【古风按】上周五（2012年5月11日），各大财经传媒报道了一条爆炸性新闻：摩根大通（JP Morgan）的一笔交易巨亏了20亿美元。除了主流媒体和摩根大通总裁Jamie Dimon故意的混淆视听，这笔亏损其实很好理解。西方银行的所谓现代化的金融投资模式基本上都是轮盘赌博倍注诀窍体系（the Martingale roulette betting system）的变种。这个倍注诀窍体系到底又是个什么东东呢？说起来很简单：比如您去赌场赌博，先下注10元，如果第一轮您输了，再下注20元，如果又输了，就继续加倍下注，直到自己赢为止。由于赌场的规则，这个倍注诀窍体系能够在理论上绝对保证您能赢钱，可是全世界的赌场并没有倒闭关门啦，为何？赌场作为庄家，在规则上作了手脚：通过概率计算，赌场设定了下注的上限，在此限额内庄家赚多赔少。除了每个赌徒（包括各大银行等市场投资体）的有限的财力，在其他的投资市场，即便在下注的上限以下，一直输的赌徒也需要有原意对赌的一方存在才能继续赌下去并实现赢的机会，否则到最后，这位一直输的赌徒就成了拿着即将爆炸的手雷的最后一个人了。这就是摩根大通巨亏20亿美元交易的内幕（当然这仅仅是经过简单化的戏说演义而已）。 关于摩根大通巨亏20亿美元交易的其他内幕，由于下面三篇英语文章（特别是第三篇John Azis的文章）和两个视频所提供的资料已经相当详细了，古风不想再画蛇添足，只是给大家补充一个事实：目前全球所有的衍生投资市场的规模在1千5百万亿美元上下（见下图最上面蓝区），而全世界每年的GDP大约只有55万亿美元的额度（见下图最下面地球标示区）。也就是说，全球有毒资产（包括其他所有赌博类的投资项目）的杠杆比率已经远超30:1了（见下图）！在上一轮的2007/2008年金融危机里，那些倒闭的投资银行（如Lehman Brothers、Bear Stearns、Morgan Stanley、Merrill Lynch等）都是在踩到这条红线（30:1）之后走上了绝路的。其实，懂得点基本算术的网友都能明白一个简单的道理：在30:1的杠杆比率下，只要不到3.4%的投资损失就能把自己的本金全部赔得精光。而在现实的投资环境之中，5%上下的价格浮动是很常见的现象。因此，下面附录的三篇文章的作者都在警告：全球有毒衍生资产的崩溃就快要到来了。一旦再次出现金融崩盘，将是席卷全球的超级大海啸，西方列强的实力也将面临萎缩85%以上的重大损失，而基本上完全丧失引领全人类文明进步的领导地位。中国等新兴国家由于“错过”了上一轮的西方金融创新的浪潮，大都没有深入地参与西方大银行搞的这场危及全人类的赌博游戏，所以，在这场危机过后，也只有中国等少数新兴国家能够重新站起来，带领着全人类重新踏上前进的征途。  那么，一旦出现衍生市场的金融崩盘，超级大海啸会按照什么路径运行呢？这就要来看看Exter的倒金字塔了（见下图）。大家一看，马上就会说：这张图不是跟上面的第一张图大同小异吗？的确如此。John Exter（1910-2006）是美国著名经济学家，曾就任过美联储理事并创立了斯里兰卡央行（http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Exter）。Exter在人类文明史上留名的贡献就是Exter倒金字塔了：越处于上层的投资额度和风险越大。最上层的如果开始土崩瓦解，就会一层一层地如纽约双子高塔般回归地面，最后，全球的绝大多数财富都会浓缩到最下层的黄金储备里面去。这个Exter倒金字塔崩塌的机制跟我们大家在高中化学课里学的萃取很像，也跟加拿大出产的冰酒的酿制过程相近。附带说一句：跟绝大多数房产中介的忽悠相反，投资房地产的风险相当高哟（在下图中排列第五），经过第一轮衍生金融核弹的冲击波的洗礼（下图中最上层白区最先垮掉），第二轮冲击波就会推倒下图中的红区（房地产包括在内），第三波就会摧毁全球股市（下图橙色区）；即便最后能在黄区内（全球各大主要货币体系）消散大部分的力道，黄金的价格将会疯涨！  至于大伙该如何应对即将到来的金融超级大海啸，请继续阅读下面的资料。 【相关阅读】古风解说法国总统大选后效应及其避险要略
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=111573 关于投资理财的《古风八条》
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=111736 古风解读全球经济战争实相
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=110642 古风第三次解读美国房市前景
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=111309 古风解读《股市崩盘五部曲》
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=108153 古风解读中国的宏观经济投资规模
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=110114 世界正进入历史性的破旧迎新之大转折
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201204/25203.html 《时轮三部曲》及其前传
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201204/18485.html 时代大轮回
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201205/3004.html 美国政府已经做好了应付内战的准备了
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201205/2959.html http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/the-2-billion-dollar-loss-by-jpmorgan-is-just-a-preview-of-the-coming-collapse-of-the-derivatives-market The 2 Billion Dollar Loss By JP Morgan Is Just A Preview Of The Coming Collapse Of The Derivatives Market
by Michael Synder, The Economic Collapse, 11 May 2012 When news broke of a 2 billion dollar trading loss by JP Morgan, much of the financial world was absolutely stunned. But the truth is that this is just the beginning. This is just a very small preview of what is going to happen when we see the collapse of the worldwide derivatives market.
