在本文里我提到這麼一段話：

“

但是，當得出這個結論時，估計是語義上差異讓黑格爾絕對不舒服了，他又不得不指出純存在既是純無又不是純無，兩者之間瞬間彼此轉化，而哲學的起點是純存在與純無的統一體。

估計黑格爾這麼折騰的時候還沒輪到叔本華罵他自己心裡就也開始不舒服了，於是他開始為他的理論找依據。找來找去在過去兩千多年的歷史上只找到了一個依據，那就是赫拉克利特的萬物瞬間變化的理論。這就使得黑格爾對於自己關於純存在就是純無而又不是純無，而哲學的起點是純存在與純無的統一體的這個能讓叔本華跳腳的說法心安理得了。”

如果有讀者對於我這段話不以為然，請看下面這幾段黑格爾的原話：

§ 147

Another contributory reason for the repugnance to the proposition about being and nothing must be mentioned; this is that the result of considering being and nothing, as expressed in the statement: being and nothing are one and the same, is incomplete. The emphasis is laid chiefly on their being one and the same, as in judgments generally, where it is the predicate that first states what the subject is. Consequently, the sense seems to be that the difference is denied, although at the same time it appears directly in the proposition; for this enunciates both determinations, being and nothing, and contains them as distinguished. At the same time, the intention cannot be that abstraction should be made from them and only the unity retained. Such a meaning would self-evidently be one-sided, because that from which abstraction is to be made is equally present and named in the proposition. Now in so far as the proposition: being and nothing are the same, asserts the identity of these determinations, but, in fact, equally contains them both as distinguished, the proposition is self-contradictory and cancels itself out. Bearing this in mind and looking at the proposition more closely, we find that it has a movement which involves the spontaneous vanishing of the proposition itself. But in thus vanishing, there takes place in it that which is to constitute its own peculiar content, namely, becoming.

§ 148

The proposition thus contains the result, it is this in its own self. But the fact to which we must pay attention here is the defect that the result is not itself expressed in the proposition; it is an external reflection which discerns it therein. In this connection we must, at the outset, make this general observation, namely, that the proposition in the form of a judgment is not suited to express speculative truths; a familiarity with this fact is likely to remove many misunderstandings of speculative truths. Judgment is an identical relation between subject and predicate; in it we abstract from the fact that the subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of the predicate, and also that the predicate is more extensive than the subject. Now if the content is speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the judgment this is not expressed. It is the form of simple judgment, when it is used to express speculative results, which is very often responsible for the paradoxical and bizarre light in which much of recent philosophy appears to those who are not familiar with speculative thought.

§ 149

To help express the speculative truth, the deficiency is made good in the first place by adding the contrary proposition: being and nothing are not the same, which is also enunciated as above. But thus there arises the further defect that these propositions are not connected, and therefore exhibit their content only in the form of an antinomy whereas their content refers to one and the same thing, and the determinations which are expressed in the two propositions are supposed to be in complete union-a union which can only be stated as an unrest of incompatibles, as a movement. The commonest injustice done to a speculative content is to make it one-sided, that is, to give prominence only to one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. It cannot then be denied that this proposition is asserted; but the statement is just as false as it is true, for once one of the propositions is taken out of the speculative content, the other must at least be equally considered and stated. Particular mention must be made here of that, so to speak, unfortunate word, 'unity'. Unity, even more than identity, expresses a subjective reflection; it is taken especially as the relation which arises from comparison, from external reflection. When this reflection finds the same thing in two different objects, the resultant unity is such that there is presupposed the complete indifference to it of the objects themselves which are compared, so that this comparing and unity does not concern the objects themselves and is a procedure and a determining external to them. Unity, therefore, expresses wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which it is asserted show themselves to be sheer opposites. So far then, it would be better to, say only unseparatedness and inseparability, but then the affirmative aspect of the relation of the whole would not find expression.

§ 150

Thus the whole true result which we have here before us is becoming, which is not merely the one-sided or abstract unity of being and nothing. It consists rather in this movement, that pure being is immediate and simple, and for that very reason is equally pure nothing, that there is a difference between them, but a difference which no less sublates itself and is not. The result, therefore, equally asserts the difference of being and nothing, but as a merely fancied or imagined difference.

§ 151

It is the common opinion that being is rather the sheer other of nothing and that nothing is clearer than their absolute difference, and nothing seems easier than to be able to state it. But it is equally easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, that it is unsayable. Let those who insist that being and nothing are different tackle the problem of stating in what the difference consists. If being and nothing had any determinateness by which they were distinguished from each other then, as has been observed, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure being and pure nothing that here they still are. Their difference is therefore completely empty, each of them is in the same way indeterminate; the difference, then, exists not in themselves but in a third, in subjective opinion. Opinion, however, is a form of subjectivity which is not proper to an exposition of this kind. But the third in which being and nothing subsist must also present itself here, and it has done so; it is becoming. In this being and nothng are distinct moments; becoming only is, in so, in so far as they are distinguished. This third is an other than they; they subsist only in an other, which is equivalent to saying that they are not self-subsistent.

