霍尔木兹海峡通航与中国的战略选择

从2026年2越28号，美国和以色列开始对伊朗采取军事打击，3月2日，伊朗宣布封锁霍尔木兹海峡，阻止国际船只通行。这一行为，是伊朗拿霍尔木兹海峡绑架全世界，严重影响全球能源供应和贸易体系，其中中国是受影响最严重的国家之一。

过去，美国曾经多次请求包括中国在内的国家参与，甚至通过军事护航方式，共同维护该海峡的通航安全。然而，中国并未作出回应。

中国具备解决这个问题的独特优势：首先，中国与伊朗保持友好的外交关系，具备斡旋空间。其次，中国具有强大的军事力量，具备军事介入的能力。另外，中国是该海峡能源运输的重要依赖方，通航受阻中国是最大的受害国。因此，中国既有动机，也具备手段， 参与此事。

如果中国采取“外交斡旋和军事参与”的方式成功推动海峡通航安全，可能带来诸多收益：

直接保障本国能源运输安全；在一定程度上改善与美国关系；在中东地区提升影响力；通过外交协调，促使美国减少对伊朗海峡沿岸的军事打击，赢得伊朗感激；同时更多地获得国际社会的认可。更进一步，在问题解决后，中国以“维护航运安全”等为由，保留军事在该地区的存在，从而实现对霍尔木兹海峡和地区的部分控制和影响。这种路径本质上是“解决问题→合理驻留→扩展影响”，与许多大国历史经验类似。

通过积极参与并解决霍尔木兹海峡通航问题，中国不仅可展示综合外交与军事能力，也符合其一贯倡导的大国外交策略和全球命运共同体领导者的战略意图。因此，这本应是一个极具战略价值的机会。

然而，截至2026年3月20日，中国仍然作壁上观。与此同时，法国、英国、德国、意大利、荷兰和日本发表联合声明，表示将与美国一道采取措施保障海峡通航安全。

这就引发了一个值得深思的问题：中国为什么不”顺应”美国的请求，利用自身的外交和军事优势，积极主动地参与霍尔木兹海峡通航的问题解决呢？

The Strait of Hormuz Navigation and China’s Strategic Choice

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel began military strikes against Iran. On March 2, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, blocking international vessels from passing through. This act can be seen as Iran “holding the Strait of Hormuz hostage” for the world, severely disrupting global energy supply and trade, with China being one of the countries most affected.

In the past, the United States had repeatedly requested countries, including China, to participate—potentially even through military escort—to jointly ensure the safe navigation of the Strait. Yet China did not respond.

China possesses unique advantages to address this issue. First, it maintains friendly diplomatic relations with Iran, giving it room for negotiation. Second, it has strong military capabilities, providing the means for intervention. Moreover, China is heavily dependent on energy transported through this strait; any disruption directly harms its national interests. Therefore, China has both the motive and the means to get involved.

If China were to successfully secure the Strait of Hormuz through “diplomatic mediation and military participation,” it could reap multiple benefits: directly safeguarding its energy transportation; improving relations with the United States to some extent; enhancing its influence in the Middle East; coordinating diplomatically to reduce U.S. military strikes along Iran’s coastline, thereby gaining Iran’s appreciation; and earning broader recognition from the international community. Furthermore, after resolving the issue, China could justify maintaining a military presence in the region under the pretext of “ensuring maritime security,” thus achieving partial control and influence over the Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding region. This path essentially follows the logic of “solve the problem → maintain presence → expand influence,” which aligns with the historical experience of many major powers.

By actively participating and resolving the Strait of Hormuz navigation issue, China could not only demonstrate its comprehensive diplomatic and military capabilities, but also align with its long-standing great-power diplomacy strategy and strategic ambition of leadership in a global community of shared destiny. Thus, this would have been an opportunity of significant strategic value for China.

However, as of March 20, 2026, China has remained on the sidelines. Meanwhile, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan issued a joint statement declaring that they would act alongside the United States to ensure the safe navigation of the strait.

This raises a thought-provoking question: why did China not “respond” to the U.S. request and actively use its diplomatic and military advantages to help resolve the navigation issue in the Strait of Hormuz?