稀土不是熊貓：供應鏈國家壟斷——“害人終害己”的互害機制

Archer Hong Qian（錢宏）
2025年10月 · Vancouver

Rare Earths Are Not Pandas: Supply-Chain State Monopoly

—The “Mutual Harm Mechanism” That Ultimately Hurts Itself

By Archer Hong Qian
October 2025 · Vancouver

一、稀土≠熊貓

I. Rare Earths ≠ Pandas

稀土與熊貓，雖然都屬於自然資源，但其性質與國際法律屬性截然不同。熊貓（Ailuropoda melanoleuca）作為中國的國家象徵，其“出借”與“合作繁育”後代的歸屬權具有主權屬性¹；而稀土則是一種遍布全球的自然礦產資源，並不具有唯一性。

Although both rare earths and pandas are natural resources, their legal and symbolic attributes differ completely. The giant panda (Ailuropoda melanoleuca) is China’s national treasure, and the offspring of pandas lent abroad remain under Chinese sovereign ownership¹. Rare earths, by contrast, are globally distributed minerals without exclusivity.

事實上，根據美國地質調查局（USGS）數據，全球可開採稀土儲量前十的國家包括中國、越南、巴西、俄羅斯、印度、澳大利亞、美國等²。稀土的“稀缺性”更多體現在經濟與技術層面，而非地質意義的稀有。中國在上世紀80年代通過收購美國稀土公司（如Molycorp）逐步掌握了分離提煉技術，但這些工藝本身並不具有壟斷性，也不具備永久技術壁壘。

According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the top ten countries with exploitable rare earth reserves include China, Vietnam, Brazil, Russia, India, Australia, and the United States². The “rarity” of rare earths lies more in economics and processing capability than in geology. China gained refining know-how in the 1980s after acquiring U.S. firms such as Molycorp, but those techniques were never permanently exclusive.

二、中國稀土壟斷的“三大優勢”

II. China’s “Triple Advantages” in the Rare-Earth Monopoly

中國稀土產業在全球市場取得主導地位的根本原因，並非技術領先，而是基於國家資本主義的體制性扭曲與非對稱競爭優勢。其核心為“三大優勢”：

China’s dominance in the global rare-earth market stems not from technological leadership but from state-capitalist structural distortions that produced three asymmetric advantages:

1. 低人權優勢 —— 勞動力成本長期被壓制，安全保障與職業健康條件薄弱；

2. 低商權優勢 —— 民營與外資企業在資源領域缺乏真正的市場話語權，政策導向與行政干預導致市場化不足；

3. 敢污染優勢 —— 環境治理標準寬鬆，污染外部性被社會化而非企業化承擔。

4. Low human-rights advantage – labor costs are depressed, and workplace safety remains weak;

5. Low business-rights advantage – private and foreign companies lack autonomy under state intervention;

6. Pollution-tolerance advantage – lax environmental regulation externalizes pollution costs to society.

加之出口退稅、信貸傾斜、土地補貼等政策性扶持，這一組合在短期內確實帶來了供應鏈成本優勢。然而，從結構性角度看，這是一種以犧牲人權、商權與環境為代價的“短期比較優勢”，與長期創新、可持續發展相衝突，缺乏共生經濟的內生健康機制³。

Combined with export rebates, credit support, and land subsidies, this configuration created short-term cost advantages. Yet structurally, it represents a short-term comparative advantage achieved at the expense of human, commercial, and environmental rights—contradicting sustainable innovation and lacking the endogenous health of Symbionomic balance³.

三、61號、62號文件的“長臂陷阱”

III. The “Long-Arm Trap” of Circulars No. 61 and No. 62

2025年中國商務部發布的《第61號 公布對境外相關稀土物項實施出口管制的決定》及《第62號出口許可證管理辦法》試圖以“國家安全”為由對稀土技術與產品實施出口限制。然而其條款設計本身存在高度的不確定性與行政隨意性。

In 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued Circulars No. 61 and No. 62, invoking “national security” to control the export of rare-earth materials and technologies. However, the design of these measures reveals high administrative arbitrariness and low operability.

• 界定模糊：文件規定“含有、集成或混有原產於中國稀土技術價值比例達到0.1%以上”的產品須申請許可；然而，0.1%如何界定？誰來鑑定？如何計價？

• 審批不明：所謂“逐案審批”，並無明確時限與救濟途徑；

• 權力過伸：禁令涵蓋“軍事潛力提升”“14納米及以下邏輯芯片研發”等，幾乎覆蓋全球高科技領域。

• Ambiguous definition – Products “containing or integrating 0.1% or more of Chinese-origin rare-earth technology” require export permits; yet no metric, certifier, or valuation method is specified.

• Opaque approval – “Case-by-case review” provides no deadlines or appeal procedures.

