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ZT:心灵哲学 2013-05-13 06:38:46

心灵哲学

百科名片

西方哲学部门中有一门叫 「心灵哲学」的(The philosophy of mind) 。它提出 的问题是,世界事物都有物理的部分,但这众多的物理部分是如何统合的?例如当我在阅读时,眼睛在由左至右看,手指在翻动纸张,大脑在使用能量,血液在输送 氧,肺部在呼吸,神经在细胞与大脑之间输送讯息,这一切都是物理的部分

编辑本段基本问题

但这 一切物理的部分是如何统合而成为一次「阅读」的经验呢?与「我」有何关系呢?「我」是否在物理身体之外呢?身体死亡之后,「我」是否仍然存在呢?「心灵」 与我的大脑是否是同一样的东西?「心灵」在哪里呢?我是否可以用我的「心灵」 与别人的「心灵」沟通?或我们只是在猜想别人的「心灵」是如何如何呢?现代科技创造人工智能可能吗? 以上这些问题都是西方哲学中「心灵哲学」会讨论到的问题,它们牵涉到生物 学、心理学、社会学、计算机科技等其它领域,但最主要是这些科目如何与我的「心灵」有关系。这些问题中最基本的一个是,心灵与我们身体的关系是怎样的?

编辑本段解决方向

西方哲学处理这个问题时有两个方向,一个是偏向肯定身体与行为的物理主义 与行为主义;另一个方向是偏向肯定心灵的理想主义(或观念论)。当然,还有很多 的哲学家是兼论两者的二元论者。先说物理主义,他们肯定只有身体和行为才是最真实的,思想与情感等东西都是由物理性质的身体所形成,如大脑的电子脉冲,肌肉的化学反应等物理现象会形 成我们各种思考和情感反应。他们提出两个实例证明此说,一是用电流刺激大脑, 对人的性情有所影响,现代医学上是有用这个方法来医治一些情绪低落的病人的。另一个例子是一个大脑严重受损的人,受损前后是完全两种模样的,受损后甚至是 否可被称为「一个人」也有问题。总之,所谓一个人就是大脑加身体加神经系统。相信我们都不反对人是有大脑、身体、神经系统的,但除此以外,真是没有其 他成分吗?一名母亲抱着她的婴孩在胸前慢动作左右摇摆,你是否只见到一名中年 妇女双手屈曲紧扣,手上放置了一名重十多磅的婴儿在作四十五度和每秒一下的摆> 动呢?难道你看不见她的动作流露出的关怀和爱心?南京大屠杀中,你是否只见到 一名军人拿着重三十磅的大刀在斜向四十五度的角度,用一百磅力度移向另一名男子的颈部,而跟着该男子的颈部以某时速的速度滚在一旁,血液则以每秒某公升的 速度向上喷出?你看不到其中的残酷吗?这些物理现象背后真的没有其它东西存在 吗?

编辑本段康德思想

西哲康德就曾指出人理性范围所见只是现象,但现象背后的物自身世界就非人理性所能认知了。
康德这是指出世界之两层性,但他承认除了现象外,还有其它世 界、其它东西存在,只是不能由知性理性认知而已,「道德」就是其中一种。由此 可见,物理主义所说实与我们生活所感有所乖离。相反于物理主义,理想主义(或译「观念论」)肯定精神多于物质,由于我们 所见的物质、身体、他人的身体、和一切经验到的,都可能是假的,因为都是经由 我们的心灵所反映给我们知道的。著名的例子是西方近代哲学之父笛卡尔的怀疑论,我们感官所知的一切都不一定是真的,都可能是假的,只有「我思故我在」才是最 真实的。这才是哲学的起点。当然笛卡尔哲学的怀疑论只是起点,最后笛卡尔仍然 保住了身体与世界的真实性,并非真正极端的理想主义者。贝克莱和莱布尼兹才真正是理想主义者。 贝克莱认为所有事物都是在心灵上存在的。我们认知世界只能通过感官而不能 由其它途径认知,这个世界就是由于这些感官的知觉所组成的。这些知觉都是观念,是心灵上存在的观念,所谓「红的感觉」不能离开心灵而独立存在。因此世界的存在,即由众多观念组合而成的世界,因而称为「被感知」的。因此有「存在即被感 知」的名言。若这里有一张桌子,我看到、摸到,故我感知到桌子的存在,我有桌子的观念, 桌子也因我的感知而成为一个存在物。但当我合上眼睛,收起双手时,这桌子即不 存在,因我没有了观念。当我再睁开眼睛时,这桌子又实时存在了,因为它又再成为我的观念,又再被我感知了。那么贝克莱如何解释桌子的连续存在呢?他认为当 我不看桌子时,会有其它人在看它,它便又继续存在了。那么,如果在深山中有一 桌子,但无人看见又如何呢?贝克莱认为最后也会有上帝在感知,所以是存在的。因为有上帝,所以万物存在。 但到底这些感官的感知是否真的是心灵的?这些感知是不是纯心灵的或纯主观 的呢?会不会有物理性的成分,有部分是客观的呢? 莱布尼兹认为世界可分为心灵上的和物质上的存在,但是凡物质上的存在都可被分解为众多的小部分,小部分又可再被分解,直至最后不能再被分解为止,那时 便是无数的单子,单子是不可被分的单位。但这些单子既是不可被分,则单子是不 占空间的东西,因为凡占空间的都可被分,不占空间而存在的,便只有在心灵上的存在了。这就是他著名的「单子论」了。 「心灵」(或译「精神」)在现代的意义很多时是指人的思想,但莱布尼兹明 显不是用此意义。
在他的时代,由于笛卡尔的世界是二分的,分为物质与心灵,故莱布尼兹继承了这种二分,无可选择地不是物质性的便只好选择心灵的。若在今天, 他可能会选用仍是物理意义但较为抽象的「能量」概念来解释,相信会更符合他的 意思。虽然莱布尼兹的单子是在心灵上存在,但他如何用单子来解释一些抽象的概念如公义、仁慈等呢?关于这点,他似乎未有好好的解释。 至于其它二元论者又如何解释心灵与身体的关系呢?柏拉图在《斐多篇》里认为身体是合成的,因此易坏;心灵是简单的,因此不易坏,因此理型既是不变的,便应存在于心灵中。由于心灵中有不朽的理型存在,因此心灵也是不朽的。你可能 不同意柏拉图这些说法,但有一点要留意的是,柏拉图其实指出了心灵不是时空中 物,因此心灵不是指我们的大脑。另外一点较多人接受的是心灵很多时是在沟通中展现出来的。沟通其实是牵涉 了主客或两个不同领域的区分。笛卡尔说「我思故我在」时其实是明显的区分出外 在的世界和内在的心灵,世界与心灵是两个领域,有分别但又互相影响。笛卡尔的心灵有偏向现代的神经系统的倾向,因为他认为心灵可影响身体,而世界是被物理 定律所决定,如果心灵要影响世界便得透过身体的活动,因此如果心灵不能指挥身 体活动,则外在世界只是一封闭系统而与心灵无关。但笛卡尔的心灵又是非经验的,不在时空之中,不是身体的一部分,但又有关于身体,可影响身体,因此《心灵的 概念》作者莱尔 曾称笛卡尔这个观点为「机器中的幽灵」。
二元论说法之中,又有所谓假象论和互动论。假象论是说我们的大脑和神经系统如此复杂,令我们有可独立决定或自由选择的假象。心灵好像是自由选择以影响 外在世界的现象,而其实外在世界只是依从物理定律而转变,一早已被决定,所谓 心灵决定也只是大脑细胞的电子脉冲影响而已。这说法其实是物理主义,心灵根本没有丝毫影响力。就像现在的计算机仿真的人工智能一样,人与计算机下棋,计算机好像 懂得用心思考而跟你一着一着的下棋,但其实只是有人早已把很多很多的复杂的变 化输入到其系统中,计算机经一轮复杂的运算后而得出结果,好像人用思考出来的一样,但其实只是一连串的机械程序而已。 至于互动论者最主要面对的问题是,如果心灵与身体是区分开的,那么它们是 如何做到互相影响的呢?好像牙齿坏了(物理现象)而导致痛苦和不快乐(心灵感受),或因害怕(心灵感受)而导致冒出冷汗和战抖(物理现象)。但这两者(心 灵和现象)之间有没有分界线呢?没有又如何分开为两个领域呢?若有,两者又如 何越过分界而连在一起产生互动呢?关于以上问题,其中一种解释是「偶然论」,即是牙齿坏了与痛楚是偶然同时 出现,并无因果关系,甚至有极端的哲学家认为并不是人的心灵在控制自己挥动臂 膀,而其实是上帝在控制你的臂膀挥动而已!这解释完全否定了因果律,像极端的怀疑论一样。 另一种解释是「预设和谐论」。他们认为心灵与世界虽然互为独立,但因在一 预设的和谐中运作,故可运作得很顺利而看来好像互相影响,就好像莱布尼兹单子 论的预设和谐一样。单子既互为独立,因何可以一起形成活动,就是在一预设的和谐中的缘故,而这其实是上帝的预设。这本是莱布尼兹用来解释目的论论证,证明 上帝存在的说法,但后来也有哲学家用来解释心灵与世界的互动。
还有一种「一体两面论」。斯宾诺莎就是持此说者,他认为所有存在都是有心灵一面和物质一面,心灵与身体是不能分开,是同一存在的两个面向。例如:思想 是心灵表现,但从另一面向看,便是大脑脉冲的表现,或者我们可称心灵表现为内在的表现,现象世界为外在的表现,则思想为内在表现,大脑脉冲为外在表现。又 例如听音乐,欣赏音乐是内在心灵的表现,声音波长与频率是外在世界的表现。这 个说法的问题是,如史宾诺莎所指出,所谓「选择自由」只是幻象,我们根本没有任何抉择的力量。因为外在世界的现象完全受制于物理定律,完全没有自由性,如 果心灵表现只是一体之两面,则心灵也是不自由的。 那么到底心灵与世界是可分开的或不能分开的?是否互相影响?关系为何?由以上所论可见,西方传统哲学所论之「心」,主要包括两种机能,一种是心灵与世 界的关系,即心灵如何知道世界的问题;另一种机能是意志的机能,即心灵如何使 我们的身体在世界上作出行为,即如何实践出心灵的要求的问题。这个结论当然是概括西方传统主流哲学而说,其中也有少数哲学家讨论心灵是牵涉道德问题,但不 是主流。但中国哲学在讨论「心」的哲学时则是以讨论道德问题为主,正可见中西 哲学取向不同,如果总是以西方哲学所要求的来评论中国哲学便会有所偏差了。

