二十一、Moment of truth  大战开始
    
Things really started to come together. I built the bank pad into one of the biggest on the street and word quickly spread about the aggressive kid from Morgan.
 一切真的开始越来越顺。在我的努力下，我所做的业务在华尔街上位居前列，很快消息就传了开来，摩根斯坦利有个作风犀利的年轻人。
    If a customer had something to do in the sector, I was the call. I traded huge positions and plunked money in Mother Morgan's till. It was a beautiful thing.
如果客户想作金融板块的衍生品交易，我是他们的第一选择。我的交易头寸很庞大，给“摩根妈妈”(Mother Morgan)的钱罐里添了不少钱，这是一件美好的事情。
     Keefe Bruyette was the biggest player in the financials on the Street and the crown jewel of my customer base. I worked hard to impress their head trader and before long, secured the majority of their flow.    Keefe Bruyette公司是华尔街上从事金融板块衍生工具交易的最大玩家，也是我最重要的客户。我竭尽全力给他们的首席交易员留下深刻印象，没过多久，就把他们绝大多数交易拿到了手。 
    NationsBank, Chemical Bank, Chase Manhattan -- you name it, we traded it. I was only 27 years old but had established myself as a customer-friendly producer. If you wanted to trade a bank, you came to Morgan and you would get taken care of.
国民银行(NationsBank)、纽约化学银行(Chemical Bank)、大通银行(Chase Manhattan)－－只要你能想到的银行，我们全都负责交易。当时我只有27岁，却已在业内确立了与客户关系融洽的名声。如果你想交易某个银行的股票期权，那就来找摩根斯坦利，一定会得到满意的服务。
     The First Interstate position began like any other. The stock was trading near $70 when Keefe's head trader asked Kim Dispigna, his Morgan salesperson, for a market in the 'Jan par leaps,' or January 100 call options that expired the following January.
起初，第一州际银行(The First Interstate)的期权交易与任何一个普通交易一样。当时股价接近70美元，Keefe的首席交易员向摩根斯坦利的销售代表金姆?迪斯匹格纳(Kim Dispigna)询问“1月标准合约”(Jan par leaps)的价格，也就是明年1月到期的100手看涨期权的价格。
     I checked the floor and found that the options were three dollars wide and 50 up, meaning the customer could buy or sell 50 contracts on either side of an illiquid market.
我看了一下挂牌情况，发现这个差价有3美元，挂了50手，也就是说客户可以在这个流动性不强的市场买入或者卖出50手合约。
     'What odd-lots,' I thought to myself as I tightened the market and increased the size tenfold. 'Whatever he needs,' I remember telling Kim, 'Just get the order.'
“怎么才这么一点。”我在心里想，同时通过做市挂牌降低差价，并把合约数增加10倍。“不管他要买多少，”我记得自己对金姆说，“把指令拿来就行。”
     Keefe built upside exposure for a few days and before long, I had a large position. I had short call options for my customer, which gave them the right to purchase stock, and I also owned equity to hedge my risk.    在接下来的几天，Keefe公司买入不少看涨期权，很快我手头就持有一个很大的头寸。我向客户卖出看空期权，让他们有权买入股票，同时我也买入股票对冲自己的风险。
     They became increasingly aggressive and I had trouble keeping up; the floor wouldn't sell any more calls and I was the only means of facilitation.   他们的胃口越来越大，我开始有点跟不上了。市场无法提供更多的看涨期权，我成为唯一的做市商。
     Finally, after several weeks, the customer asked what the position limit was.
     最终，过了几星期，客户问我他们能买入的上限是多少。
    'Eighty-five hundred contracts,' I replied, 'That's as many contracts as he's allowed to buy, according the exchange.' We were almost there. “8500手.”
我回答道，“这是证交所允许买入的最高限。”我们距离这个上限已经很近了。
     To say that I was involved in First Interstate is like saying that Google is involved in the Internet. If anyone on Wall Street had something to do in the name, they knew Morgan Stanley was the call.       现在，说我持有第一洲际银行的股票，就像是在说谷歌(Google)从事的是互联网业务。华尔街任何一个交易第一洲际银行股票的人都知道，摩根斯坦利是个大多头。
     I had a massive position -- short calls to my customer and long everything under the sun against them. I assumed the customer knew something and I went along for the ride.
我持有的头寸十分庞大－－在向客户卖出第一洲际银行股票看空期权时，我自己买入任何可以对冲这一风险的东西。我认为客户可能知道什么消息，并准备好搭乘这趟便车。
 I traded that monster for months. When I liked the market, I pressed my upside bet. When I didn't like the tape, I shorted other banks against it. At no point did I waver from my conviction or abandon the position.    我玩弄这个庞然大物好几个月时间。当我看好市场走势时，就增加多头部位，当不看好时，就卖空其他银行进行对冲，但在任何时候我看多的信念都没有动摇过，也没有放弃过自己的多头部位。
 Everyone in the room knew the story and I was sitting atop the train waiting for it to pull into the Promised Land.     交易大厅里的每个人都知道这件事，知道我现在坐在一列火车的顶上，等待启程去往梦想之国。
 Stress? Sure, but I had an edge and it was razor sharp. 
有压力吗？当然，但我有自己的优势，而这种优势就像剃刀边缘一样犀利。

二十二、Cuts like a knife  收割时刻
 
It was a slow afternoon when Kim's voice cut through the quiet room.
一个交易清淡的下午，金姆的声音突然划过宁静的交易室。
 'How ya makin' Letter I?' she said, referring to First Interstate's old ticker.
 “字母I打头的能交易吗？”她问道，指的是第一洲际银行的交易代码。
 I looked at her and smiled, assuming she was teasing, as she was apt to do. Keefe was already at its position limit.     我微笑着看她，以为是在开玩笑，因为她经常跟我打趣。Keefe公司的持有部位已经到了上限。
 I looked at my screen, not bothering to call my broker to see what the floor market was. 'There's 50 offered at 23 1/2, I'll make it 500. Whaddya wanna do?' I said, calling her bluff.
我看着自己的交易屏，根本就懒得让自己的场地经纪人去查市场交易情况。“现在有50手，报价23.5美元，我可以增加到500手，你想怎么做？”我说，想戳穿她的虚张声势。
 'He needs a two-sided market,' she said, meaning Keefe was asking where it could sell.
“他需要一个双边市场，”金姆说，意思是Keefe想知道是可以卖空还是买多。
 'Really?' “真的？”
 'Yeah.' “没错。”
 I looked her in the eye, a smile no longer on my face. '21 1/2-23 1/2 500 up,' I offered with a slight crack in my voice.  我看着她的眼睛，脸上不再有笑容。“21.5/23.5，500手。”我的嗓音有点沙哑。
 'He'll sell ya 500 at 1/2' she shot back, 'and he's got more behind it.'
“这个价格他愿意卖给你500手，”她回击道，“而且接下来还有更多的卖单。”
 I'm not sure I breathed during the next several minutes. I slapped 500 on the tape and called my floor broker to sell some of my underlying exposure in my long position.    我不敢确定自己在接下来的几分钟内是否还有呼吸。我敲下500手的卖单，并让经纪人卖出一些我持有的多头股票。
 Unfortunately, every option trader on the floor knew the size of my position and the stock was knocked for a buck before I could blink.     不幸的是，市场上每个期权交易员都知道我持有的庞大部位，第一洲际银行的股票一眨眼的功夫就暴跌了1美元。
 The closing bell was an hour away and an uneventful session suddenly became the most important day of my career. 离闭市还有一小时，这个本来风平浪静的交易日突然变成我职业生涯中最重要的一天。
 'Keep reflecting bids,' Kim said, 'I think he wants to get done today.'
“不断重复这个卖单，”金姆说，“我想他希望在今天全部卖掉。”
 I needed to make sales and asked the customer if I could 'get in shape' and he told me to go for it. 我得促成这些交易，并问客户能否让我“减减肥”，他说可以。
  I sold stock, preparing to trade another slug of calls. If the customer was going to sell 8,000 call options -- which represented 800,000 shares -- I knew I would have to buy most of them. With 15 minutes left in the session, I yelled 'Figure bid for 8,000!'        我卖出股票，并准备新一轮卖单的来临。如果客户想卖出8000手看涨期权─这代表着80万股第一洲际银行的股票─我知道自己必须几乎照单全收。离闭市还有15分钟的时候，我大声喊道：“挂8000手买单！”
 I needed Keefe to sell me the rest of his position so I could unwind my risk and work off my remaining exposure in the marketplace. I watched Kim as she spoke to the head trader, clenching my jaw as I held the phone tightly to my ear. My floor broker was at the ready.         我需要Keefe把剩下的头寸卖给我，这样我就可以有时间化解风险，把自己剩余的头寸慢慢平掉。我盯着金姆和Keefe的首席交易员商量，话筒紧紧贴着耳边，下巴咬得死死的，我的市场经纪人在随时待命。
 'Great bid,' she said. 'He's gonna hold tight and finish up in the morning.'
“成交，”金姆说，“客户确认了，明天早上完成交易。”
 Our trade would have to wait.  我们的交易只有等待。

