剝落意識形態以後，殖官主義還在那裡

After Ideology Is Stripped Away, Bureaucolonialism Is Still There
——從越南革新、米萊聯合國演講到全球組織信託重建

—From Vietnam’s Đổi Mới and Milei’s UN Speech to Rebuilding Global Organizational Trust

錢 宏（Archer Hong Qian）

2026年9月23日，阿根廷總統哈維爾·米萊再次站上紐約聯合國大會講台。

這一次，他沒有把矛頭停留在某項政策、某個機構或者某個國家，而是直接指向聯合國本身的組織運行機制。

米萊首先承認，聯合國創立之初關於自由、平等、國家主權、和平解決爭端的理想是高尚的。但他認為，這個當初共同訂立的“神聖契約”已經被破壞：本來應當維護集體安全和基本權利的國際組織，在許多真正需要有所作為的地方無能為力，卻又逐漸形成一個龐大的官僚體系，越來越熱衷於規定各國及其人民應該怎樣生活。

他甚至使用了極其尖銳的語言，把聯合國稱為一個供養“傲慢官僚”的無用組織，並援引奧地利經濟學家路德維希·馮·米塞斯的話，大意是：好人不會總想着控制同胞怎樣生活。

無論人們是否贊同米萊的政治立場，這句話背後所指向的問題，卻不能因為措辭尖銳而被輕輕放過。

米塞斯更深一層的警告是：

一旦國家開始干預個人生活方式，就會一路走向對生活細節的規制，最終取消個人自由。

這既是制度警告，也是一種道德審判。

因為它最終追問的是：

一個人、一群人或者一個組織，憑什麼把自己變成 Subject（主體），再以某種崇高目標的名義，把另外的人變成由自己安排、管理、支配甚至榨取的 Object（客體）？

如果我們暫時把20世紀以來那些已經爭論得令人眼花繚亂的社會主義與資本主義、左傾與右傾、東方與西方、民族主義與全球主義、多元文化與傳統價值等等意識形態外殼一層層剝落，也許會發現：

殖官主義（Bureaucolonialism）還在那裡。

一、去年行走越南，我首先看到的不是意識形態政治正確

2025年11月，我從新加坡進入越南，一路行走長安、下龍灣、河內。

人口超過一億、平均年齡約32歲的越南，給我留下最深印象的，並不是教科書裡的“社會主義越南”，而是一種撲面而來的社會生命力。

街邊攤、咖啡館、家庭旅館、小企業、農村手工業、城市服務業，到處都可以看見普通人的自組織、自連接、自交換。

我當時在《越南國運處上升態勢——基於亞當·斯密“繁榮三原素”與共生經濟學的結構性觀察》中寫了一句話：

“這些不是國家命令出來，而是人民自己生長出來的。”

這句話至今仍是我理解越南近四十年變化的一把鑰匙。

1986年開始的革新開放（Đổi Mới），如果僅僅理解為社會主義向資本主義讓步，恐怕仍然沒有走出20世紀意識形態敘事。

我看到的更深層變化是：

拆除妨礙生命自組織連接的資訊防火牆和體制機制藩籬，讓個體、家庭、企業、市場、貿易以及整個社會生活重新生長。

這就是為什麼我當時借用亞當·斯密1755年關於國家繁榮的著名概括——和平、輕稅和過得去的司法行政——進一步提出“三重和平”：

個體與社群之間的和平，使交換與信任發生；

社會制度中的和平，使分工、規則與組織具有可預測性；

國家之間的和平，使貿易、旅遊、投資和友誼成為可能。

和平不是軟弱，而是尊重生命自組織連接動態平衡的交互主體共生過程。

於是，一個值得重新思考的問題出現了：

越南究竟“姓社”還是“姓資”，真的那麼重要嗎？

如果一個自稱社會主義的國家不斷釋放個體、家庭、市場與社會自組織活力；而另一個自稱自由、民主或者資本主義的組織，卻不斷增加規則、機構、職位和控制，那麼，究竟誰更加尊重生命？

真正值得檢驗的，已經不是標籤。

而是：

組織與生命之間究竟發生了什麼？

二、聯合國恰好提供了一個剝落意識形態的組織標本

這就把問題帶到了聯合國。

聯合國不是社會主義國家。

也不是資本主義國家。

它不是東方國家，也不是西方國家；不是民族國家，更不能簡單歸屬於某一種階級、宗教或者文明。

正因為如此，聯合國反而成為觀察組織病理的一個極其難得的樣本。

如果把社會主義—資本主義、左—右、東方—西方這些變量暫時拿掉，我們就可以更直接地追問：

為什麼一個以和平、安全、人權與國際合作為使命建立起來的組織，同樣會產生機構增殖、授權增殖、會議增殖、報告增殖以及官僚程序增殖？

聯合國自己已經不得不承認這個問題。

截至2026年，聯合國80年間累計產生了超過4萬項決議、決定和相關授權；僅2024年，秘書處服務的政府間會議就超過2.7萬場。2026年3月31日，聯大主席安娜萊娜·貝爾伯克在推動授權審查改革時公開指出，超過4萬項有效授權和每年2.7萬場會議所造成的負擔已經不能繼續照舊。聯合國UN80改革文件也承認，長期累積形成了重複、重疊、碎片化、資金錯配以及責任邊界不清等問題。

更值得注意的是，古特雷斯2026年5月公布UN80改革進展報告時已經直言：

現狀不可持續。

改革聯合國，當然不是古特雷斯才想到的。

從加利到安南，從潘基文到古特雷斯，聯合國改革已經講了幾十年。機構調整、預算改革、管理改革、發展系統改革、維和改革、安理會改革……方案不可謂不多。

可是為什麼“聯合國改革”本身幾乎也變成了聯合國的一項常設議題？

為什麼改革了幾十年，還要在成立80周年的時候再搞一次UN80？

如果只說“改革還不夠徹底”，恐怕已經解釋不了問題。

我們必須再往裡面挖一層：

是不是組織本身存在一種自我繁殖機制？

三、從“官僚主義”進一步看到“殖官主義”

