動盪莫測的2017年算個球？2040年中國GDP將占全世界的40%！

US$123,000,000,000,000 —— 2040年中國GDP

China’s estimated economy by the year 2040. Be warned.

In 2040, the Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly 

three times the economic output of the entire globe in 2000. 

China’s per capita income will hit $85,000, more than double 

the forecast for the European Union, and also much higher than 

that of India and Japan. In other words, the average Chinese 

megacity dweller will be living twice as well as the average 

Frenchman when China goes from a poor country in 2000 to a 

superrich country in 2040. Although it will not have overtaken 

the United States in per capita wealth, according to my forecasts, 

China’s share of global GDP — 40 percent — will dwarf that of 

the United States (14 percent) and the European Union ( 5 

percent) 30 years from now. This is what economic hegemony 

will look like.

       中國2040年將成為全球唯一超富大國 ！

2010年1月4日，諾貝爾經濟學獎得主、芝加哥大學(University 

of Chicago)的福格爾(Robert W。 Fogel)教授在《外交政策》

雜誌上發表了一篇文章，題為：123，000，000，000，000美元：

為什麼到2040年中國經濟總量會達到123萬億美元。

（ 2015中國全年國內生產總值（GDP）67.6708萬億元人民幣，

同比增長6.9%，相當於10.42萬億美元。2016年中國GDP預計增長

6.7%, 即為72.2047萬億元人民幣，以6.90:1匯率計，相當於10.46

萬億美元。而2015年美國GDP經濟總量大約為17.87萬億美元。

分別按匯率法和購買力平價法（相當於剔除了匯率波動的影響）預

測中美兩國GDP增長趨勢，其中匯率法預測結果是：2019年中國

GDP為19.8萬億美元，美國為18.9萬億美元；購買力平價法預測

結果是：2016年中國GDP為17.1萬億美元，美國為16.8萬億美元。

依據匯率法，多算一點，取一個整數，以2019年中國GDP為20萬

億美元為起點，從2020年1月1日起算，截止2040年12月31日，

共計21年期間，每年不間斷地、持續增長百分之九點多，即可勝利

抵達2040年中國國內生產總值占全世界40%的123萬億美元！

如此看來，偉大領袖習近平習主席的正能量，不僅有海內的周小

平周同志、雲南新任鎮越鐵路省省長阮成發阮博士同志代表着，而

且，還有海外的羅伯特·福格爾福同志代表着。其能量之正，亮瞎

左中右各位的昏花老眼；是不是有一點兒正得過了？你說。是不

是頭頂1993年諾貝爾經濟學五毛大獎，七年前以八十三歲高齡身

軀，也同中國黨和政府玩兒起了自帶乾糧的高級黑、捧起來宰殺

的把戲？）

為什麼中國現在那麼成功、那麼繁榮，而美國卻陷入了偏執的自

毀文化，為什麼我們那麼盲目、無法解決失業率多年居高不下的

困境……我們的自殺式的戰時經濟還在繼續侵吞掉大約50%的稅收

……我們的意識形態鬥爭讓我們進一步深陷債務之中……我們的

媒體總是混淆我們的視聽，總是把注意力集中於小部分自私好戰

的極端分子……兩黨領導人種種不負責任的舉措在我們無知無覺

的情況下幫助着中國實現其取代美國成為世界經濟超級大國的宏

大戰略……高盛在自挖牆角──搞清楚這一切背後的原因至關重要。

看看這段讓人哭泣甚而發狂的文字吧：到2040年，也就是一代人

之後，短短30年的工夫，福格爾預言的迅速形成的新世界格局將

是，中國成為唯一的超級經濟大國，昔日世界舞台上的主角美國

則成了老二，而且是遠遠落後的老二，這其中部分的原因便要歸

咎於高盛以及在其影響下近年來的諸多糟糕決斷。福格爾警告說：

“2040年，中國的經濟總量將達到123萬億美元，是2000年全球經

濟總量的將近三倍。中國人均國民收入將達到85，000美元，是歐

盟屆時預期人均收入的兩倍，比印度和日本也要高出許多。換言之，

在中國從2000年的窮國一躍而為2040年的超級富國之後，中國大

都市普通居民的生活水準將是普通法國人的兩倍。”