二十三、Sleepless in Manhattan  曼哈顿不眠夜
    
I was the first person on the trading floor the next day for no other reason than I hadn't been able to sleep.     第二天早上，我第一个来到交易室；不为别的，因为我根本就睡不着。
     At 6 a.m., the bank trader from the listed stock desk walked over to me, smiled and said 'You're still involved in Letter I, right?' My heart froze. 凌晨6点，上市公司股票交易席位的银行类股票交易员向我走来，笑着说：“你还有I打头的股票，对吗？”我的心一下子揪了起来。
     'Yeah...?' “嗯…？”
     'You're...you're still long it, right? Please tell me you're still long it.'
“你…你还是看多，对吗？请跟我说你还是看多。”
   My mouth opened but nothing came out. The trader turned and walked away without saying a word. 我的嘴巴张大，但什么也说不出来。交易员转身走开，一句话也没留下。
     I grabbed the Journal, went to the men's room and stepped in to the far stall. Three minutes later, the entire trading floor erupted. I'm not sure how long I sat there. But it didn't matter; I desperately wanted to stay. 我抓起《华尔街日报》，走进洗手间最里头的一个隔间。三分钟后，我觉得整个交易大厅天崩地裂。我不知道自己在那里呆了多久，但没关系，我很想多呆一会儿。
     I took several deep breaths, left the Journal on the floor and stepped out the door.
     我深深地吸了几口气，把《华尔街日报》放在地板上，走出洗手间。
     You would have thought that I hit a walk-off home run and teammates were waiting for me at the home plate of Yankee Stadium.    你可能会想，人们对我的欢迎程度，彷佛就像自己在扬基棒球队的主场击出一个本垒打，队员们在本垒无比热烈地迎接我。
    Salespeople patted me on the back, traders gave me the thumbs up and friends from the Street left messages to congratulate me. The head of the department walked up to me with a sparkle in his eye and almost hugged me.    销售代表拍我的背，交易员对我翘起大拇指，华尔街上的朋友们给我发来信息表示祝贺，部门负责人两眼放光地冲我走来，几乎就要和我拥抱到一起。
     'Way to go, Todd-o, way to stick it out!' “干得漂亮，托德，干得漂亮！”
     There was only one small problem -- I was short, very short. Through my trades the day before with Keefe, I bet that the stock would decline and I would be able to cover the rest of my position for a profit.    但有个小问题─我已经转为看空，非常看空。通过昨天和Keefe达成的交易，我押赌今天股票会下跌，所以大笔做空，希望通过多空的切换来实现盈利。
     Instead, the stock traded 35 points higher and what would have been a seven-figure win suddenly morphed into a multiple seven-figure loss.   然而，今天的股价比昨天收盘价高出35个点，本来可以有七位数的盈利，现在却突然变成几个七位数的亏损。
     Wells Fargo had been in talks with First Interstate and the deal fell apart. That may or may not be the reason Keefe tried to sell his position. I didn't know and it didn't matter. Wells Fargo made a hostile bid, which at the time was unheard of in the banking sector.    富国银行(Wells Fargo)一直在和第一洲际银行商谈购并计划，但这笔交易流产了。这可能就是，也可能不是Keefe试图平掉其头寸的原因。我不知道真相是什么，但这并不重要。富国银行发起一场敌意收购，这在当时的银行业可谓史无前例。
     To add insult to injury, Morgan Stanley was the banker on the deal and I was restricted from trading either stock. My position was taken from me on the opening. In other words, I was completely screwed.    雪上加霜的是，摩根斯坦利为这笔购并交易提供投行服务，我受到限制，根本不能买卖两家银行的股票。我的头寸一开盘就被人接走，也就是说，我彻底搞砸了。
     I didn't move from my turret all day. I didn't go to the bathroom. I didn't eat lunch. I didn't make outgoing calls. I didn't do anything but stare at the flickering 'I' that continued to wink and blink and taunt me so.     我在自己的座位上呆着，一整天都没有挪窝，洗手间没去，午饭没吃，不打任何电话，只是呆呆地看着屏幕，上面闪烁跳动的第一洲际银行的股价彷佛在不断嘲笑着我。
     Around 7 p.m., Ralph Reynolds, the head of our department, called me into his office. Here we go, I thought, the end of my world as I knew it.   晚上7点左右，部门负责人拉夫.雷诺德(Ralph Reynolds)把我叫进办公室。完了，我想，这下子彻底完蛋了。
     Someone once told me that on Wall Street, you're only as good as your last trade. I assumed that spoke to the general direction of performance, not the literal interpretation that suddenly sank in.     有人曾对我说过一句话，一个人在华尔街的价值是以最后一笔交易来衡量的。我以为这是对业绩为王现象的一种比喻，而不应从字面上来理解，但我突然理解了这层意思。
    I was so close to the cash register. Yet after a single trade, my career was over. I would have banked millions of dollars if the deal were announced a day earlier. Instead, I was going to be a sacrificial lamb. My confidence and self-esteem were shattered as I prepared myself for the inevitable news.
我离华尔街的收款机近在咫尺，但一个交易过后，我的职业生涯就此结束。如果敌意收购的消息早一天传出，我就可以赚到成百上千万美元，但现在，自己却成为一只可怜的替罪羊。我的自信和自尊已经荡然无存，准备迎接无法躲避的坏消息。
     I explained the sequence of events to my boss as he stared deep into my eyes. My trading account was still up substantially for the year but I was certain it wouldn't matter. He measured me as if he was judging my soul. After a long pause, he spoke.         我把事情的来龙去脉向老板说了一遍，他一直盯着我的眼睛看。我今年的交易情况还是给公司赚了不少钱，但我想这一定无济于事。他在考量着我，就像要审判我的灵魂一样。经过长时间的沉默，他终于说话了。
    'Go home, get some rest and come ready to play the next day.'    “回家，休息一下，明天再来上班。”
 He wasn't happy about the loss but he wasn't going to spike my career over it. The mechanics of my swing, he decided, outweighed the results of the at-bat.     他对亏损并不满意，但不打算对我毁了我的事业。他做出的结论是，我挥拍的动作比击球的结果更重要。
 I walked from the office, took the elevator downstairs, exited Morgan Stanley's offices and turned the corner.    我从办公室走出来，坐电梯下楼，走出摩根斯坦利的办公大楼，绕过街道的拐角。
 There, as I leaned against a neighboring building, surrounded by strangers making their way to the theater, I began to laugh.
在那里，我靠在一栋楼的 上，周围都是去看活剧的陌生人。我开始大笑起来。
 Within a few minutes, tears were streaming down the sides of my cheeks.
 几分钟后，我的两颊上挂满了眼泪。

二十四、重拾自信

   我在第一洲际银行(First Interstate)的交易中遭遇滑铁卢之后，摩根斯坦利的管理层密切关注我的交易方式，就像棒球队教练关注一个被快球击中头部的强击手一样。我花了一段时间才捡回自信，但做过几笔漂亮的交易后，我又重新找回了工作节奏。
   有件事我一直没想明白，是患有注意力缺失症的人适合做交易员，还是交易员的工作压力大所以很容易注意力缺失。不管怎么说，这次惨败经历很快就被我抛在脑后了。
   几个月后，发奖金的日子又来了，我的年薪再次翻倍，达到30万美元。26岁的我还获得晋升，成为公司最年轻的副总裁。
   冥冥中自有天意。13岁的时候，我站在收银台后，把面包圈卖给小镇另一边家境殷实的同学们。13年后，我已经有钱买下整个面包圈店。
   “托德.哈里森，摩根斯坦利公司全球股票衍生品副总裁。”
   我的名片成为我最爱的财产。这就是我命中注定的职业生涯，财富决定个人价值，金钱代表事业成功。当时的我并不傲慢自大，但回过头来看，自己确实有点找不到北了。
   在工作之余，你们可以想象得到，一个二十多岁的年轻人揣着一大笔钱会找些什么乐子。我去汉普顿(Hamptons)度假消夏，买了几辆保时捷跑车，不停地换女朋友，有找老婆的打算，但并不是太着急。
   在办公室，我注意到别人对我的看法发生了微妙的变化。那些年纪大一些的未被提升的销售代表和交易员态度为之一变。我早上带着宿醉跌跌撞撞地来上班不再是件可笑或可爱的事，现在我是管理层的一员，从公司利润大饼中切下较大的一块带回家，这种举动属于失态，显得很不专业。
   我第一次真正品尝到摩根斯坦利内部政治斗争的滋味，这是绝大多数巨头企业存在的龌龊潜规则。我清楚，如果自己继续有上佳表现，批评的声音很快就会平息下来。天真的我一去不复返，取而代之的是对权力的渴望，这笔交易我心甘情愿。
   经过多年的不懈努力，我牢牢地抓住了成功，感觉非常棒。我让衣橱里的服装焕然一新，去高尚餐厅吃晚饭，照顾好自己的家人。生活如此美好，至少我这么认为，自己多年来渴望得到的，已经成为现实。
    也许，对美好前程的憧憬让我昏了头，但这并不重要。1996年转瞬即逝，我确信成功就在下一个拐角处。

Following the First Interstate fiasco, Morgan Stanley management watched the way I traded like a baseball manager watches a slugger beaned by a fastball. It took a while to regain my confidence but after a few solid strokes, I found my rhythm.
I've never figured out if people with attention deficit disorder made good traders or if the assimilation of a sensory overload environment gave traders that affliction. Either way, the debacle quickly faded in my rear-view mirror.
    When bonus season rolled around a few months later, my compensation again doubled to $300,000. I was also promoted, becoming the youngest vice president in the firm at the age of 26.
I couldn't help notice the symmetry. At 13, I was standing behind a counter serving bagels to affluent classmates from the other side of town. Thirteen years later, I could afford to buy the bagel store.
'Todd A. Harrison, Vice-President, Global Equity Derivatives, Morgan Stanley.'
    My business card became my favorite possession. That was the way I was programmed; my net worth dictated self-worth and money defined success. I wasn't arrogant or cocky, but in hindsight my sensibilities were surely skewed.
    Outside the office, I had the type of fun you might expect a twenty-something making a lot of money to have. I summered in the Hamptons, treated myself to a few Porsches and migrated from one girlfriend to the next, keeping an eye out for a wife but not looking particularly hard.
Inside the office, I noticed a subtle shift in the general perception. Older salesmen and traders who were passed over for a promotion adopted a different attitude. The mornings I rumbled in with a hangover were no longer cute or funny. I was an officer of the firm that took home a larger slice of the bonus pie; it was suddenly considered unprofessional.
It was my first real taste of Morgan Stanley politics, the nasty subculture that exists in most big companies. I knew if I continued to produce, the critics would be silenced. The innocence was gone but it was replaced with power. That trade I was willing to make.
After years of reaching for the brass ring, my grasp around it firmed and I liked the way it felt. I upgraded my wardrobe, dined at fine restaurants and took care of my family. Life was good or so I thought, as I had the types of things I was conditioned to aspire to.
    Perhaps I was blinded by the promise of bigger and better things but I didn't care. As 1996 rolled around, I was certain they were right around the corner. 