我這些年一直使用“殖官主義”這個概念。

今天看來，它的定義域應該進一步打開。

殖官主義不是社會主義的專利，不是資本主義的專利；不是東方的專利，也不是西方的專利；甚至不是國家機器的專利。

它是一種跨制度、跨文化、跨意識形態的組織癌變。

任何組織建立之初，都有一個受託目的。

政府受人民、國民、公民之託；

企業承擔投資者、員工、消費者以及社會契約所形成的責任；

大學受教育與知識創造之託；

醫院受生命健康之託；

公益組織受公益使命之託；

聯合國則受會員國以及人類對於和平、安全、合作的共同期待之託。

但是，組織一旦形成，就會產生職位、權力、預算、規則、資源以及解釋規則的人。

危險由此開始。

掌管國家機器以及其他大型組織中有權、有勢、有錢的人們，可能逐漸以 Subject（主體） 自居，假公濟私，將本來同樣具有主體性的他者降格為 Object（客體），加以支配、操縱和榨取。

於是：

使命產生機構；

機構產生職位；

職位需要預算；

預算需要項目；

項目需要授權；

授權產生規則；

規則需要更多執行者；

執行者又需要更多管轄對象來證明自己存在的必要性。

組織由此不斷自我繁殖為Reproductive Officialdom（殖官）。

終於有一天，原本為了完成使命而存在的組織，開始為了維持組織自身而尋找使命。

這就是我所說的殖官主義。

它比一般意義上的“官僚主義”更深一層。

官僚主義可以表現為繁文縟節、低效、推諉、僵化；

殖官主義追問的卻是：

為什麼明明已經低效、失效甚至有害的組織結構，仍然能夠繼續繁殖？

因為官可以生權，權可以生利，利又可以護官；機構可以生機構，規則可以生規則，預算可以生預算，並最終形成一套自我繁殖、自我保護、自我解釋、自我正當化的組織生態。

所以，“殖”這個字不能丟。

四、“好話說盡，壞事做絕”的那個“絕”

殖官主義最危險的時候，往往不是公開宣布：

“我要支配你。”

恰恰相反，它經常滿嘴都是最好聽的話。

天下為公。

為人民服務。

人民至上。

公平正義。

共同利益。

全人類福祉。

和平與發展。

人類政治史從來不缺好話。

所以古人才會留下那句尖銳的話：

說堯舜之言，行桀紂之實。

用今天的話說，就是：

好話說盡，壞事做絕。

但是，這裡的“絕”，不能只理解為壞事做到極端。

它還有更深的一層：

把生命正常生長的道路堵絕。

掌管國家機器、有權有勢有錢的人們以Subject（主體）自居，假公濟私，將他者作為Object（客體）加以支配、操縱和榨取；組織自我繁殖而失信於人民、國民、公民生命所託，拖累經世濟民，脫離社會生活常規，最後，不僅耗盡社會資源，而且把生命原本可以自組織、自連接、自創造的通道一條條堵絕。

於是，一邊說“天下為公”，一邊結黨營私；

一邊說“為人民服務”，一邊與民爭利；

一邊說公共利益，一邊把公共權力轉換成職位、審批、預算、壟斷和特殊利益；

一邊要求普通人無私奉獻，一邊讓組織內部的利益結構不斷自我繁殖。

到了這裡，我們必須追問：

“天下為公”的那個“公”，究竟是誰的公？

如果所謂“公”，不是一個個生命主體之間交互生成的公共性，而是某個政治組織首先把自己宣布為“公”的化身，再由自己壟斷對“公”的定義權、解釋權和執行權，那麼“天下為公”甚至可能發生最危險的語義倒置：

公，不再意味着權力屬於所有人；

公，反而變成少數人以所有人的名義行使權力。

同樣，“為人民服務”也可能發生委託—受託關係的倒置：

本來人民是委託人，組織是受託人；

最後卻變成組織是主人，人民反過來必須供養、服從和服務於組織。

這已經不是簡單的公私之爭。

而是生命主體與組織受託者的位置被顛倒了。這就是吉拉斯1957年《新階級》的洞見。

五、米塞斯的警告為什麼也是一種道德審判？

因此，再回頭看米萊在聯合國大會上援引米塞斯，就會發現它的意義遠遠超過一場自由主義政治演說。

米塞斯真正值得重視的制度洞見是：

一旦國家開始干預個人生活方式，就會一路走向對生活細節的規制，最終取消個人自由。

為什麼？

因為一次干預需要一條規則；

一條規則需要一個執行機構；

一個機構需要人員、職位和預算；

職位和預算又需要更多事項進入其管轄範圍，以證明這個機構繼續存在的合理性。

於是，原本以某種公共目的開始的有限干預，可以逐漸生成一整套以規制他人生活為職業、資源和權力來源的組織結構。

這當然是制度分析。

但它同樣構成道德審判。

因為它最終問的是：

善意能不能自動構成支配他者生命的授權？

不能。

“天下為公”不能。

“為人民服務”不能。

“全人類福祉”同樣不能。

Intersubjective Symbiosism（交互主體共生）所要改變的，恰恰就是這種Subject—Object關係。

我承認你是主體；

你也承認我是主體；

不同主體之間發生連接、交互、契合，並由此生成新的價值、新的可能、新的生命。

生命本自具足，又非獨存。

所以真正的“公”，不是某個高高在上的主體替億萬個客體預先定義出來的結果，而只能從無數主體之間真實的交互關係中不斷生成。

六、聯合國80年改革史為什麼始終改不動？

這樣再看聯合國，問題就清楚多了。

1945年成立的聯合國當然不是一個“壞組織”。

恰恰相反，它誕生於兩次世界大戰之後，人類希望避免再次走向毀滅，其和平理想具有不可否認的歷史意義。

但是：

組織的創始理想高尚，並不能證明組織80年後的每一種運行機制仍然合理。

聯合國今天的財政困境就是一個非常具體的信號。

2026年度，中國作為聯合國第二大會費分攤國，直到9月1日才繳清約6.414億美元常規預算會費。美國則到9月中旬才支付7.25億美元常規預算款，另支付約1.02億美元維和款；付款之後，美國常規預算仍有超過13億美元欠款。