编辑本段笛卡尔思想

简要概括

心灵哲学成为当代西方哲学中最活跃的学科之一,该领域爆发了并正在进行着所谓的“本体论变革”,笛卡尔的二元论的思想成为他们批判的对象,因此,笛卡尔对心灵哲学所作的贡献是大多数哲学家所忽略的问题,本文将结合当代“本体论变革”中的部分思想对笛卡尔心灵哲学的思想进行全面的分析和评价。
最近三、四十年,心灵哲学作为哲学的一大分支,倍受哲学家的关注,得到了前所未有的发展,成为当代西方哲学中最活跃的学科之一。并且,该领域爆发了并正在进行着所谓的“本体论变革”。这一变革,共同的目的是批判、颠覆常识的心身观和潜藏在大多数并未超越笛卡尔的思想。

基本思想

笛卡尔的关于心灵哲学的思想大致可以从三个方面概括:自我意识、心身关系、人与机器。
自我意识。笛卡尔的方法是以“怀疑”开路的。他的形而上学的沉思的“第一沉思”就是普遍的怀疑。我在怀疑,这也是在说,我在思想。既然肯定我在思想,那么就必须也肯定我的存在。在他看来,“我思”必然依附一个主体,那就是我。因此,我是存在的。既然我是存在的,那就必然占有一定的空间,因此就具有广延的属性,属性又依附一定的实体,因而就推出了“物质实体”。我是一个实体,这个实体的全部本质和本性就是思想。“思”就是以属性而存在的,和上面一样又推出了“心灵实体”。
心身关系。上面已经说了,笛卡尔的“物质实体”和“心灵实体”是从属性“广延”和“思”中推出来的。他认为,“广延”和“思”无论从哪个层面上来看都不可能还原为对方,因此,它们具有不可还原性,物质实体和心灵实体具有绝对的区别,进而,他就提出了心身二元论的思想。
人和机器。笛卡尔是“人和机器说”的坚决反对者。他认为人不是机器,动物才是机器,因为人和动物的身体是物质的不同形态,所以它们也服从物质的普遍规律。他同意将动物和人的肉体看作机器。但是,一旦超出了肉体和物质的范围,进入意识和精神的层面,就不能将动物和人同等对待。

编辑本段参考文献

[1]高新民、刘占锋,心灵的解构——心灵哲学本体论变革研究,中国社会科学出版社
[2]十六——十八世纪西欧各国哲学,商务印书馆
[3]笛卡尔,第一哲学沉思集,第二卷
[4]笛卡尔,论灵魂的激情,第一部
[5]高新民、殷筱,心灵的解构:当代西方心灵哲学的“本体论变革”
[6]周晓亮,自我意识、心身关系、人与机器——试论笛卡尔的心理哲学思想

编辑本段图书

基本信息

作 者:高新民储昭华 著
出 版 社:商务印书馆
ISBN:9787100033237
出版时间:2002-07-01
页 数:1145
定 价:70.00元

内容简介

《心灵哲学》从该学科的大量研究领域中挑选了最近研究较多、属前言和焦点问题的九大问题,内容全面丰富,理论鲜明,值得心理学研究者参考。 心灵哲学是现当代西方哲学中与语言哲学、科学哲学具有同等地位的哲学分支。心灵哲学主要研究的是心理现象的形式、范围、本质、特征、心身关系、心理内容及其根源等,并对常识心理解释模式和心理学进行哲学反思。
一部风格独特的心灵语录,解精神饥渴,指心灵之路。 我们比以往任何时候都更加迫切地需要建立一门相对独立于灵魂学和心理学的专门研究心灵的人文科学,这就是——心灵哲学。心灵哲学旨在使我们进一步认识心灵的本质、心灵的特征、心灵的存在、变化方式,更重要的是使我们懂得如何净化自己的心灵,升华自己的心灵,涵养自己的心灵,保护自己的心灵;如何使自己的心灵纯洁、自由、独立、宁静而崇高,进而升华自己的人生境界,完美地走过自己人之为人的一生。

图书目录

第一部分 心身问题
心身问题、描述心理学与心理物理学问题/罗德里克·M.齐硕姆
心理与物理的偶然等同论/D.M.阿姆斯特朗
心理事件与大脑/保罗·K.费耶阿本德
自然层次的连续性/威廉·G.利康
把功能还给功能主义/埃里奥特·索伯
第二部分 感受性质
副现象的感受性质/弗兰克·杰克逊
玛丽不知道什么/弗兰克·杰克逊
成为一只蝙蝠可能是什么样子/托马斯·内格尔
感受性质与物理主义、取消主义/金在权
功能主义与感受性质/悉尼·休梅克
感受性质、表征论与自然主义/弗雷德·德雷特斯克
第三部分 随附性
随附性的种种概念/金在权
本体论的随附性/约翰·豪格兰德
上帝心灵中的还原/丹尼尔·博恩瓦克
物理主义、随附性与依赖性/保罗·K.莫泽J.D.特劳特
第四部分 意识
“意识”一词的两种用法/诺曼·马尔科姆
勇敢地面对意识难题/大卫·J.查默
意识、信息与泛心论/威廉·西格尔
意识、民众心理学与认知科学/阿尔文·I.戈德曼
关于心灵起源的四个假说/朱利安·杰恩斯
第五部分 思想的语言与心理表征
第六部分 意向性与心理内容理论
第七部分 他心问题
第八部分 行动哲学
人名译名对照/
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作者:stinger 留言时间:2013-05-13 09:25:40
叫意识哲学也不行,因为已经有“philosophy of consciousness".
回复 | 0
作者:慕容青草 留言时间:2013-05-13 08:17:09
呵呵。。。有意思。。。兔子把万维所说的刷屏用到自己的博客上来了。。。:)
回复 | 0
作者:嘎拉哈 留言时间:2013-05-13 07:09:55
俺觉得叫“意识哲学”比较合适。在中文里“心灵”一词带有灵魂(spirit)外加一点道德的味道。
回复 | 0
作者:stinger 留言时间:2013-05-13 06:42:17
Philosophy of mind
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