二十五、Welcome to the jungle  丛林世界
 
    As I climbed the Morgan totem pole, I took tremendous pride in what I did and how I did it. The equity floor was a financial juggernaut and the derivative desk was at the center of it all. 在攀爬摩根斯坦利的图腾柱时，我对自己做过的事以及做事的方式抱有极大的自豪感。股票交易场地是金融海洋的漩涡，而衍生品交易席位则是漩涡的最中心。
   We wore 'MORGAN' across our chest like a badge of honor. It was us against Goldman Sachs -- two titans on the street in a rivalry that made the Yanks and Sox look like high-school sweethearts. 我们胸口佩戴着“摩根”(MORGAN)徽章，就像荣誉勋章一样。摩根斯坦利与高盛(Goldman Sachs)这两家华尔街巨头之间的对抗，让纽约扬基队和波士顿红袜队的争斗看上去就像小孩子打架。
   During the several regime changes in my department, I saw bad things happen to good people. The steady stalwarts -- the guys who came to work and produced every day -- were passed over for promotion in favor of politically savvy players. 在衍生品交易团队的几次人事更替中，我看到一些好人没好报的现象。那些工作兢兢业业、每天任劳任怨的人得不到晋升机会，而那些玲珑八面善于钻营的人，却混得风生水起，春风得意。
     I learned a lot during those years, particularly when I was perceived as a threat to the establishment. That never made much sense, as I was a producer on the desk and an ambassador of our institution. 那些年，我学到了很多东西，尤其在别人认为我对即成秩序构成危险那段时间。那种想法根本不合情理，因为我的交易给公司赚了不少钱，而且成为客户与公司之间良好的沟通桥梁。
    I was asked to recruit on behalf of the firm. They sent me to UCLA and North Carolina, put me up in swanky hotels and told me to interview college co-eds. Morgan's blue blood flowed through my veins and I did what I could to further our cause. 我受命为公司招聘新员工。他们派我去加州大学洛杉矶分校(UCLA)和北卡罗来纳(North Carolina)，让我住豪华酒店，面试那些大学生。摩根斯坦利的蓝血在我血管里奔流，我竭尽所能，致力于让公司更好地发展。
    Agendas abound when money's around and they're not always consistent with the corporate mandate. I never kissed up or played the game and that didn't sit well with Mark Neuberger, the man who deftly navigated the changing landscape to become a managing director in 1996.  钱多的地方是非也多，而且很多事情并不总以公司的利益为先。我从不溜须拍马，也不拉帮结派，这一点和马克.努伯格(Mark Neuberger)可谓背道而驰。他善于在人事变更中灵巧地发现机会，并在1996年坐上了董事总经理的宝座。

二十六、The office  办公室政治
 
    After the second management shakeup of my tenure, Mark was named to run the equity derivative trading operation. He stepped over a lot of people to get there, but did what he had to and got what he wanted. Unfortunately, his plans didn't include room for an up and comer with plans of his own.  入司后，我经历了第二次管理层大换血，马克成为股票衍生品交易团队的负责人。他是踩着很多人才得到这个位置的，为此不惜手段，并终于得偿所愿。不幸的是，他的发展蓝图并没有给一个有自己发展规划的年轻人留下空间。
     When several high-profile traders defected to other firms, Mark put his thumbprint on the operation. He took the most active tech stocks such as Dell, Intel, Microsoft and Cisco. He assigned the less-liquid stocks to others on the desk.  在几个颇具声望的交易员倒戈跳槽后，马克将衍生品团队揽于自己的控制之下，负责戴尔(Dell)、英特尔(Intel)、微软(Microsoft)和思科(Cisco)等最活跃的技术股的交易，而把流动性较差的股票品种交给其他交易员去做。
     His strategy was simple: trade the names trafficked by the largest commission-paying customers and leave the other, more difficult trades for others. There were times when one of our customers entered an order in an illiquid stock, and Mark instructed me to facilitate the transaction.     他的策略很简单，把给佣金最高的客户所青睐的投资品种掌握在自己手里，把其他做起来难一些的交易交给别人。有时候我们的客户会要求交易一个流动性较差的股票，马克就交给我去安排。
   'One firm firm,' he said as he passed the risk, knowing full well that my profit and loss would bear the brunt of the damage. “这家公司你来做。”他把交易风险传递给我，心里非常清楚，产生的损失都由我给公司创造的利润来弥补。
    Sometimes I facilitated the orders, other times I refused. One time, when I took down a chunk of calls that moved against me for a six-figure loss, he laughed and said. 'There it goes!'  
有时候我会接受，但有时也会拒绝。一次，我接下一大笔看涨期权的单子，结果遭受了六位数的损失，他大笑着对我说：“搞砸了吧！”
 The writing was on the wall at that very moment. 
在那个时刻，他的意图已是昭然若显。
 
二十七、Conduct unbecoming  行为不当
   
One afternoon, towards the end of 1996, I was summoned to human resources high atop our new tower at 1585 Broadway. When I walked into the conference room, several people were seated around a large oak table. Mark Neuberger sat at the far end.     1996年末的一天下午，我被叫到百老汇街1585号新办公大楼顶层的人力资源部。我走进会议室，看到几个人围坐在一张大的橡木办公桌旁，马克.努伯格就坐在最远的位置上。
    They informed me I was being put on probation for conduct unbecoming a Morgan Stanley professional. I studied the room and when my eyes met Mark and he looked away, I knew precisely what was happening.    他们通知我，我因不符合摩根斯坦利专业人员的不当行为而被留职察看。我环视整个房间，目光转向马克时，他不敢和我对视。我心里非常清楚，这到底是怎么一回事。
    They handed me my annual review and there, on a single piece of paper, it said the other desk heads -- the men who ran the listed and over-the-counter operations -- didn't trust me. 
他们把我的年度考评报告给我看，报告只有一页纸，上面说其他交易席位─即上市公司股票交易席位和柜台外股票交易席位─的负责人不信任我。
    Odd, I thought. Jon Olesky, the managing director of the listed stock desk, was in charge of recruiting and personally picked me to represent the firm. David Slaine ran the OTC desk and was my big brother on the street. It was a power struggle pure and simple, and Mark didn't want me around to challenge his authority.     真邪门，我心里想。上市公司股票交易席位的董事总经理乔纳.奥雷斯基(Jon Olesky)曾负责新员工招聘，亲自挑选我代表公司去选人；而柜台外股票交易席位的负责人戴维.斯莱恩(David Slaine)则是我在华尔街的老大哥。这纯粹是一场权力斗争，马克不想让我在身边挑战他的权威，就这么简单。 

    I protested to Mark's boss, Tom Clark, and was told to not rock the boat. He wanted me to sign the review, as we were required to do, and take one for the team.    我向马克的老板汤姆.克拉克(Tom Clark)投诉，但他劝我不要搞得公司不和谐，希望我服从要求，在考评报告上签字，为团队的全局考虑。
    I was upset but didn't want to leave the only firm I had ever worked for.
    我很沮丧，但不想离开自己的第一份工作。
    I didn't want to leave my brothers. 不想离开在这里的兄弟们。
    I didn't want to leave the cash register.  不想离开收银台。
 