• Overreach – Prohibitions extend to “military enhancement” and “14-nm chip R&D,” encompassing nearly all advanced manufacturing.

這不僅違反了中國加入WTO時作出的“不得設限”承諾⁴，而且與2014年中國在WTO稀土案中敗訴後撤銷出口配額的先例相矛盾⁵。換言之，這一政策重啟舊路徑，等於**“自毀國際信譽”**。

This move not only violates China’s WTO accession commitment to avoid export restrictions⁴ but also contradicts the 2014 WTO ruling⁵ that forced China to remove its previous quotas—thus undermining its own international credibility.

四、互害機制的顯現

IV. The Emergence of the “Mutual Harm Mechanism”

短期看，稀土出口管制似乎能形成“貿易籌碼”；但從結構上看，它是一個典型的互害機制（Mutual Harm Mechanism）：

At first glance, rare-earth export control may appear to create trade leverage. Structurally, however, it manifests a Mutual Harm Mechanism—a self-destructive feedback loop:

• 該政策將直接刺激美國、澳大利亞、加拿大、印度、日本等國重啟稀土開採與提煉投資。例如，美國國防部2025年已宣布持股19%的洛杉磯稀土加工企業，預計2028年年產重稀土1萬噸；

• 其他國家將加速研發替代材料與工藝，包括無稀土電機技術、回收提煉技術與替代磁性材料；

• 一旦全球技術門檻被突破，中國將從“稀土支配者”轉為“稀土過剩者”，陷入類似鋼鐵、煤炭產業的“產能陷阱”。

• It directly motivates the U.S., Australia, Canada, India, and Japan to restart rare-earth extraction and refining; the U.S. Department of Defense already holds 19% of a Los Angeles refinery expected to produce 10,000 tons annually by 2028.

• It accelerates international R&D in rare-earth-free motors, recycling, and substitute magnetic materials.

• Once global technical thresholds are surpassed, China shifts from “dominant supplier” to “overcapacity victim,” as seen in steel and coal.

結果是：害人終害己。中國的“稀土武器論”不僅失去國際道義，更會加速他國脫鈎，使自身成為供應鏈孤島。

The result: harm to others turns into self-harm. The so-called “rare-earth weapon” narrative loses moral legitimacy, speeds up global decoupling, and leaves China isolated in supply chains.

五、生態轉向：無稀土新生態

V. The Ecological Turn: A Rare-Earth-Free Future

特斯拉首席執行官埃隆·馬斯克在2023年宣布，特斯拉將研發“無稀土電機”以實現電動機生態的徹底重塑⁶。這一突破預示稀土的“戰略地位”正被技術革命快速消解。

In 2023, Tesla CEO Elon Musk announced the development of “rare-earth-free motors”⁶, signaling that the strategic value of rare earths is rapidly dissolving under technological evolution.

稀土的真正替代，不僅是材料層面的替代，更是文明結構的轉向：從稀缺性競爭邏輯轉向共生性平衡邏輯。在共生經濟學（Symbionomics）框架下，真正的競爭力來自生態的健康循環與技術的倫理共生，而非壟斷、封鎖與報復。

The true replacement of rare earths lies not merely in materials science but in a civilizational shift—from a logic of scarcity and rivalry to a logic of symbiotic balance. Within the framework of Symbionomics, genuine competitiveness arises from ethical co-evolution between ecology and technology, not from monopoly, coercion, or retaliation.

六、結語

VI. Conclusion

“稀土不是熊貓。”熊貓象徵文化與生命的共享，而稀土若被濫用於權力工具化與壟斷化，只會成為互害機制的導火索。一個文明的成熟，不在於資源的控制力，而在於能否以智慧與愛——即**“Amorsophia”**——實現自我約束與生態共榮。

“Rare earths are not pandas.” Pandas embody shared life and cultural goodwill; rare-earth coercion, by contrast, triggers mutual destruction. The maturity of civilization lies not in control over resources but in the capacity for self-restraint and symbiotic flourishing through wisdom and love—Amorsophia.

注釋 / Notes

1. 《瀕危野生動植物種國際貿易公約》（CITES）第三附錄，明確國寶動物的跨國合作繁育主權歸屬。
    CITES Appendix III defines sovereign ownership in cross-border breeding cooperation.

2. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024: Rare Earths.

3. 錢宏，《共生經濟學》（Symbionomics），2023。

4. WTO, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 2001, Art. 11.3.

5. WTO Dispute DS431: China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, 2014.

6. Tesla Investor Day 2023, “Permanent Magnet-Free Motor Announcement.”

7. 錢宏，《特斯拉無稀土電機技術的生態重塑與哲學-經濟學啟示》，共生網：http://symbiosism.com.cn/10940.html