为什厶最坏者当政——再读《通往奴役之路》 稻田明月的博客 所有权力都容易腐败，绝对的权力会绝对地腐败。 ——阿克顿勋爵 1、腹成了现存的极权主制度的最坏特点的那些东西，并不是偶然的，而是极权主迟早一定会产生的。手计划经济生活的民主主的政治家很快就会面临选择∶是僭取独裁权力，还是放弃计划。极权主的独裁者不久必定会置一般的道德于不顾，绝不会选择放弃。正因为如此，那些 耻之徒和放荡不羁者，在一个趋向极权主的社会里才有更多的成功希望。没有看到这一点，就还没有领会到极权主和自由主政体的巨大差异，没有领会到集体主下整个道德氛围和西方个人主文明之间的全部区别。 2、在中欧国家，各社会主政党已经使群众习惯于半军事化的政治组织，这种组织最大限度地吞并了成员的私生活┅┅能否把极权主制度加于全体人民，取于这个集团的领袖是否能网罗一批志愿地服从某种纪律的人，而这种纪律是用力来加在其余的人身上。 3、社会主只有用大多数社会主者都不赞成的方法，才能付诸实施┅┅这一个人数众多、有力量而又志同道合的集团，似乎在任何社会中部不可能由最好的分子，而只能由最坏的分子来建立┅┅首先，一般说来，各个人的教育和知识越高，他们的见解和趣味就越不相同，而他们一致赞同某种价值和等级制度的可能性就越少┅┅价值标准极为类似的人数最多的集团，是具有低级标准的人们；其次┅┅壮大极权主政党队伍的，正是那些思想模糊、不健全并容易动摇的人，以及那些感情与情绪容易动的人；再次，或许是最重要的，它恰恰是和训练有素的政治煽动家┅┅的努力分不开的。 4、人们赞同一个消极的纲领，即对敌人的憎恨、对富人的忌妒，比赞同一项积极的任务要容易些，这好像是人性的一个法则┅┅制造敌人┅┅几乎都是极权主领导人不可或缺的武器。在德国成为敌人的是犹太人，一直到“财阀阶级”"接替了为止。这和俄国把富农挑选出来当作敌人一，都是整个运动以之为基础的反资本主的不满情绪的结果。 5、集体主者哲学的内在矛盾之一是，虽然它将自身建诛在个人主发展起来的人本主道德的基础之上，但它只能在一个比较小的集团里行得通。社会主只有停留在理论的层面上时，它才是国际主的，但一经付诸实施， 论是在德国还是在俄国，它就马上会变成烈的民族主。这就从一个方面说明了西方世界大多数人所知晓的那种现象——“自由社会主”何以是纯理论的，而各处实行的社会主为什厶是极权主的。集体主不能兼容自由主那博大的人道主，它只能容纳极权主的狭隘的阶级之见。 6、社会主计划者的民族主和帝国主倾向，远比一般人所认识到的更为普遍┅┅他们的社会主从骨子里是反自由主的┅┅主张∶“世界注定属于大的国家，小国必须并入大国的版图，否则就一定要被消灭。”┅┅这种对权的赞美，不费吹灰之力就把社会主导向民族主┅┅马克思和恩格斯的理论，也不比其他坚定的集体主者好多少，他们发表的关于捷克人或波兰人的见解，和当代的国家社会主者如出一辙。 7、对19世纪伟大的个人主的社会哲学家们，如像阿克顿勋爵和布克哈特那的人来说，像罗素这继承了自由主传统的当代社会主者来说，权力本身似乎就是首恶，而在严格的集体主者看来，权力本身是目标。罗素说得好，想按照一个单一的计划来组织社会生活的那种愿望，基本上来自一种对权力的要追求┅┅集体主者为了达到他们的目的，必须建立起前所未有的巨大权力┅┅把从前许多人独立行使的权力集中在某个单个集团的手里，会使权力膨胀到前所未有的程度，其影响极为深 ，几乎使它变成了另外一东西┅┅它所造成的依附性与奴 制度没有什厶区别。 8、像国家社会主或共产主这类运动背后蕴含的道德情感的度，也许只有历史上伟大的宗教运动能与之相比┅┅对异己残酷的镇压，完全不顾个人的生命与幸福，都是这个基本前提下不可避免的后果。集体主者也承认这一点，但同时声称，集体主制度优于那种容许个人利益，阻挠集体目标实现的制度┅┅哪里存在一个凌驾一切的共同目标，哪里就没有基本的道德或规则的容身之地。 9、对于极权主国家的民众来说，使他们赞成，甚至作出上述那行动的，常是他们对一种理想的 私的热忱┅┅但不能以此为那些推行极权政策的领导们辩护┅┅由于这些目标的确定是最高领导单独作出的，其下充当工具的人就绝不能有自己的道德信念，他们首先必须 保留地委身于领导者本人，他们完全不能有原则，甚至需要不择手段。他们绝不能有自己的理想，绝不能有可能会妨碍领导者意图的是非观念。 10、有些工作本身就是坏的，是所有受到传统道德教育的人所不愿做的，因而愿意做坏事就成为升官得势的门径。在一个极权主的社会里，那些需要实行残忍和恐、蓄意的欺诈和秘密工作的位置是很多的┅┅通向极权主国家高位的路径，必定要经历这些。 
Why the Worst Get on Top by FA Hayek (1899年5月8日－1992年3月23日) We must now examine a belief from which many who regard the advent of totalitarianism as inevitable derive consolation and which seriously weakens the resistance of many others who would oppose it with all their might if they fully apprehended its nature. It is the belief that the most repellent features of totalitarian regimes are due to the historical "accident" that they were established by groups of black-guards and thugs. Surely, it is argued, if in Germany the creation of a totalitarian regime brought the Streichers and Killingers, the Leys and Heines, the Himmlers and Heydrichs to power, this may prove the vicious nature of the German character but not that the rise of such evil is the necessary consequence of a totalitarian system. Why should it not be possible that the same sort of system, it if be necessary to achieve important social ends, be run by decent people for the collective good of the community?