第一、第二大會費分攤國都把巨額繳費拖到聯大召開前夕附近，這當然各有國內政治、財政安排以及對聯合國政策不同意見等複雜原因，不能簡單歸結為一個因素。

但是，對於一個以組織信託為分析對象的人來說，這至少值得提出一個問題：

為什麼會員國越來越不願意及時把錢交給這個組織？

信託不僅存在於語言裡。

錢，也是信任票。

資源是否願意繼續交付，本身就是委託人對受託組織的一種現實反饋。

而聯合國自己的UN80改革恰恰承認，系統存在授權過多、會議和報告過多、職責重複、執行碎片化、資源與任務錯配以及問責結果不足等問題。

所以，米萊的話並不是從天上掉下來的。

他說聯合國形成了一個越來越龐大的官僚體系，要決定世界各國人民應該怎樣生活；他認為一個組織如果說了無數話、通過無數決議，卻不能讓自己的話在現實世界產生相應結果，就會失去最重要的東西——權威。

這種批評可以爭論。

但不能因為它來自米萊，就用一個“右翼”“自由意志主義”的標籤把它處理掉。

標籤不能代替事實。

七、其實，我在2018年並沒有主張“不要聯合國”

早在2018年台灣晨星出版社正式出版的《全球共生：化解衝突重建世界秩序的中國學派》中，我已經收入《全球治理與聯合國改革》一文。

我當時的基本判斷恰恰是：

聯合國不同於歐盟、東盟、七國集團或者二十國集團，它不應該成為任何排他性的利益共同體，而應該成為“不捨棄任何地球生靈”的 Civil Symbiont（公民共生體）。

我當時已經看到另一個結構性矛盾：

荒漠化、環境氣候、難民、糧食安全、生化核武、跨國災難、外層空間、公共衛生等等全球性問題，越來越具有超主權、超地緣、超文明性質，而現行聯合國卻仍主要以主權國家為單位構造組織機制。

全球性問題已經越過舊邊界，組織結構卻沒有同步越過舊邊界。

因此，我當時提出拓展已經基本停止運作的託管理事會功能，並進一步建立 UN Global Symbiosism Council（全球共生理事會，GSC），讓地球公民、國家和地區、國際組織、NGO、教科文衛體藝媒組織、跨國企業及其他社會主體共同進入全球治理。

那時，我關注的主要問題是：

聯合國應該怎樣改革？

八年以後，今天再看，我願意向自己的方案繼續追問：

即使真的建立一個GSC，誰能保證它幾十年以後不會再次殖官化？

沒人能夠僅憑名稱保證。

一個機構叫“共生理事會”，不等於它天然共生。

就像一個組織把“人民”“共和國”“民主”“公共”“公益”寫進名稱，也不能證明它天然屬於人民、天然民主、天然公共。

任何組織都沒有免檢資格。

八、超主權治理，不等於建立一個“超級主權”

就在米萊演講前一天，川普站在同一個聯合國大會講台上，從另一個方向觸及了全球組織信託的邊界。他明確說：

“There is no global government.”——“不存在全球政府。”

緊接着又表示，只要他擔任總統，就不會有“global taxes（全球稅）”。他的意思很明確：國際合作不能成為未經各國人民授權的全球官僚不斷擴張權力的理由，國際組織不能由國家之間的協調者異化為凌駕主權國家之上的統治者。

把川普與米萊前後兩天的講話放在一起看，問題就更清楚了：

川普追問：國際組織憑什麼從協調者變成凌駕主權國家之上的Subject？

米萊追問：官僚組織憑什麼從受託者變成規定別人怎樣生活的Subject？

而我們還要繼續追問：

任何組織，憑什麼從生命的受託者變成生命的支配者？

這也使我2018年提出的 UN Global Symbiosism Council（全球共生理事會，GSC） 有必要進一步明確自己的邊界。當年我提出，氣候、海洋、難民、公共衛生、外層空間等越來越多問題具有超主權、超地緣、超文明性質，需要超越單一國家邊界的共同治理。

這個判斷今天仍然成立。但是必須同時強調：

超主權問題，不等於超級主權；超主權治理，更不等於建立“世界政府”。

世界需要全球合作，但未必需要世界政府。不能因為需要解決全球問題，就把國家、公民和社會組織從Subject降格為Object，再在它們之上製造一個更大的Subject。否則，使命產生授權，授權產生機構，機構產生職位、預算和更多規則，最終同樣可能發生殖官主義癌變。

因此，GSC不應成為“世界政府”的雛形，而應成為一種交互主體共生的全球組織信託機制：國家、公民、社區、企業、社會組織和國際組織都是不同主體，通過有限授權，在共同事務中連接、交互、契合；權力有邊界，責任可追溯，成本可計量，效果可驗證，行為可糾偏，授權可收回。

這正是 Intersubjective Symbiosism（交互主體共生） 與“世界政府”思維的根本區別：

不是 One Subject → All Objects，
而是 Subjects ↔ Subjects → Symbiosis。

所以，真正的問題並不是“國家主權還是全球治理”的二選一，而是找到兩者之間能夠生成新可能的“間”：

全球性問題需要共同治理，但共同治理必須發生在主體之間，而不是凌駕於主體之上。

川普的“There is no global government”、米萊對官僚組織控制他人生活的質問，與交互主體共生在這裡形成了一個重要交匯：

世界需要全球合作，但未必需要世界政府；需要超主權治理，但不能製造超級主權。

而怎樣保證這樣的組織也不發生殖官主義癌變，正是下面必須回答的組織免疫機制問題。

九、問題已經從“怎樣改革組織”走向“怎樣阻斷組織癌變”

因此，今天再討論聯合國改革，如果仍然只是：

裁撤幾個機構；

減少幾個職位；

壓縮一些預算；

合併幾個部門；

恐怕仍然不夠。

這些當然應該做。

但如果殖官主義的生成機制沒有改變，今天砍掉十個機構，明天完全可能再長出二十個。

真正需要建立的，是一種組織免疫機制。

任何組織都必須不斷回答：

誰託付你？

託付你做什麼？

你占用了多少生命資源？

你降低了多少成本？

你賦予了多少能力？

增加了多少健康？

創造了多少信任？

帶來了多少和平？

這正是共生經濟學提出GDE的意義：

C——降本；E——賦能；H——健康；T——信任；P——和平。

進一步通過 ηᵢ＝GDEᵢ/GDPᵢ 檢驗具體項目、組織和經濟活動的生命效能，並最終進入 R＝GDE/GDP 的總體觀察。

組織不能自己宣布：

“我的使命很偉大，所以我的存在天然合理。”