A phrenological mapping[1] of the brain. Phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain.
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind-body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.[2][3][4]
Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind-body problem. Dualism can be traced back to Plato,[5] and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy,[6] but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century.[7] Substance Dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas Property Dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.[8]
Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities. This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later espoused by the 17th century rationalist Baruch Spinoza.[9] Physicalists argue that only the entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that the mind will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual-aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism and functionalism.[10]
Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body.[10] These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences.[11][12][13][14] Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position that challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states.[15][16][17] Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the brain is all there is to the mind, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.[18][19] Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues. However, they are far from having been resolved, and modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality (aboutness) of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.[20][21]

The mind-body problem concerns the explanation of the relationship that exists between mind, and body processes.Our old experiences depend on stimulation that arrive at our various Sensory organs from the external world, and these stimulation cause changes in our mental states causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move his or her body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain what he or she wants. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties.A related problem is how someone's propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract.
Contents [hide]
1 Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem
1.1 Arguments for dualism
1.2 Interactionist dualism
1.3 Other forms of dualism
1.3.1 Psychophysical parallelism
1.3.2 Occasionalism
1.3.3 Property dualism
1.3.4 Dual aspect theory
2 Monist solutions to the mind–body problem
2.1 Physicalistic monisms
2.1.1 Behaviorism
2.1.2 Identity theory
2.1.3 Functionalism
2.1.4 Non-reductive physicalism
2.1.5 Weak emergentism
2.1.6 Eliminative materialism
2.2 Non-physicalist monisms
2.2.1 Idealism
2.2.2 Neutral monism
3 Mysterianism
4 Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem
5 Externalism and internalism
6 Naturalism and its problems
6.1 Qualia
6.2 Intentionality
7 Philosophy of perception
8 Philosophy of mind and science
8.1 Neurobiology
8.2 Computer science
8.3 Psychology
8.4 Cognitive science
9 Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
10 Mind in Eastern philosophy
10.1 Mind in Hindu philosophy
10.1.1 Dualism
10.1.2 Vedanta monistic idealism
10.1.3 Materialism
10.2 Buddhist philosophy of mind
10.2.1 Abhidharma theories of mind
10.2.2 Indian Mahayana
10.2.3 Tibetan Buddhism
10.2.4 Zen Buddhism
11 Topics related to philosophy of mind
11.1 Free will
11.2 Self
12 See also
13 References
14 Further reading
15 External links
Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem [edit]

Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter (or body). It begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.[8] One of the earliest known formulations of mind-body dualism was expressed in the eastern Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy (c. 650 BCE), which divided the world into purusha (mind/spirit) and prakriti (material substance).[6] Specifically, the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali presents an analytical approach to the nature of the mind.
In Western Philosophy, the earliest discussions of dualist ideas are in the writings of Plato who maintained that humans' "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, their physical body.[5][22] However, the best-known version of dualism is due to René Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a non-extended, non-physical substance, a "res cogitans".[7] Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness, and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. He was therefore the first to formulate the mind-body problem in the form in which it still exists today.[7]
Arguments for dualism [edit]
The most frequently used argument in favour of dualism is that it appeals to the common-sense intuition that conscious experience is distinct from inanimate matter. If asked what the mind is, the average person would usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity. They would almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice-versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic, or simply unintelligible.[8] Many modern philosophers of mind think that these intuitions are misleading and that we should use our critical faculties, along with empirical evidence from the sciences, to examine these assumptions to determine whether there is any real basis to them.[8]
Another important argument in favor of dualism is that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different, and perhaps irreconcilable, properties.[23] Mental events have a subjective quality, whereas physical events do not. So, for example, one can reasonably ask what a burnt finger feels like, or what a blue sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like to a person. But it is meaningless, or at least odd, to ask what a surge in the uptake of glutamate in the dorsolateral portion of the hippocampus feels like.
Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events 'qualia' or 'raw feels'.[23] There is something that it is like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on. There are qualia involved in these mental events that seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical.[24]
If consciousness (the mind) can exist independently of physical reality (the brain), one must explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One possible explanation is that of a miracle, proposed by Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche, where all mind-body interactions require the direct intervention of God.
Another possible argument has been proposed by C. S. Lewis,[25] is the Argument from Reason: if, as monism implies, all of our thoughts are the effects of physical causes, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground. Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if monism is correct, there would be no way of knowing this—or anything else—we could not even suppose it, except by a fluke.
The zombie argument is based on a thought experiment proposed by Todd Moody, and developed by David Chalmers in his book The Conscious Mind. The basic idea is that one can imagine one's body, and therefore conceive the existence of one's body, without any conscious states being associated with this body. Chalmers' argument is that it seems very plausible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe about a zombie must be true of it. Since none of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be by definition described scientifically via physics, the move from conceivability to possibility is not such a large one.[26] Others such as Dennett have argued that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an incoherent,[27] or unlikely,[28] concept. It has been argued under physicalism that one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's. This argument has been expressed by Dennett who argues that "Zombies think they are conscious; think they have qualia; think they suffer pains—they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!" [27]
Interactionist dualism [edit]


Portrait of René Descartes by Frans Hals (1648)
Interactionist dualism, or simply interactionism, is the particular form of dualism first espoused by Descartes in the Meditations.[7] In the 20th century, its major defenders have been Karl Popper and John Carew Eccles.[29] It is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states.[8]
Descartes' famous argument for this position can be summarized as follows: Seth has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing that has no spatial extension (i.e., it cannot be measured in terms of length, weight, height, and so on). He also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties.[7]
At the same time, however, it is clear that Seth's mental states (desires, beliefs, etc.) have causal effects on his body and vice-versa: A child touches a hot stove (physical event) which causes pain (mental event) and makes her yell (physical event), this in turn provokes a sense of fear and protectiveness in the caregiver (mental event), and so on.
Descartes' argument crucially depends on the premise that what Seth believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true. Many contemporary philosophers doubt this.[30][31][32] For example, Joseph Agassi suggests that several scientific discoveries made since the early 20th century have undermined the idea of privileged access to one's own ideas. Freud claimed that a psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than the person himself does. Duhem has shown that a philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than that person herself does, while Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than the person whose customs and habits they are. He also asserts that modern psychological experiments that cause people to see things that are not there provide grounds for rejecting Descartes' argument, because scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than the person herself can.[33][34] The weakness common to all these arguments against interactionism is that they put all introspective insight in doubt. We know people make mistakes about the world (including other's internal states), but not always. Therefore, it is logically absurd to assume persons are always in error about their own mental states and judgements about the nature of the mind itself.
Other forms of dualism [edit]


