Before a child could even speak, a political dossier could already determine that child's prospects for education, employment, marriage, and much of life itself.

Eventually, those labels were removed.

But what happened to the mechanisms of power that manufactured them?

This remains a historical question that cannot be avoided when discussing property rights, private-sector confidence, and capital flows today.

The 2026 Nobel laureates in economics have drawn attention to expectations. Yet behind expectations lies confidence. And behind confidence lies a still more fundamental question: Can commitments genuinely constrain those who hold power?

I. The Class Labels Were Removed. Has the Power to Manufacture Them Been Constrained?

From the 1950s through the mid-1970s, class struggle was widely applied to the governance of society during peacetime. Political classifications, family backgrounds, and social relationships became grounds for hierarchical treatment.

The notorious slogan, "The son of a hero is a fine fellow; the son of a reactionary is a bastard," bound personal rights to ancestral identities, damaging the opportunities and dignity of several generations.

A revolution that proclaimed its intention to eliminate class distinctions proceeded to create new distinctions through the political identities of continuous revolution.

The urban–rural household registration system, unified state procurement and distribution, resource allocation, and the political "reeducation" of intellectuals reinforced divisions between workers and peasants, cities and villages, and intellectual and manual labor.

Political identity screening overshadowed individual ability and creativity. Relatives and friends were compelled to draw ideological boundaries between themselves. Social trust dissipated through suspicion, denunciation, and mutual vigilance.

After Reform and Opening Up began, the redress of wrongful political cases, the removal of class labels from landlords and rich peasants, the restoration of university entrance examinations, and the opening of new economic opportunities enabled hundreds of millions of individuals to regain room for independent action.

Creative vitality consequently surged.

This history demonstrates that the cost of institutionalized identity discrimination extends beyond violations of individual rights and the suppression of human creativity. It includes the erosion of organizational trust throughout society—and the immense effort required to restore it.

Yet abolishing a particular identity label and abolishing the arbitrary power to manufacture identity hierarchies represent two different levels of reform or renovation.

Who has the authority to classify people?

Who decides how different identities are treated?

To whom can those whose rights have been violated appeal?

And who can constrain the ultimate decision-maker?

These questions remain relevant today.

II. The Institutional Source Code: From Class Background to Ownership Hierarchy

China's current Constitution, built upon the framework of the 1982 Constitution, affirms the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the predominant position of public ownership, and the leading role of the state-owned economy.

At the same time, it recognizes and protects the non-public economy and lawful private property.

The 1982 Constitution also omitted the right to strike that had appeared in the 1978 Constitution, while establishing state ownership of urban land and collective ownership of rural land.

The 2025 Private Sector Promotion Law further emphasizes equal protection and fair competition while reaffirming the Party's leadership.

Class background and forms of ownership are classifications of different kinds. They should not be treated as identical.

Nevertheless, when economic classifications translate into hierarchical differences in policy priorities, access to credit, judicial protection, and the allocation of public resources, the same fundamental question returns:

Who confers equal standing upon independent economic subjects?

Issuing policy documents, making promises, and enacting promotional legislation may improve business conditions for a time. Yet such measures do not necessarily change the power structure that ultimately determines whether those promises will be honored.

When those making commitments also possess the authority to interpret, amend, and ultimately adjudicate those commitments, without effective independent constraints, property rights face a fundamental Credible Commitment Problem.

This does not mean that all property protections must inevitably fail, or that every instance of capital outflow represents an attempt to escape political risk.

But alongside interest-rate differentials, exchange rates, investment returns, and international portfolio diversification, expectations about the future inevitably enter into assessments of capital risk.

People may move wealth in pursuit of higher returns. They may also willingly incur substantial costs to protect themselves against unpredictable losses of rights.

The eventual result is the simultaneous contraction of consumer and investment markets that people are witnessing today.

The essential issue is now clear.

Who formulates policies protecting lawful property rights certainly matters.

Who can constrain the power to change those rules matters even more.