“即便30年之後中國的人均財富不一定能超過美國，根據我的預計，

中國在全球GDP中的占比（40%）──也會遠超美國（14%）和歐盟

（5%）。這就是2040年的世界經濟霸權格局。”

沒錯，一代人之後，中國的經濟實力將會是美國的四倍多，而我們

的孩子，下一代的美國人，卻還得背負着我們自2000年以來累積下

來的戰爭赤字。

福格爾認為這一代美國人之所以相比中國會落入下風，有六個原因：

1。 中國正在快速轉型為資本主義消費經濟

沒錯，福格爾表示，“中國長期壓抑的消費傾向”正在急劇釋放，

“從很多方面來看，中國都是目前全球最具資本主義特色的國家。”

看明白了嗎？當我們在戰場上大肆揮霍錢財、當高盛和華爾街將美

國轉變為財富集中極少數人手中的財閥統治之時，中國正在日益資

本主義化（和民主化）。

“在中國的大城市，居民的生活水準和人均收入已經達到世界銀行

認定的‘中高收入’水平，服裝、電子產品、快餐、汽車的獲得都

很便利，而且是越來越便利。”這就是中國的未來。原因何在？因

為他們的新“政府已經認定，國內消費的增長對於中國經濟來說至

關重要，政府出台了大量的促進消費者消費欲望的國內政策。"

2。 中國目前的政治體系資本主義化更甚於美國

福格爾說，“中國的政治體制很有可能有別於你的想象。”北京政

府並非事事都是老大，“多數經濟改革，包括一些最為成功的改革，

是由地方政府推動、監管的。”如今“在中國針對上層決策的批評

和辯論超出了很多人的想象。”

福格爾參加過多次中國留美經濟學會(Chinese Economists 

Society)的會議。該學會很多經濟學家公開“批評中國政府”，甚

至會“指出財政部最近的決策有失誤，對電力和煤炭的指導調價措

施提出疑慮……甚至在北京的報紙上刊登批評信”。隨後會有某位

財政部長來接見這些經濟學家，探討他們的見解。

“比起過去，如今中國的經濟計劃要順應民意得多，對新觀點也持

更為開放的態度。”對，比我們更資本主義化，甚至可能也更民主。

3。 中國最近對教育的大手筆投入

福格爾着重指出，中國正在對教育做出“大手筆的投入”。“受過

教育的勞動者工作效率就會高很多……受過大學教育的勞動者的工

作效率是受教育年限不滿九年的勞動者的三倍……高中畢業生則是

其的1。8倍。”

“下一代中國人將實現100%的高中入學率和大約50%的大學入學

率，此舉將為其年度經濟增長率貢獻大於六個百分點。”與此同時，

美國卻把數萬億美元扔進戰場、背負上巨額債務、教育也開始糊弄

事，將奔向2040年賽跑的領跑地位拱手讓給了中國。

4。 中國七億人口的農村經濟為經濟增長添磚加瓦

福格爾說，展望中國未來的時候，我們“總是會想到上海的高樓和

廣東的工廠，而往往會忽略一個經濟增長引擎：中國鄉村發生的

巨變。”

從 1978年到2003年，中國工業及服務業中的勞動生產率平均為每

年6%，而在未來，農村地區的勞動生產率將增長，中國有七億農民，

占了中國總人口的一半以上。“如今，遼闊的鄉村為中國經濟增長

做出了大約三分之一的貢獻”，隨着下一代中國鄉村人口增加一億，

農村對中國經濟的貢獻率還將進一步增長。

5。 中國政府的數據其實是低報了中國的經濟發展

福格爾警告我們不要被那種聲稱“中國的數據是虛假的，在一些關

鍵方面故意誇大”的報告所愚弄，事實正好相反：“中國的統計學

家很可能低報了中國的經濟發展。”

