霍爾木茲海峽通航與中國的戰略選擇
從2026年2越28號，美國和以色列開始對伊朗採取軍事打擊，3月2日，伊朗宣布封鎖霍爾木茲海峽，阻止國際船隻通行。這一行為，是伊朗拿霍爾木茲海峽綁架全世界，嚴重影響全球能源供應和貿易體系，其中中國是受影響最嚴重的國家之一。 過去，美國曾經多次請求包括中國在內的國家參與，甚至通過軍事護航方式，共同維護該海峽的通航安全。然而，中國並未作出回應。 中國具備解決這個問題的獨特優勢：首先，中國與伊朗保持友好的外交關係，具備斡旋空間。其次，中國具有強大的軍事力量，具備軍事介入的能力。另外，中國是該海峽能源運輸的重要依賴方，通航受阻中國是最大的受害國。因此，中國既有動機，也具備手段， 參與此事。 如果中國採取“外交斡旋和軍事參與”的方式成功推動海峽通航安全，可能帶來諸多收益： 直接保障本國能源運輸安全；在一定程度上改善與美國關係；在中東地區提升影響力；通過外交協調，促使美國減少對伊朗海峽沿岸的軍事打擊，贏得伊朗感激；同時更多地獲得國際社會的認可。更進一步，在問題解決後，中國以“維護航運安全”等為由，保留軍事在該地區的存在，從而實現對霍爾木茲海峽和地區的部分控制和影響。這種路徑本質上是“解決問題→合理駐留→擴展影響”，與許多大國歷史經驗類似。 通過積極參與並解決霍爾木茲海峽通航問題，中國不僅可展示綜合外交與軍事能力，也符合其一貫倡導的大國外交策略和全球命運共同體領導者的戰略意圖。因此，這本應是一個極具戰略價值的機會。 然而，截至2026年3月20日，中國仍然作壁上觀。與此同時，法國、英國、德國、意大利、荷蘭和日本發表聯合聲明，表示將與美國一道採取措施保障海峽通航安全。 這就引發了一個值得深思的問題：中國為什麼不”順應”美國的請求，利用自身的外交和軍事優勢，積極主動地參與霍爾木茲海峽通航的問題解決呢？
The Strait of Hormuz Navigation and China’s Strategic Choice On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel began military strikes against Iran. On March 2, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, blocking international vessels from passing through. This act can be seen as Iran “holding the Strait of Hormuz hostage” for the world, severely disrupting global energy supply and trade, with China being one of the countries most affected. In the past, the United States had repeatedly requested countries, including China, to participate—potentially even through military escort—to jointly ensure the safe navigation of the Strait. Yet China did not respond. China possesses unique advantages to address this issue. First, it maintains friendly diplomatic relations with Iran, giving it room for negotiation. Second, it has strong military capabilities, providing the means for intervention. Moreover, China is heavily dependent on energy transported through this strait; any disruption directly harms its national interests. Therefore, China has both the motive and the means to get involved. If China were to successfully secure the Strait of Hormuz through “diplomatic mediation and military participation,” it could reap multiple benefits: directly safeguarding its energy transportation; improving relations with the United States to some extent; enhancing its influence in the Middle East; coordinating diplomatically to reduce U.S. military strikes along Iran’s coastline, thereby gaining Iran’s appreciation; and earning broader recognition from the international community. Furthermore, after resolving the issue, China could justify maintaining a military presence in the region under the pretext of “ensuring maritime security,” thus achieving partial control and influence over the Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding region. This path essentially follows the logic of “solve the problem → maintain presence → expand influence,” which aligns with the historical experience of many major powers. By actively participating and resolving the Strait of Hormuz navigation issue, China could not only demonstrate its comprehensive diplomatic and military capabilities, but also align with its long-standing great-power diplomacy strategy and strategic ambition of leadership in a global community of shared destiny. Thus, this would have been an opportunity of significant strategic value for China. However, as of March 20, 2026, China has remained on the sidelines. Meanwhile, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan issued a joint statement declaring that they would act alongside the United States to ensure the safe navigation of the strait. This raises a thought-provoking question: why did China not “respond” to the U.S. request and actively use its diplomatic and military advantages to help resolve the navigation issue in the Strait of Hormuz?
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