III. Why Did I Conclude That Vietnam's National Fortunes Were on the Rise?

My article last year examined the social vitality and developmental momentum generated by Vietnam's policy of Đổi Mới, seeking to understand how Adam Smith's three essentials of prosperity emerge in actual social life.

Rereading that article today, I find the question advancing another step:

How can prosperity generated by the people themselves obtain lasting institutional guarantees?

Adam Smith identified three essentials of national prosperity: peace, light taxation, and a tolerable administration of justice.

From this perspective, I observed three dimensions of peace in Vietnam.

The first concerns the freedom of exchange and the development of trust among individuals and communities.

The second concerns institutional arrangements that provide stable expectations for business operations and the division of labor.

The third concerns international trade relationships governed by rules, reducing conflict while expanding cooperation.

Peace is no weakness. It is a nation's strongest infrastructure.

Vietnam's integration into international manufacturing networks, expansion of trade, growing tourism sector, and entrepreneurial vitality have undoubtedly benefited from geography, demographics, and international investment.

More significant, however, is the gradual enlargement of the space in which ordinary people can engage in business, exchange, and self-organization.

Such vitality cannot simply be commanded into existence by the state.

It grows out of people's own everyday activities.

Last year, my question was: Why are Vietnam's national fortunes rising?

Today, I ask a further question: Can that rise be sustained, and on what institutional foundations?

Peace creates security. Security encourages investment. Investment expands the division of labor. The division of labor stimulates innovation.

Yet every link in this process requires dependable expectations concerning property rights and organizational trust.

Without credible institutional commitments, the dynamism of development can still be consumed by arbitrary exercises of power.

Thus, my observations over these two years converge.

The earlier article explored the conditions under which prosperity emerges. The present article examines the institutional foundations that might sustain it.

The labor and investment rules associated with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), together with the domestic division of official responsibilities and public parliamentary questioning, provide two concrete points of interaction through which we can examine whether political power can be subjected to binding rules.

There is also an intriguing difference of just one Chinese character between Vietnam's Renovation and Opening Up (革新开放) and China's Reform and Opening Up (改革开放).

Vietnam's term Đổi Mới means renovation or renewal.

In Chinese, "reform" tends to suggest adjustments within an existing framework, reminiscent of the historical institutional reforms associated with Wang Mang, Wang Anshi, and Zhang Juzheng.

"Renovation," by contrast, more explicitly evokes the renewal of underlying principles and organizational relationships.

Words alone cannot determine the success or failure of institutions. Nevertheless, this distinction invites us to ask what reform actually changes.

The meaning of renovation reminds us that once a society decides to open a particular field, it must be prepared to renew the principles governing that field.

Reform may proceed in stages.

But each step must establish the standing of independent subjects within the field being opened, rather than leaving their fundamental rights dependent upon future permission.

IV. The First Point of Interaction: How External Agreements Subject Domestic Power to International Constraints

Vietnam's thoroughness in institutional details predates the CPTPP.

Vietnam launched Đổi Mới in 1986. In 1987, it adopted its Law on Foreign Investment, which entered into force in 1988.

Article 4 expressly permitted the establishment of enterprises with 100% foreign ownership. Article 14 provided for such enterprises to manage their own operations and fulfill their legal obligations.

At that time, project approval requirements and industry restrictions still existed. Implementation would necessarily develop gradually.

But within the areas opened to foreign investment, the law had already recognized enterprises with complete foreign ownership as independent business subjects.

This illustrates what thoroughness in institutional details means.

Reform may proceed one step at a time, but each step undertaken should first establish its principles thoroughly in theory and law.

Today, a particular area of independent subjecthood is recognized. Tomorrow, the conditions for implementing it can be further improved.

History always unfolds through a process. The establishment of principles and their full realization in practice do not necessarily occur simultaneously.

Vietnam joined the CPTPP in 2019. Its Free Trade Agreement with the European Union (EVFTA) entered into force in 2020.