Becoming is as much the subsistence of being as it is of non-being; or, their subsistence is only their being in a one. It is just this their subsistence that equally sublates their difference.

被關閉博及其他感興趣的朋友：

從下面這幾段黑格爾的原文可以看出，如我所述，黑格爾在論證他關於哲學的開頭的理論時，他的心目中已經先入為主地假設這個開頭一定是存在的：

§ 114

The foregoing shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot be made with anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition of which the concrete, now become simple, would be the result. But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and an other; for anything which is in its own self a first and an other implies that an advance has already been made. Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty being.

§ 115

If impatience with the consideration of the abstract beginning should provoke anyone to say that the beginning should be made not with the beginning, but straightway with the subject matter itself, well then, this subject matter is nothing else but the said empty being; for what this subject matter is, that will be explicated only in the development of the science and cannot be presupposed by it as known beforehand.

§ 116

Whatever other form the beginning takes in the attempt to begin with something other than empty being, it will suffer from the defects already specified. Let those who are still dissatisfied with this beginning tackle the problem of avoiding these defects by beginning in some other way.

這種先入為主的假設是他的相關論述的致命邏輯要害。

被關閉博：

不好意思，一直稱呼你為關閉博，但仔細猜測一下，你可能是被迫關閉，所以應該稱呼你為被關閉博。

in case 在你內心深處還有一絲這樣的疑慮：“到底是你慕容青草把否定循環邏輯作為黑格爾的《邏輯學》的邏輯前提還是黑格爾本人這樣論述”的話，考慮到你不太可能去讀黑格爾的原著，我這裡將黑格爾的相關原話的英譯版給你列出來：

Healthy common sense has so much lost its respect for the school which claims possession of such laws of truth and still busies itself with them that it ridicules it and its laws and regards anyone as insufferable who can utter truths in accordance with such laws: the plant is a plant, science is science. It has also formed an equally just estimate of the significance of the formulas which constitute the rules of syllogising which in fact is a cardinal function of the understanding (although it would be a mistake not to recognise that these have their place in cognition where they must be obeyed); it knows that the formulas quite as well serve impartially error and sophistry and that however truth may be defined, they cannot serve higher, for example, religious truth that generally speaking they concern only the correctness of the knowledge of facts, not truth itself.

-------Science of Logic, by Hegel, URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlprefac.htm#HL1_31 § 27

另外，對於給你的第一個跟帖的回覆如果你也有類似的疑慮的話，下面是黑格爾本人的解釋：

§ 114

The foregoing shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot be made with anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition of which the concrete, now become simple, would be the result. But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and an other; for anything which is in its own self a first and an other implies that an advance has already been made. Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty being.

-------Science of Logic, by Hegel, URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbegin.htm

黑格爾的這段解釋沒有我給你的解釋那麼簡單明確易懂，但是意思是一樣的，只不過他習慣性地要把簡單的問題說複雜了。

關閉博：

對於你的第二個跟帖的問題本來不想回復，但是考慮到你的問題或許在其他讀者中也有代表性，猶豫再三，還是回復吧：

1）你的第二個問題屬於在質疑本文提到的黑格爾的邏輯前提。。。鑑於我已反覆指出我認為他的前提有錯誤或缺陷，所以儘管你的質疑與我認為他錯的理由不同，但畢竟殊途同歸，我不覺得有義務替黑格爾辯護，這是我不打算回復的原因。。。

2）我這裡討論的是黑格爾的一本題為《邏輯學》的著作，顧名思義，這裡講的是邏輯。。。當然，邏輯的涵義可以很廣，可以是傳統的形式邏輯，也可以是如你提到的語言邏輯，但是，黑格爾的邏輯既不是傳統的形式邏輯，也不是語言邏輯，是什麼邏輯呢？有人將它稱為辯證邏輯，什麼是辯證邏輯呢?那就是他的那本估計要有百萬字的《邏輯學》討論的內容，如果你有興趣不妨自己去讀一下那本書，細細地體會一下他所說的邏輯到底是什麼，畢竟別人怎麼說都不是黑格爾自己說的好。。。但是，不論黑格爾的邏輯到底是什麼，很顯然他沒有把他的邏輯等同於語言邏輯，而是認為他的邏輯是可以解釋所有的現象的，而且如同數學邏輯一樣是不允許循環證明的。。。

3）如果你非要用語言邏輯可以自己解釋自己來說明黑格爾是錯誤的，我也沒有必要及義務來替黑格爾做辯護，反正我自己都認為他的前提是有錯誤的，但是既然我們因為我的文章而友好地交換意見，那麼我也就是順便向朋友指出下面的第4）點：

