按：現代歷史的格局完全由二次世界大戰決定。無知毛左以為毛澤東如何勇敢對抗美國，其實美國看毛只是斯大林的一个小卒。打狗看主人，美國雖給毛纏著，但眼睛一直注意的是蘇聯。美蘇拼死較量，毛這个小卒在旁確給美國吃了不少苦頭。毛可以派無數炮灰去韓國，越南，雖然給美軍痛宰，但中國人命在毛眼裡一文不値。而美軍稍有傷亡，就大呼小叫。美國因中國而對日，德開戰，借雄厚軍事工業實力，成了二戰最大贏家。沒想到轉眼間中國變成斯大林的走卒，反過來輿美國殘殺，讓美國成了二戰最窩囊贏家！而中國人雖趕走了日本，免做皇民，卻轉眼又遭屠殺整肅，俄化洗腦。

韓戰，越戰只是開始，中共還在夢想重掌前蘇聯的共產大旗，繼續推廣極權統治，對抗美國代表的自由世界，甚至以核戰恐嚇。中共統治六十年，“前三十年用革命的暴力消灭了所有平民百姓自己的私产，把它变成了所谓的全体人民的共产。后三十年，又以改革的名义把本来（名意上）属于全体人民的公共财产变成了少数官员自己的私产”。而美國人在韓戰，越戰死傷慘重，但苦頭恐尚未吃盡。為何至此，談究其中歷史不光有學術意義，更有助判斷今后美中主導的自由對抗極權的世界會如何演化。這裡轉引 JFK 當年的一篇演講，將美國何以一失足而害慘中美二國的這段歷史清楚解讀。

The Communist Conquest of China - JFK

Over these past few days we have learned the extent of the disasters befalling China and the United States. Our relationship with China since the end of the Second World War has been a tragic one, and it is of the utmost importance that we search out and spotlight those who must bear the responsibility for our present predicament.

When we look at the ease with which the Communists have overthrown the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek, it comes as somewhat of a shock to remember that on November 22, 1941,* our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, handed Ambassador Namuru an ultimatum to the effect that: (1) Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indochina; (2) the United States and Japan will not support militarily, politically, economically, any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China.

It was clearly enunciated that the independence of China and the stability of the National Government was the fundamental object of our Far Eastern policy.

That this and other statements of our policies in the Far East led directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor is well known. And it might be said that we almost knowingly entered into combat with Japan to preserve the independence of China and the countries to the south of it. Contrast this policy which reached its height in 1943, when the United States and Britain agreed at Cairo to liberate China and return to that country at the end of the war Manchuria and all Japanese-held areas, to the confused and vacillating policy which we have followed since that day.

In 1944 Gen. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell presented a plan to arm 1,000,000 Chinese Communists, who had been carefully building their resources in preparation for a post-war seizure of power, and with them to capture Shanghai and clear the Yangtze. This plan was supported by some State Department officials, including Ambassador Clarence Gauss. Chiang Kai-shek refused to cooperate with this plan, which would have presented the Chinese Communists with an easy coup. Chiang requested that Stilwell be recalled, which caused such bitter comment in this country; and Gauss resigned. From this date our relations with the National Government declined.

At the Yalta Conference in 1945 a sick Roosevelt, with the advice of General Marshall and other Chiefs of Staff, gave the Kurile Islands as well as the control of various strategic Chinese ports, such as Port Arthur and Dairen, to the Soviet Union.

According to former Ambassador Bullitt, in Life magazine in 1948, "Whatever share of the responsibility was Roosevelt's and whatever share was Marshall's, the vital interest of the United States in the independent integrity of China was sacrificed, and the foundation was laid for the present tragic situation in the Far East."

When the armies of Soviet Russia withdrew from Manchuria they left Chinese Communists in control of this area and in possession of great masses of Japanese war material.

During this period began the great split in the minds of our diplomats over whether to support the government of Chiang Kai-shek, or force Chiang Kai-shek as the price of our assistance to bring Chinese Communists into his government to form a coalition.

When Ambassador Patrick Hurley resigned in 1945 he stated, "Professional diplomats continuously advised the Chinese Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States.  The chief opposition to the accomplishment of our mission came from American career diplomats, the embassy at Chungking, and the Chinese and Far Eastern divisions of the State Department."

With the troubled situation in China beginning to loom large in the United States, General Marshall was sent at the request of President Truman as a special emissary to China to effect a compromise and to bring about a coalition government.

In Ambassador Bullitt's article in Life, he states and I quote:  "In early summer of 1946 in order to force Chiang Kai-shek to take Communists into the Chinese Government, General Marshall had the Department of State refuse to give licenses for export of ammunition to China. Thus from the summer of 1946 to February 1948 not a single shell or a single cartridge was delivered to China for use in its American armament. And in the aviation field Marshall likewise blundered, and as a result of his breaking the American Government's contract to deliver to China planes to maintain eight and one-third air groups, for 3 years** no combat or bombing planes were delivered to China from September 1946 to March 1948. As Marshall himself confessed in February 1948 to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, this "was in effect an embargo on military supplies."

In 1948 we appropriated $468,000,000 for China, only a fraction of what we were sending to Europe, and out of this $468,000,000 only $125,000,000 was for military purposes. The end was drawing near; the assistance was too little and too late; and the Nationalist Government was engaged in a death struggle with the on-rushing Communist armies.

On November 20, 1948, former Senator D. Worth Clark, who had been sent on a special mission to China by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, in his report to the committee said, "Piecemeal aid will no longer save failing China from communism. It is now an all-out program or none, a fish or cut bait proposition."

Clark said this conclusion was confirmed by Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart and top American Army officers in China.

On November 25, 1948, 3 years too late, the New York Times said: "Secretary of State George Marshall said today the United States Government was considering what assistance it could properly give to the Chinese Government in the present critical situation."

On December 21 a Times headline was "ECA Administrator Hoffman, after seeing Truman, discloses freezing of $70,000,000 program in China in view of uncertain war situation."

The indifference, if not the contempt, with which the State Department and the President treated the wife of the head of the Nationalist Government, who was then fighting for a free China—Madame Chiang Kai-shek—was as the final chapter in this tragic story.

Our policy in China has reaped the whirlwind. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisers, the Lattimores and the Fairbanks, with the imperfections of the diplomatic system in China after 20 years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-Communist China.

There are those who claimed, and still claim, that Chinese communism was not really communism at all but merely an advanced agrarian movement which did not take directions from Moscow.

Listen to the words of the Bolton report: "Its doctrines follow those of Lenin and Stalin. Its leaders are Moscow-trained (of 35 leading Chinese Communist political leaders listed in the report, over a half either spent some time or studied in Moscow).  Its policies and actions, its strategy and tactics are Communist.  The Chinese Communists have followed faithfully every zigzag of the Kremlin's line for a generation."

This is the tragic story of China whose freedom we once fought to preserve. What our young men had saved our diplomats and our President have frittered away.

*The correct date was November 26, 1941.

**The actual duration of the embargo was about a year and a half.