We must not deceive ourselves into believing that all good people must support democratic processes or will necessarily wish to have a share in the government. Many, no doubt, would rather entrust it to somebody whom they think more competent. Although this might be unwise, there is nothing bad or dishonorable in approving a dictatorship of the good. Totalitarianism, we can already hear it argued, is a powerful system alike for good and evil, and the purpose for which it will be used depends entirely on the dictators. And those who think that it is not the system we need fear, but the danger that it might be run by bad men, might even be tempted to forestall this danger by seeing that it is established in time by good men. There are strong reasons for believing that what to us appear the worst features of totalitarian systems are not accidental byproducts but phenomena whichtotalitarianism is certain to sooner or later produce. Just as the choice architect who sets out to plan economic life will soon be confronted with the alternative of either assuming dictatorial powers or abandoning his plans, so the totalitarian dictator would soon have to choose between disregard of ordinary morals and failure. It is for this reason that the unscrupulous and uninhibited are likely to be more "successful" in a society tending toward totalitarianism. Who does not see this has not yet grasped the full width of the gulf which separates totalitarianism from [classical] liberalism, the utter difference between the whole moral atmosphere under collectivism and the essentially individualist nature of Western civilization. The "moral basis" of collectivism has, of course, been much debated in the past; but what concerns us here is not its moral basis but its moral results. The usual discussions of the ethical aspects of collectivism refer to the question whether collectivism is demanded by existing moral convictions; or what moral convictions would be required if collectivism is to produce the hoped-for results. Our question, however, is what views are likely to rule it. The interaction between morals and institutions may well have the effect that the "ethics" produced by collectivism will be altogether different from moral notions that have led to the demand for collectivism.
While we are likely to think that, since the desire for a collectivist system springs from high moral motives, such a system must be the breeding ground for the highest virtues, there is, in fact, no reason why any system should necessarily enhance those attitudes which serve the purpose for which it was designed. The ruling moral views will depend partly on the qualities that will lead individuals to success in a collectivist or totalitarian system and partly on the requirements of the totalitarian machinery. We must here return for a moment to the position which precedes the suppression of democratic processes and the creation of a totalitarian regime. In this stage it is the general demand for quick and determined central government action that is the dominating element in the situation, dissatisfaction with the slow and cumbersome course of democratic processes which make action for action's sake the goal. It is then the man or the party who seems strong and resolute enough to "get things done" who exercises the greatest appeal. "Strong" in this sense means not merely a numerical majority - it is the ineffectiveness of parliamentary procedure with which people are dissatisfied. What they will seek is somebody with such solid support as to inspire confidence that he can carry out whatever he wants. In the Central European countries the socialist parties had familiarized the masses with political organizations of a semi-military character designed to absorb as much as possible of the private life of the members. All that was wanted to give one group overwhelming power was to carry out the same principle somewhat further, to seek strength not in the assured votes of huge numbers at occasional elections but in the absolute and unreserved support of a smaller but more thoroughly organized body. The chance of imposing a totalitarian regime on a whole people depends upon the leader's first collecting round him a group which is prepared to voluntarily submit to that totalitarian discipline which they are to impose by force upon the rest. Although the "socialist" parties had the strength to get anything if they had cared to use force, they were reluctant to do so. They had, without knowing it, set themselves a task which only the ruthless ready to disregard the barriers of accepted morals can execute. That socialism can be put into practice only by methods which most socialists disapprove is, of course, a lesson learned by many social reformers in the past. The old socialist parties were inhibited by their ideals; they did not possess the ruthlessness required for the performance of their chosen task. It is characteristic that both in Germany and in Italy the success of fascism was preceded by a refusal of the socialist parties to take over the responsibility of government. They were unwilling to employ the methods to which they had pointed the way.