二十八、The good ship  再度启程
   
Slaino didn't like what he was seeing. He knew I was being sandbagged, and he protested in kind. As he was in a different department -- and as the equity division suffered another wave of defections -- his protests fell on deaf ears.
斯莱恩不喜欢马克处理这些事情的方式，他知道我是被冤枉的，于是为我出头提出抗议。但他在别的部门，而且当时整个股票部门正遭受着另一波的跳槽冲击，因此他的抗议没有得到任何反响。
    I refused to sign the review. It was fundamentally false and I knew that as soon as I put pen to paper, my days at Mother Morgan would be numbered.
我拒绝在考评报告上签字，因为报告存在根本性的错误，而且我知道一旦签上名字，自己在“摩根妈妈”的日子就屈指可数了。
    Seven years, I thought to myself. Seven years of blood, sweat and tears. I wasn't going out like that.   七年了，我对自己说，七年的血汗和泪水，我不能就这样被扫地出门。
    A few months earlier, Raj Rajratanam and Gary Rosenbach, formerly of Needham & Company, created a powerful new hedge fund. The Galleon Group opened for business with roughly $500 million under management and they were the talk of the town.
几个月前，曾在Needham & Company公司工作的拉吉.拉吉拉塔南姆(Raj Rajratanam) 和盖瑞.罗森巴赫(Gary Rosenbach)新创建了一个实力很强的对冲基金Galleon Group，刚开业就管理约5亿美元的资金，成为华尔街的热门谈资。
    Slaino and Gary were close friends after years on the street, and David made the introduction. I began to facilitate some of Gary's option trades and we developed a healthy rapport. As we made money together, the conversations increased in frequency.     斯莱恩和盖瑞是在华尔街摸爬滚打多年的好朋友，于是介绍我认识。我开始安排盖瑞的一些期权交易，建立起很好的默契。在共同赚钱的过程中，我们之间的沟通频率也不断增加。
    I didn't want to leave Morgan but I was fighting a losing battle. Every few days, Tom asked me to sign the review and each time I declined. I knew that I couldn't put it off forever.   我不想离开摩根斯坦利，但觉得自己在这场战争中必败无疑。每隔几天，汤姆就会要求我在考核报告上签字，每次我都拒绝，但心里清楚，自己不可能永远这样拖下去。
    With David's endorsement, I began discussions with Galleon about moving to their shop. They didn't have a derivative specialist and it was an intuitive fit. As pressure continued to build, I found myself delving deeper into the potential opportunity.    在斯莱恩的推荐下，我开始和Galleon公司商谈跳槽过去的事。他们没有衍生品专家，所以这是想都不用想的事。在公司受到的排挤日增，而我对跳槽机会也开始日渐关注。
    We agreed that I would join them as the managing director of derivatives. I would receive a token salary and derive the lion's share of my compensation as a function of performance.        最后我和Galleon公司谈好，去那里担任衍生品交易董事总经理，有一个象征性的底薪，主要收入来自于业绩提成。
    I walked into Tom's office and shut the door behind me. I expressed reservations about the falsities contained in the review and he assured me that I would be taken care of.
我走进汤姆的办公室，把门关上，向他说明我可以签字，但对考核报告中的错误说法持保留意见。他向我保证，会处理好这件事。
    'Will I really be taken care of?' I asked with great concern.
    “你真的会处理好？”我很担心地问道。
    'You have my word,' he said, pushing the review directly in front of me as he uncapped his pen.       “我向你保证。”他说，把报告直接推到我面前，并把笔帽摘下。
    I signed the review, putting my better judgment aside. When bonus time arrived, I was paid $500,000 for one year's worth of work.    我在报告上签了字，姑且信他一回。发奖金的时候到了，我的年薪是50万美元。
    I thanked them and waited patiently for the check to clear. Once it did, I walked into Tom's office and tendered my resignation.   我向他们表示感谢，耐心地等待支票兑现。钱一到手，我走进汤姆的办公室，交出自己的辞呈。
    They were stuck. Not only had they just paid a half-million dollars to a departing trader, I went to work for the most respected new hedge fund on the street.
   他们惊呆了，不仅是因为刚刚付了50万美元的巨款给一个即将离职的交易员，而且我去的是华尔街最受人尊重的新对冲基金。
    Vikram Pandit, who eventually became CEO of Citigroup Inc., ran Morgan's equity division and called me to his office to offer congratulations. He said that if there was anything I needed, he would be happy to oblige.      后来成为花旗集团(Citigroup Inc.)首席执行官的潘伟迪(Vikram Pandit)此时负责摩根斯坦利的股票部门，他把我叫进办公室表示祝贺，并说如果我有什么需要的，他乐意帮忙。
    I gathered my belongings and said goodbye to the only professional family I ever knew. I felt like I out-traded the best desk on the street.
我收拾好东西，向自己工作过的唯一一个专业投资机构说再见，觉得自己在与华尔街最好的交易席位的博弈中取得了胜利。
    The power shoe was on the other foot, and I liked the way it fit. 
    现在我换上了另一双好鞋，我喜欢那种合脚的感觉。 

二十九、新开始

   我很想说自己上了对冲基金Galleon Group这条船后一路顺风顺水，但实际情况是，迎接我的是一场完美风暴。
   泰国解除泰铢与美元之间的联系汇率后，一个全球性的金融危机正在酝酿之中，其引发的多米诺骨牌效应波及整个亚洲，并让资本市场体系陷入瘫痪状态。
   当时，我还没注意泰铢的问题，也不关注那个名叫“长期资本管理公司”(Long Term Capital Management)的强大对冲基金。我根本没有意识到，亚洲彼岸一只蝴蝶煽动的翅膀可以在纽约57号东大街掀起一场飓风。
   我管理公司整体组合的敞口衍生交易，自己也管理一个组合，后者规模较小，但我可以从利润中提成。虽然一切听上去很简单，但我很快发现，自己在摩根斯坦利学到的技巧在买方投资领域并不是很管用。
   我喜欢当客户的感觉。摩根斯坦利、高盛、第一波士顿、德意志银行，以及其他顶尖公司都争着来拉我们的生意。作为负责执行指令的交易员，我经常决定选择哪些公司安排交易并向其支付佣金。
   我周围人才济济，但也面对一个现实，即对冲基金的交易员得凭自己的业绩吃饭。那里没有源源不断的客户流，也没有响当当的名声。一切都完全不同于从前。
   办公室里坐着八个人，手无寸铁，只有智慧和信息作为武器。当金融危机逐渐在全世界蔓延时，我根本没想到要给自己穿上一件防弹衣。
   我在两个角色间来回转换，把主要精力放在公司旗舰基金的衍生品组合上，因为当时我确信这就是自己的饭票。
   盖瑞.罗森巴赫(Gary Rosenbach) 、拉吉.拉吉拉塔南姆(Raj Rajratanam) 和其他三个合伙人暴风骤雨般地把交易指令发过来，而我则寻找各种方法来把他们的想法付诸实施。
   我在公司整体敞口上花的精力越多，投入自己那个组合的精力就越少。到年底时，自己组合上的亏损堆积起来，饭碗能否保住，完全要看那几个我几乎一无所知的人做出的决定。
   最后的结果是不发奖金。事实上，他们告诉我，以交易账户的业绩来看，我能保住这份工作已经很走运了。
I would love to say it was easy sailing as I reached for the rudder at the hedge fund, Galleon Group. The truth is I navigated directly toward the perfect storm. 
    A global financial contagion began brewing after Thailand cut the peg between the Thai baht and the U.S. dollar. That began a domino effect that spread throughout Asia and crippled the capital market system.
I wasn't thinking about the Thai baht, nor focused on a powerful hedge fund called Long Term Capital Management. I was unaware that a butterfly flapping its wings in Asia could create a hurricane on East 57th Street in New York City.
I managed the derivative exposure for the overall portfolio and traded my own, smaller book, where I would be paid a percentage of the profits. It sounded easy but I quickly discovered that the skills I learned at Morgan Stanley weren't helpful on the buy side.
I enjoyed life as a customer. Morgan, Goldman , First Boston, Deutsche Bank and other top-tier firms all vied for our business. As the trader responsible for executing the orders, I often chose which firms were paid with our commissions.
I was surrounded by tremendous talent, but struggled with the reality that hedge-fund traders eat what they kill. There wasn't customer flow to lean against or a franchise to tap into; it was an entirely different process.
There were about eight of us sitting in a room, armed with nothing but acumen and information. As financial contagion consumed the world, finding a life vest was the last thing on my mind.
I toggled between my two roles, focusing primarily on the derivative portfolio of the flagship fund, as I was certain that was my meal ticket.
Gary Rosenbach, Raj Rajratanam and three other partners slapped on positions at a furious pace and I looked for ways to leverage their ideas into performance.
The more time I spent on the overall exposure, the less I focused on my own trading. By the time the end of the year arrived, losses piled up on my pad and my job security was at the mercy of a select few I barely knew.
    There would be no bonus. In fact, given the performance in my trading account, I was told I was lucky to have a job.
 

三十、The beginning of the bubble  泡沫开始
 
    As the world markets digested the global imbalances, Alan Greenspan slammed his foot on the gas with historic fiscal and monetary stimuli. That planted the seeds of the dot.com bubble that would eventually create the real estate, commodity and debt bubbles behind it.
在全球贸易不平衡的大背景下，艾伦.格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)推出史无前例的财政和货币刺激政策，开足马力促进经济增长。这埋下了互联网虚假繁荣的种子，并随后造成房地产、大宗商品和债务的泡沫。
 David Slaine resigned from Morgan Stanley to join Galleon as a partner in 1998. Assets under management swelled into the billions and our stature grew in kind. 1998年，戴维.斯莱恩(David Slaine)从摩根斯坦利辞职，以合伙人的身份加入Galleon。公司管理的资产膨胀到数十亿美元，我们在业界的地位也水涨船高。
 Slaino and I sat next to each other as Galleon grew into one of the most powerful funds on Wall Street. I sharpened my skills and learned how to play the game. 我就坐在斯莱恩旁边，一起看着Galleon成长为华尔街实力最强的对冲基金之一。我的交易技巧不断得到提高，并学会了对冲基金的游戏规则。
 Following the script I wrote at Morgan, I did whatever I could to add value. This time, however, I had a skill set to execute upon. I introduced options that leveraged in-house strategies and offered intricate ways to maximize reward relative to risk.  和在摩根斯坦利一样，我在Galleon也想方设法增加自己对公司的价值。不过，这次我已经有了一套成型的交易技巧，利用期权手段来实施公司的投资策略，通过错综复杂的方式使风险收益最大化。
 I wasn't a partner, however. That was a fact of which I was reminded often. In one of our morning meetings, I noted that Russia imploded and offered that it could pollute the U.S., a thought dismissed by the partners.  然而，我还不是合伙人，这一点我经常提醒自己。有一天，在投资晨会上，我指出俄罗斯市场暴跌，建议说这可能会影响到美国市场，但合伙人并不同意这个观点。
    A few days later, global markets were infected and stocks began to cascade lower. It was an expensive lesson, as unforeseen systemic forces overwhelmed my stylistic approach to risk management.    几天后，全球市场都受到影响，股价全面跳水。我们为此付出了高昂的学费，不可预见的系统性洪水冲垮了我的风险管理大坝。
    After the downdraft, the market rallied in response to the coordinated agenda by central banks around the world. That won the battle for Alan Greenspan, and he was lauded as the best Federal Reserve chairman of all time.
市场陷入低谷后，各国央行联手推出一系列振兴计划，股市开始重整旗鼓。格林斯潘打赢了这场战役，被誉为有史以来最佳的美联储主席。
   History would teach us that his policies forever changed the DNA of the marketplace and laid the seeds of sorrow that eventually collapsed the system. Nobody cared at the time; investors around the world were too busy enjoying the feast before the famine.   历史会告诉我们，格林斯潘的政策永远改变了资本市场的基因构成，埋下了苦难的种子，并最终导致金融系统的奔溃。但在当时，没人关心这个问题，全世界的投资者都在享受饥荒来临之前的资本市场饕餮大餐。