Through international economic agreements, Vietnam connected labor rights, market access, and investment protection with changes in domestic legislation.

Vietnam's 2019 Labor Code legally permitted the establishment of worker representative organizations within enterprises outside the official Vietnam General Confederation of Labour.

This created the possibility of organizational space through which workers could express their interests independently of the previously dominant official union channel.

The change touches upon the right of social subjects to represent and articulate their own interests.

However, legal recognition does not automatically translate into freedom of operation.

As of 2026, the practical establishment and operation of independent labor organizations in Vietnam remain subject to substantial restrictions.

Chapter 9 of the CPTPP, meanwhile, establishes conditions for expropriation, compensation requirements, and investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms for qualifying cross-border investments.

Governments assume treaty obligations. Breaches may result in arbitration proceedings, compensation liabilities, and damage to international credibility.

Some property-rights protections thereby acquire external constraints extending beyond unilateral administrative promises.

The legal boundaries must be clearly understood.

International investment arbitration does not automatically cover all privately owned property within Vietnam.

As of October 27, 2026, twenty EU member states had submitted ratification notifications for the EU–Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA), while seven had yet to complete the process. EVIPA had therefore not entered into force.

The EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), by contrast, entered into force on August 1, 2020.

An international treaty is neither an all-powerful lock nor an empty piece of paper.

Its effectiveness depends on its scope of application, implementation requirements, and actual compliance.

The institutional principle worth examining is that a government voluntarily accepts contractual obligations it cannot completely alter unilaterally.

In doing so, earning international confidence becomes a matter of legally verifiable obligations and enforceable accountability.

V. The Second Point of Interaction: Internal Division of Responsibilities and Public Parliamentary Questioning

Vietnam has long maintained a leadership arrangement in which the General Secretary of the Communist Party, the State President, the Prime Minister, and the Chairperson of the National Assembly were traditionally held by four different individuals.

This arrangement is commonly known as the "Four Pillars."

The separation of offices can create organizational space for interaction among Party leadership, state representation, executive administration, and legislative oversight.

Public questioning of government officials in the National Assembly brings that interaction into a visible institutional process.

Vietnam's 2015 Law on Supervisory Activities of the National Assembly and People's Councils established provisions concerning questioning, public broadcasting, supervisory resolutions, institutional responsibilities, and implementation reports.

Questions are raised. Officials respond publicly. Responsibilities are identified. Deadlines for corrective action are established. Results are subsequently reviewed.

These institutional details bring the exercise of public power into a setting that society can observe and evaluate.

Yet the "Four Pillars" arrangement should not be idealized.

In April 2026, Tô Lâm assumed the presidency while retaining his position as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

This demonstrated that the previous separation of senior offices could be altered.

Oversight by the National Assembly also remains constrained by Vietnam's existing political and organizational arrangements.

Televised proceedings can increase transparency, but transparency alone cannot substitute for effective legal remedies and institutional checks on power.

Precisely because these limitations remain, Vietnam's experiments deserve careful examination.

Different offices must have clearly defined boundaries of authority.

Public questioning must lead to responsibilities that are genuinely fulfilled.

Oversight procedures must be protected against easy cancellation by those subject to oversight.

VI. How Can These Two Points of Interaction Help Eliminate the Power to Manufacture Identity Labels?

Externally, international agreements constrain governmental power through legal obligations, arbitration, and the costs of violating commitments.

Internally, the division of institutional responsibilities, parliamentary questioning, and accountability procedures seek to constrain the exercise of power.

One creates external pressure to honor commitments.

The other creates channels for internal correction.

If both operate effectively and reinforce one another, they can help establish conditions under which individuals and enterprises gradually move beyond dependence upon discretionary policy favors.

This also provides a clear set of practical tests.

Can workers lawfully represent their own interests?

Can enterprises obtain effective remedies against improper expropriation?

Can public officials be questioned openly and held responsible for breaches of their obligations?

Can public and private enterprises compete fairly and gain opportunities according to their contributions rather than their ownership identities?