Four varieties of dualism. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Occasionalism is not shown.
Psychophysical parallelism [edit]
Psychophysical parallelism, or simply parallelism, is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another. Instead, they run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other.[35] This view was most prominently defended by Gottfried Leibniz. Although Leibniz was an ontological monist who believed that only one type of substance, the monad, exists in the universe, and that everything is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony.[36]
Occasionalism [edit]
Occasionalism is the view espoused by Nicholas Malebranche that asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events, or between physical and mental events, are not really causal at all. While body and mind are different substances, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.[37]
Property dualism [edit]
Property dualism, is the view that the world is constituted of just one kind of substance - the physical kind - and there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical bodies (at least, brains). How mental and physical properties relate causally depends on the variety of property dualism in question, and is not always a clear issue. Sub-varieties of property dualism include:-
Strong emergentism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge in a way not fully accountable for by physical laws. Hence, it is a form of emergent materialism.[8] These emergent properties have an independent ontological status and cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical substrate from which they emerge. They are dependent on the physical properties from which they emerge, but opinions vary as to the coherence of top-down causation, i.e. the causal effectiveness of such properties. A form of property dualism has been espoused by David Chalmers and the concept has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years,[38] but was already suggested in the 19th century by William James.
Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine first formulated by Thomas Henry Huxley.[39] It consists of the view that mental phenomena are causally ineffectual, where one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products (i.e. epiphenomena) of the physical world.[35] This view has been defended most strongly in recent times by Frank Jackson.[40]
Non-reductive Physicalism is the view that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: mental states (such as qualia) are not reducible to physical states. The ontological stance towards qualia in the case of non-reductive physicalism does not imply that qualia are causally inert; this is what distinguishes it from epiphenomenalism.
Panpsychism is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, since it regards everything as having both mental and physical properties. However, some panpsychists say mechanical behaviour is derived from primitive mentality of atoms and molecules—as are sophisticated mentality and organic behaviour, the difference being attributed to the presence or absence of complex structure in a compound object. So long as the reduction of non-mental properties to mental ones is in place, panpsychism is not a (strong) form of property dualism; otherwise it is.
Dual aspect theory [edit]
Dual aspect theory or dual-aspect monism is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance. (Thus it is a mixed position, which is monistic in some respects). In modern philosophical writings,the theory's relationship to neutral monism has become somewhat ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements and the relationships into which they enter to determine whether the group can be thought of as mental, physical, both, or neither, dual-aspect theory suggests that the mental and the physical are manifestations (or aspects) of some underlying substance, entity or process that is itself neither mental nor physical as normally understood. Various formulations of dual-aspect monism also require the mental and the physical to be complementary, mutually irreducible and perhaps inseparable(though distinct).[41][42][43]
Monist solutions to the mind–body problem [edit]

In contrast to dualism, monism does not accept any fundamental divisions. The fundamentally disseparate nature of reality has been central to forms of eastern philosophies for over two millennia. In Indian and Chinese philosophy, monism is integral to how experience is understood. Today, the most common forms of monism in Western philosophy are physicalist.[10] Physicalistic monism asserts that the only existing substance is physical, in some sense of that term to be clarified by our best science.[44] However, a variety of formulations (see below) are possible. Another form of monism, idealism, states that the only existing substance is mental. Although pure idealism, such as that of George Berkeley, is uncommon in contemporary Western philosophy, a more sophisticated variant called panpsychism, according to which mental experience and properties may be at the foundation of physical experience and properties, has been espoused by some philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead and David Ray Griffin.[38]
Phenomenalism is the theory that representations (or sense data) of external objects are all that exist. Such a view was briefly adopted by Bertrand Russell and many of the logical positivists during the early 20th century.[45] A third possibility is to accept the existence of a basic substance that is neither physical nor mental. The mental and physical would then both be properties of this neutral substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza[9] and was popularized by Ernst Mach[46] in the 19th century. This neutral monism, as it is called, resembles property dualism.
Physicalistic monisms [edit]
Behaviorism [edit]
Main article: Behaviorism
Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half.[10] In psychology, behaviorism developed as a reaction to the inadequacies of introspectionism.[44] Introspective reports on one's own interior mental life are not subject to careful examination for accuracy and cannot be used to form predictive generalizations. Without generalizability and the possibility of third-person examination, the behaviorists argued, psychology cannot be scientific.[44] The way out, therefore, was to eliminate the idea of an interior mental life (and hence an ontologically independent mind) altogether and focus instead on the description of observable behavior.[47]
Parallel to these developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism (sometimes called logical behaviorism) was developed.[44] This is characterized by a strong verificationism, which generally considers unverifiable statements about interior mental life senseless. For the behaviorist, mental states are not interior states on which one can make introspective reports. They are just descriptions of behavior or dispositions to behave in certain ways, made by third parties to explain and predict others' behavior.[48]
Philosophical behaviorism has fallen out of favor since the latter half of the 20th century, coinciding with the rise of cognitivism.[2] Cognitivists reject behaviorism due to several perceived problems. For example, behaviorism could be said to be counter-intuitive when it maintains that someone is talking about behavior in the event that a person is experiencing a painful headache.
Identity theory [edit]
Main article: Type physicalism
Type physicalism (or type-identity theory) was developed by John Smart[17] and Ullin Place[49] as a direct reaction to the failure of behaviorism. These philosophers reasoned that, if mental states are something material, but not behavioral, then mental states are probably identical to internal states of the brain. In very simplified terms: a mental state M is nothing other than brain state B. The mental state "desire for a cup of coffee" would thus be nothing more than the "firing of certain neurons in certain brain regions".[17]