在服務行業，“小公司通常不會向政府申報盈利數據，政府部門通

常都無法真實地統計到產能提高的真實狀況。”和美國一樣，“官

方估算的GDP值嚴重地低估了國內經濟的增長”，因為這些估算沒

有“把諸如教育、醫療等公共事業機構的發展考慮進去”。

原因何在呢？因為“這些領域的重大發展多數都沒有完全計入

GDP”。這是一個全球性的問題，“不過中國服務行業的快速增長

使得這樣的低估差距尤為明顯。”

6。 到2040年，中國將再次成為全球唯一的一個超級經濟大國

“在西方人看來，全球經濟中心位於亞洲的世界格局是難以想象的。

不過這種情況並非前所未有……在過去2000年的1800年中，中國一

直都是全球最強大的經濟體……當歐洲還處於黑暗時代、陷於宗教

戰爭的紛飛戰火之時，中國卻滋養出了全世界最高的生活水準。如

今，在中國人眼裡，中國的崛起不過是一次輝煌的回歸而已。”

到2040年，中國將成為全世界唯一的超級經濟大國，擁有四倍於

美國的經濟總量，這在很大程度上要歸功於高盛陰謀──這邊廂，

高盛在大肆開挖美國的資本主義和民主牆角，那邊廂，高盛的資

本、人才和人脈也正在被中國一點一點給吸乾。

Most accounts of China’s economic ascent offer little but vague or threatening generalities, and they usually grossly underestimate the extent of the rise — and how fast it’s coming. (For instance, a recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace predicts that by 2050, China’seconomy will be just 20 percent larger than that of the United States.) Such accounts fail to fully credit the forces at work behind China’s recent successor understand how those trends will shape the future. Even China’s own economic data in some ways actually underestimate economic outputs.

It’s the same story with the relative decline of a Europe plagued by falling fertility as its era of global economic clout finally ends. Here, too, the trajectory will be more sudden and stark than most reporting suggests. Europe’s low birthrate and its muted consumerism mean its contribution to global GDP will tumble to a quarter of its current share within 30 years. At that point, the economy of the 15 earliest EU countries combined will be an eighth the size of China’s.

This is what the future will look like in a generation. It’s coming sooner than we think.

What, precisely, does China have going so right for it?

The first essential factor that is often overlooked: the enormous investment China is making in education. More educated workers are much more productive workers. (As I have reported elsewhere, U.S. data indicate that college-educated workers are three times as productive, and a high school graduate is 1.8 times as productive, as a worker with less than a ninth-grade education.) In China, high school and college enrollments are rising steeply due to significant state investment. In 1998, then-President Jiang Zemin called for a massive increase in enrollment in higher education. At the time, just 3.4 million students were enrolled in China’s colleges and universities. The response was swift: Over the next four years, enrollment in higher education increased 165 percent, and the number of Chinese studying abroad rose 152 percent. Between 2000 and 2004, university enrollment continued to rise steeply, by about 50 percent. I forecast that China will be able to increase its high school enrollment rate to the neighborhood of 100 percent and the college rate to about 50 percent over the next generation, which would by itself add more than 6 percentage points to the country’s annual economic growth rate. These targets for higher education are not out of reach. It should be remembered that several Western European countries saw college enrollment rates climb from about 25 to 50 percent in just the last two decades of the 20th century.

And it’s not just individual workers whose productivityjumps significantly as a result of more education; it’s true of firms as well,according to work by economist Edwin Mansfield. In a remarkable 1971 study,Mansfield found that the presidents of companies that have been early adoptersof complex new technologies were on average younger and better educated thanheads of firms that were slower to innovate.

The second thing many underestimate when making projections for China’s economy is the continued role of the rural sector. When we imaginethe future, we tend to picture Shanghai high-rises and Guangdong factories, butchanges afoot in the Chinese countryside have made it an underappreciatedeconomic engine. In analyzing economic growth, it is useful to divide aneconomy into three sectors: agriculture, services, and industry. Over thequarter-century between 1978 and 2003, the growth of labor productivity in Chinahas been high in each of these sectors, averaging about 6 percent annually. Thelevel of output per worker has been much higher in industry and services, andthose sectors have received the most analysis and attention. (I estimate thatChina’s rapid urbanization, which shifts workers to industry and services,added 3 percentage points to the annual national growth rate.) However,productivity is increasing even for those who remain in rural areas. In 2009,about 55 percent of China’s population, or 700 million people, still lived inthe countryside. That large rural sector is responsible for about a third ofChinese economic growth today, and it will not disappear in the next 30 years.