Vietnam has yet to resolve these issues completely.

Its experience combines legal openings with continuing restrictions and renewed concentration of power.

Learning from Vietnam therefore requires examining verifiable institutional breakthroughs while recognizing commitments that remain unfulfilled.

In this sense, Vietnam's Renovation and Opening Up offers a mirror through which to examine China's Reform and Opening Up.

VII. How Institutionalized Identity Hierarchies Consume Prosperity

Ultimately, the root of the problem lies in the relationship between Subject and Object.

If a political organization perpetually regards itself as the sole Subject, while treating workers, entrepreneurs, investors, and ordinary citizens merely as Objects to be arranged, controlled, and granted permission, how can society develop genuine self-organization?

You allow people to operate businesses, yet fail to recognize their property rights fully.

You permit them to speak, yet deny them independent standing to represent their interests.

You grant them certain rights while retaining arbitrary power to withdraw those rights whenever you choose.

When Subjects are reduced to Objects, where can lasting trust and prosperity come from?

Within the framework of Everything Intersubjective Symbiosism (EIS), every individual, enterprise, and social organization possesses its own endowments, rights, and responsibilities.

The state safeguards public order.

Workers contribute labor and knowledge.

Enterprises organize production and assume risk.

Different subjects generate symbiotic effectiveness through mutually beneficial interaction.

The driving force of self-organization and the potential energy of symbiotic and collaborative generation are mutually responsive, complementary, and co-constitutive.

When a particular power-holding group treats other subjects as Objects to be arbitrarily classified, controlled, and allocated, identity screening displaces the recognition of ability.

Political preferences displace fair competition.

The costs of risk avoidance crowd out productive investment.

Plurality without symbiosis produces disorder—even conflict.

When unitary power suppresses interactions among independent subjects, society continuously loses its capacity for self-correction and innovation.

Symbionomics proposes the concept of Gross Domestic Effectiveness (GDE):

GDE = Σ(GDPᵢ × ηᵢ)

Here, η (Eta) represents the Effectiveness Coefficient.

Five factors—Cost Reduction (C), Empowerment (E), Health (H), Trust (T), and Peace (P)—provide important dimensions for understanding developmental effectiveness.

Institutionalized identity hierarchies raise costs, restrict empowerment, damage health, weaken trust, and generate conflict.

As a result, a substantial portion of the benefits produced by GDP growth may be consumed by organizational inefficiency and social losses.

A country may mobilize enormous amounts of capital to build factories, highways, and other infrastructure.

Yet unstable expectations concerning property rights may compel wealth holders to spend resources on defensive arrangements, relocation, and short-term arbitrage.

The scale of production can expand even while organizational trust continues to erode.

And once public credibility is lost, restoring it is exceedingly difficult.

VIII. What Kind of Institutional Commitment Can Thoroughness in the Details Produce?

The thoroughness of reform must ultimately be judged by whether rules can constrain those who make them.

Once workers' organizational rights are written into law, can workers actually exercise those rights?

Once investment treaties are signed, can dispute-settlement mechanisms be effectively invoked?

Once parliamentary questioning is publicly broadcast, do administrative departments implement corrective measures on time and accept responsibility?

Can lawful private property obtain stable, equal, and legally enforceable protection?

These details may appear minor.

Yet each concerns a critical point at which power encounters the rights of other subjects.

Only when principles become enforceable rights, commitments become responsibilities, and supervision becomes procedures capable of imposing accountability can institutional risk premiums decline and organizational trust gradually be rebuilt.

Learning from Vietnam means examining two institutional experiments.

The first introduces external legal constraints through international agreements.

The second develops domestic interaction among institutions through differentiated responsibilities, public questioning, and accountability procedures.

Their limitations also carry an important lesson.

If institutional forms change without a corresponding change in the extent to which power is actually constrained, institutional risks may persist.

Last year in Vietnam, I observed how people's exchanges and creativity could converge into a rising national dynamism.