The classic Identity theory and Anomalous Monism in contrast. For the Identity theory, every token instantiation of a single mental type corresponds (as indicated by the arrows) to a physical token of a single physical type. For anomalous monism, the token-token correspondences can fall outside of the type-type correspondences. The result is token identity.
Despite its initial plausibility, the identity theory faces a strong challenge in the form of the thesis of multiple realizability, first formulated by Hilary Putnam.[19] It is obvious that not only humans, but many different species of animals can, for example, experience pain. However, it seems highly unlikely that all of these diverse organisms with the same pain experience are in the identical brain state. And if this is the case, then pain cannot be identical to a specific brain state. The identity theory is thus empirically unfounded.[19]
On the other hand, even granted the above, it does not follow that identity theories of all types must be abandoned. According to token identity theories, the fact that a certain brain state is connected with only one mental state of a person does not have to mean that there is an absolute correlation between types of mental states and types of brain state. The type-token distinction can be illustrated by a simple example: the word "green" contains four types of letters (g, r, e, n) with two tokens (occurrences) of the letter e along with one each of the others. The idea of token identity is that only particular occurrences of mental events are identical with particular occurrences or tokenings of physical events.[50] Anomalous monism (see below) and most other non-reductive physicalisms are token-identity theories.[51] Despite these problems, there is a renewed interest in the type identity theory today, primarily due to the influence of Jaegwon Kim.[17]
Functionalism [edit]
Main article: Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Functionalism was formulated by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor as a reaction to the inadequacies of the identity theory.[19] Putnam and Fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind.[52] At about the same time or slightly after, D.M. Armstrong and David Kellogg Lewis formulated a version of functionalism that analyzed the mental concepts of folk psychology in terms of functional roles.[53] Finally, Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Harman. Another one, psychofunctionalism, is an approach adopted by naturalistic Philosophy of Mind associated with Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn.
What all these different varieties of functionalism share in common is the thesis that mental states are characterized by their causal relations with other mental states and with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. That is, functionalism abstracts away from the details of the physical implementation of a mental state by characterizing it in terms of non-mental functional properties. For example, a kidney is characterized scientifically by its functional role in filtering blood and maintaining certain chemical balances. From this point of view, it does not really matter whether the kidney be made up of organic tissue, plastic nanotubes or silicon chips: it is the role that it plays and its relations to other organs that define it as a kidney.[52]
Non-reductive physicalism [edit]
Main article: Non-reductive physicalism
Non-reductionist philosophers hold firmly to two essential convictions with regard to mind-body relations: 1) Physicalism is true and mental states must be physical states, but 2) All reductionist proposals are unsatisfactory: mental states cannot be reduced to behavior, brain states or functional states.[44] Hence, the question arises whether there can still be a non-reductive physicalism. Donald Davidson's anomalous monism[18] is an attempt to formulate such a physicalism.
Davidson uses the thesis of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical–causal reducibility between the mental and physical without ontological reducibility.[54]
Because non-reductive physicalist theories attempt to both retain the ontological distinction between mind and body and to try to solve the 'surfeit of explanations puzzle' in some way; critics often see this as a paradox and point out the similarities to epiphenomenalism, in that it is the brain that is seen as the root 'cause' not the mind, and the mind seems to be rendered inert.
Epiphenomenalism regards one or more mental states as the byproduct of physical brain states, having no influence on physical states. The interaction is one-way (solving the 'surfeit of explanations puzzle') but leaving us with non-reducible mental states (as a byproduct of brain states) - both ontologically and causally irreducible to physical states. Pain would be seen by epiphenomenaliasts as being caused by the brain state but as not having effects on other brain states, though it might have effects on other mental states (i.e. cause distress).
Weak emergentism [edit]
Main article: Emergentism
Weak emergentism is a form of "non-reductive physicalism" that involves a layered view of nature, with the layers arranged in terms of increasing complexity and each corresponding to its own special science. Some philosophers hold that emergent properties causally interact with more fundamental levels, while others maintain that higher-order properties simply supervene over lower levels without direct causal interaction. The latter group therefore holds a less strict, or "weaker", definition of emergentism, which can be rigorously stated as follows: a property P of composite object O is emergent if it is metaphysically impossible for another object to lack property P if that object is composed of parts with intrinsic properties identical to those in O and has those parts in an identical configuration.
Sometimes emergentists use the example of water having a new property when Hydrogen H and Oxygen O combine to form H2O (water). In this example there "emerges" a new property of a transparent liquid that would not have been predicted by understanding hydrogen and oxygen as a gas. This is analogous to physical properties of the brain giving rise to a mental state. Emergentists try to solve the notorious mind-body gap this way. One problem for emergentism is the idea of "causal closure" in the world that does not allow for a mind-to-body causation.[55]
Eliminative materialism [edit]
Main article: Eliminative materialism
If one is a materialist and believes that all aspects of our common sense psychology will find reduction to a mature cognitive-neuroscience, and that non-reductive materialism is mistaken, then one can adopt a final, more radical position: eliminative materialism.
There are several varieties of eliminative materialism, but all maintain that our common-sense "folk psychology" badly misrepresents the nature of some aspect of cognition. Eliminativists such as Patricia and Paul Churchland argue that while folk psychology treats cognition as fundamentally sentence-like, the non-linguistic vector/matrix model of neural network theory or connectionism will prove to be a much more accurate account of how the brain works.[15]
The Churchlands often invoke the fate of other, erroneous popular theories and ontologies that have arisen in the course of history.[15][16] For example, Ptolemaic astronomy served to explain and roughly predict the motions of the planets for centuries, but eventually this model of the solar system was eliminated in favor of the Copernican model. The Churchlands believe the same eliminative fate awaits the "sentence-cruncher" model of the mind in which thought and behavior are the result of manipulating sentence-like states called "propositional attitudes".
Non-physicalist monisms [edit]
Idealism [edit]
Idealism is the form of monism that sees the world as consisting of minds, mental contents and or consciousness. Idealists are not faced with explaining how for minds arise from bodies: rather, the world, bodies and objects are regarded as mere appearances held by minds. However, accounting for the mind-body problem is not usually the main motivation for idealsim; rather, idealists tend to be motivated by skepticism, intentionality, and the unique nature of ideas. Idealism is prominent in Eastern religious and philosophical thought. It has gone through several cycles of popularity and neglect in the history of Western philosophy.
Different varieties of idealism may hold that there are
multiple minds (pluralistic idealism)
only one human mind (solipsism)
or a single Absolute, Anima Mundi, One or Oversoul.
Neutral monism [edit]
Neutral monism, in philosophy, is the metaphysical view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves "neutral," that is, neither physical nor mental. This view denies that the mental and the physical are two fundamentally different things. Rather, neutral monism claims the universe consists of only one kind of stuff, in the form of neutral elements that are in themselves neither mental nor physical. These neutral elements might have the properties of color and shape, just as we experience those properties. But these shaped and colored elements do not exist in a mind (considered as a substantial entity, whether dualistically or physicalistically); they exist on their own.
Mysterianism [edit]

Main article: New mysterianism
Some philosophers take an epistemic approach and argue that the mind-body problem is currently unsolvable, and perhaps will always remain unsolvable to human beings. This is usually termed New mysterianism. Colin McGinn holds that human beings are cognitively closed in regards to their own minds. According to McGinn human minds lack the concept-forming procedures to fully grasp how mental properties such as consciousness arise from their causal basis.[56] An example would be how an elephant is cognitively closed in regards to particle physics.
A more moderate conception has been expounded by Thomas Nagel, which holds that the mind body problem is currently unsolvable at the present stage of scientific development and that it might take a future scientific paradigm shift or revolution to bridge the explanatory gap. Nagel posits that in the future a sort of "objective phenomenology" might be able to bridge the gap between subjective conscious experience and its physical basis.[57]
Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem [edit]

Each attempt to answer the mind-body problem encounters substantial problems. Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion.[58] These philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and his followers in the tradition of linguistic criticism, therefore reject the problem as illusory.[59] They argue that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that human experience can be described in different ways—for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts.[59] This is the case, for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary—the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a category error or a sort of fallacy of reasoning.[59]
Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Peter Hacker.[58] However, Hilary Putnam, the originator of functionalism, has also adopted the position that the mind-body problem is an illusory problem which should be dissolved according to the manner of Wittgenstein.[60]
Externalism and internalism [edit]

Where is the mind located? If the mind is a physical phenomenon of some kind, it has to be located somewhere. There are two possible options: either the mind is internal to the body (internalism) or the mind is external to it (externalism). More generally, either the mind depends only on events and properties taking place inside the subject's body or it depends also on factors external to it.
Proponents of internalism are committed to the view that neural activity is sufficient to produce the mind. Proponents of externalism maintain that the surrounding world is in some sense constitutive of the mind.
Externalism differentiates into several versions. The main ones are semantic externalism, cognitive externalism, phenomenal externalism. Each of these versions of externalism can further be divided whether they refer only to the content or to the vehicles of mind.
Semantic externalism holds that the semantic content of the mind is totally or partially defined by state of affairs external to the body of the subject. Hilary Putnam's Twin earth thought experiment is a good example.
Cognitive externalism is a very broad collections of views that suggests the role of the environment, of tools, of development, and of the body in fleshing out cognition. Embodied cognition, the extended mind, and enactivism are good examples.
Phenomenal externalism suggests that the phenomenal aspects of the mind are external to the body. Authors who addressed this possibility are Ted Honderich, Edwin Holt, Francois Tonneau, Kevin O'Regan, Riccardo Manzotti, Teed Rockwell and Max Velmans.
Naturalism and its problems [edit]

The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the problem that the mind has certain properties that no other material thing seems to possess. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can nonetheless emerge from a material thing. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "naturalization of the mental."[44] Some of the crucial problems that this project attempts to resolve include the existence of qualia and the nature of intentionality.[44]
Qualia [edit]
Main article: Qualia
Many mental states seem to be experienced subjectively in different ways by different individuals.[24] And it is characteristic of a mental state that it has some experiential quality, e.g. of pain, that it hurts. However, the sensation of pain between two individuals may not be identical, since no one has a perfect way to measure how much something hurts or of describing exactly how it feels to hurt. Philosophers and scientists therefore ask where these experiences come from. The existence of cerebral events, in and of themselves, cannot explain why they are accompanied by these corresponding qualitative experiences. The puzzle of why many cerebral processes occur with an accompanying experiential aspect in consciousness seems impossible to explain.[23]
Yet it also seems to many that science will eventually have to explain such experiences.[44] This follows from an assumption about the possibility of reductive explanations. According to this view, if an attempt can be successfully made to explain a phenomenon reductively (e.g., water), then it can be explained why the phenomenon has all of its properties (e.g., fluidity, transparency).[44] In the case of mental states, this means that there needs to be an explanation of why they have the property of being experienced in a certain way.
The 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger criticized the ontological assumptions underpinning such a reductive model, and claimed that it was impossible to make sense of experience in these terms. This is because, according to Heidegger, the nature of our subjective experience and its qualities is impossible to understand in terms of Cartesian "substances" that bear "properties." Another way to put this is that the very concept of qualitative experience is incoherent in terms of—or is semantically incommensurable with the concept of—substances that bear properties.[61]
This problem of explaining introspective first-person aspects of mental states and consciousness in general in terms of third-person quantitative neuroscience is called the explanatory gap.[62] There are several different views of the nature of this gap among contemporary philosophers of mind. David Chalmers and the early Frank Jackson interpret the gap as ontological in nature; that is, they maintain that qualia can never be explained by science because physicalism is false. There are two separate categories involved and one cannot be reduced to the other.[63] An alternative view is taken by philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn. According to them, the gap is epistemological in nature. For Nagel, science is not yet able to explain subjective experience because it has not yet arrived at the level or kind of knowledge that is required. We are not even able to formulate the problem coherently.[24] For McGinn, on other hand, the problem is one of permanent and inherent biological limitations. We are not able to resolve the explanatory gap because the realm of subjective experiences is cognitively closed to us in the same manner that quantum physics is cognitively closed to elephants.[64] Other philosophers liquidate the gap as purely a semantic problem. This semantic problem, of course, led to the famous "Qualia Question", which is: Does Red cause Redness?
Intentionality [edit]
Main article: Intentionality


