REVENTADOR, Ecuador — The dam sits under the glare of an active volcano, with columns of ash spewing toward the sky.
厄瓜多尔雷文塔多火山——大坝坐落在一座活火山下，缕缕火山灰喷入天空。
Officials had warned against the dam for decades. Geologists said an earthquake could wipe it away.
数十年来，官员们一直对这座大坝发出警告。地质学家表示，一场地震就能将其抹去。
大坝附近的雷文塔多火山在喷发火山灰。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
Now, only two years after opening, thousands of cracks are splintering the dam’s machinery. Its reservoir is clogged with silt, sand and trees. And the only time engineers tried to throttle up the facility completely, it shook violently and shorted out the national electricity grid.
This giant dam in the jungle, financed and built by China, was supposed to christen Ecuador’s vast ambitions, solve its energy needs and help lift the small South American country out of poverty.
Nearly every top Ecuadorean official involved in the dam’s construction is either imprisoned or sentenced on bribery charges. That includes a former vice president, a former electricity minister and even the former anti-corruption official monitoring the project, who was caught on tape talking about Chinese bribes.
Then there is the price tag: around $19 billion in Chinese loans, not only for this dam, known as Coca Codo Sinclair, but also for bridges, highways, irrigation, schools, health clinics and a half dozen other dams the government is scrambling to pay for.
It doesn’t matter whether Ecuador can afford them.
厄瓜多尔付不起这些钱，没关系。
China gets paid either way.
无论如何，中国都能得到回报。
To settle the bill, China gets to keep 80 percent of Ecuador’s most valuable export — oil — because many of the contracts are repaid in petroleum, not dollars. In fact, China gets the oil at a discount, then sells it for an additional profit.
But that is not enough. Hobbled by the debts, President Lenín Moreno has slashed social spending, gasoline subsidies, several government agencies and more than 1,000 public jobs. Most economists expect the country to slide into recession, stirring outrage.
“China took advantage of Ecuador,” said Ecuador’s energy minister, Carlos Pérez. “The strategy of China is clear. They take economic control of countries.”
在丛林中央为科卡科多辛克雷项目修建的输电线。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
在库尤哈镇，一家人在自家门廊前剥豆子。他们每月大约要付60美元电费。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
The story of how the dam got built brings together two natural allies, both eager to change the course of the hemisphere and displace the United States as the unrivaled power in the region.
China made its plans clear a decade ago, when it swept into Latin America during the global financial crisis, tossing governments an economic lifeline and promising to “treat each other as equals,” a clear swipe at American dominance.
It worked. China, now South America’s top trading partner, has seeded the region with infrastructure and a staggering trail of loans. It has reaped political benefits, too, getting Latin American nations to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Still, as the giant dam in Ecuador shows, the two sides were hardly equal partners.
但就像是厄瓜多尔的巨型大坝所体现的那样，这两方远算不上是平等的伙伴。
Both nations were willing to overlook deep design flaws, questionable economics and independent warnings that the technical studies for the dam were decades out of date.
During his time in government, officials had rejected a much smaller version of the project. The whole idea was doomed, he said, because of the volcano nearby. A major earthquake had decimated oil infrastructure in the area in 1987.
“The volcano has been erupting since the time the Spanish came to Ecuador in the 16th century,” Mr. Santos said, adding that investing so much money “in such a risky location was nonsense.”
An independent review of the project in 2010, prepared by a Mexican government agency and obtained by The New York Times, warned that the amount of water in the region to power the dam had not been studied for nearly 30 years.
Since that time, Ecuador had suffered punishing droughts, and there were concerns that its glaciers were melting because of climate change.
自那之后，厄瓜多尔一直遭受着严重干旱，人们还担心由于气候变化，该国冰川也在融化。
Despite the advice, Luciano Cepeda, the dam’s former general manager, said top Ecuadorean officials pressed ahead anyway because “a new study would have taken several years” and they didn’t want to slow down.