三十一、Back to life, back in reality  回到现实
 
    The intelligence and information in that small room on East 57th Street was matched only by the size of the egos. They profited in good times and bad as I crafted derivative strategies that maximized gains and stemmed losses.
57号东大街那个小办公室里汇集的咨讯信息规模之大，只有身处其中之人的自负才堪与相比。无论市场好坏，公司都能赚到钱，而我则在精心安排衍生品交易策略，确保收益最大化，同时避免损失发生。
 I focused more of my attention on the big fund, certain that it was my meal ticket to bigger and better things. As 1998 drew to a close, I was finally going to cash in.      我把更多的精力放在旗舰基金上，认为这是我获得更大成功的入门券。1998年底，终于又要发奖金了。
 If you told me while I was growing up that I would make six figures in my 20s, I would have been thrilled. But my sights were set on a new benchmark. I wanted to be a millionaire by the time I was 30.    在我年轻时，如果你说我二十多岁就能赚到六位数的年薪，我会激动不已。但现在，我的眼光已经锁定在更高的标准上，希望在30岁前成为百万富翁。
 There were six partners at Galleon and more than enough profits to go around. I couldn't help do the math in my head.    Galleon只有六个合伙人，而赚的钱够很多人分的，我忍不住在脑子里盘算起来。
 I could smell it -- extreme affluence was right around the corner. I sat down with Gary, exchanged pleasantries and awaited communication of my reward.
我能闻到钞票的味道─巨大的财富就在下一个拐角处等着我。我和盖瑞坐了下来，说了几句打趣的话，等待着关于奖金的消息。
 The terms of my employment were very clear, he explained. While they appreciated the work I did managing the overall derivative risk for the flagship fund, my compensation was based on my smaller trading account. That was my deal, take it or leave it.  盖瑞说，我的劳动合同上写得很清楚。虽然他们欣赏我在管理旗舰基金整体衍生品风险方面所付出的劳动，但我的奖金基于那个规模较小的交易账户的业绩。合同上就是这么写的，要就要，不要拉倒。
 My bonus was a big, fat zero.  所以，我的奖金是个大大的零鸭蛋。

三十二、Green with envy  红眼病
   
I'm not proud to admit this but I began to covet while at Galleon.
我有点羞于承认，但在Galleon工作期间，自己确实开始变得贪婪起来。
    The partners made insane money, the type of money that superstar athletes and famous actors won't see in a lifetime. They were taking it home each year, facilitating lavish lifestyles, enormous homes, private jets and a garage full of expensive cars.     合伙人的收入是个天文数字，连超级体育明星和著名演员一辈子都见不到这么多钱。他们每年都赚得盆满钵满，过着奢华的生活，住着豪宅，坐私人飞机，大车库里停满了豪华汽车。
    Money is tremendous motivation when you're that young, and I've seen it make good people to do bad things. Suddenly, $500,000 seemed like a very small sum. I entered the world of the mega-millions, rainmakers that would make Gordon Gekko blush. I set my sights at joining the ranks of the Wall Street elite. 金钱对我当时那个岁数的人来说具有极大的推动力，我见过一些好人为了钱干坏事。突然之间，50万美元对我来说变成一个很小的数字。我进入了超级百万富翁的世界之中，这些人呼风唤雨的能力，让电影《华尔街》中迈克尔•道格拉斯扮演的“戈登•盖柯”(Gordon Gekko)相见形惭。我给自己定下目标，要加入华尔街精英人士的行列。
    The policies introduced by Alan Greenspan kicked in and the stock market furiously climbed the front end of the technology bubble. Fortunes were made on a daily basis as IPO's climbed hundreds of points in a single session.  格林斯潘的刺激政策发挥了作用，股市开始疯狂攀升，技术股泡沫一发不可收拾。每天都有大量的富翁产生，上市新股在一个交易时间段内就能翻上好几倍。
    The eyes of the world were on Wall Street and Galleon was humming. The firm paid millions of commission dollars to the street and they were given fat allocations on new issues. 全世界的目光都聚焦到华尔街，Galleon上下一片繁忙景象。公司支付数百万美元的佣金，换来数额巨大的新股认购权。
      Zing! 25,000 shares of an IPO up $60.
      一转眼，2.5万股新股价格涨到60美元。
       Shazzam! 30,000 shares opening $40 higher than where it was priced.
     又一转眼，3万股新股开盘比上市定价高出40美元。
      Pow! An oh-by-the way 'kiss' from a second-tier broker looking to get in Galleon's good graces.
      啪啪！某二线券商来拍马屁，想拉进一些Galleon的交易业务。
    This was my year. It had to be my year. As we edged toward the end of 1999, my relationship with the partners couldn't be better. The firm was killing it, which is to say there was more money than you could shake a stick at.
这一年属于我，必须属于我。随着1999年末的临近，我与公司合伙人之间的关系处得比蜜还甜。公司成为大赢家，也就是说，赚到的钱连点石成金的魔术棒都比不上。
    The performance of my smaller portfolio lagged but I made up for it in spades. The P&L on the large option bets for the flagship fund spoke for itself and my inclusion in the circle of trust was a mere formality.    我管理的那个规模较小的组合表现不佳，但大组合的业绩很好。旗舰基金的期权交易记录是最好的成绩单，我被纳入合伙人的小圈子只需走个过场便是。
    Gary sat me down to let me know that I would finally be getting a bonus and my eyes began to spin like a slot machine.    盖瑞让我坐下，告诉我今年终于能拿到奖金了，我的眼睛直冒星星，就像玩老虎机中了奖一样。
    What would it be, a million? Two million? Three million?
    奖金有多少？一百万？两百万？三百万？
    'Todd,' he began, 'The partners appreciate your efforts this year. We're going to reward you with $50,000.'    “托德，”盖瑞开始说话，“合伙人们很欣赏你今年做出的努力，将给你5万美元的奖金。”
    It hit me like a ton of bricks. 我就像被整整一吨砖头砸到了头。
    If I was ever going to make real money on Wall Street, I had to step from behind the shadows. If I was going to be a serious player, I had to be a partner. I asked Gary if that was in the cards and he told me that it wasn't.
要想在华尔街赚到大钱，我必须从别人的背后走出来；要想出人头地，必须成为合伙人。我问盖瑞公司有没有计划让我做合伙人，他说没有。
    When I left Morgan Stanley, David told me to make it count because you could only leave a firm that reputable once. 当我离开摩根斯坦利时，戴维对我说，要珍惜这段经历，因为你只有一次机会离开一家这么好的公司。
    The same could be said of Galleon -- they were one of the top hedge funds and nobody left on their own volition. I knew what I had to do and understood what was at stake.    同样的说法也适用于Galleon─它是顶尖的对冲基金，没人愿意主动离开。我知道自己应该做什么，也知道跳槽的风险所在。
    Once I left, that door would never be open to me again.
    一旦离开，这里的大门将永远不会再向我打开。
 

三十三、走进新千年

   股市暴涨，达到不可思议的高位，遍地都是黄金─我只要选好自己的位置就行。日历翻到了2000年，我走进一个全新的千年纪，眼前彷佛看到一道绚烂的彩虹。
   我跟吉姆•克莱默(Jim Cramer)和杰夫•伯克维兹(Jeff Berkowitz)谈过好几次，彼此似乎已经达成共识。那个公司的交易资金量为4亿美元，比Galleon小得多，但他们抛出了一根橄榄枝：合伙人。
   我们见了几次，讨论一些具体事项。我加入该公司后，将负责整个交易业务，底薪30万美元，这正是我拿了几年微薄奖金后希望获得的稳定收入。更诱人的是，我能分到公司利润蛋糕中很不错的一块。
   吉姆这个人容易情绪激动，但在我看来，他也诚实而公正。杰夫成了我的好朋友，他为人务实，不偏不倚。作为合伙人，他们俩很互补，而我掌握的技能也同样能填补他们的空白。
   当我把跳槽的打算告诉自己的同事兼朋友戴维•斯莱恩(David Slaine)时，他问了我一个很简单的问题：“你信任他们吗？”
   这是一个简单而又至关重要的判断标准。在危急关头，他们会为我考虑吗？会把我的利益看得和他们自己的一样重要吗？能不能做正确的事？我相信他们可以。于是，我们在曼哈顿的Gramercy Tavern餐厅会面，仔细敲定最后的细节。
   我们谈论市场、生活和世界，气氛轻松活泼。吉姆说起一个名叫TheStreet.com的金融网站，是他在1996年和人共同创立的，并于1999年5月上市。我听说过这个网站，但不熟悉具体是做什么事情的，怎么会和财富管理搭上边儿。
   不久后，我将有所领悟，无论其好坏。

Whaddya say, Y2K?