John Searle—one of the most influential philosophers of mind, proponent of biological naturalism (Berkeley 2002)
Intentionality is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards (about) or be in relation with something in the external world.[21] This property of mental states entails that they have contents and semantic referents and can therefore be assigned truth values. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem: natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen.[65] It would not make any sense to say that a natural process is true or false. But mental ideas or judgments are true or false, so how then can mental states (ideas or judgments) be natural processes? The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example, the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus.[20]
Philosophy of perception [edit]

Main article: Philosophy of perception
Philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual objects, in particular how perceptual experience relates to appearances and beliefs about the world.[66] The main contemporary views within philosophy of perception include naive realism, enactivism and representional views.[67][3][4]
Philosophy of mind and science [edit]

Humans are corporeal beings and, as such, they are subject to examination and description by the natural sciences. Since mental processes are intimately related to bodily processes, the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind.[2] There are many scientific disciplines that study processes related to the mental. The list of such sciences includes: biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology, and psychology.[68]
Neurobiology [edit]
Main article: Neurobiology
The theoretical background of biology, as is the case with modern natural sciences in general, is fundamentally materialistic. The objects of study are, in the first place, physical processes, which are considered to be the foundations of mental activity and behavior.[69] The increasing success of biology in the explanation of mental phenomena can be seen by the absence of any empirical refutation of its fundamental presupposition: "there can be no change in the mental states of a person without a change in brain states."[68]
Within the field of neurobiology, there are many subdisciplines that are concerned with the relations between mental and physical states and processes:[69] Sensory neurophysiology investigates the relation between the processes of perception and stimulation.[70] Cognitive neuroscience studies the correlations between mental processes and neural processes.[70] Neuropsychology describes the dependence of mental faculties on specific anatomical regions of the brain.[70] Lastly, evolutionary biology studies the origins and development of the human nervous system and, in as much as this is the basis of the mind, also describes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of mental phenomena beginning from their most primitive stages.[68] Evolutionary biology furthermore places tight constraints on any philosophical theory of the mind, as the gene-based mechanism of natural selection does not allow any giant leaps in the development of neural complexity or neural software but only incremental steps over long time periods.[71]


Since the 1980s, sophisticated neuroimaging procedures, such as fMRI (above), have furnished increasing knowledge about the workings of the human brain, shedding light on ancient philosophical problems.
The methodological breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward the elaboration of increasingly ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions (see: neural correlate).[69] Several groups are inspired by these advances.
Computer science [edit]
Main article: Computer science
Computer science concerns itself with the automatic processing of information (or at least with physical systems of symbols to which information is assigned) by means of such things as computers.[72] From the beginning, computer programmers have been able to develop programs that permit computers to carry out tasks for which organic beings need a mind. A simple example is multiplication. But it is clear that computers do not use a mind to multiply. Could they, someday, come to have what we call a mind? This question has been propelled into the forefront of much philosophical debate because of investigations in the field of artificial intelligence.
Within AI, it is common to distinguish between a modest research program and a more ambitious one: this distinction was coined by John Searle in terms of a weak AI and strong AI. The exclusive objective of "weak AI", according to Searle, is the successful simulation of mental states, with no attempt to make computers become conscious or aware, etc. The objective of strong AI, on the contrary, is a computer with consciousness similar to that of human beings.[73] The program of strong AI goes back to one of the pioneers of computation Alan Turing. As an answer to the question "Can computers think?", he formulated the famous Turing test.[74] Turing believed that a computer could be said to "think" when, if placed in a room by itself next to another room that contained a human being and with the same questions being asked of both the computer and the human being by a third party human being, the computer's responses turned out to be indistinguishable from those of the human. Essentially, Turing's view of machine intelligence followed the behaviourist model of the mind—intelligence is as intelligence does. The Turing test has received many criticisms, among which the most famous is probably the Chinese room thought experiment formulated by Searle.[73]
The question about the possible sensitivity (qualia) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain (wetware).[75]
Psychology [edit]
Main article: Psychology
Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly. It uses generally empirical methods to investigate concrete mental states like joy, fear or obsessions. Psychology investigates the laws that bind these mental states to each other or with inputs and outputs to the human organism.[76]
An example of this is the psychology of perception. Scientists working in this field have discovered general principles of the perception of forms. A law of the psychology of forms says that objects that move in the same direction are perceived as related to each other.[68] This law describes a relation between visual input and mental perceptual states. However, it does not suggest anything about the nature of perceptual states. The laws discovered by psychology are compatible with all the answers to the mind-body problem already described.
Cognitive science [edit]
Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary scientific study of the mind and its processes. It examines what cognition is, what it does, and how it works. It includes research on intelligence and behavior, especially focusing on how information is represented, processed, and transformed (in faculties such as perception, language, memory, reasoning, and emotion) within nervous systems (human or other animal) and machines (e.g. computers). Cognitive science consists of multiple research disciplines, including psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and education.[77] It spans many levels of analysis, from low-level learning and decision mechanisms to high-level logic and planning; from neural circuitry to modular brain organization.
Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition [edit]

Most of the discussion in this article has focused on one style or tradition of philosophy in modern Western culture, usually called analytic philosophy (sometimes described as Anglo-American philosophy).[78] Many other schools of thought exist, however, which are sometimes subsumed under the broad label of continental philosophy.[78] In any case, though topics and methods here are numerous, in relation to the philosophy of mind the various schools that fall under this label (phenomenology, existentialism, etc.) can globally be seen to differ from the analytic school in that they focus less on language and logical analysis alone but also take in other forms of understanding human existence and experience. With reference specifically to the discussion of the mind, this tends to translate into attempts to grasp the concepts of thought and perceptual experience in some sense that does not merely involve the analysis of linguistic forms.[78]
In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel discusses three distinct types of mind: the 'subjective mind', the mind of an individual; the 'objective mind', the mind of society and of the State; and the 'Absolute mind', a unity of all concepts. See also Hegel's Philosophy of Mind from his Encyclopedia.[79]
In 1896, Henri Bergson made in Matter and Memory "Essay on the relation of body and spirit" a forceful case for the ontological difference of body and mind by reducing the problem to the more definite one of memory, thus allowing for a solution built on the empirical test case of aphasia.
In modern times, the two main schools that have developed in response or opposition to this Hegelian tradition are phenomenology and existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl, focuses on the contents of the human mind (see noema) and how phenomenological processes shape our experiences.[80] Existentialism, a school of thought founded upon the work of Søren Kierkegaard, focuses on the content of experiences and how the mind deals with such experiences.
Mind in Eastern philosophy [edit]

Mind in Hindu philosophy [edit]
Dualism [edit]
Substance Dualism is a common feature of several orthodox Hindu schools including the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Yoga and Dvaita Vedanta. In these schools a clear difference is drawn between matter and a non-material soul, which is eternal and undergoes samsara, a cycle of death and rebirth. The Nyāya school argued that qualities such as cognition and desire are inherent qualities which are not possessed by anything solely material, and therefore by process of elimination must belong to a non-material self, the atman.[81] Many of these schools see their spiritual goal as moksha, liberation from the cycle of reincarnation.
Vedanta monistic idealism [edit]