而必須允許生命反過來詢問：

你究竟給我帶來了什麼？

繼而經過發現、記錄、確權、獎—抑—通、Mind Bank與價值承兌，使組織行為進入真實的反饋機制：

獎勵真正賦能生命的行為；

抑制不斷製造負載的行為；

打通被權力、部門和特殊利益堵塞的生命連接。

到這裡，組織信託才不是一個漂亮的詞。

十、越南與米萊為什麼會在這裡相遇？

一個是越南共產黨領導下的越南。

一個是公開信奉自由意志主義的阿根廷總統米萊。

按照20世紀的意識形態地圖，兩者似乎相距甚遠。

但如果把標籤剝掉，反而可以看到一個值得研究的共同問題。

越南近四十年的革新，在相當程度上表現為：

拆除妨礙生命自組織連接的藩籬。

米萊在阿根廷推進的改革，則集中於壓縮政府組織成本、削減規制、裁撤部分機構，並強調限制國家對經濟社會生活的不必要干預；而在聯合國講台上，他又把這種批判進一步指向國際組織。

兩者當然不是同一種改革，更不意味着所有具體政策都可以互相複製。

但是它們都迫使我們重新回答：

組織究竟應該支配生命，還是賦能生命？

因此，越南與米萊真正值得中國大陸研究的，並不是複製越南，更不是照搬阿根廷。

而是重新檢查那些我們已經聽得過於熟悉的詞：

公有。

國有。

全民。

集體。

為人民服務。

天下為公。

名稱說明不了受託關係。

判斷一個組織究竟是不是“為公”，不能只聽它怎樣稱呼自己，而應該看：

誰掌握權力？

誰承擔成本？

誰獲得利益？

誰能夠糾錯？

誰可以說“不”？

受託者能不能真正受到委託者約束？

如果掌握國家機器、有權有勢有錢的人們成為永恆的Subject，而人民、國民、公民只能作為被管理、被配置、被支配乃至被榨取的Object，那麼，再漂亮的意識形態包裝，也改變不了受託關係已經發生倒置的事實。

十一、殖官主義為什麼最終可能走向“同歸於盡”？

“癌變”並不是為了聳人聽聞。

癌細胞最可怕的地方，不是它具有某種“壞思想”。

它本來就是生命體的一部分。

問題在於它失去了與整體生命之間正常的關係，開始異常增殖，並不斷吸取整個生命體的營養供自己繼續繁殖。

最後發生什麼？

宿主越來越虛弱。

癌細胞卻越來越多。

直到宿主死亡。

而宿主死亡之日，也是癌細胞自身失去生存條件之時。

殖官主義與此存在一個令人警醒的結構對應：

組織因社會需要而生成；

組織逐漸異常自我繁殖；

組織不斷吸取社會資源維持自身繁殖；

生命主體越來越衰弱；

組織信託不斷坍塌；

最終整個社會進入系統性危機。

所以我說：

掌管國家機器、有權有勢有錢的人們以Subject（主體）自居，假公濟私，將他者作為Object（客體）加以支配、操縱和榨取，組織自我繁殖而失信於人民、國民、公民生命所託，拖累經世濟民，脫離社會生活常規，最後——

要麼自行毀滅，要麼同歸於盡！

這就是“好話說盡，壞事做絕”的那個“絕”。

不僅把壞事做到極端。

而且可能把生命賴以繼續生成的道路也堵絕。

十二、20世紀爭主義，21世紀必須重建組織信託

回頭看過去一百多年，人類在意識形態爭論上投入了巨大的生命成本。

社會主義還是資本主義？

左還是右？

國家還是市場？

東方還是西方？

民族主義還是全球主義？

這些問題當然有意義。

但如果所有注意力都停留在這些問題上，我們可能漏掉了一個更底層的事實：

無論什麼主義，只要形成組織；無論什麼組織，只要掌握權力、資源和規則，就必須面對同一種危險：受託者會不會變成統治者？服務者會不會變成支配者？組織會不會從賦能生命轉向供養自身？

癌細胞不問意識形態。

殖官主義同樣如此。

所以，米萊在聯合國講台上援引米塞斯，真正值得聽進去的，不只是自由主義者。

它實際上向一切試圖以崇高目標取得支配他者生活之權的組織提出了一個最樸素的道德問題：

你憑什麼？

這不是反對公共生活。

恰恰相反。

只有一個主體不再把另一個主體降格為客體，真正的“公”才可能發生。

只有從Subject—Object的支配關係走向 Intersubjective Symbiosism（交互主體共生），組織才可能重新成為生命的受託者。

2018年，我提出全球共生理事會，希望改變聯合國處理全球事務的組織結構。八年後的今天，我願意給當年的方案再加上一條更加嚴格的原則：

任何組織，無論以多麼崇高的理想建立，都沒有天然的道德豁免權；任何權力，無論以“天下為公”“為人民服務”還是“全人類福祉”的名義行使，都必須接受生命效能的持續檢驗。

因為：

組織因生命所託而生，也必須因生命是否得益而接受檢驗。

20世紀，人們爭論的是：

什麼主義來組織人？

21世紀，我們還必須追問：

誰來阻止組織吞噬人？

剝落社會主義與資本主義、左與右、東方與西方、民族國家與多元文化等等意識形態外殼以後，我們會發現：

殖官主義還在那裡。

因此，真正需要的不是再發明一種漂亮的主義去替代另一種主義，而是建立一種能夠持續阻斷殖官主義癌變的組織免疫機制。

從支配生命回到賦能生命；

從組織自我繁殖回到生命自組織連接；

Subject—Object回到Intersubjective；

從組織失信回到組織信託。

徹底阻斷殖官主義對形形色色、大大小小不同組織的癌變效應——

這才是重建組織信託真正開始的地方。

After Ideology Is Stripped Away, Bureaucolonialism Is Still There

—From Vietnam’s Đổi Mới and Milei’s UN Speech to Rebuilding Global Organizational Trust

Archer Hong Qian

On September 23, 2026, Argentine President Javier Milei once again took the podium at the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

This time, he did not stop at criticizing a particular policy, institution, or country. He directed his criticism at the operating mechanism of the United Nations itself.