Even a Chinese diplomat in Ecuador, who was not authorized to speak publicly, said he had his doubts about the project.
甚至一名驻厄瓜多尔中国外交官都表示，他对这个项目有疑问。该外交官未获公开发言的授权。
“We didn’t give sufficient attention to the environmental reporting,” the diplomat said.
“我们没有对环境报告予以足够的关注，”该外交官表示。
火警电话上的标记，清楚地表明是谁修建了这座大坝。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
厄瓜多尔官员曾经否决一个比该大坝规模小得多的方案。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
China’s record offered both encouragement and cause for concern. Its massive Three Gorges Dam, which cuts the Yangtze River and rises 600 feet high, was the largest hydroelectric project in the world, designed to produce 20 times the power of the Hoover Dam.
But inadequate safety measures led to the deaths of 100 workers, the dam displaced more than one million people, and the environmental damage was considerable, including the destruction of forests.
Warnings aside, there were bigger geopolitical forces at play. Ecuador’s president at the time, Rafael Correa, was a left-wing populist who had vowed to modernize his country and free it from the orbit of the United States.
Elected in 2006 under a surge that brought leftists to power across Latin America, Mr. Correa took aim at the United States with fiery, anti-imperialist speeches. In 2008, he refused to renew a lease that allowed American anti-narcotics surveillance flights to operate from an Ecuadorean air force base.
Soon, Western financial institutions fell in Mr. Correa’s cross hairs. He denounced the International Monetary Fund, saying it put restrictions on his spending. Then in 2008, he defaulted on $3.2 billion of his country’s foreign debt and invited China to fill in the breach.
“Correa wanted to get away from Western banks and institutions,” said Diego Borja, Mr. Correa’s former minister of economic coordination. “We knew this relationship wouldn’t be an easy one with China.”
Mr. Borja and other officials were staggered by the terms on Chinese loans. Most came from a large state-owned lender, the Chinese Export-Import Bank, which had high interest rates and required Ecuador to use Chinese companies in construction, effectively eliminating competition.
China seemed particularly interested in oil from Ecuador, one of OPEC’s smallest members. In one deal in 2009, China lent Ecuador $1 billion, to be repaid in oil shipments to the state oil company PetroChina.
“But we didn’t have other options,” Mr. Borja recalled. “The doors were closed to the West.”
“可是我们别无选择，”博尔哈回忆道。“通往西方的大门是关着的。”
Mr. Correa suddenly had access to money, but a new crisis emerged: The country was running out of power. A drought was depleting the nation’s reservoirs, paralyzing its dams. Rather than look for another source, Mr. Correa doubled down on hydro power.
Officials say it was Mr. Correa’s electricity minister, Aleksey Mosquera, who first mentioned Coca Codo Sinclair: a megaproject that was supposed to provide a third of the country’s electricity and represent the single largest investment in Ecuador’s history.
When it finally opened in late 2016, China’s president, Xi Jinping, flew to Ecuador to celebrate.
2016年底，当它终于要启用时，中国主席习近平飞到厄瓜多尔参加庆祝活动。
Yet only two days before the visit, the dam was in chaos.
而就在访问前两天，大坝还在混乱之中。
Engineers had tried to generate the project’s full 1500 megawatts, but neither the facility nor Ecuador’s electrical grid could handle it. The equipment shuddered dangerously, and blackouts spread across the country, officials said.
Ecuadoreans were never told about the failure, and a full power test has not been attempted since.
厄瓜多尔人始终不知道有这个故障，并且自那以后再也没有尝试过满负荷测试。
Today, the dam typically runs at half capacity. Experts say that given its design — and the cycle of wet and dry seasons in Ecuador — it would be able to generate the full amount of electricity for only a few hours a day, six months out of the year.
Ecuador still has to pay back the debt, though. The $1.7 billion loan from China’s Export-Import Bank is lucrative for China: 7 percent interest over 15 years. In interest alone, Ecuador owes $125 million a year.
Now, many Ecuadoreans say the burden falls on them.