4）研讀古典著作與考古有點類似。。。雖然我們希望能夠從古人的文章中得到智慧，但那並非唯一的目的。。研讀古典著作的另一個重要的目的是搞懂古人是怎麼想，理解古人的意思---即便你不認同他的意思，你也需要先弄清他的意思，然後再發表你的評論，而不是把你的意思強加給古人。。。。。。不知朋友在提出語言可以自己解釋自己的時候有沒有理解黑格爾在《邏輯學》中所討論的哲學的出發點時所針對的邏輯與語言之間有什麼不同？。。。

如果你的目的是用語言的解釋功能來嘲笑黑格爾在瞎掰，我沒有任何理由反對你也沒有任何理由為黑格爾辯護。。。我只想善意地提醒一下，語言邏輯不是黑格爾的《邏輯學》考慮的對象。。。。

祝大家新年好！

本文是希望給那些哲學系的學生提供點tips。。。專業哲學界對他們的誤導時間太長:)

至於這裡的好朋友們，大家各取所需:)

慕容博好。你這裡所講的《老子》，是第二章，不是第一章，而第一章是最重要的，老子不是從二開始講。老子的論述總是按照道一二三萬物來的。有無相生是對善美這類對象而言的。第一章，同出而異名，是第二章中那種有無的“一”的根源，這個根源是玄而又玄，眾妙之門。

正如你大象的比喻，辯證法的轉圜需要辯證法之外的東西，但黑格爾有意地避而不談。這樣的辯證就成了黑是白，黑不是白；但這兩者之間的轉圜，不能從其本身得到，必須引入額外的東西。避而不談，就導致詭辯。老子的辯證是圓環的。所以老子的辯證並不是什麼樸素的辯證，而是搞哲學的人只能理解到這一步。

從柏拉圖的理型到黑格爾的純無，都是“死”的。這樣的哲學只能認識杯子，桌子一類的對象，無法認識河流，春天，等對象。這個問題在老莊學術中可以得到解決。你如有興趣，可以參見拙著：https://books.google.com/books?id=VQC-DQAAQBAJ&pg

看來博文已經修改了。

【哲學的邏輯是用來解釋一切的，如果哲學有起點，那麼它的起點一定不能用其它的東西來解釋，否則就會出現自己解釋自己的循環論證的錯誤；而哲學的出發點是存在的。】

實際上，我認為，【否則就會出現自己解釋自己的循環論證的錯誤】這個結論，可以商榷。

自己解釋自己的現象是存在的，比如人類的語言。

更加廣義地講，宇宙出現精神世界，就是宇宙自己解釋自己的一種方式；精神世界裡解釋精神世界，也是一種自己解釋自己。

新年快樂！

朋友：

你的那個問題不難回答。。先說明一下，我後來覺得起點一詞可能容易引起誤會，將之改為出發點了。。。

回到你的問題，如果用來解釋其它問題的出發點不是空的，比如它具有ABC這個內容（這裡的ABC不是它的名字而是它的內容），那麼我們就可以問題ABC是什麼，你就要再對ABC進行解釋，這樣一來ABC就不是最基本的出發點了。。。所以，如果你能接受文中提出的黑格爾的基本邏輯前提，那麼你一定會象黑格爾那樣得出哲學的出發點必須是空的這個結論。。。

黑格爾的邏輯思維還是比較嚴格地。。。前幾年萬維有一網友用什麼絕對的絕對產生潛在然後產生在來構築他自己的哲學大廈。。。如果他能有黑格爾那樣的邏輯論證水平，那麼他的理論可能也會象黑格爾那樣紅起來了。。。不過那哥們不重視邏輯論證。。。人家黑格爾用了幾萬字論證也罷瞎謅也罷，有一套邏輯嚴格的理論擺在那裡，那哥們從他的絕對的絕對直接跳到他的潛在，然後跳到他的在，不需任何邏輯論證。。。

不過我倒是認為黑格爾的那個前提本身是有問題的。。。科學也罷，哲學也罷，對於高水平的人來說，其實最容易出錯的不是論證的過程而是前提。。。。。。以薛定諤貓為例，它的前提是貓不具備象人一樣的判斷條件，因此只有當人介入時才會出現幾率坍縮。。。但是，自那理論提出後代幾十年裡，生物心理學的發展表明動物的心理與人智慧之間的界限並不像薛定諤那個時代的人們以為的那樣明確，這樣一來，薛定諤貓的假說一下子就從根本上不成立了。。。。。。

哲學的一大功效是找出人們思維的前提條件中的問題，包括找出象黑格爾這樣的大哲學家的思維的前提條件中的缺陷。。。。

謝謝

祝賀新年！

不討論黑格爾哲學本身，僅僅討論邏輯上的問題。

【既然哲學可以解釋一切，而哲學的起點是存在的，那麼哲學的起點一定不能被任何其它東西來解釋，因此哲學的起點一定是空的】

這裡明顯的問題是，為什麼“哲學的起點一定是空的”？既然被稱為“哲學的起點”，這個起點就應該是哲學的，從而它是有特徵的，有內容的。

一種可能比較容易理解的解釋：“哲學的邏輯”應該就是哲學的起點，或者“哲學的邏輯”的公理就是哲學的起點。