Milei first acknowledged the nobility of the ideals on which the United Nations was founded: liberty, equality, national sovereignty, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Yet in his view, the “sacred covenant” originally made together has been broken. An international organization that was supposed to safeguard collective security and fundamental rights has proved powerless in many areas where action is genuinely needed, while gradually developing an enormous bureaucracy increasingly inclined to prescribe how countries and their peoples should live.

He even used exceptionally sharp language, calling the United Nations a useless organization that sustains “arrogant bureaucrats,” and cited the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises to the effect that good people do not constantly seek to control how their fellow citizens live.

Whether or not one agrees with Milei’s political position, the question behind those sharp words should not be brushed aside simply because of their severity.

Mises’s deeper warning was this:

Once the state begins to intervene in individual ways of life, it will proceed toward regulating the details of life and ultimately abolishing individual freedom.

This is both an institutional warning and a moral judgment.

For in the end it asks:

What gives a person, a group of people, or an organization the right to turn itself into the Subject and, in the name of some lofty objective, turn others into Objects to be arranged, managed, dominated, or even exploited?

If we temporarily peel away, layer by layer, the ideological shells that have dazzled and divided people since the twentieth century—socialism versus capitalism, left versus right, East versus West, nationalism versus globalism, multiculturalism versus traditional values—we may discover:

Bureaucolonialism is still there.

I. Traveling Through Vietnam Last Year, What I Saw First Was Not Ideological Political Correctness

In November 2025, I entered Vietnam from Singapore and traveled through Tràng An, Hạ Long Bay, and Hanoi.

Vietnam, with a population exceeding 100 million and an average age of about 32, left its deepest impression on me not as the “socialist Vietnam” of textbooks, but through the social vitality that seemed to be everywhere.

Street stalls, cafés, family-run inns, small businesses, rural handicrafts, and urban services all revealed ordinary people self-organizing, self-connecting, and exchanging on their own initiative.

At the time, in “Vietnam’s National Fortunes Are on the Rise—A Structural Observation Based on Adam Smith’s ‘Three Elements of Prosperity’ and Symbionomics,” I wrote:

“These were not ordered into existence by the state; they grew out of the people themselves.”

That sentence remains a key to my understanding of Vietnam’s transformation over nearly four decades.

If the Đổi Mới reforms begun in 1986 are understood merely as socialism making concessions to capitalism, we may still be trapped within the ideological narrative of the twentieth century.

What I saw at a deeper level was this:

Dismantle the information firewalls and institutional barriers that obstruct life’s self-organizing connections, and allow individuals, families, enterprises, markets, trade, and social life as a whole to grow again.

This is why, drawing on Adam Smith’s famous 1755 formulation of the conditions of national prosperity—peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice—I further proposed “threefold peace”:

Peace between individuals and communities, enabling exchange and trust;

Peace within social institutions, making division of labor, rules, and organizations predictable;

Peace among nations, making trade, tourism, investment, and friendship possible.

Peace is not weakness. It is an intersubjective symbiotic process that respects the dynamic balance of life’s self-organizing connections.

This raises a question worth reconsidering:

Does it really matter so much whether Vietnam is labeled “socialist” or “capitalist”?

If a country calling itself socialist continually releases the self-organizing vitality of individuals, families, markets, and society, while another organization calling itself free, democratic, or capitalist continually adds rules, institutions, positions, and controls, then which one is actually more respectful of life?

What truly deserves examination is no longer the label.

The question is:

What, exactly, is happening between organization and life?

II. The United Nations Provides a Revealing Organizational Specimen Once Ideology Is Peeled Away

This brings us to the United Nations.

The United Nations is not a socialist state.

Nor is it a capitalist state.

It is neither an Eastern nor a Western country; it is not a nation-state, and it cannot simply be assigned to a particular class, religion, or civilization.

Precisely for that reason, the United Nations offers an unusually revealing specimen for observing organizational pathology.

If we temporarily remove variables such as socialism versus capitalism, left versus right, and East versus West, we can ask more directly:

Why does an organization founded for peace, security, human rights, and international cooperation also generate proliferating institutions, proliferating mandates, proliferating meetings, proliferating reports, and proliferating bureaucratic procedures?

The United Nations itself has had to acknowledge this problem.

By 2026, more than 40,000 resolutions, decisions, and related mandates had accumulated over the UN’s eighty-year history. In 2024 alone, the Secretariat serviced more than 27,000 intergovernmental meetings. On March 31, 2026, while advancing mandate-review reform, President of the General Assembly Annalena Baerbock publicly noted that the burden created by more than 40,000 active mandates and 27,000 meetings a year could not continue as before. UN80 reform documents likewise acknowledged long-standing problems of duplication, overlap, fragmentation, misaligned funding, and unclear lines of responsibility.

More strikingly, when António Guterres released the UN80 reform progress report in May 2026, he stated plainly:

The status quo is unsustainable.

Reforming the United Nations, of course, did not begin with Guterres.

From Boutros-Ghali to Annan, from Ban Ki-moon to Guterres, UN reform has been discussed for decades: institutional restructuring, budget reform, management reform, development-system reform, peacekeeping reform, Security Council reform—the proposals have hardly been few.

Yet why has “UN reform” itself almost become a standing item on the UN agenda?

Why, after decades of reform, was another UN80 initiative still needed at the organization’s eightieth anniversary?

To say merely that “reform has not gone far enough” may no longer explain the problem.

We have to dig one layer deeper:

Does organization itself contain a mechanism of self-reproduction?

III. From “Bureaucratism” to “Bureaucolonialism”

I have used the concept of “Bureaucolonialism” for years.

Today, I believe its domain of application should be broadened further.

Bureaucolonialism is not the monopoly of socialism or capitalism; it belongs neither exclusively to East nor West; indeed, it is not even confined to the machinery of the state.

It is a form of organizational cancer that cuts across systems, cultures, and ideologies.

Every organization begins with a purpose entrusted to it.

Government is entrusted by the people, nationals, and citizens;

Enterprises bear responsibilities arising from their relationships with investors, employees, consumers, and the social contract;

Universities are entrusted with education and the creation of knowledge;

Hospitals are entrusted with human health;

Public-interest organizations are entrusted with public purposes;

The United Nations is entrusted by its member states and by humanity’s shared expectations for peace, security, and cooperation.