三十四、Lucky charms  幸运徽章
   
The elasticity of the technology bubble shaped the collective mindset into the perceived reality that a new paradigm was upon us.    网络股的泡泡越吹越大，人们陷入一种集体心理，认为人类已经跨入一个全新的互联网时代。
    For those managing money at the beginning of 2000, the price action was nothing short of surreal. Each day was a journey unto itself, a volatile manifestation of emotion that somehow morphed net worth into self worth at the end of each session.     对那些在2000年初从事投资管理的人来说，互联网的估值可谓荒诞不经，超乎想象。每天都有全新的神话上演，情绪上的非理性波动让人以为在每天股市收盘后，自己的价值就等同于自己的财富。
    I couldn't have scripted a better beginning to my newfound existence running the trading operation at Cramer, Berkowitz. After a flurry of emotional buying following the Y2K scare, the Nasdaq dropped 450 points -- an astounding 11% -- in a matter of days. It was trial by fire and our desk gelled as if we worked together for years.      我在Cramer, Berkowitz公司作为交易负责人的开头简直好得无与伦比。出于对千年虫的恐惧，纳斯达克市场在短短几天内暴跌450点，市值惊人地缩水11%，但随后又出现狂热的买盘。这是一场血与火的考验，我们的交易团队无比团结，就像在一起共事过很多年一样。
    They say everything is funny when you're making money, and there were giggles all around as the ink dried on my contract. We were all on our best behavior. But make no mistake, we were a collection of distinctly powerful personalities with proven formulas for success.    人们说，当你在赚钱的时候，什么事情看上去都很美好。我刚开始在那里工作的时候，身边总是一片欢笑声。大家都很有礼貌，但千万不要搞错，我们这几个人其实个性都很强，每个人都有自己的成功秘诀。
    Jeff had a brilliant analytical mind, research director Matt Jacobs was plugged into the street, Jim played momentum and I used volatility to my advantage. When we were on the same page, it was akin to four chefs mixing the perfect brew. As we captured the violent market swings, we drank the sweet taste of success like nothing I've ever experienced.
杰夫的分析能力超群，研究部主管麦特.杰考伯(Matt Jacobs)对市场的触觉灵敏无比，吉姆是个动能投资者，而我善于利用市场的波动性。当大家拧成一股绳时，就像一列势不可挡的战车。我们捕捉市场的起伏波动，品尝着成功的甜蜜滋味，我从未享受过这种感觉。
    In February 2000, Cramer penned his infamous 'Winners of the New World' column on TheStreet.com, extolling the virtues of 10 high-flying technology stocks. Each of them sat on a parabolic perch after a massive rally but it didn't matter. He believed they were the winners in the new world and tried to convince us in kind.          2000年2月，克莱默在TheStreet.com开了一个日后声名狼藉的“新世界赢家”(Winners of the New World)专栏，颂扬10只表现卓越的网络股。这些股票都在经历过大涨之后出现抛物线式的回落，但克莱默并不在意，认为它们都是日后网络新时代的赢家，还极力想说服我们。
    I tried to separate Jim's online persona from our internal dynamic -- sometimes successfully and other times in vain -- yet our first few months were blissful as profits padded our portfolio. While I struggled when I started at Morgan Stanley and Galleon, I was immediately at ease when I arrived each morning at the head of the desk.    我试图让吉姆不要把自己的网络人格带入公司的内部管理─这有时候管用，但有时候纯属徒劳。好在头几个月我们的运气不错，组合的利润越积越多。我刚开始在摩根斯坦利和Galleon公司工作时，都有些力不从心；而在这里担任交易主管时，一开始就感觉得心应手。
    As part of my charge, I was responsible for the implementation of risk management systems, commission allocation to our trading partners and staffing decisions on the desk.      作为职责的一部分，我负责风险管理系统的实施、交易合作伙伴的佣金分配和交易席位的用人决策。
    The status quo that preceded my arrival would quickly change; I was ready to put my fingerprints on the operation.    交易部门的格局即将因我的上任而改变，因为我已准备好在这里留下自己的烙印。

三十五、New kid in town  新官上任
   
It all seemed very strange. We actively traded $400 million and calculated the profit or loss by hand each day. The actual number, along with trade errors, arrived from Goldman Sachs the very next afternoon.
这里的一切看上去都很奇怪。我们每天积极地对4亿美元的组合进行交易，用手工计算损益, 正式的数字以及交易错误记录将在第二天下午由高盛发过来。
    Our offices were on 40 Fulton Street, adjacent to the Brooklyn Bridge. There were a dozen or so full-time employees, including three clerks directly under my charge. They each made six-figure salaries for executing orders on behalf of Jim and Jeff. That seemed extravagant, given my experience on the street.
我们的办公室在福尔顿街(Fulton Street)40号，紧邻布鲁克林大桥(Brooklyn Bridge)。公司有十几个全职员工，其中三个直接归我管。他们为吉姆和杰夫执行交易指令，每人都有六位数的薪水；以我在华尔街的从业经历来看，这似乎太挥霍了一点。
    Within a few months, I ushered through several changes. The clerks were replaced with young guns that had skill sets accretive to the trading process. Their base salaries were low, but there was no ceiling if we produced.
在几个月内，我促成了一些变化。那几个交易员被更具交易技能的年轻人换掉了，新来的人底薪更低，但只要业绩好，上不封顶。
    We installed a state-of-the-art risk management system that allowed us to monitor our performance in real time and 'stress test' various market scenarios. I met with the desk heads of our brokers and told them commission would be correlated to their idea generation and the liquidity they provided.
我们安装了顶尖的风险管理系统，能够实时监控交易情况，对各种可能的情况进行“压力测试”。我和券商的交易负责人见面，说明佣金将与他们的交易建议以及提供的流动性挂钩起来。
    It was pure meritocracy, within our walls and with regard to our relationships. We were tough but fair and always operated within the letter of the law. Word of our approach quickly spread and our firm hummed like a well-oiled machine.
在公司内部管理和外界关系维护上，我们奉行精英主义，对工作标准的要求高，但对人公平，依法合规办事。我们的处事方法很快传了开来，公司高速运转，就像一台上足了油的机器。
    We got the first call from brokers when analysts changed a rating on a stock. Head traders communicated the directional flow from their most-respected accounts and I was always quick to offer my opinion in an attempt to establish goodwill.   当分析师调整对某只股票的评级时，券商总是第一个给我们打电话，他们的首席交易员会跟我沟通其主要账户的交易趋势，而我也总是很快地告诉他们自己的市场观点，从而建立良好的互信关系。
    We treated people the way I wanted to be treated when I was on the other end of the phone. We always told them why we traded and rarely hurt them with our flow. If we ran over them with one of our orders, we adjusted prices as a matter of course.    在沟通时，我尽量做到“己所不欲，勿施于人”，总是说清楚交易原因，很少因为自身的交易给他们造成损失。如果交易指令正好跟他们撞车，我们就会自觉地调整价格。
    My grandfather taught me that all we have is our name and our word. The trading operation at Cramer, Berkowitz evolved into a direct extension of that. 
我的祖父曾经说过，我们唯一拥有的就是自己的名字和承诺。Cramer, Berkowitz公司交易部门就是这一原则的直接延伸。

三十六、挥棒失误

   2000年春天，我的胆子越来越大，开始敢于对超出自己击球范围的来球挥棒。有个经纪人提醒我关注一只名叫Focus Enhancements的股票，认为这是一匹即将起跑的黑马。
   我们几个合伙人亲密合作，赚了不少钱，而我的交易表现尤其出色，因此吉姆和杰夫都对我言听计从。我们评估了这个机会，在股价处于6到8美元的区间买进了六位数的仓位。
   我们处于最佳状态，自信心随着行业声誉的提高而水涨船高。这只股票来回摆动很大，每个交易时段都有10%到15%的波动─而我们彷佛拿着剧本，每次都能很好地把握交易机会。
   到第一季度中旬，我们已经获利颇丰，而且对前景信心十足。回过头来看，这其中已经埋藏了隐患。
   “有Focus Enhancements的新闻！”杰考伯大喊，我们都把目光集中到电视屏幕上。这是一则负面新闻，我们还没来得及喘上一口气，Focus Enhancements的股价已经暴跌30%。
   一片沉默。电话在响，但没人去接，只有CNBC的新闻评论员玛丽亚.巴蒂洛莫(Maria Bartiromo)在背景中不知说些什么。我惊呆了，每个人都是。其实，这一损失看似巨大，但和四亿美元的组合规模相比微不足道。
   我坐在吉姆对面，看着他的脸由白变红，由红变紫，然后就开始抽搐起来。

这种批评的表情今后将变得十分常见。他猛地推开椅子站起来，走进了办公室。出于一种本能反应，我们也跟着走进去，并随手把门关上。
   我一直对自己要求很严，设定最高的标准。我不需要别人来说我搞砸了，他们知道这一点，我也知道。
   但这只是一笔交易而已，虽然损失巨大，但只是一笔交易，而我之前一系列的交易决策已给公司带来数百万美元的利润。我做好了接受批评的准备，但根本没料到即将到来的狂风骤雨。
   刚开始的时候，吉姆还比较镇定─这是相对于他后来的表现而言。大家起初是想讨论一下对策，看看应该规避风险斩仓，还是抓住机会补仓，但很快讨论就演变成一场大吵大闹的肥皂剧。
   合伙人之间的正常对话已经不复存在。吉姆以我在整个职业生涯中从未见过的方式向我发泄不满，翻来覆去地说这件事有多么可怕，多么难以接受，一遍又一遍。
   吉姆大喊大叫，大声咒骂；更奇怪的是，在他发泄完后，我甚至看到他眼角有一滴眼泪。无论在工作场所还是别的地方，我都从没见过如此离奇的情绪宣泄方式。
   在我离开办公室时，我没有考虑该如何处理Focus Enhancements的股票，脑子里只有一个念头：“这家伙是谁，这到底是怎么回事？”
   这些年来，我跟许多不同性格的人打过交道，但那一天的所见所闻给我留下难以磨灭的印象，也给我上了宝贵的一课。路遥知马力，日久见人心；在交易失利的时候，最能看出同一战壕中战友的真正面目。