Third, though it’s a common refrain that Chinese data areflawed or deliberately inflated in key ways, Chinese statisticians may well be underestimating economic progress. This is especially true in the servicesector because small firms often don’t report their numbers to the governmentand officials often fail to adequately account for improvements in the qualityof output. In the United States as well as China, official estimates of GDP badly underestimate national growth if they do not take into accountimprovements in services such as education and health care. (Most greatadvances in these areas aren’t fully counted in GDP because the values of thesesectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An hour of a doctor’s timeis considered no more valuable today than an hour of a doctor’s time was beforethe age of antibiotics and modern surgery.) Other countries have a similarnational accounting problem, but the rapid growth of China’s service sectormakes the underestimation more pronounced.

Fourth, and most surprising to some, the Chinese politicalsystem is likely not what you think. Although outside observers often assumethat Beijing is always at the helm, most economic reforms, including the mostsuccessful ones, have been locally driven and overseen. And though China mostcertainly is not an open democracy, there’s more criticism and debate in upperechelons of policymaking than many realize. Unchecked mandates can of courselead to disaster, but there’s a reason Beijing has avoided any repeats of theGreat Leap Forward in recent years.

For instance, there is an annual meeting of Chineseeconomists called the Chinese Economists Society. I have participated in manyof them. There are people in attendance who are very critical of the Chinesegovernment — and very openly so. Of course, they are not going to say "down withHu Jintao," but they may point out that the latest decision by the financeministry is flawed or raise concerns about a proposed adjustment to the pricesof electricity and coal, or call attention to issues of equity. They might evenpublish a critical letter in a Beijing newspaper. Then the Chinese financeminister might actually call them up and say: "Will you get some of your peopletogether? We would like to have some of our people meet with you and find outmore about what you are thinking." Many people don’t realize suchback-and-forth occurs in Beijing. In this sense, Chinese economic planning hasbecome much more responsive and open to new ideas than it was in the past.

Finally, people don’t give enough credit to China’slong-repressed consumerist tendencies. In many ways, China is the mostcapitalist country in the world right now. In the big Chinese cities, livingstandards and per capita income are at the level of countries the World Bankwould deem "high middle income," already higher, for example, than that of theCzech Republic. In those cities there is already a high standard of living, andeven alongside the vaunted Chinese propensity for saving, a clear and growingaffinity for acquiring clothes, electronics, fast food, automobiles — all aglimpse into China’s future. Indeed, the government has made the judgment thatincreasing domestic consumption will be critical to China’s economy, and a hostof domestic policies now aim to increase Chinese consumers’ appetite foracquisitions.

And Europe? Europe, by which I mean the 15 earliest EUmembers, faces twin challenges of demography and culture, its economic futureburdened by a mix of reproductive habits and consumer restraint.

Europeans, of course, won’t be eating grass in 2040. Theireconomic decline over the next 30 years will be relative, not absolute, astechnological advances and other factors should allow Europe’s overall laborproductivity to continue to grow about 1.8 percent annually. Yet theirpercentage contribution to global GDP will tumble, shrinking by a factor offour, from 21 percent to 5 percent, in a generation.

Demography is the first key issue. The population of WesternEuropean countries has been aging rapidly, and that is likely to continue overthe next several decades. The basic reason: European couples aren’t producingenough babies. Europe’s total fertility rate has been below the level needed toreplace the population for about 34 years, according to a 2005 Rand Corp.study. As a result, the percentage of women of childbearing age will decline,in the earliest 15 EU countries, from about 50 percent in 2000 (it was alsoabout 50 percent in 1950) to the U.N. projection of about 35 percent in 2040.So we have a double whammy: Not only will reproductive-age women have sharplyreduced fertility rates, but the proportion of women who are in theirchildbearing years will also have declined sharply. By 2040, almost a third ofWestern Europe’s population may be over age 65.