But once an organization is formed, it generates positions, power, budgets, rules, resources, and people empowered to interpret those rules.

The danger begins there.

Those who control the machinery of the state or other large organizations, possessing power, status, and money, may gradually cast themselves as the Subject, use public purposes for private ends, and reduce others—who are equally subjects—to Objects to be dominated, manipulated, and exploited.

Then:

Missions create institutions;

Institutions create positions;

Positions require budgets;

Budgets require projects;

Projects require mandates;

Mandates generate rules;

Rules require more executors;

And executors require more objects of jurisdiction to justify their own necessity.

Organization thus reproduces itself continuously as Reproductive Officialdom.

Eventually, an organization that originally existed to fulfill a mission begins searching for missions in order to sustain itself.

This is what I call Bureaucolonialism.

It goes a layer deeper than “bureaucratism” in the ordinary sense.

Bureaucratism may appear as red tape, inefficiency, buck-passing, and rigidity.

Bureaucolonialism asks a further question:

Why can an organizational structure that is already inefficient, ineffective, or even harmful continue to reproduce itself?

Because office can generate power, power can generate benefits, and benefits can in turn protect office; institutions can generate institutions, rules can generate rules, and budgets can generate budgets, ultimately forming an organizational ecology capable of self-reproduction, self-protection, self-interpretation, and self-justification.

That is why the “reproductive” in Reproductive Officialdom cannot be discarded.

IV. The “Utmost” in “Saying All the Right Things While Doing Harm to the Utmost”

Bureaucolonialism is often most dangerous not when it openly declares:

“I want to dominate you.”

Quite the opposite: it frequently speaks in the most appealing language.

“All under Heaven belongs to the public.”

“Serve the people.”

“The people above all.”

“Fairness and justice.”

“The common interest.”

“The welfare of all humanity.”

“Peace and development.”

Human political history has never lacked beautiful words.

Hence the sharp old saying:

Speaking the words of Yao and Shun while doing the deeds of Jie and Zhou.

In today’s language:

Saying all the right things while doing harm to the utmost.

But the “utmost” here should not be understood merely as carrying wrongdoing to an extreme.

It has a deeper meaning:

Blocking off the normal paths through which life grows.

Those who control the machinery of the state and possess power, status, and money cast themselves as the Subject, use public purposes for private ends, and treat others as Objects to be dominated, manipulated, and exploited. Organizations reproduce themselves and lose the trust placed in them by the lives of the people, nationals, and citizens; they burden the work of ordering the world and benefiting the people, depart from the normal workings of social life, and ultimately not only exhaust social resources but block, one by one, the channels through which life could otherwise self-organize, self-connect, and create.

Thus one may proclaim “All under Heaven belongs to the public” while forming factions for private gain;

Proclaim “serve the people” while competing with the people for benefits;

Invoke the public interest while converting public power into positions, approvals, budgets, monopolies, and special interests;

Demand selfless sacrifice from ordinary people while allowing internal organizational interests to reproduce without end.

At this point we must ask:

Whose “public” is the “public” in “All under Heaven belongs to the public”?

If the “public” is not a publicness generated through interaction among living subjects, but instead a political organization first declares itself the embodiment of “the public” and then monopolizes the power to define, interpret, and enforce that “public,” the phrase may undergo its most dangerous semantic inversion:

“Public” no longer means that power belongs to everyone;

It becomes the exercise of power by a few in everyone’s name.

Likewise, “serving the people” can invert the principal-trustee relationship:

The people are originally the principals, and the organization is the trustee;

In the end, the organization becomes the master, while the people are required to support, obey, and serve the organization.

This is no longer simply a dispute between public and private.

It is the reversal of the positions of living subjects and organizational trustees. This is the insight of Milovan Djilas’s 1957 book The New Class.

V. Why Is Mises’s Warning Also a Moral Judgment?

Seen in this light, when we return to Milei’s citation of Mises at the United Nations General Assembly, its significance reaches far beyond a libertarian political speech.

Mises’s institutional insight worth taking seriously is this:

Once the state begins to intervene in individual ways of life, it will proceed toward regulating the details of life and ultimately abolishing individual freedom.

Why?

Because one intervention requires a rule;

A rule requires an enforcement institution;

An institution requires personnel, positions, and a budget;

And positions and budgets require more matters to enter their jurisdiction in order to justify the institution’s continued existence.

Thus, limited intervention initially undertaken for some public purpose can gradually generate an entire organizational structure that derives its occupation, resources, and power from regulating the lives of others.

This is certainly institutional analysis.

But it is also a moral judgment.

For in the end it asks:

Can good intentions automatically confer authorization to dominate the lives of others?

No.

“All under Heaven belongs to the public” cannot.

“Serving the people” cannot.

“The welfare of all humanity” cannot either.

What Intersubjective Symbiosism seeks to change is precisely this Subject–Object relationship.

I recognize you as a subject;

You recognize me as a subject;

Different subjects connect, interact, and resonate with one another, thereby generating new value, new possibilities, and new life.

Life is inherently self-sufficient, yet never exists alone.

True “publicness,” therefore, is not an outcome predefined by some subject standing above billions of objects. It can only be continually generated through real interactions among countless subjects.

VI. Why Has Eighty Years of UN Reform Still Failed to Reform the UN?

Seen from this perspective, the United Nations becomes easier to understand.

The United Nations founded in 1945 is certainly not a “bad organization.”

Quite the contrary. It emerged after two world wars from humanity’s desire to avoid another descent into destruction, and the historical significance of its ideal of peace cannot be denied.

But:

The nobility of an organization’s founding ideals does not prove that every aspect of its operating mechanism eighty years later remains reasonable.

The UN’s present financial difficulties provide a very concrete signal.

For 2026, China, the second-largest contributor to the UN regular budget, did not pay its regular-budget assessment of approximately US$641.4 million in full until September 1. The United States did not pay US$725 million toward the regular budget and roughly US$102 million toward peacekeeping until mid-September; even after those payments, more than US$1.3 billion in U.S. regular-budget arrears remained.

The two largest contributors both delayed substantial payments until around the eve of the General Assembly. This of course reflects complex and differing factors—domestic politics, fiscal arrangements, and disagreements over UN policies among them—and cannot simply be attributed to a single cause.

But for someone analyzing Organizational Trust, it at least raises a question:

Why are member states increasingly reluctant to hand over their money to this organization on time?

