在本文里我提到这么一段话：

“

但是，当得出这个结论时，估计是语义上差异让黑格尔绝对不舒服了，他又不得不指出纯存在既是纯无又不是纯无，两者之间瞬间彼此转化，而哲学的起点是纯存在与纯无的统一体。

估计黑格尔这么折腾的时候还没轮到叔本华骂他自己心里就也开始不舒服了，于是他开始为他的理论找依据。找来找去在过去两千多年的历史上只找到了一个依据，那就是赫拉克利特的万物瞬间变化的理论。这就使得黑格尔对于自己关于纯存在就是纯无而又不是纯无，而哲学的起点是纯存在与纯无的统一体的这个能让叔本华跳脚的说法心安理得了。”

如果有读者对于我这段话不以为然，请看下面这几段黑格尔的原话：

§ 147

Another contributory reason for the repugnance to the proposition about being and nothing must be mentioned; this is that the result of considering being and nothing, as expressed in the statement: being and nothing are one and the same, is incomplete. The emphasis is laid chiefly on their being one and the same, as in judgments generally, where it is the predicate that first states what the subject is. Consequently, the sense seems to be that the difference is denied, although at the same time it appears directly in the proposition; for this enunciates both determinations, being and nothing, and contains them as distinguished. At the same time, the intention cannot be that abstraction should be made from them and only the unity retained. Such a meaning would self-evidently be one-sided, because that from which abstraction is to be made is equally present and named in the proposition. Now in so far as the proposition: being and nothing are the same, asserts the identity of these determinations, but, in fact, equally contains them both as distinguished, the proposition is self-contradictory and cancels itself out. Bearing this in mind and looking at the proposition more closely, we find that it has a movement which involves the spontaneous vanishing of the proposition itself. But in thus vanishing, there takes place in it that which is to constitute its own peculiar content, namely, becoming.

§ 148

The proposition thus contains the result, it is this in its own self. But the fact to which we must pay attention here is the defect that the result is not itself expressed in the proposition; it is an external reflection which discerns it therein. In this connection we must, at the outset, make this general observation, namely, that the proposition in the form of a judgment is not suited to express speculative truths; a familiarity with this fact is likely to remove many misunderstandings of speculative truths. Judgment is an identical relation between subject and predicate; in it we abstract from the fact that the subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of the predicate, and also that the predicate is more extensive than the subject. Now if the content is speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the judgment this is not expressed. It is the form of simple judgment, when it is used to express speculative results, which is very often responsible for the paradoxical and bizarre light in which much of recent philosophy appears to those who are not familiar with speculative thought.

§ 149

To help express the speculative truth, the deficiency is made good in the first place by adding the contrary proposition: being and nothing are not the same, which is also enunciated as above. But thus there arises the further defect that these propositions are not connected, and therefore exhibit their content only in the form of an antinomy whereas their content refers to one and the same thing, and the determinations which are expressed in the two propositions are supposed to be in complete union-a union which can only be stated as an unrest of incompatibles, as a movement. The commonest injustice done to a speculative content is to make it one-sided, that is, to give prominence only to one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. It cannot then be denied that this proposition is asserted; but the statement is just as false as it is true, for once one of the propositions is taken out of the speculative content, the other must at least be equally considered and stated. Particular mention must be made here of that, so to speak, unfortunate word, 'unity'. Unity, even more than identity, expresses a subjective reflection; it is taken especially as the relation which arises from comparison, from external reflection. When this reflection finds the same thing in two different objects, the resultant unity is such that there is presupposed the complete indifference to it of the objects themselves which are compared, so that this comparing and unity does not concern the objects themselves and is a procedure and a determining external to them. Unity, therefore, expresses wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which it is asserted show themselves to be sheer opposites. So far then, it would be better to, say only unseparatedness and inseparability, but then the affirmative aspect of the relation of the whole would not find expression.

§ 150

Thus the whole true result which we have here before us is becoming, which is not merely the one-sided or abstract unity of being and nothing. It consists rather in this movement, that pure being is immediate and simple, and for that very reason is equally pure nothing, that there is a difference between them, but a difference which no less sublates itself and is not. The result, therefore, equally asserts the difference of being and nothing, but as a merely fancied or imagined difference.

§ 151

It is the common opinion that being is rather the sheer other of nothing and that nothing is clearer than their absolute difference, and nothing seems easier than to be able to state it. But it is equally easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, that it is unsayable. Let those who insist that being and nothing are different tackle the problem of stating in what the difference consists. If being and nothing had any determinateness by which they were distinguished from each other then, as has been observed, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure being and pure nothing that here they still are. Their difference is therefore completely empty, each of them is in the same way indeterminate; the difference, then, exists not in themselves but in a third, in subjective opinion. Opinion, however, is a form of subjectivity which is not proper to an exposition of this kind. But the third in which being and nothing subsist must also present itself here, and it has done so; it is becoming. In this being and nothng are distinct moments; becoming only is, in so, in so far as they are distinguished. This third is an other than they; they subsist only in an other, which is equivalent to saying that they are not self-subsistent.