When most Americans think of Wall Street, they think of a bunch of stuffy bankers trading stocks and bonds. But over the past couple of decades it has evolved into much more than that. Today, Wall Street is the biggest casino in the entire world. When the "too big to fail" banks make good bets, they can make a lot of money. When they make bad bets, they can lose a lot of money, and that is exactly what just happened to JP Morgan. Their Chief Investment Office made a series of trades which turned out horribly, and it resulted in a loss of over 2 billion dollars over the past 40 days.
But 2 billion dollars is small potatoes compared to the vast size of the global derivatives market. It has been estimated that the the notional value of all the derivatives in the world is somewhere between 600 trillion dollars and 1.5 quadrillion dollars. Nobody really knows the real amount, but when this derivatives bubble finally bursts there is not going to be nearly enough money on the entire planet to fix things. Sadly, a lot of mainstream news reports are not even using the word "derivatives" when they discuss what just happened at JP Morgan. This morning I listened carefully as one reporter described the 2 billion dollar loss as simply a "bad bet". And perhaps that is easier for the American people to understand. JP Morgan made a series of really bad bets and during a conference call last night CEO Jamie Dimon admitted that the strategy was "flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, poorly executed and poorly monitored". The funny thing is that JP Morgan is considered to be much more "risk averse" than most other major Wall Street financial institutions are. So if this kind of stuff is happening at JP Morgan, then what in the world is going on at some of these other places? That is a really good question. For those interested in the technical details of the 2 billion dollar loss, an article posted on CNBC described exactly how this loss happened... The failed hedge likely involved a bet on the flattening of a credit derivative curve, part of the CDX family of investment grade credit indices, said two sources with knowledge of the industry, but not directly involved in the matter. JPMorgan was then caught by sharp moves at the long end of the bet, they said. The CDX index gives traders exposure to credit risk across a range of assets, and gets its value from a basket of individual credit derivatives.
In essence, JP Morgan made a series of bets which turned out very, very badly. This loss was so huge that it even caused members of Congress to take note. The following is from a statement that U.S. Senator Carl Levin issued a few hours after this news first broke... "The enormous loss JPMorgan announced today is just the latest evidence that what banks call 'hedges' are often risky bets that so-called 'too big to fail' banks have no business making."
Unfortunately, the losses from this trade may not be over yet. In fact, if things go very, very badly the losses could end up being much larger as a recent Zero Hedge article detailed... Simple: because it knew with 100% certainty that if things turn out very, very badly, that the taxpayer, via the Fed, would come to its rescue. Luckily, things turned out only 80% bad. Although it is not over yet: if credit spreads soar, assuming at $200 million DV01, and a 100 bps move, JPM could suffer a $20 billion loss when all is said and done. But hey: at least "net" is not "gross" and we know, just know, that the SEC will get involved and make sure something like this never happens again.
And yes, the SEC has announced an "investigation" into this 2 billion dollar loss. But we all know that the SEC is basically useless. In recent years SEC employees have become known more for watching pornography in their Washington D.C. offices than for regulating Wall Street. But what has become abundantly clear is that Wall Street is completely incapable of policing itself. This point was underscored in a recent commentary by Henry Blodget of Business Insider... Wall Street can't be trusted to manage—or even correctly assess—its own risks. This is in part because, time and again, Wall Street has demonstrated that it doesn't even KNOW what risks it is taking. In short, Wall Street bankers are just a bunch of kids playing with dynamite. There are two reasons for this, neither of which boil down to "stupidity." - The first reason is that the gambling instruments the banks now use are mind-bogglingly complicated. Warren Buffett once described derivatives as "weapons of mass destruction." And those weapons have gotten a lot more complex in the past few years.
- The second reason is that Wall Street's incentive structure is fundamentally flawed: Bankers get all of the upside for winning bets, and someone else—the government or shareholders—covers the downside.
The second reason is particularly insidious. The worst thing that can happen to a trader who blows a huge bet and demolishes his firm—literally the worst thing—is that he will get fired. Then he will immediately go get a job at a hedge fund and make more than he was making before he blew up the firm.