Trust does not exist only in words.

Money is also a vote of confidence.

Whether resources continue to be entrusted is itself a form of real-world feedback from principals to a trustee organization.

The UN’s own UN80 reform initiative acknowledges excessive mandates, too many meetings and reports, overlapping responsibilities, fragmented implementation, mismatches between resources and tasks, and inadequate accountability for results.

Milei’s criticism, therefore, did not come out of nowhere.

He argued that the United Nations had developed an increasingly large bureaucracy seeking to decide how people in countries around the world should live. He also argued that an organization that says countless things and adopts countless resolutions, yet cannot make its words produce corresponding results in the real world, loses what matters most—authority.

Such criticism can be debated.

But it cannot be disposed of simply by attaching the labels “right-wing” or “libertarian” to Milei.

Labels cannot substitute for facts.

VII. In 2018, I Was Not Arguing That We Should “Do Away with the United Nations”

As early as 2018, my essay “Global Governance and United Nations Reform” was included in Global Symbiosism: A Chinese School for Resolving Conflict and Rebuilding World Order, formally published in Taiwan by Morning Star Publishing.

My basic judgment at the time was precisely this:

Unlike the European Union, ASEAN, the Group of Seven, or the Group of Twenty, the United Nations should not become an exclusive community of interests. It should become a Civil Symbiont that “abandons no living being on Earth.”

I had already identified another structural contradiction:

Desertification, environmental and climate issues, refugees, food security, biochemical and nuclear weapons, transnational disasters, outer space, public health, and other global issues were increasingly supranational, trans-geopolitical, and trans-civilizational in character, while the existing United Nations remained organized primarily around sovereign states.

Global problems had crossed old boundaries, but organizational structures had not crossed them at the same pace.

I therefore proposed expanding the functions of the largely inactive Trusteeship Council and further establishing a UN Global Symbiosism Council (GSC), bringing global citizens, countries and regions, international organizations, NGOs, organizations in education, science, culture, health, sports, arts and media, multinational enterprises, and other social actors into global governance.

At that time, my main question was:

How should the United Nations be reformed?

Eight years later, I am willing to ask a further question of my own proposal:

Even if a GSC were actually established, who could guarantee that it would not itself become bureaucolonialized decades later?

No one can guarantee that merely by virtue of a name.

An institution called a “Symbiosism Council” is not inherently symbiotic.

Just as an organization that includes words such as “people,” “republic,” “democracy,” “public,” or “public interest” in its name is not thereby inherently of the people, democratic, or public.

No organization is exempt from examination.

VIII. Supranational Governance Does Not Mean Creating a “Super-Sovereign”

The day before Milei’s speech, Trump stood at the same United Nations General Assembly podium and approached the boundary of global Organizational Trust from another direction. He stated explicitly:

“There is no global government.”

He immediately added that as long as he was president there would be no “global taxes.” His meaning was clear: international cooperation cannot become a justification for unelected global bureaucrats continually expanding their power, and international organizations cannot mutate from coordinators among states into rulers standing above sovereign nations.

Placed side by side, Trump’s and Milei’s speeches make the question clearer:

Trump asks: What gives an international organization the right to move from coordinator to Subject standing above sovereign states?

Milei asks: What gives a bureaucratic organization the right to move from trustee to Subject prescribing how others should live?

We must go one step further:

What gives any organization the right to move from trustee of life to ruler over life?

This also requires a clearer boundary for the UN Global Symbiosism Council (GSC) I proposed in 2018. I argued then that climate, oceans, refugees, public health, outer space, and many other issues were becoming supranational, trans-geopolitical, and trans-civilizational and therefore required governance extending beyond the boundaries of any single state.

That judgment still stands. But another point must be stated just as clearly:

Supranational problems do not imply super-sovereignty; supranational governance certainly does not mean establishing a “world government.”

The world needs global cooperation, but not necessarily a world government. The need to solve global problems cannot justify reducing states, citizens, and social organizations from Subjects to Objects and then constructing an even larger Subject above them. Otherwise, missions create mandates, mandates create institutions, institutions create positions, budgets, and more rules, and Bureaucolonialism can emerge all over again.

The GSC, therefore, should not become an embryo of “world government.” It should be a global Organizational Trust mechanism based on Intersubjective Symbiosism: states, citizens, communities, enterprises, social organizations, and international organizations remain different subjects; through limited authorization they connect, interact, and resonate in common affairs. Power has boundaries, responsibility is traceable, costs are measurable, results are verifiable, conduct is correctable, and mandates are revocable.

This is the fundamental distinction between Intersubjective Symbiosism and the logic of “world government”:

Not One Subject → All Objects,

but Subjects ↔ Subjects → Symbiosis.

The real question, therefore, is not the binary choice of “national sovereignty or global governance,” but how to find the “between” in which a new possibility can be generated:

Global problems require common governance, but common governance must occur among subjects, not above them.

Trump’s “There is no global government,” Milei’s challenge to bureaucratic control over other people’s lives, and Intersubjective Symbiosism converge here on an important point:

The world needs global cooperation, but not necessarily a world government; it needs supranational governance, but must not manufacture super-sovereignty.

How to ensure that such organizations do not themselves undergo Bureaucolonialist cancerization is precisely the question of organizational immunity that must be answered next.

IX. The Question Has Moved from “How to Reform Organizations” to “How to Block Organizational Cancerization”

Therefore, if today’s discussion of UN reform still consists only of:

Abolishing a few institutions;

Reducing a few positions;

Cutting some budgets;

Merging a few departments;

that is probably still not enough.

These things should of course be done.

But if the generative mechanism of Bureaucolonialism remains unchanged, ten institutions cut today may be replaced by twenty tomorrow.

What is truly needed is a form of organizational immunity.

Every organization must continually answer:

Who entrusted you?

What were you entrusted to do?

How many resources of life have you consumed?

How much cost have you reduced?

How much capability have you enabled?

How much health have you increased?

How much trust have you created?

How much peace have you brought?

This is precisely the significance of GDE in Symbionomics:

C—Cost Reduction; E—Empowerment; H—Health; T—Trust; P—Peace.

We can then use ηᵢ = GDEᵢ/GDPᵢ to examine the life-effectiveness of specific projects, organizations, and economic activities, and ultimately move toward the overall measure R = GDE/GDP.