Wild pitches

Feeling emboldened in the spring of 2000, I swung at a pitch outside of my strike zone. One of my brokers alerted me to a special situation, a stock called Focus Enhancements that he believed was ready to run.
We were making money hand over fist and as I was trading particularly well, Jim and Jeff were happy to indulge me. After we weighed the opportunity, we established a six-figure position as it traded between $6 and $8.
We were in a groove and our confidence was matched only by our growing reputation. With the market swinging wildly -- 10 to 15% at a clip -- we seemingly had the script in our hands before it hit the tape.
By the middle of the first quarter, we established a sizable lead on the averages and a boldness that bespoke our performance. In hindsight, that was the first warning.
'[Focus Enhancements] on the tape!' Jacobs screamed as we all trained our eyes on the TV headlines. The news was negative and the stock dropped 30% before we took our next breath.
Nobody said a word as phones rang unanswered and CNBC anchor Maria Bartiromo chattered away in the background. I was frozen -- we all were -- despite the fact that the loss, while substantial, was a pimple in the much broader complexion of our $400 million portfolio.
I sat across from Jim and watched his face turn from white to pink to a sullen shade of red. And then the twitching started, a facial tick that would become all too familiar with time. He pushed back from his turret and walked into his office. Instinctively, we followed and shut the door behind us.
I've always been my harshest critic and hold myself to the highest standards. Nobody needed to tell me I screwed up. They knew it, I knew it.
But this was one trade -- a big trade but one trade -- in the context of a series of profitable decisions that netted our firm millions of dollars. I braced for some backlash but wasn't prepared for the realities that came to bear.
Jim was relatively calm at first -- relative to him, as it turned out. What began as a discussion regarding our alternatives to either mitigate risk or seize an opportunity quickly devolved into a soapbox rant.
It stopped being a dialogue between partners; Jim unloaded on me in a way I've never seen in my entire working life. All he could do was detail how horrible and unacceptable the situation was, over and over and over again.
Jim screamed. He swore. Here's the odd part -- I may have even seen a tear by the time he was done. It was the strangest display of emotion I ever witnessed in a professional setting or otherwise.
By the time I left his office, I wasn't thinking about Focus Enhancements. All I could think of is 'Who is this guy and what the heck just happened?'
I've worked with some serious personalities over the years, but what I witnessed that day set a new standard and produced a valuable lesson. Just as bad seasons point out good fans and bad times produce good friends, bad trades define the true colors of your partners in the pits.

三十七、坐卧不安

   我祖父曾经告诉我，要保持右手抬起，这是前任“金手套”(Golden Gloves)拳王的战斗秘籍，进攻的时候，一定要随时注意保护自己。
   经过那次吉姆.克莱默的宣泄事件，我走进空荡荡的公司大厅时，再也没有以往那种感觉了。我知道那个道理，一个交易员是否优秀取决于其最新的那次交易，但在这家公司，这个说法被上升到一个全新的高度。
   经常做对并不够，必须保持每天、每时、每刻都做对。
   到了2000年3月，纳斯达克市场在短短一个多月时间里上涨了35%。Focus Enhancements的失利逐渐被大家淡忘。杰夫.伯克维兹和麦特.杰考伯潜心挖掘美国上市企业的投资价值，而吉姆和我则面对面地坐在一起，相隔不过五英尺远，从早到晚共同在股市的高山和低谷间跋涉。
   虽然我们的目标相同，但交易风格截然不同。吉姆喜欢追涨；对下跌的股票兴趣不大。由于在摩根斯坦利的从业经历，我喜欢“淡化”市场，逢低买入，逢高卖出。这是一个狭路相逢勇者胜的游戏，有人赢，就有人输。
   我清楚地记着那个觉醒时刻，就像昨天刚刚发生一样。网络股在一天之内上涨了10、30、50个点，而那天晚上，我突然从梦中惊醒，彷佛顿悟一般，感到对网络股的莫大担忧。我不是第一次有这种感觉，但这次不一样，自己从未有过如此清晰的预感，彷佛水晶一样一览无遗。这一时刻，决定了我今后的职业生涯发展。
   网络股泡沫就要破灭了。
   做交易时，最难遵循的投资纪律之一就是卖出正赚钱的股票，而我管理的组合规模如此之大，牵涉的损益数字比别人要多好几个零，再考虑到办公室里一些人的情绪波动，可想而知，我手头的任务有多困难。
   我不想说自己是“众人皆醉我独醒”─杰夫对网络股也有不好的预感─但时机把握的重要性，加上公司内部的敏感氛围，使任何一个小错误都不允许发生。

     吉姆在他的第一本书《一个华尔街瘾君子的自白》(Confessions of a Street Addict)里这样写道：

   “四月份到了，纳斯达克指数还在4500点的区域，托德说，现在市场正处于大崩溃的边缘，纳斯达克的泡沫即将破灭，指数很快就要回到1500点。”   现在，你应该相当了解吉姆这个人了。他有一颗善良的心，但如果你处于他的对立面，他会让你生不如死。
   杰夫曾经说过，如果吉姆开车撞了人，而你跟他好好说，他会把被撞的人送去医院检查，请伤者全家吃晚饭。但如果你指责吉姆，他就会举起拳头大喊：“闭嘴，不然连你也撞！”
   这就是金融史上最大一次撞车事件发生前几周，我在Cramer, Berkowitz公司的真实情况。
   光有金融马车就要失控的强烈预感是不够的，我得解释清楚为什么时机是正确的，并要有策略地进行操作。毕竟，要是我们在股市上涨趋势中踏空，就会因持有空头而损失惨重。
   压力非常巨大，但作为公司新的一员，我知道忠诚意味着直言不讳。

My grandfather taught me to keep my right hand up. That was the former Golden Gloves boxer's way of telling me to protect myself. 
After Jim Cramer's rant, I never walked through those hallowed halls the same way again. I knew I was only as good as my last trade, but at Cramer, Berkowitz, that expression was taken to an entirely new level.
It wasn't enough to be right. You had to be right all the time, every day.
It was March 2000 and the Nasdaq rallied 35% in a little over a month. As Focus Enhancements faded into the rear-view mirror, Jeff Berkowitz and Matt Jacobs scoured corporate America as Jim and I, sitting five feet apart and facing each other, moved mountains and molehills from dawn to dusk.
While we shared a mission, our styles were diametrically different. Jim warmed to stocks once they rallied, and cooled after they fell. Thanks to my training at Morgan Stanley, I liked to 'fade' the market, nibbling on dips and selling blips. It was a high stakes game of chicken and somebody was bound to blink.
I remember my moment of clarity as if it happened yesterday. Tech stocks were ramping up 10, 30, 50 points in a single day and I awoke in the middle of the night with a disturbing epiphany. It wasn't the first time I had the thought but it was different this time -- a clarity that seemed obvious, a crystallization that would define my career.
The technology bubble was about to burst.
One of the toughest disciplines when trading is to sell a stock that is making money. Multiply that dynamic by a large portfolio, add a slew of zeros and factor in the emotional context of our office and you'll get a sense of the task at hand.
I won't say I was the lone bear -- Jeff also sensed wreckage on the horizon -- but the timing, coupled with the intensely competitive landscape, made for prickly friction with a razor-thin margin of error. I believe Jim summed it up in his first book, 'Confessions of a Street Addict,' when he wrote:
'When April came in, and the Nasdaq was still in the 4,500 area, Todd suggested that we were on the verge of a collapse of titanic proportions, that the whole Nasdaq bubble was about to burst and would shortly be at 1,500.'
Now, you've got to understand Jim. He has a genuinely kind heart but could make your life miserable if you're on the wrong side of his mind.
Jeff used to say that if Jim hit someone with a car and you politely informed him of the accident, he would drive the victim to the hospital and buy the family dinner. If you told Jim he screwed up, he would raise his arms and scream, 'Shut up or I'll hit you too!'
Such was life at Cramer, Berkowitz in the weeks before what proved to be the largest car crash in financial history.
It wasn't enough that I had a strong sense the wheels were going to fall off the financial wagon; I had to explain why the timing was right and do it with tact. Heaven help me if we missed further upside or worse, got squeezed on the short side.
The tension was thick and as the new kid on the block, I knew where loyalties lied. 

三十八、泡沫破灭

    2000年4月，互联网泡沫应声破灭，纳斯达克在短短几个交易时段内暴跌20%。更值得一提的是，我们积极利用市场波动性进行交易，抓住了指数下跌后涨回4500点的一波反弹，随后又在不断创下新低的市场跌势中，稳稳站在空头阵营的一方。
   这一切令人难以置信，但绝对千真万确。你得相信我的话。整个市场彷佛在我们周围崩塌了，而我们就处在风暴中心，四周狂风大作，不见天日，而中间这座小岛却宁静安详。
   我们赚了一大笔钱，付给华尔街券商巨额佣金，而我一手打造的交易团队和风险管理团队也得到很高的奖金。组合的盈利幅度非常巨大，一天就有两三千万美元，是那种你根本不想理解的数字。
   我们新上马的投资监控系统能实时显示组合的损益情况，每一分每一秒，我们都能知道交易是赚是赔。这既有好处，也有不好的地方。我不需要看交易显示屏，只要看坐在对桌吉姆的脸色，就能猜个八九不离十。
   任何说自己不那么关注交易业绩的交易员都不该从事这个行业。我们管理着成百上千个交易头寸，它们是一个整体组合，也有着一个共同的损益底线。我们有各自的分工，有归属自己的交易“名字”。我们身处同一团队，但每天晚上洗澡时，都会回顾自己个人一天来的交易得失。
   我们俩交易方式的风格差异日趋明显。当市场上涨时，吉姆会大举买进；当市场转向时，有时候才过了几分钟，交易清单上就会突然出现空头头寸。
   我密切关注着他，在交易自己头寸的同时，也留心组合的整体损益。我并不想冒犯谁，也不想维持现状。经历过前两次跳槽后，我的职业生涯只有两个目标：一是赚钱，二是保住胜利果实。
   夏天到了，我们近乎狂热地工作，并把工作热情转化为出色的业绩。不过，办公室里还是萦绕着一种说不清道不明的焦虑--只有业绩好于华尔街上平均水平，才不枉忍受这种焦虑。
   既有精诚合作，又有磕磕绊绊；既有友谊，又有争吵；既亲近，又疏远。所有这些极端同时存在。
   这就是Cramer, Berkowitz公司的日子，但我不知道的是，我们就要向外界打开窗户。