现在，很多厄瓜多尔人说负担落到了他们身上。
Under the constant hum of the dam’s transmission towers, residents in the town of Cuyuja worry that the towers will topple in the constant mudslides. Geologists say the tower foundations weren’t built into bedrock by the Chinese.
Another complaint is the bill. Maria Esther Tello paid $60 last month to keep the lights on in her home, a shock given the government’s promises electricity prices would go down.
At an entrance to the dam is an inscription, in marble.
大坝入口处刻有如下大理石碑文。
“Jorge Glas Espinel, vice president of the republic,” it says. “For having forged and envisioned this monumental project.”
“共和国副总统豪尔赫·格拉斯·埃斯皮内尔(Jorge Glas Espinel)”，上面写道。“他设想并实现了这一不朽的工程。”
Mr. Glas now sits in a cell in Ecuador, sentenced to six years in prison.
格拉斯如今在厄瓜多尔监狱中，被判六年监禁。
He was convicted of taking bribes from China’s main competitor for infrastructure projects in much of Latin America: Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction giant. American prosecutors say Odebrecht paid $33.5 million in bribes in Ecuador as part of a worldwide scheme to win business.
Now Ecuadorean officials are investigating whether the Chinese also made payments to Mr. Glas and others around him.
眼下，厄瓜多尔官员正在调查中国人是否也给格拉斯和他身边的人付过钱。
蔗农卡洛斯·乌萨马和家人在手工榨甘蔗。去年附近一座大坝泄洪，导致他们家失去了一名亲人。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
当地皮艇手雅伊尔·罗布雷斯在大坝附近的吉柯斯河上。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
“I don’t think it’s a coincidence that all the same people managed all these projects,” said Mr. Pérez, the energy minister.
“我不认为所有这些项目都由同样的人员管理是个巧合，”能源部长佩雷斯说。
The officials include Mr. Mosquera, the former electricity minister, who is serving a five-year sentence for taking $1 million from Odebrecht; and Carlos Pólit, the former anti-corruption official, who was charged with receiving millions in bribes from the company. Ricardo Rivera, another close associate of Mr. Glas, was also convicted of receiving payments from the Brazilians.
But evidence has emerged suggesting that officials took bribes from China as well.
但表明官员们收受中国人贿款的证据也已浮现。
Ecuadorean law enforcement officials say they have confirmed a secret tape recorded by an Odebrecht executive, given to Brazilian prosecutors and leaked to the Brazilian news media. In the recording, made at the house of Mr. Pólit, the anti-corruption official, the two men discuss a bribe.
The executive can be heard saying that Mr. Glas, Ecuador’s vice president, was “asking for a lot of money.”
可以听到这名高管说厄瓜多尔副总统格拉斯在“要很大一笔钱。”
The executive then explained that he was told “it was an obligation because the Chinese had already paid.”
高管随后解释，他当时被告知“这是一项义务，因为中国人已经付了钱。”
The recording has set off an investigation, particularly around Mr. Rivera, who presented himself as the vice president’s representative during multiple visits to China, according to Ecuadorean law enforcement officials.
They say they are examining 13 bank transfers worth $17.4 million authorized by Mr. Rivera to an HSBC account in Hong Kong. Law enforcement officials say they consider the bank transfers authentic — and want to know how Mr. Rivera deposited so much money in China.
Until recently, Attorney General Paúl Pérez was leading an investigation into corruption by the Chinese, and traveled to China in November to ask for help.
But Mr. Pérez abruptly resigned on Nov. 13, shortly after returning. He did not respond to interview requests.
但在11月13日回国后不久，佩雷斯突然辞职。他没有回应采访请求。
A lawyer for Mr. Glas denied that his client had been involved in corruption with Coca Coda Sinclair, calling Mr. Glas “an honorable, honest man” and describing the dam’s problems as “small imperfections.”
Mr. Correa, the former president, is in exile in Belgium, wanted for organizing the kidnapping of a rival. Many of his lieutenants have been sentenced for corruption or are on the run as well.