Becoming is as much the subsistence of being as it is of non-being; or, their subsistence is only their being in a one. It is just this their subsistence that equally sublates their difference.

被关闭博及其他感兴趣的朋友：

从下面这几段黑格尔的原文可以看出，如我所述，黑格尔在论证他关于哲学的开头的理论时，他的心目中已经先入为主地假设这个开头一定是存在的：

§ 114

The foregoing shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot be made with anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition of which the concrete, now become simple, would be the result. But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and an other; for anything which is in its own self a first and an other implies that an advance has already been made. Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty being.

§ 115

If impatience with the consideration of the abstract beginning should provoke anyone to say that the beginning should be made not with the beginning, but straightway with the subject matter itself, well then, this subject matter is nothing else but the said empty being; for what this subject matter is, that will be explicated only in the development of the science and cannot be presupposed by it as known beforehand.

§ 116

Whatever other form the beginning takes in the attempt to begin with something other than empty being, it will suffer from the defects already specified. Let those who are still dissatisfied with this beginning tackle the problem of avoiding these defects by beginning in some other way.

这种先入为主的假设是他的相关论述的致命逻辑要害。

被关闭博：

不好意思，一直称呼你为关闭博，但仔细猜测一下，你可能是被迫关闭，所以应该称呼你为被关闭博。

in case 在你内心深处还有一丝这样的疑虑：“到底是你慕容青草把否定循环逻辑作为黑格尔的《逻辑学》的逻辑前提还是黑格尔本人这样论述”的话，考虑到你不太可能去读黑格尔的原著，我这里将黑格尔的相关原话的英译版给你列出来：

Healthy common sense has so much lost its respect for the school which claims possession of such laws of truth and still busies itself with them that it ridicules it and its laws and regards anyone as insufferable who can utter truths in accordance with such laws: the plant is a plant, science is science. It has also formed an equally just estimate of the significance of the formulas which constitute the rules of syllogising which in fact is a cardinal function of the understanding (although it would be a mistake not to recognise that these have their place in cognition where they must be obeyed); it knows that the formulas quite as well serve impartially error and sophistry and that however truth may be defined, they cannot serve higher, for example, religious truth that generally speaking they concern only the correctness of the knowledge of facts, not truth itself.

-------Science of Logic, by Hegel, URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlprefac.htm#HL1_31 § 27

另外，对于给你的第一个跟帖的回复如果你也有类似的疑虑的话，下面是黑格尔本人的解释：

§ 114

The foregoing shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot be made with anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition of which the concrete, now become simple, would be the result. But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and an other; for anything which is in its own self a first and an other implies that an advance has already been made. Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty being.

-------Science of Logic, by Hegel, URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbegin.htm

黑格尔的这段解释没有我给你的解释那么简单明确易懂，但是意思是一样的，只不过他习惯性地要把简单的问题说复杂了。

关闭博：

对于你的第二个跟帖的问题本来不想回复，但是考虑到你的问题或许在其他读者中也有代表性，犹豫再三，还是回复吧：

1）你的第二个问题属于在质疑本文提到的黑格尔的逻辑前提。。。鉴于我已反复指出我认为他的前提有错误或缺陷，所以尽管你的质疑与我认为他错的理由不同，但毕竟殊途同归，我不觉得有义务替黑格尔辩护，这是我不打算回复的原因。。。

2）我这里讨论的是黑格尔的一本题为《逻辑学》的著作，顾名思义，这里讲的是逻辑。。。当然，逻辑的涵义可以很广，可以是传统的形式逻辑，也可以是如你提到的语言逻辑，但是，黑格尔的逻辑既不是传统的形式逻辑，也不是语言逻辑，是什么逻辑呢？有人将它称为辩证逻辑，什么是辩证逻辑呢?那就是他的那本估计要有百万字的《逻辑学》讨论的内容，如果你有兴趣不妨自己去读一下那本书，细细地体会一下他所说的逻辑到底是什么，毕竟别人怎么说都不是黑格尔自己说的好。。。但是，不论黑格尔的逻辑到底是什么，很显然他没有把他的逻辑等同于语言逻辑，而是认为他的逻辑是可以解释所有的现象的，而且如同数学逻辑一样是不允许循环证明的。。。

3）如果你非要用语言逻辑可以自己解释自己来说明黑格尔是错误的，我也没有必要及义务来替黑格尔做辩护，反正我自己都认为他的前提是有错误的，但是既然我们因为我的文章而友好地交换意见，那么我也就是顺便向朋友指出下面的第4）点：