Why are there fewer babies? One key reason is that Europeanattitudes toward sex have evolved sharply. One-hundred fifty years ago, it wasconsidered a sin to enjoy sex, the only legitimate purpose for which wasprocreation. But today, young women believe that sex is mainly a recreationalactivity. Behind the fertility trend is a vast cultural shift from thegeneration that fought in World War II, which married early and produced thegreat baby boom of 1945 to 1965. The easy availability of birth control and therise of sex as recreation mean that populations are likely to shrink in manyEuropean countries. As early as 2000, the natural rate of increase (birthsminus deaths) was already negative in Germany and Italy. By 2040, it is likelythat the natural increase will be negative in the five largest Europeancountries, except Britain.

So what if Europeans have a little fun now and then? Well,fun has consequences. Declining fertility pushes up the age of the citizenryand shrinks the percentage of people in the workforce, and so impedes growth.Demographic changes also shape the hiring and promotion structures ofindividual companies, and not necessarily for the better; if the elderly clingto the best jobs well past retirement age, younger workers may have to wait anextra decade, perhaps longer, to get their turn. And because younger workersare a major source of new ideas, slowing down the ascendancy of the nextgeneration may retard the pace of technological change. (If fertility ratesremain as low as they have been, Italy’s population will fall by half in 50years. Naturally, politicians are doing everything they can. They are joiningwith the Holy See and telling young women: Please procreate.)

In another way, Europe’s culture confounds economists.Citizens of Europe’s wealthy countries are not working longer hours to makehigher salaries and accumulate more goods. Rather, European culture continuesto prize long vacations, early retirements, and shorter work weeks overacquiring more stuff, at least in comparison to many other developed countries,such as the United States. In my observation, those living in most WesternEuropean countries appear to be more content than Americans with the kind ofcommodities they already have, for example, not aspiring to own more TVs perhousehold. Set aside whether that’s virtuous. A promenade in the Jardin duLuxembourg, as opposed to a trip to Walmart for a flat-screen TV, won’t helpthe European Union’s GDP growth.

Of course, China faces its own demographic nightmares, andskeptics point to many obstacles that could derail the Chinese bullet trainover the next 30 years: rising income inequality, potential social unrest,territorial disputes, fuel scarcity, water shortages, environmental pollution,and a still-rickety banking system. Although the critics have a point, theseconcerns are no secret to China’s leaders; in recent years, Beijing has provenquite adept in tackling problems it has set out to address. Moreover, historyseems to be moving in the right direction for China. The most tumultuous localdispute, over Taiwan’s sovereignty, now appears to be headed toward aresolution. And at home, the government’s increasing sensitivity to publicopinion, combined with improving living standards, has resulted in a level ofpopular confidence in the government that, in my opinion, makes major politicalinstability unlikely.

Could Europe surprise us by growing substantially more thanI have predicted? It seems farfetched, but it could happen, either by Europeanscurtailing vacations and siesta time to adopt a more workaholic ethos, or bymore young women and their partners aligning their views of sex more closelywith those of the pope than those of movie stars. Anything’s possible, butdon’t bet on it — Europeans seem to like their lifestyles just fine, and they’velong since given up their dreams of world domination. An unexpectedtechnological breakthrough could also shake things up, though this isn’t thesort of thing economists can base predictions on.

To the West, the notion of a world in which the center of globaleconomic gravity lies in Asia may seem unimaginable. But it wouldn’t be thefirst time. As China scholars, who take a long view of history, often pointout, China was the world’s largest economy for much of the last two millennia.(Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, reckons China has beenthe globe’s top economy for 18 of the past 20 centuries.) While Europe wasfumbling in the Dark Ages and fighting disastrous religious wars, Chinacultivated the highest standards of living in the world. Today, the notion of arising China is, in Chinese eyes, merely a return to the status quo.

2050年 —— 第三次世界大戰爆發

       Scenario:  World War III in 2050

Events Before

2020

Russia accepts Georgia and Azerbaijan as part if it follow by 

their willing request , NATO peacekeeping forces dissolve, and 

Iran becomes a new world power.

China asserts more inlfluence over Asia, economic growth 

slows, but finally collapses and dissolves into many smaller 

countries.