An organization cannot simply declare:

“My mission is great, therefore my existence is inherently justified.”

Life itself must be allowed to ask in return:

What, exactly, have you brought to me?

Through discovery, recording, rights confirmation, Reward–Restrain–Pass-Through, Mind Bank, and value fulfillment, organizational behavior can then enter a real feedback mechanism:

Reward behavior that genuinely empowers life;

Restrain behavior that continually creates burdens;

Open the connections of life blocked by power, departments, and special interests.

Only then does Organizational Trust cease to be merely a beautiful phrase.

X. Why Do Vietnam and Milei Meet Here?

One is Vietnam under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The other is Javier Milei, an Argentine president who openly embraces libertarianism.

On the ideological map of the twentieth century, the two appear far apart.

But once the labels are stripped away, a common question worth studying becomes visible.

Vietnam’s reforms over nearly four decades have, to a considerable extent, involved:

Removing barriers that obstruct life’s self-organizing connections.

Milei’s reforms in Argentina have focused on reducing the organizational costs of government, cutting regulations, eliminating some institutions, and limiting unnecessary state intervention in economic and social life; at the United Nations, he extended this criticism to international organizations.

The two are certainly not the same kind of reform, nor does this mean that all of their specific policies can be copied from one to the other.

But both force us to answer anew:

Should organization dominate life, or empower life?

What makes Vietnam and Milei especially worth studying for people in mainland China, therefore, is not the prospect of copying Vietnam or mechanically transplanting Argentina.

It is the need to re-examine words that have become all too familiar:

Public ownership.

State ownership.

Ownership by the whole people.

Collective ownership.

Serving the people.

All under Heaven belongs to the public.

Names tell us nothing decisive about the relationship of trust.

To determine whether an organization is truly “for the public,” we cannot merely listen to what it calls itself. We must ask:

Who holds power?

Who bears the cost?

Who receives the benefit?

Who can correct errors?

Who can say “no”?

Can the trustee truly be constrained by the principal?

If those who control the machinery of the state and possess power, status, and money become permanent Subjects, while the people, nationals, and citizens can only be Objects to be managed, allocated, dominated, or even exploited, then no beautiful ideological packaging can change the fact that the relationship of trust has been inverted.

XI. Why Can Bureaucolonialism Ultimately Lead to “Mutual Destruction”?

The metaphor of “cancerization” is not used for sensational effect.

What makes a cancer cell dangerous is not that it possesses some “bad ideology.”

It was originally part of the living body.

The problem is that it loses its normal relationship with the whole organism, begins to proliferate abnormally, and continually draws nutrients from the entire organism in order to sustain its own reproduction.

What happens in the end?

The host becomes weaker and weaker.

The cancer cells become more and more numerous.

Until the host dies.

And the day the host dies is also the day the cancer cells lose the conditions of their own survival.

Bureaucolonialism has an alarming structural correspondence with this process:

Organizations arise from social needs;

Organizations gradually begin abnormal self-reproduction;

Organizations continually absorb social resources to sustain that reproduction;

Living subjects become progressively weaker;

Organizational Trust continually collapses;

Ultimately, the whole society enters systemic crisis.

That is why I say:

Those who control the machinery of the state and possess power, status, and money cast themselves as the Subject, use public purposes for private ends, and treat others as Objects to be dominated, manipulated, and exploited. Organizations reproduce themselves and lose the trust placed in them by the lives of the people, nationals, and citizens; they burden the work of ordering the world and benefiting the people and depart from the normal workings of social life. In the end—

Either they destroy themselves, or they drag everyone into mutual destruction.

This is the “utmost” in “saying all the right things while doing harm to the utmost.”

It means not only carrying wrongdoing to an extreme.

It may also mean blocking off the very paths by which life can continue to generate itself.

XII. The Twentieth Century Fought over Ideologies; the Twenty-First Century Must Rebuild Organizational Trust

Looking back over more than a century, humanity has invested enormous amounts of life-energy in ideological disputes.

Socialism or capitalism?

Left or right?

State or market?

East or West?

Nationalism or globalism?

These questions certainly matter.

But if all our attention remains fixed on them, we may miss a more fundamental fact:

Whatever the ideology, once it forms an organization; whatever the organization, once it controls power, resources, and rules, it faces the same danger: Will the trustee become the ruler? Will the servant become the dominator? Will the organization turn from empowering life to sustaining itself?

Cancer cells do not ask about ideology.

Neither does Bureaucolonialism.

Thus, when Milei cited Mises from the UN podium, the people who should listen were not only libertarians.

His words in fact pose the simplest moral question to every organization that seeks the right to dominate other people’s lives in the name of a lofty objective:

What gives you the right?

This is not an argument against public life.

Quite the opposite.

Only when one subject ceases to reduce another subject to an object can a genuine “public” come into being.

Only by moving from the domination of Subject–Object relations toward Intersubjective Symbiosism can organizations once again become trustees of life.

In 2018, I proposed a Global Symbiosism Council in the hope of changing the organizational structure through which the United Nations addresses global affairs. Eight years later, I would add a stricter principle to that proposal:

No organization, however lofty the ideal on which it was founded, possesses an inherent moral exemption; no power, whether exercised in the name of “All under Heaven belongs to the public,” “serving the people,” or “the welfare of all humanity,” can be exempt from continuous examination of its effectiveness for life.

Because:

Organizations arise from what life entrusts to them, and they must be examined according to whether life actually benefits.

In the twentieth century, people argued over:

What ideology should organize human beings?

In the twenty-first century, we must also ask:

Who will prevent organizations from devouring human beings?

Once the ideological shells of socialism and capitalism, left and right, East and West, nation-state and multiculturalism are peeled away, we discover:

Bureaucolonialism is still there.

What is truly needed, therefore, is not another beautiful ideology to replace the previous one, but an organizational immune mechanism capable of continuously blocking the cancerization of Bureaucolonialism.

From dominating life back to empowering life;

From organizational self-reproduction back to life’s self-organizing connections;

From Subject–Object back to Intersubjective;

From organizational distrust back to Organizational Trust.

To completely block the cancerizing effects of Bureaucolonialism on organizations of every kind, large and small—

That is where rebuilding Organizational Trust truly begins.