4）研读古典著作与考古有点类似。。。虽然我们希望能够从古人的文章中得到智慧，但那并非唯一的目的。。研读古典著作的另一个重要的目的是搞懂古人是怎么想，理解古人的意思---即便你不认同他的意思，你也需要先弄清他的意思，然后再发表你的评论，而不是把你的意思强加给古人。。。。。。不知朋友在提出语言可以自己解释自己的时候有没有理解黑格尔在《逻辑学》中所讨论的哲学的出发点时所针对的逻辑与语言之间有什么不同？。。。

如果你的目的是用语言的解释功能来嘲笑黑格尔在瞎掰，我没有任何理由反对你也没有任何理由为黑格尔辩护。。。我只想善意地提醒一下，语言逻辑不是黑格尔的《逻辑学》考虑的对象。。。。

祝大家新年好！

本文是希望给那些哲学系的学生提供点tips。。。专业哲学界对他们的误导时间太长:)

至于这里的好朋友们，大家各取所需:)

慕容博好。你这里所讲的《老子》，是第二章，不是第一章，而第一章是最重要的，老子不是从二开始讲。老子的论述总是按照道一二三万物来的。有无相生是对善美这类对象而言的。第一章，同出而异名，是第二章中那种有无的“一”的根源，这个根源是玄而又玄，众妙之门。

正如你大象的比喻，辩证法的转圜需要辩证法之外的东西，但黑格尔有意地避而不谈。这样的辩证就成了黑是白，黑不是白；但这两者之间的转圜，不能从其本身得到，必须引入额外的东西。避而不谈，就导致诡辩。老子的辩证是圆环的。所以老子的辩证并不是什么朴素的辩证，而是搞哲学的人只能理解到这一步。

从柏拉图的理型到黑格尔的纯无，都是“死”的。这样的哲学只能认识杯子，桌子一类的对象，无法认识河流，春天，等对象。这个问题在老庄学术中可以得到解决。你如有兴趣，可以参见拙著：https://books.google.com/books?id=VQC-DQAAQBAJ&pg

看来博文已经修改了。

【哲学的逻辑是用来解释一切的，如果哲学有起点，那么它的起点一定不能用其它的东西来解释，否则就会出现自己解释自己的循环论证的错误；而哲学的出发点是存在的。】

实际上，我认为，【否则就会出现自己解释自己的循环论证的错误】这个结论，可以商榷。

自己解释自己的现象是存在的，比如人类的语言。

更加广义地讲，宇宙出现精神世界，就是宇宙自己解释自己的一种方式；精神世界里解释精神世界，也是一种自己解释自己。

新年快乐！

朋友：

你的那个问题不难回答。。先说明一下，我后来觉得起点一词可能容易引起误会，将之改为出发点了。。。

回到你的问题，如果用来解释其它问题的出发点不是空的，比如它具有ABC这个内容（这里的ABC不是它的名字而是它的内容），那么我们就可以问题ABC是什么，你就要再对ABC进行解释，这样一来ABC就不是最基本的出发点了。。。所以，如果你能接受文中提出的黑格尔的基本逻辑前提，那么你一定会象黑格尔那样得出哲学的出发点必须是空的这个结论。。。

黑格尔的逻辑思维还是比较严格地。。。前几年万维有一网友用什么绝对的绝对产生潜在然后产生在来构筑他自己的哲学大厦。。。如果他能有黑格尔那样的逻辑论证水平，那么他的理论可能也会象黑格尔那样红起来了。。。不过那哥们不重视逻辑论证。。。人家黑格尔用了几万字论证也罢瞎诌也罢，有一套逻辑严格的理论摆在那里，那哥们从他的绝对的绝对直接跳到他的潜在，然后跳到他的在，不需任何逻辑论证。。。

不过我倒是认为黑格尔的那个前提本身是有问题的。。。科学也罢，哲学也罢，对于高水平的人来说，其实最容易出错的不是论证的过程而是前提。。。。。。以薛定谔猫为例，它的前提是猫不具备象人一样的判断条件，因此只有当人介入时才会出现几率坍缩。。。但是，自那理论提出后代几十年里，生物心理学的发展表明动物的心理与人智慧之间的界限并不像薛定谔那个时代的人们以为的那样明确，这样一来，薛定谔猫的假说一下子就从根本上不成立了。。。。。。

哲学的一大功效是找出人们思维的前提条件中的问题，包括找出象黑格尔这样的大哲学家的思维的前提条件中的缺陷。。。。

谢谢

祝贺新年！

不讨论黑格尔哲学本身，仅仅讨论逻辑上的问题。

【既然哲学可以解释一切，而哲学的起点是存在的，那么哲学的起点一定不能被任何其它东西来解释，因此哲学的起点一定是空的】

这里明显的问题是，为什么“哲学的起点一定是空的”？既然被称为“哲学的起点”，这个起点就应该是哲学的，从而它是有特征的，有内容的。

一种可能比较容易理解的解释：“哲学的逻辑”应该就是哲学的起点，或者“哲学的逻辑”的公理就是哲学的起点。