NATO tries to expands to include Ukraine and Poland, but 

dissolves because of internal issues and follows the collapse 

of the USA.

Whole ASIA will be afraid of being controlled by China.

2023

The USA start to recover from a worst crisis in the history, 

and continues to spread its influence in Central Asia, but no 

longer a super power in the world.

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia join Russia.

North and South Korea open a Unification Dialogue after 

years of being used and controlled by China and USA.

2025

Iraq and Afghanistan become fully independent, though 

controlled de facto by the USA.

Chinese's population growth slows further.

Russia is shocked by Chechen uprising.

The USA takes limited military action against Pakistan, 

bombing it.

Pakistan does not respond.

Russian growth booms again after decades of slow growth.

The territory of Greenland joins Russia.

Ireland is invaded by Britain which intends to give it total 

independence immediately after conquering to halt the IRA, 

Ireland joins NATO.

Sweden and Finland, threatened by Russia, join NATO.

Mexico talking with NATO for associate partnership.

Bosnia and Herzegona, Macedonia and Yugoslavia join 

NATO

Isreal ivades Jordan Syria and Lebanon Thacks to use 

weponss

2020-2025

Montenegro and Moldova join NATO.

Russian economy, with Russian peak oil reached and no 

stable income, and with gradual loss of exports to NATO 

economies, stabilizes at a nervously low rate.

Chinese growth slows.

As an experimental action, North and South Korea practice 

a single ideology in a small reigion. It is "hybrid socialisim" 

which includes economic limitations and civic freedoms. 

It is successful.

2016-2020

Korea unites.

Turkey has grown in economic and military power.

Japan abolishes its WWII-age limitations in the ceremonial 

move of intervening with the foreign affairs of Korea, which 

is attacked by far-left guerillas, militarily.

Russia and China have slowed, and nearly stopped, growth.

2020-2030

Russian's population growth is positive due to its policy to 

accept more people from other countries to migrate in.

With decaying influence, Brazil is now nothing more than a 

middle power.

Chinese growth stops.

Poland and Turkey are now developed countries, since they 

exploit the economy of the ex-USSR.

The Russian Federation become a super power once again.

China disbands. It is chaotic.

More than 2/3 of China's population disappears after 

being attacked by a nuke bombs rain by Japan.

Many minor countries attempt to take some profits. Indonesia

becomes a new power, Vietnam becomes bother country to 

Japan and Indonesia, forming a new allies power in Asia 

including Japan, India, Indonesia, Vietnam,....

After North and South unification, Korea is now a powerful 

country. And it may allies with a couple of large countries 

in the old China after the collapse of China.

2030-2040

Japan, Turkey and Poland now world powers.

World economy flourishes without the control of the USA.

Pre-War

All sides make delicate deployments.

Turkey and Poland form the new Central Powers, which 

aims to thrust East and exploit Russia and western China.

The USA and Japan make an alliance named the Pacific 

Alliance, aiming to spread in both directions.

The War

World War Three officially began with Turkey's now-nuclear 

missiles launched at American and British satellites in space, 

on Christmas 2049. Immediately, the USA declares war on 

Turkey once the attack is analyzed.

The Sides

The Eurasian Powers includes Turkey's vast territory, 

stretching from Northern Iraq, Syria, the Caucaucus, up 

to other parts of Central Russia and former Yugoslavia. 

Poland has a large country, from its own to Western Russia. 

The Eastern European states are also members of the 

coalition. Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are military supporters 

of the Powers, as are the other Middle Eastern and North 

African dominions of Turkey. In Asia, Pakistan and 

Afghanistan are military supporters. Many other Islamic 

Asian states are spiritually supportive.

The Pacific Alliance constitutes the Western European 

states, the USA, Mexico and South America as well as J

apan, whose territory consists of Eastern China. Japan 

has dominions in SouthEast Asia as well as the semi-

independent ally of India.

http://future.wikia.com/wiki/Scenario:_World_War_III_in_2050

What If China & Japan Went To War?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OzFcF7s-dD8

USA Vs China In WW3 Secret Plans And Their 

Preparation | Documentary

Crouching Tiger Episode 1: Will There Be War With China?