据网上的消息,加方公布了一份美要求逮捕孟晚舟的申请。过目后觉得有些话需要和网友交流一下。 从目前公开的资料看,美方可能证据不是很足,我个人认为对孟晚舟有些怀疑,但是证据可能不足,是否要逮捕看美加的具体法律规定了。第二个问题是Skycom是否违法?如果Skycom没有违法,其它一切都只是工作错误或误解。至于华为的人在Skycom里面工作,这并不违法,也不能说明华为和Skycom间的法律关系。美方的资料猜测的因素多了一些。 下面是公开的资料,请网友自己阅读并做判断: Summary of Facts
事实摘要 Wanzhou Meng(“Meng”), also known as“Cathy Meng” and“Sabrina Meng,” is the Chief Financial Officer(“CFO”) of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.(Huawei”), a corporation organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China(“PRC”) and the world’s largest telecommunications equipment company. Meng is a citizen of the PRC and a daughter of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei. In addition to her role as CFO, Meng currently serves as Huawei’s Deputy Chairwoman of the Board, and serves or has served in various roles at other Huawei subsidiaries and affiliates. Meng also served on the board of Hong Kong-based Skycom Tech Co. Ltd.(“Skycom”) in or about and between February2008 and April2009. According to financial statements for Skycom for the years2009 and2010, the“principal activities of Skycom were engaged in[sic] investment holding and acting as a contractor for contracts undertaking[sic] in Iran.” 孟晚舟,英文名Cathy Meng或Sabrina Meng,是华为技术有限公司(以下简称“华为”)的首席财务官。华为依据中国的法律运营,是全球最大的电信设备提供商。孟晚舟是中国公民,其为华为创始人任正非的女儿。除了是CFO,她也是华为的副董事长。她还在多家华为子公司中担任过或正在担任职务。孟晚舟也曾于2008年2月至2009年4月前后,在总部位于香港的Skycom科技有限公司(以下简称“Skycom”)担任过董事。Skycom2009和2010年的财报显示:Skycom的主要业务是投资控股并担任与伊朗(签订)的合同的承包商。 According to information obtained through an investigation by U.S. authorities, including the following, Huawei operated Skycom as an unofficial subsidiary to conduct business in Iran while concealing Skycom’s link to Huawei. In this manner and as explained in further detail below, Huawei could conceal the nature of certain business it was conducting in and related to Iran, which is generally considered a high-risk jurisdiction. 根据美国当局调查所获得的信息(以下有述):华为将Skycom作为非官方的子公司运营,以此开展在伊朗的业务,同时隐瞒了两家公司间的联系。华为用这种方式隐瞒了它在伊朗境内开展的以及与伊朗有关的业务信息,而这一块通常被认为是一个高风险管辖区。具体细节如下》 Former employees of Skycom have stated, in sum and substance, that Skycom was not distinct from Huawei. For example, Skycom employees had Huawei email addresses and badges, individuals working in Iran used different sets of stationery(“Huawei” and“Skycom”) for different business purposes, and the leadership of Skycom in Iran were Huawei employees; 根据Skycom前雇员的陈述,无论是整体还是细节,Skycom都和华为关系密切。例如,Skycom的雇员用华为的电邮地址,有华为的徽章。在伊朗工作的人员根据不同的业务需要使用不同的文具(华为和Skycom都有)。Skycom在伊朗的领导层是华为的雇员; Documents show that multiple Skycom bank accounts were controlled by Huawei employees, and Huawei employees were signatories on these accounts between2007 and2013; 文件显示,多个Skycom的银行账号是由华为雇员控制的,这些雇员2007-2013年间是账户的签字人; Documents and email records show that persons listed as“Managing Directors” for Skycom were Huawei employees; 文档和电子邮件的记录显示:被列为“Skycom经理”的人员是华为的雇员; Skycom official documents, including several Memoranda of Understanding, bore the Huawei logo; Skycom的官方文件,包括几份备忘录,上面有Huawei的商标; Email correspondence and other records show that all identified Skycom business was conducted using“@huawei.com” email addresses; and 电邮通信和其它记录显示:所有被确认的Skycom的业务使用的都是包含“@huawei.com”的电邮地址; Documents show that a purportedly unrelated entity to which Skycom was supposedly“sold” in2009 was actually also controlled by Huawei until at least in or about2014. 文件显示:据传2009年收购了Skycom的一家先前被认为并不相关的实体事实上也是由华为控制的,直到2014年前后。 Transactional records and other documents obtained by U.S. authorities further demonstrate that Huawei operated Skycom as an unofficial subsidiary to conduct business in Iran while concealing Skycom’s link to Huawei. Among other things, records obtained through the investigation show that Skycom was used to transact telecommunications business in Iran for major Iranian-based telecommunications companies. 美国当局获取的交易记录和其他文件进一步显示:华为把Skycom作为非官方的子公司来运营,目的是为了在伊朗开展业务,同时隐瞒起了Skycom与华为的关系。此外,调查的记录显示,Skycom被用来为伊朗主要的电信公司经营电信业务。 