We never learned one of the basic lessons that we should have learned from the financial crisis of 2008. Wall Street bankers take huge risks because the risk/reward ratio is all messed up. If the bankers make huge bets and they win, then they win big. If the bankers make huge bets and they lose, then the federal government uses taxpayer money to clean up the mess. Under those kind of conditions, why not bet the farm? Sadly, most Americans do not even know what derivatives are. Most Americans have no idea that we are rapidly approaching a horrific derivatives crisis that is going to make 2008 look like a Sunday picnic.  According to the Comptroller of the Currency, the "too big to fail" banks have exposure to derivatives that is absolutely mind blowing. Just check out the following numbers from an official U.S. government report... JPMorgan Chase - $70.1 Trillion Citibank - $52.1 Trillion Bank of America - $50.1 Trillion Goldman Sachs - $44.2 Trillion So a 2 billion dollar loss for JP Morgan is nothing compared to their total exposure of over 70 trillion dollars. Overall, the 9 largest U.S. banks have a total of more than 200 trillion dollars of exposure to derivatives. That is approximately 3 times the size of the entire global economy. It is hard for the average person on the street to begin to comprehend how immense this derivatives bubble is. So let's not make too much out of this 2 billion dollar loss by JP Morgan. This is just chicken feed. This is just a preview of coming attractions. Soon enough the real problems with derivatives will begin, and when that happens it will shake the entire global financial system to the core.
http://azizonomics.com/2012/05/11/does-jamie-dimon-even-know-what-hedging-risk-is/ Does Jamie Dimon Even Know What Heging Risk Is?
by John Azis, Azizonomics, 11 May 2012 From Bloomberg: J.P Morgan Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon said the firm suffered a $2 billion trading loss after an “egregious” failure in a unit managing risks, jeopardizing Wall Street banks’ efforts to loosen a federal ban on bets with their own money. The firm’s chief investment office, run by Ina Drew, 55, took flawed positions on synthetic credit securities that remain volatile and may cost an additional $1 billion this quarter or next, Dimon told analysts yesterday. Losses mounted as JPMorgan tried to mitigate transactions designed to hedge credit exposure.
Having listened to the conference call (I was roaring with laughter), Jamie Dimon sounded very defensive especially about one detail: that the CIO’s activities were solely in risk management, and that its bets were designed to hedge risk. Now, we all know very well that banks have been capable of turning “risk management” into a hugely risky business — that was the whole problem with the mid-00s securitisation bubble, which made a sport out of packaging up bad debt and spreading it around balance sheets via shadow banking intermediation, thus turning a small localised risk (of mortgage default) into a huge systemic risk (of a default cascade). But wait a minute? If you’re hedging risk then the bets you make will be cancelled against your existing balance sheet. In other words, if your hedges turn out to be worthless then your initial portfolio should have gained, and if your initial portfolio falls, then your hedges will activate, limiting your losses. A hedge is only a hedge if it covers your position. That is how hedging risk works. If the loss on your hedge is not being cancelled-out by gains in your initial portfolio then by definition you are not hedging risk. You are speculating. Dimon then stuck his foot in his mouth even more by claiming that the CIO was “managing fat tails.” But you don’t manage fat tails by making bets with tails so fat that a change in momentum produces a $2 billion loss. You manage tail risk by making lots and lots of small cheap high-payoff bets, which appears to be precisely the opposite of what the CIO and Bruno Iksil was doing: 
The larger point, though, is I think we all know damn well what Jamie Dimon and Bruno Iksil were doing — as Zero Hedge explained last month, they were using the CIO’s risk management business as a cover to reopen the firm’s proprietary trading activities in contravention of the current ban. Personally, I have no idea why the authorities insist on this rule — if J.P. Morgan want to persist with a hyper-fragile prop trading strategy that rather than hedging against tail risk actually magnifies risk, then there should be nothing to stop them from losing their money. After all, these goons would quickly learn to stop acting so incompetent without a government safety net there to coddle them. The fact that Dimon is trying to cover the tracks and mislead regulators is egregious, but that’s what we have come to expect from this den of vipers and thieves.