Today, I ask: Where does the institutional potential energy capable of sustaining that dynamism come from?

For the "Three Dimensions of Peace" to develop into lasting prosperity, fair judicial administration, fulfillment of international obligations, and responsibility under domestic oversight must all be realized in details that every individual and enterprise can personally experience and verify.

Vietnam's 1987 recognition of wholly foreign-owned enterprises, its subsequent legal recognition of worker representative organizations, and its acceptance of certain external constraints through international investment treaties each touch upon the relationships among subjects in the fields of property, organization, and state action.

A legal breakthrough may not immediately be realized in practice.

Indeed, that is precisely why implementation must continue to be examined.

But once the underlying principle is clearly established, reform has a direction against which fulfillment and accountability can be measured.

Thoroughness in the details means enabling every recognized subject to exercise genuine agency, while ensuring that those making commitments are themselves subject to constraints.

Reform can proceed step by step.

But every step should reach the very foundation of subjecthood.

After the labels have been removed, we must still ask:

Has the power to manufacture those labels been constrained?

How much wealth a country can mobilize depends on its resources, opportunities, and productive capabilities.

How much confidence and capital it can retain over the long term depends on how rights, responsibilities, and trust are honored through credible commitments.

Behind expectations lies confidence.

And confidence must ultimately be sustained by institutional commitments fulfilled in the details.

Intersubjective Symbiosis: The Foundation of Prosperity

Allowing 100% foreign ownership is a detail.

Behind it lies recognition of foreign investors as independent subjects possessing full ownership rights in their enterprises.

Allowing qualifying investors under the CPTPP to pursue international arbitration against a government is a detail.

Behind it lies the state's acceptance of external legal constraints on its own authority.

Public parliamentary questioning is a detail.

Behind it lies the requirement that those exercising political power face questions and oversight from other institutional actors.

Together, these three details reveal a fundamental issue:

Can political power recognize independent subjects beyond itself?

The devil is in the details, and details determine success or failure.

The thoroughness of reform manifests itself in every specific area that has already been opened to reform.

History may advance gradually, but principles must be clear.

Implementation can improve step by step, but the recognition of independent subjecthood cannot be granted only halfway.

A political organization that always regards itself as the sole Subject, treating everyone else as Objects, will find it difficult to establish lasting organizational trust, however many incentives or permissions it offers.

Intersubjective Symbiosism provides the foundation for prosperity.

And one final remark:

If China wishes to arrest its economic decline, and if it will neither follow Japan's path nor manage to emulate Singapore, then perhaps it should at least learn from Vietnam!

Principal References

1. Constitution of the People's Republic of China (2018 Amendment); Private Sector Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China (2025).

2. Vietnam, Law on Foreign Investment (adopted in 1987; effective in 1988), Articles 4 and 14; Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (1986), decisions concerning Đổi Mới.

3. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Chapter 9 (Investment) and Chapter 19 (Labour); Vietnam, Labour Code (2019).

4. Vietnam, Law on Supervisory Activities of the National Assembly and People's Councils (2015); Resolution No. 68 of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (2025).

5. EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), effective in 2020; EU–Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA), a separate agreement whose entry into force depends on completion of the relevant ratification procedures.

6. Official reports concerning Vietnam's leadership changes in April 2026; research and reports on the implementation of independent labor organizations in Vietnam (2026).

7. Archer Hong Qian, Vietnam's National Fortunes Are on the Rise: A Structural Observation Based on Adam Smith's Three Essentials of Prosperity and Symbionomics (2025).

8. http://symbiosism.com.cn/11185.html

9. Archer Hong Qian, Organizational Trust Behind the CPTPP Threshold: When the “Thirty-Six Stratagems” Encounter Ex Ante Verifiability, Ongoing Accountability, and Ex Post Fulfillment (2026).

10. http://symbiosism.com.cn/12687.html

11. https://www.amorsophia.com/article/10327

12. Archer Hong Qian, Symbionomics: An Overview (Revised Edition); Elevating AI to AM (2026).