Śaṅkara
In the Advaita Vedanta of the 8th century Indian philosopher Śaṅkara, the mind, body and world are all held to be the same unchanging eternal conscious entity called Brahman. Advaita means non-dual and is a kind of Idealism which holds that all that exists is pure absolute consciousness. The fact that the world seems to be made up of changing entities is an illusion, or Maya. The only thing that exists is Brahman, which is described as Satchitananda (Being, consciousness and bliss). Advaita Vedanta is best described by a verse which states "Brahman is alone True, and this world of plurality is an error; the individual self is not different from Brahman".[82]
Another form of monistic Vedanta is Vishishtadvaita (Qualified Non-Dualism) as posited by the eleventh century philosopher Ramanuja. Ramanuja criticized Advaita Vedanta by arguing that consciousness is always intentional and that it is also always a property of something. Ramanuja's Brahman is defined by a multiplicity of qualities and properties in a single monistic entity. This doctrine is called 'samanadhikaranya' (several things in a common substrate).[83]
Materialism [edit]
Arguably the first exposition of empirical materialism in the history of philosophy is in the Cārvāka school (a.k.a Lokāyata). The Cārvāka school rejected the existence of anything but matter (which they defined as being made up of the four elements), including God and the soul. Therefore they held that even consciousness was nothing but a construct made up of atoms. A section of the Cārvāka school believed in a material soul made up of air or breath, but since this also was a form of matter, it was not said to survive death.[84]
Buddhist philosophy of mind [edit]
The Five Aggregates (pañca khandha)
according to the Pali Canon.


form (rūpa)
4 elements
(mahābhūta)


contact
(phassa)
↓ ↑

consciousness
(viññāna)











mental factors (cetasika)

feeling
(vedanā)



perception
(sañña)



formation
(saṅkhāra)




Form is derived from the Four Great Elements.
Consciousness arises from other aggregates.
Mental Factors arise from the Contact of
Consciousness and other aggregates.
Source: MN 109 (Thanissaro, 2001) | diagram details
A salient feature of Buddhist philosophy which sets it apart from Indian orthodoxy is the centrality of the doctrine of not-self (Pāli. anatta, Skt. anātman). The Buddha's not-self doctrine sees humans as an impermanent composite of five psychological and physical aspects instead of a single fixed self. In this sense, what is called ego or the self is merely a convenient fiction, an illusion that does not apply to anything real but to an erroneous way of looking at the ever changing stream of five interconnected aggregate factors.[85] The relationship between these aggregates is said to be one of dependent-arising (pratītyasamutpāda). This means that all things, including mental events, arise co-dependently from a plurality of other causes and conditions. This seems to reject both causal determinist and epiphenomenalist conceptions of mind.[85]
Abhidharma theories of mind [edit]
Three centuries after the death of the Buddha (c. 150 BCE) saw the growth of a large body of literature called the Abhidharma in several contending Buddhist schools. In the Abdhidharmic analysis of mind, the ordinary thought is defined as prapañca (‘conceptual proliferation’). According to this theory, perceptual experience is bound up in multiple conceptualizations (expectations, judgments and desires). This proliferation of conceptualizations form our illusory superimposition of concepts like self and other upon an ever changing stream of aggregate phenomena.[85] In this conception of mind no strict distinction is made between the conscious faculty and the actual sense perception of various phenomena. Consciousness is instead said to be divided into six sense modalities, five for the five senses and sixth for perception of mental phenomena.[85] The arising of cognitive awareness is said to depend on sense perception, awareness of the mental faculty itself which is termed mental or ‘introspective awareness’ (manovijñāna) and attention (āvartana), the picking out of objects out of the constantly changing stream of sensory impressions.
Rejection of a permanent agent eventually led to the philosophical problems of the seeming continuity of mind and also of explaining how rebirth and karma continue to be relevant doctrines without an eternal mind. This challenge was met by the Theravāda school by introducing the concept of mind as a factor of existence. This 'life-stream' (Bhavanga-sota) is an undercurrent forming the condition of being. The continuity of a karmic 'person' is therefore assured in the form of a mindstream (citta-santana), a series of flowing mental moments arising from the subliminal life-continuum mind (Bhavanga-citta), mental content, and attention.[85]
Indian Mahayana [edit]
The Sautrāntika school held a form of phenomenalism that saw the world as imperceptible. It held that external objects exist only as a support for cognition, which can only apprehend mental representations. This influenced the later Yogacara school of Mahayana Buddhism. The Yogācāra school is often called the mind-only school because of its internalist stance that consciousness is the ultimate existing reality. The works of Vasubandhu have often been interpreted as arguing for some form of Idealism. Vasubandhu uses the dream argument and a mereological refutation of atomism to attack the reality of external objects as anything other than mental entities.[86] Scholarly interpretations of Vasubandhu's philosophy vary widely, and include phenomenalism, neutral monism and realist phenomenology.
The Indian Mahayana schools were divided on the issue of the possibility of reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana). Dharmakīrti accepted the idea of reflexive awareness as expounded by the Yogacara school, comparing it to lamp that illuminates itself while also illuminating other objects. This was strictly rejected by Mādhyamika scholars like Candrakīrti. Since in the philosophy of the Mādhyamika all things and mental events are characterized by emptiness, they argued that consciousness could not be an inherently reflexive ultimate reality since that would mean it was self validating and therefore not characterized by emptiness.[85] These views were ultimately reconciled by the 8th century thinker Śāntarakṣita. In Śāntarakṣita's synthesis he adopts the idealist Yogācāra views of reflexive awareness as a conventional truth into the structure of the two truths doctrine. Thus he states: "By relying on the Mind-Only system, know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on this Middle Way system, know that no self exists at all, even in that [mind]." [87]
The Yogācāra school also developed the theory of the repository consciousness (ālayavijñāna) to explain continuity of mind in rebirth and accumulation of karma. This repository consciousness acts as a storehouse for karmic seeds (bija) when all other senses are absent during the process of death and rebirth as well as being the causal potentiality of dharmic phenomena.[85] Thus according to B. Alan Wallace:
No constituents of the body—in the brain or elsewhere—transform into mental states and processes. Such subjective experiences do not emerge from the body, but neither do they emerge from nothing. Rather, all objective mental appearances arise from the substrate, and all subjective mental states and processes arise from the substrate consciousness [88]
Tibetan Buddhism [edit]
Tibetan Buddhist theories of mind evolved directly from the Indian Mahayana views. Thus the founder of the Gelug school, Je Tsongkhapa discusses the Yogācāra system of the Eight Consciousnesses in his Explanation of the Difficult Points.[89] He would later come to repudiate Śāntarakṣita's pragmatic idealism. According to the 14th Dalai Lama the mind can be defined "as an entity that has the nature of mere experience, that is, 'clarity and knowing.' It is the knowing nature, or agency, that is called mind, and this is non-material."[90] The simultaneously dual nature of mind is as follows:
1. Clarity (gsal) - The mental activity which produces cognitive phenomena (snang-ba).
2. Knowing (rig) - The mental activity of perceiving cognitive phenomena.
Because Tibetan philosophy of mind is ultimately soteriological, it focuses on meditative practices such as Dzogchen and Mahamudra that allow a practitioner to experience the true reflexive nature of their mind directly. This unobstructed knowledge of one's primordial, empty and non-dual Buddha nature is called rigpa. The mind's innermost nature is described among various schools as pure luminosity or 'clear light' (‘od gsal) and is often compared to a crystal ball or a mirror. Sogyal Rinpoche speaks of mind thus: "Imagine a sky, empty, spacious, and pure from the beginning; its essence is like this. Imagine a sun, luminous, clear, unobstructed, and spontaneously present; its nature is like this."
Zen Buddhism [edit]
The central issue in Chinese Zen philosophy of mind is in the difference between the pure and awakened mind and the defiled mind. Chinese Chan master Huangpo described the mind as without beginning and without form or limit while the defiled mind was that which was obscured by attachment to form and concepts.[91] The pure Buddha-mind is thus able to see things "as they truly are", as absolute and non-dual 'thusness' (Tathatā). This non-conceptual seeing also includes the paradoxical fact that there is no difference between a defiled and a pure mind, as well as no difference between samsara and nirvana.[91]
In the Shobogenzo, the Japanese philosopher Dogen argued that body and mind are neither ontologically nor phenomenologically distinct but are characterized by a oneness called shin jin (bodymind). According to Dogen, 'casting off body and mind' (Shinjin datsuraku) in zazen will allow one to experience things-as-they-are (genjokoan) which is the nature of original enlightenment (hongaku).[92]
Topics related to philosophy of mind [edit]