http://azizonomics.com/2012/05/12/double-or-nothing-how-wall-street-is-destroying-itself/ Double or Nothing: How Wall Street is Destroying Itself
by John Azis, Azizonomics, 12 May 2012 There’s nothing controversial about the claim— reported on by Slate, Bloomberg and Harvard Magazine — that in the last 20 years Wall Street has moved away from an investment-led model, to a gambling-led model. This was exemplified by the failure of LTCM which blew up unsuccessfully making huge interest rate bets for tiny profits, or “picking up nickels in front of a streamroller”, and by Jon Corzine’s MF Global doing practically the same thing with European debt (while at the same time stealing from clients). As Nassim Taleb described in The Black Swan this strategy — betting large amounts for small frequent profits — is extremely fragile because eventually (and probably sooner in the real world than in a model) losses will happen (and, of course, if you are betting big, losses will be big). If you are running your business on the basis of leverage, this is especially dangerous, because facing a margin call or a downgrade you may be left in a fire sale to raise collateral. This fragile business model is in fact descended from the Martingale roulette betting system. Martingale is the perfect example of the failure of theory, because in theory, Martingale is a system of guaranteed profit, which I think is probably what makes these kinds of practices so attractive to the arbitrageurs of Wall Street (and of course Wall Street often selects for this by recruiting and promoting the most wild-eyed and risk-hungry). Martingale works by betting, and then doubling your bet until you win. This — in theory, and given enough capital — delivers a profit of your initial stake every time. Historically, the problem has been that bettors run out of capital eventually, simply because they don’t have an infinite stock (of course, thanks to Ben Bernanke, that is no longer a problem). The key feature of this system— and the attribute which many institutions have copied — is that it delivers frequent small-to-moderate profits, and occasional huge losses (when the bettor runs out of money). The key difference between modern business models, and the traditional roulette betting system is that today the focus is on betting multiple times on a single outcome. By this method (and given enough capital) it is in theory possible to win whichever way an event goes. If things are going your way, it is possible to insure your position by betting against your initial bet, and so produce a position that profits no matter what the eventual outcome. If things are not going your way, it is possible to throw larger and larger chunks of capital into a position or counter-position again and again and again —mirroring the Martingale strategy — to try to compensate for earlier bets that have gone awry (this, of course, is so often the downfall of rogue traders like Nick Leeson and Kweku Adoboli). This brings up a key issue: there is a second problem with the Martingale strategy in the real world beyond the obvious problem of running out of capital. You can have all the capital in the world (and thanks to the Fed, the TBTF banks now have a printing-press backstop) but if you do not have a counter-party to take your bets (and as your bets and counter-bets get bigger and bigger it by definition becomes harder and harder to find suitable counter-parties) then you are Corzined, and you will be left sitting on top of a very large load of pain (sound familiar, Bruno Iksil?) The obvious real world example takes us back to the casino table — if you are trying to execute a Martingale strategy starting at $100, and have lost 10 times in a row, your 11th bet would have to be for $204,800 to win back your initial stake of $100. That might well exceed the casino table limits — in other words you have lost your counter-party, and are left facing a loss far huger than any expected gains. Similarly (as Jamie Dimon and Bruno Iksil have now learned to their discredit) if you have built up a whale-sized market-dominating gross position of bets and counter-bets on the CDX IG9 index (or any such market) which turns heavily negative, it is exceedingly difficult to find a counter-party to continue increasing your bets against, and your Martingale game will probably be over, and you will be forced to face up to the (now exceedingly huge) loss. (And this recklessness is what Dimon refers to as “hedging portfolio risk“?) The really sickening thing is that I know that these kinds of activities are going on far more than is widely recognised; every time a Wall Street bank announces a perfect trading quarter it sets off an alarm bell ringing in my head, because it means that the arbitrageurs are chasing losses and picking up nickels in front of streamrollers again, and emboldened by confidence will eventually will get crushed under the wheel, and our hyper-connected hyper-leveraged system will be thrown into shock once again by downgrades, margin calls and fire sales. The obvious conclusion is that if the loss-chasing Martingale traders cannot resist blowing up even with the zero-interest rate policy and an unfettered fiat liquidity backstop, then perhaps this system is fundamentally weak. Alas, no. I think that the conclusion that the clueless schmucks at the Fed have reached is that poor Wall Street needs not only a lender-of-last-resort, but a counter-party-of-last-resort. If you broke your trading book doubling or quadrupling down on horseshit and are sitting on top of a colossal mark-to-market loss, why not have the Fed step in and take it off your hands at a price floor in exchange for newly “printed” digital currency? That’s what the 2008 bailouts did. Only one problem: eventually, this approach will destroy the currency. Would you want your wealth stored in dollars that Bernanke can just duplicate and pony up to the latest TBTF Martingale catastrophe artist? I thought not: that’s one reason why Eurasian creditor nations are all quickly and purposefully going about ditching the dollar for bilateral trade. The bottom line for Wall Street is that either the bailouts will stop and anyone practising this crazy behaviour will end up bust — ending the moral hazard of adrenaline junkie coke-and-hookers traders and 21-year-old PhD-wielding quants playing the Martingale game risk free thanks to the Fed — or the Fed will destroy the currency. I don’t know how long that will take, but the fact that the dollar is effectively no longer the global reserve currency says everything I need to know about where we are going. The bigger point here is whatever happened to banking as banking, instead of banking as a game of roulette? You know, where investment banks make the majority of their profits and spend the majority of their efforts lending to people who need the money to create products and make ideas reality? |