前总统科雷亚如今流亡在比利时，因谋划绑架对手被通缉。他的多名副手已因贪污被判刑或者也在逃亡。
Mr. Pólit and a lawyer for Mr. Rivera did not respond to requests for comment; nor did Sinohydro, the Chinese state-owned construction giant that built the dam.
波利特和里维埃拉的一名律师未回应置评请求；修建该大坝的中国国有建设巨头中国水电亦未回应。
7,648 cracks in the dam’s machinery
大坝机械出现7648道裂缝
When you approach Coca Codo Sinclair along the Quijos River, it’s hard to tell you’re nearing a dam at all.
沿着吉柯斯河走向科卡科多辛克雷水电站时，你根本无法看出来你是在靠近一座大坝。
Much of the reservoir containing the project’s water supply has filled up with small trees and bushes. Boats sometimes get grounded because the sediment is so thick.
储存该项目供水的水库大部分地方都塞满了小树和灌木。由于沉淀物太厚，船只有时会被搁浅。
Workers at the dam say the silting, a consequence of design flaws, is only the latest problem.
大坝的工作人员说，设计缺陷导致的淤塞只是诸多问题中最新的一个。
As early as 2014, technicians noticed cracks in the Chinese-made stainless steel equipment. That December, 13 workers were killed when a tunnel flooded and collapsed.
A senior engineer sent records to Mr. Correa, the president, asking to brief him on the problems, according to documents viewed by The Times. The engineer was fired days later, according to former officials.
由于设计问题，水库出现了泥沙和树木的堵塞。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
为了支付修建大坝的费用，中国占据了厄瓜多尔最珍贵的出口资源——石油——出口量的80%，因为许多合同是以石油而非美元付款的。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
Mr. Pólit, the anti-corruption official, performed audits. But they resulted in only mild criticism like work delays, with minor fines against the Chinese.
反腐官员波利特进行了审计。但他们只是对中国人不痛不痒地批评了几句，比如工作延误，并处以轻微罚款。
Ecuadorean law enforcement officials say they are investigating whether Mr. Pólit and other officials were paid by the Chinese to overlook the problems. It was part of Mr. Pérez’s inquiry before his resignation, they say.
Now, 7,648 cracks have developed in the dam’s machinery, according to the government, because of substandard steel and inadequate welding by Sinohydro. Sand and silt are also big concerns because they can damage vital equipment.
On a recent visit, an engineer looked on nervously as readouts showed sand flowing into the dam. But workers say they’re sometimes confused because of shoddy translations.
One sign in Chinese reads correctly: “Direct-Current (DC) Pumping Group.”
有一块牌子上的中文是正确的：“直流泵组压力”。
The Spanish does not: “Pressure Group from Washington, D.C.”
西班牙语则变成了：“来自华盛顿特区的压力组”。
一块用中文、英文和西班牙文写的设备标牌。中文是正确名称：“直流泵组压力”。西班文则变成了“来自华盛顿特区的压力组”。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
The communication problems extend downriver.
沟通问题还会影响到下游。
The heavy sedimentation means engineers sporadically release large amounts of water to clear out the system, causing flash floods where Carlos Usamá, a sugar cane farmer, lives. No one warns him, he says.
“They know they don’t have too many financing sources, so they are going back to knocking on China’s door,” she said.
她说：“他们知道自己没有太多的融资来源，所以他们会回去敲中国的门。”
China has already made some concessions to Ecuador, like paying 92 cents more per barrel of oil. The share of Ecuador’s oil going to the Chinese has also dropped — to 80 percent, from 90 percent.
But the government still needs $11.7 billion to finance its debt, and it is billions short, analysts say.
但分析人士称，政府仍然需要117亿美元来为债务融资，而且仍有数十亿美元的缺口。
Beyond China, the new government is going back to the institutions Mr. Correa demonized: the World Bank and the I.M.F. Some worry that Ecuador is simply seeking another set of financial masters.