PROVISIONAL ARREST REQUEST FOR WANZHOU MENG 孟晚舟临时逮捕请求书 The investigation by U.S. authorities has revealed a conspiracy between and among Meng and other Huawei representatives to misrepresent to numerous multinational financial institutions, including a global financial institution which conducts business in the United States(“Financial Institution1”), Huawei’s business practices, particularly Huawei’s control of Skycom in or about and between2009 and2014. Specifically, Meng and other Huawei representatives repeatedly lied about the nature of the relationship between Huawei and Skycom and the fact that Skycom operated as Huawei’s Iran-based affiliate in order to continue to obtain banking services from multinational financial institutions. 美国当局的调查显示:孟晚舟和其他华为代表共谋向众多跨国金融机构做了虚假陈述,包括一家在美国开展业务的全球性金融机构(以下简称为:金融机构1)。虚假陈述的内容涉及华为的业务,重点是华为在2009-2014年间对Skycom的控制权。具体而言,孟晚舟和其他华为代表在华为和Skycom关系的实质上反复撒谎,隐瞒了Skycom作为华为在伊朗的附属公司运营的事实,这些行为的目的是为了从跨国金融机构处继续获得银行服务。 The motivation for these misrepresentations stemmed from Huawei’s need to move money out of countries that are subject to U.S. or E.U. sanctions– such as Iran, Syria, or Sudan– through the international banking system. At various times, both the U.S. and E.U. legal regimes have imposed sanctions that prohibit the provision of U.S. or E.U. services to Iran, such as banking services. Of particular relevance, companies such as Huawei operating in sanctioned countries often need to repatriate income out of those countries by relying on U.S.-dollar clearing transactions, which typically pass through the United States, or Euro-clearing transactions, which typically pass through E.U. countries. Huawei was a customer of Financial Institution1 and the other victim institutions, and conducted a significant amount of its international banking activity, including U.S.-dollar-clearing transactions, with Financial Institution1. The financial institutions at issue, including Financial Institution1, maintained policies by which they would not onboard Iran-based clients or process Iran-related transactions through the United States, so as to avoid exposure to U.S. civil and criminal liability. In response to due diligence inquiries by the banks regarding these internal policies, Meng and other Huawei representatives repeated stated that Huawei did not operate Skycom and that, with respect to Financial Institution1, Huawei would not use Financial Institution1 to process any Iran-related transactions. 这些虚假陈诉的动机源于华为需要通过国际银行系统将资金从受美国或欧盟制裁的国家(如伊朗、叙利亚或苏丹)转移出去。美国和欧盟的法律体系多次实施制裁,禁止向伊朗提供美欧的服务(如银行服务)。尤其需要注意的是,华为这样在受制裁国家开展业务的公司经常需要依靠美元结算交易(通常通过美国)或欧元结算交易(通常通过欧盟国家),从受制裁国家转回收入。华为曾是金融机构1和其他受害机构的客户。华为与金融机构1进行了大量的国际银行业务,包括美元结算交易。涉及的包括金融机构1在内的金融机构都有相关政策,不与总部在伊朗的客户进行交易,也不通过美国处理与伊朗相关的交易,以免承担美国的民事或刑事责任。针对银行就这些内部政策进行的尽职调查,孟晚舟和其他华为代表反复表示:华为不控股Skycom,也不会利用金融机构1来处理任何与伊朗相关的交易。 Because Meng and other Huawei representatives misrepresented to Financial Institution1 and the other financial institutions about Huawei’s relationship with Skycom, these victim banking institutions were induced into carrying out transactions that they otherwise would not have completed. As a result, they violated the banks’ internal policies, potentially violated U.S. sanctions laws, and exposed the banks to the risk of fines and forfeiture. In particular, these relationships included the clearing of hundreds of millions of U.S.-dollar transactions through correspondent accounts at financial institutions in Eurozone countries. In essence, these misrepresentations exposed the financial institutions to serious harm and denied the institutions the opportunity to make decisions based on the true risk of processing certain transaction and the reputations risk associated with banking high-risk clients such as Huawei. 因为孟晚舟和其他华为代表向金融机构1和其他金融机构虚假陈述了华为与Skycom的关系,这些受害的银行机构被诱使进行了原本不会发生的交易。结果,它们违反了银行的内部政策,并有可能因此违反了美国的制裁法案,面临着罚款和被吊销资格的风险。注意,华为与Skycom的关系包括通过欧元区国家金融机构的往来账户结算了数亿美元的交易。实质上,这些虚假陈述使金融机构面临着巨大的危险,使它们无法判断出进行某些交易的真实风险,并根据这些真实风险做出判断,也使他们无法判断与华为这样的银行高风险客户进行交易所冒的声誉风险。 For example, during the relevant timeframe, Financial Institution1 was under investigation for U.S. sanctions violations involving Iran and later entered into a deferred prosecution agreement pertaining to U.S. sanctions violations involving Iran, and could therefore have suffered criminal consequences for processing Huawei’s Iran-based transactions. 例如,在相关时限内,金融机构1正因为违反了美国对伊朗的制裁(法案)而接受调查,之后达成了延迟起诉协议,并可能因为违反了上述法案(处理了华为在伊 |