Pop goes the bubble  泡沫破灭
 
    April 2000 arrived with a bang and the Nasdaq dropped 20% in a few short sessions. What's more, as we actively traded the volatility, we caught the counter-trend rally back to Nasdaq 4,500 before again riding the short side to fresh market lows.
I wouldn't believe it either if I wasn't there but you'll have to take me at my word. Markets crashed around us and we were in the epicenter of the storm, an island of clarity in an otherwise unsure world.
We posted huge gains, paid the street insane commissions and the trading staff and risk-management protocol I implemented paid huge dividends. The swings were wild, moving $20 milllion to $30 million in a single day, the type of numbers you didn't want to comprehend.
Our new systems updated our profit and loss dynamically and we knew exactly where we stood with each flickering tick. That was both a blessing and a curse. I didn't need to watch my screens; the look on Jim's face across the desk told the story in real time.
Any trader who says they don't take performance personally shouldn't be managing money. We ran one portfolio -- hundreds of positions that forged a singular bottom line -- but we each had our 'names.' While we played for the same team, we eyeballed our individual stats as we hit the showers each night.
The stylistic dichotomy between our individual trading approaches became increasingly apparent. When the market rallied, Jim tossed fresh long exposure into our portfolio. After it reversed, sometimes minutes later, short positions suddenly appeared on the sheets.
I watched him closely and traded my positions with an eye on the overall portfolio. I wasn't worried about stepping on toes or honoring the status quo. After coming so close in my two previous professional endeavors, I had two missions in life -- to make money and protect those gains.
As the summer approached, we operated at a feverish pitch and harnessed that energy into tremendous performance. Still, there was an unspoken angst in the office -- the type of tension that was only acceptable if we beat the Street.
It was functional, dysfunctional, friendly, heated, seamless and strangely sophomoric all at the same time.
 It was life at Cramer, Berkowitz, and unbeknownst to me, we were about to open our window to the world. 

三十九、一扇大门

   七月的炎热令人无法忍受，我让司机凌晨五点就送我去上班。公司的生意不错，在华尔街，这种说法的意思就是我们在赚钱。
   在外人看来，我们管理的基金就像一架穿越完美风暴而毫发无损的战斗机；而在公司内部，一种不同的氛围正在酝酿中。
   吉姆计划去汉普顿度假，正和TheStreet.com的编辑通电话，想找人代他写专栏。当吉姆把目光锁定在我身上时，我彷佛看到他头顶上方出现一个闪光的灯泡，他咧嘴笑了起来。
   “就这么定了，托德帮我写下周一的文章，然后你再找别人接手。”吉姆说。
   我正交易着200个头寸，管理4亿美元的风险敞口，而且历史上最大一个泡沫正在破灭。我不想分心干别的事情。
   “伙计，我最后一次写东西是在夏令营时给妈妈写信，我没办法帮忙。”
   但吉姆和往常一样，打定了的主意就不会再变。反正他自己的问题解决了，现在烫手的山芋已经抛到我的手上。
   写第一篇专栏文章时，我没花很多心思，因为还有更重要的事情要做。我引用了一段“Grateful Dead”乐队创作的歌词作为开头，随意讲了一些对流行文化的看法，回过头来谈现在的熊市思路，最后探讨了自己的投资理念和方法。
   我没觉得这份兼职有什么意思，但它也没妨碍我什么。事实上，写东西能帮我整理自己的思路，让我在市场的惊涛骇浪中更能游刃有余。
   闭市的钟声响起前，我接到TheStreet.com编辑的电话，请我把这周的专栏文章都接下来。
“没问题，”我对杰夫眨眨眼睛，说，“愿意效劳。”

A door opens

The July heat was unbearable as my driver navigated the FDR at 5 a.m. Business was good, which on Wall Street means we were making money.
To the outside looking in, our fund was a fighter jet navigating the perfect storm of a bubble gone awry. Internally, a different dynamic began to take shape.
As Jim readied to vacation in the Hamptons, he was on the phone with his editor at TheStreet.com, looking for someone to write his column. When his eyes locked on mine, I saw the light bulb flash overhead as a grin spread across his face.
'I've got it covered. Todd-o will write on Monday while you find someone for the rest of the week,' he said.
I was trading 200 positions and managing $400 million worth of risk as the biggest bubble in history imploded. I didn't want another job.
'Dude, the last time I wrote something was to my mother while at summer camp. It's not happening.'
In typical Jim fashion, his mind was already made up. His problem was solved and it quickly became mine.
I didn't put much thought into my first column as I had bigger fish to fry. I scribed Grateful Dead lyrics that pertained to the tape, threaded in some levity through pop-culture references and espoused my bearish bent in real-time, delving into the details of my particular approach.
I didn't embrace the double duty but it didn't bother me either. In fact, it helped crystallize my thoughts as I tried to navigate the wicked crosscurrents of the marketplace.
As the closing bell approached at the end of the day, I got a call from the editor asking me to finish the week.
'Sure,' I said as I looked at Jeff and winked. 'Anything I can do to help.'

四十、The switch is flipped  重大变化
   
There was no middle ground with Jim. Every day was either the best ever or the worst imaginable. That applied to his personal relationships as well; you were either his best friend or a sworn enemy.   吉姆是个极端的人，每天的交易业绩要么好得出奇，要么坏得难以想象。他在人际交往上也是如此，你要么是他最好的朋友，要么是他最痛恨的敌人。 

    I toggled between the two, often in the same day, but there was little doubt which side of his emotional chasm I was on when I pulled up to his East End rental that Friday night.
我在这两个角色之间来回转换，有时在同一天就能分饰二角。不过,周五晚上我到他租的东区(East End)公寓时，吉姆的情绪指针明显处于偏向我的一侧。
    'Todd-o!' he screamed as he ran down the driveway and wrapped me in a bear hug, 'We gotta talk!'   “托德！”他狂呼着从门口冲过来，给我一个大大的熊抱，“我们来好好谈谈！”
    I was with a friend who was stunned by the outburst of emotion. I couldn't blame her -- Hurricane Jim was frenzied energy that swallowed everything in his path. She didn't know the other side of that ride but it's just as well; she wouldn't believe it anyway.    他爆发出的激情让我身边的一个朋友惊呆了。这也难怪，她不知道“飓风”吉姆的能量可以席卷沿途所经的一切；而且她也不知道，吉姆发起狂来同样可怕。不过没关系，说了她也不会相信。
    He told me that my columns performed fantastically well. That surprised me but I had little time to digest it. He had a plan and his wheels were spinning quickly.    吉姆告诉我，我写的专栏文章大受欢迎，这让我相当吃惊。还没等我回过味来，他已经给我制定了一个计划，不给我任何喘息的时间。
    'We're going to give you a trading diary on TheStreet.com right next to mine. It'll be great -- Whaddya say?'    “你要在TheStreet.com我的专栏旁边开一个交易日记，效果一定很好！怎么样？”
    What would you say? 我还能说什么？
    I never shied from a challenge and I'm not sure I could have even if I wanted to. To be honest, I wasn't sure that's what I wanted. I actually enjoyed writing, if only for the opportunity to synthesize my thoughts. Little did I know that Jim opened a door that forever changed my life; little does he know that I remain grateful for that to this day.  
我从没在挑战面前退缩过，我也知道，即使打退堂鼓，也不一定管用。说实话，我不觉得写文章是我想做的事。但我实际上喜欢写作的过程，因为它能让我理清思路。我并不知道，吉姆向我打开了一扇大门，并将永远改变我的生活。吉姆也不知道，直至今日，我还一直为此感激他。
    I swore I wouldn't let the column splinter the focus that was quietly lining my pockets. Writing came naturally, from the heart and from the gut, and it soon became a seamless duopoly that introduced a world I never knew existed.
我对自己发誓，不能被专栏写作分散精力，同时感觉它已悄悄地占用了我不少时间。我彷佛天生就适合写作，从骨子里，在内心中；它和交易工作一起，很快成为我生活中不可或缺的两大部分，开启了一个我以往一无所知的新世界。
    At first, I feared the additional responsibility would add tension to an already tense environment. While Jim and I often disagreed on how to approach the market, that dialogue was behind closed doors.
起初，我担心这一额外职责会让早已紧张的工作关系绷得更紧。虽然吉姆和我在市场观点上经常各持己见，但那毕竟是关起门来的意见对立。
    Now, through the power of the Internet, we were at odds for the world to see. 现在，通过互联网的力量，我们的观点分歧将天下皆知。
    When trading, one must adapt to the market. Different times require different styles and the choppy cusp of the Internet bubble was a lesson in agility. By the time the crowd got on one side of the market, it viciously shifted, leaving blood in its wake.
做交易时，你必须适应市场的变化。不同的时间需要采取不同的策略，互联网泡沫的膨胀和破灭就是最好的例证。当大家都相信网络新时代已经来临时，市场却阴险地来了个三百六十度的大转弯，让股市哀鸿遍野，血流成河。
    It wasn't an easy tape to trade; in fact, it was brutal even if you were best in breed.       事实上，这不是个容易把握的市场，即使你是其中的佼佼者，也依然要经历腥风血雨。 

    I began to view Jim's momentum-style approach as a contrary indicator, sub-consciously at first and then with increased regularity. As our fund continued to outperform and I embraced the column he enabled me to attain, I swallowed my tongue and kept the peace.      我开始把吉姆的动能投资风格作为反向指针，起初是下意识的，但后来就习以为常。我们的基金依然业绩出众，我的专栏文章也在继续，但我避免和吉姆争论，一切以和为贵。
    I didn't dislike the man; in fact, I had tremendous respect for his intelligence and cared for him as a friend. We all wanted the same thing and tried to push through our problems despite increasingly frequent clashes.
我不是不喜欢吉姆，事实上，我非常尊重他的才智，并以朋友的身份关心他。我们的目标是一致的，虽然冲突日益频繁，但还是尽量求同存异，共同前进。
    As we edged through the back half of 2000, it was clear something was going to give. 2000年下半年就这样过去了。我越来越有一种感觉，有什么事就要发生。
    And that something wasn't going to be me. 而这事对我没什么好处。