There are countless subjects that are affected by the ideas developed in the philosophy of mind. Clear examples of this are the nature of death and its definitive character, the nature of emotion, of perception and of memory. Questions about what a person is and what his or her identity consists of also have much to do with the philosophy of mind. There are two subjects that, in connection with the philosophy of the mind, have aroused special attention: free will and the self.[2]
Free will [edit]
Main article: Free will
In the context of philosophy of mind, the problem of free will takes on renewed intensity. This is certainly the case, at least, for materialistic determinists.[2] According to this position, natural laws completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and therefore the will as well, would be material states, which means human behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some take this reasoning a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.[93]
This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand, by the compatibilists. Those who adopt this position suggest that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of "free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced". It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is one where the agent could have done otherwise if it had chosen otherwise. In this sense a person can be free even though determinism is true.[93] The most important compatibilist in the history of the philosophy was David Hume.[94] More recently, this position is defended, for example, by Daniel Dennett.[95]
On the other hand, there are also many incompatibilists who reject the argument because they believe that the will is free in a stronger sense called libertarianism.[93] These philosophers affirm the course of the world is either a) not completely determined by natural law where natural law is intercepted by physically independent agency,[96] b) determined by indeterministic natural law only, or c) determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the subjective effort of physically non-reducible agency.[97] Under Libertarianism, the will does not have to be deterministic and, therefore, it is potentially free. Critics of the second proposition (b) accuse the incompatibilists of using an incoherent concept of freedom. They argue as follows: if our will is not determined by anything, then we desire what we desire by pure chance. And if what we desire is purely accidental, we are not free. So if our will is not determined by anything, we are not free.[93]
Self [edit]
Main article: Self
The philosophy of mind also has important consequences for the concept of self. If by "self" or "I" one refers to an essential, immutable nucleus of the person, most modern philosophers of mind will affirm that no such thing exists.[98] The idea of a self as an immutable essential nucleus derives from the idea of an immaterial soul. Such an idea is unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, due to their physicalistic orientations, and due to a general acceptance among philosophers of the scepticism of the concept of 'self' by David Hume, who could never catch himself doing, thinking or feeling anything.[99] However, in the light of empirical results from developmental psychology, developmental biology and neuroscience, the idea of an essential inconstant, material nucleus—an integrated representational system distributed over changing patterns of synaptic connections—seems reasonable.[100] The view of the self as an illusion is accepted by some philosophers, including Daniel Dennett.
See also [edit]

Animal consciousness
Collective Intentionality
Subject–object problem
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^ Armstrong, D., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge.
^ Stanton, W.L. (1983) "Supervenience and Psychological Law in Anomalous Monism", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 72-9
^ Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press; 2 edition (July 8, 2005) ISBN 0-8133-4269-4
^ McGinn, Colin. "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?", Mind, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 391, July 1989 (pp. 349-366), p. 350.
Reprinted in O'Connor, Timothy and Robb, David. "Colin McGinn, Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?", Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 2003, p. 438ff.
^ "Hard problem of Consciousness", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Josh Weisberg
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^ Hubert Dreyfus, "Critique of Descartes I" (recorded lecture), University of California at Berkeley, Sept. 18, 2007.
^ Joseph Levine, Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap, in: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 4, October, 1983, 354–361
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^ McGinn, C. "Can the Mind-Body Problem Be Solved", Mind, New Series, Volume 98, Issue 391, pp. 349–366. a (online)
^ Fodor, Jerry (1993). Psychosemantics. The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-06106-6.
^ cf. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/ BonJour, Laurence (2007): Epistemological Problems of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 1.9.2010.
^ Siegel, S. (2011)."The Contents of Perception", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/perception-contents/>.
^ a b c d Pinker, S. (1997) How the Mind Works. tr. It: Come Funziona la Mente. Milan:Mondadori, 2000. ISBN 88-04-49908-7
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^ a b c Pinel, J.P.J (1997). Psychobiology. Prentice Hall. ISBN 88-15-07174-1.
^ Metzinger, Thomas (2003). Being No One - The Self Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 349–366. ISBN 0-262-13417-9.
^ Sipser, M. (1998). Introduction to the Theory of Computation. Boston, Mass.: PWS Publishing Co. ISBN 0-534-94728-X.
^ a b Searle, John (1980). "Minds, Brains and Programs". The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (3): 417–424.
^ Turing, Alan (October 1950), "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", Mind LIX (236): 433–460, doi:10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433, ISSN 0026-4423, retrieved 2008-08-18
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^ Thagard, Paul, Cognitive Science, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
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^ Blumenthal, James, "Śāntarakṣita", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
^ B. Alan Wallace; Mind in the Balance: Meditation in Science, Buddhism, and Christianity, p. 95-96
^ Sparham, Gareth, "Tsongkhapa", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (fall 20011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
^ Talk by His Holiness the Dalai Lama at Cambridge, MA USA, From MindScience, edited by Daniel Goleman and Robert F. Thurman, first in 1991 by Wisdom Publications, Boston, USA.
^ a b Zeuschner, Robert B., "The Understanding of Mind in the Northern Line of Ch'an (Zen)", Philosophy East and West, V. 28, No. 1 (January 1978), pp. 69-79, University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, USA.
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^ Dennett, C. and Hofstadter, D.R. (1981). The Mind's I. Bantam Books. ISBN 0-553-01412-9.
^ Searle, John (Jan 2005). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press Inc, USA. ISBN 0-19-515733-8.
^ LeDoux, Joseph (2002). The Synaptic Self. New York: Viking Penguin. ISBN 88-7078-795-8.
Further reading [edit]

Wikibooks: Consciousness Studies
The London Philosophy Study Guide offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Philosophy of Mind
AL Engleman "Expressions: A Philosophy of Mind" (CafePress, 2005)
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1980), p. 120, 125.
Pedro Jesús Teruel, Mente, cerebro y antropología en Kant (Madrid, 2008). ISBN 978-84-309-4688-4.
Alfred North Whitehead Science and the Modern World (1925; reprinted London, 1985), pp. 68–70.
Edwin Burtt The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, 2nd ed. (London, 1932), pp. 318–19.
Felix Deutsch (ed.) On the Mysterious Leap from the Mind to the Body (New York, 1959).
Herbert Feigl The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript (1967), in H. Feigl et al., (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis, 1958), Vol. 2, pp. 370–497, at p. 373.
Nap Mabaquiao, Jr., Mind, Science and Computation (with foreword by Tim Crane). Manila: De La Salle University Publishing House, 2012.
Celia Green The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem. (Oxford: Oxford Forum, 2003). Applies a sceptical view on causality to the problems of interactionism.
Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Understanding the Mind: The Nature and Power of the Mind, Tharpa Publications (2nd. ed., 1997) ISBN 978-0-948006-78-4
Scott Robert Sehon, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency and Explanation. Cambridge: MIT University Press, 2005.
External links [edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind at PhilPapers
Philosophy of mind at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
Theory of Mind entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Guide to Philosophy of Mind, compiled by David Chalmers.
MindPapers: A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Mind and the Science of Consciousness, compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor).
Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Chris Eliasmith.
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.
A list of online papers on consciousness and philosophy of mind, compiled by David Chalmers
Field guide to the Philosophy of Mind
Mind Field: The Playground of Gods, from the Indian Psychology series by Swami Veda Bharati.
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