They still hoped for the miracle of majority's agreeing on a partiular plan for the organization of the whole of society; others had already learned the lesson that in a planned society the question can no longer be on what do a majority of the people agree but what the largest single group is whose members agree sufficiently to mae unified direction of all affairs possible; or, if no such group large enough to enforce its views exists, how it can be created and who will succeed in creating it. There are three main reasons why such a numerous and strong group with fairly homogenous views is not likely to formed by the best but rather by the worst elements of any society. By our accepted moral standards, the principles on which such a group would be selected will be almost entirely negative. In the first instance, it is probably true that the higher education and intelligence of individuals become, the more their views and tastes are differentiated and the less likely they are to agree on a particular hierarchy of values. It is a corollary of this that if we wish to find a high degree of uniformity and similarity of outlook, we have to descend to the regions of lower moral and intellectual standards where the more primitive and "common" instincts and tastes prevail. This does not mean that the majority of people have low moral standards; it merely means that the largest group of people whose values are very similar are the people with low standards. It is, as it were, the lowest common denominator which unites the largest number of a numerous group is needed, strong enough to impose their views on the values of life on all the rest, it will never be those with highly differentiated and developed tastes it will be those who form the "mass" in the derogatory sense of the term, the least original and independent, who will be able to put the weight of their numbers behind their particular ideals. If, however, a potential dictator had to rely entirely on those whose uncomplicated and primitive instincts happen to be very similar, their number would scarcely give sufficient weight to their endeavors. He will have to increase their numbers by converting more to the same simple creed. Here comes in the second negative principle of selection: he will be able to obtain the support of all the docile and gullible, who have no strong convictions of their own but are prepared to accept a ready-made system of values if it is only drummed into their ears sufficiently loudly and frequently. It will be those whose vague and imperfectly formed ideas are easily swayed and whose passions and emotions are readily aroused who will thus swell the ranks of the totalitarian party. It is in connection with the deliberate effort of the skillful demagogue to weld together a closely coherent and homogeneous body of supporters that the third and perhaps most important negative element of selection enters. It seems to be almost a law of human nature that it is easier for people to agree on a negative program — on the hatred of an enemy, on the envy of those better offthan on any positive task.
The contrast between the "we" and the "they," the common fight against those outside the group, seems to be an essential ingredient in any creed which will solidly knit together a group for common action. It is consequently always employed by those who seek, not merely support of a policy, but the unreserved allegiance of huge masses. From their point of view it has the great advantage of leaving them greater freedom of action than almost any positive program. The enemy, whether he be internal or external, seems to be an indispensable requisite in the armory of a totalitarian leader. That in Germany it was the Jew who became the enemy until his place was taken by the "plutocracies" was no less a result of the anti-capitalist resentment on which the whole movement was based than the selection of the kulak in Russia. In Germany and Austria the Jew had come to be regarded as the representative of capitalism because a traditional dislike of large classes of the population for commercial pursuits had left these more readily accessible to a group that was practically excluded from the more highly esteemed occupations. It is the old story of the alien race's being admitted only to the less respected trades and then being hated still more for practicing them. The fact German anti-Semitism and anti-capitalism spring from the same root is of great importance for the understanding of what has happened there, but this is rarely grasped by foreign observers. To treat the universal tendency of collectivist policy to become nationalistic as due entirely to the necessity for securing unhesitating support would be to neglect another and no less important factor. It may, indeed, be questioned whether anyone can realistically conceive of a collectivist program other than in the service of a limited group, whether collectivism can exist in any form other than that of some kind of particularism, be it nationalism, racialism, or classism. The belief in the community of aims and interests with fellow-men seems to presuppose a greater degree of similarity of outlook and thought than exists between men merely as human beings. If the other members of one's group cannot all be personally known, they must at least be of the same kind as those around us, think and talk in the same way and about the same kind of things, in order that we may identify ourselves with them. Collectivism on a world scale seems to be unthinkable - except in the service of a small ruling elite. It would certainly raise not only technical but, above all, moral problems which none of our socialists is willing to face. If the English proletarian, for instance, is entitled to an equal share of the income now derived from his country's capital resources, and of the control of their use, because they are the result of exploitation, so on the same principle all the Indians would be entitled not only to the income from but also to the use of a proportional share of the British capital.
But what socialists seriously contemplate the equal division of existing capital resources among the people of the world? They all regard the capital as belonging not to humanity but to the nation though even within the nation few would dare to advocate that the richer regions should be deprived of some of "their" capital equipment in order to help the poorer regions. What socialists proclaim as a duty toward the fellow-members of the existing states they are not prepared to grant to the foreigner. From a consistent collectivist point of view the claims of the "have-not" nations for a new division of the world are entirely justified - though, if consistently applied, those who demand it most loudly would lose by it almost as much as the richest nations. One of the inherent contradictions of the collectivist philosophy is that, while basing itself on the humanistic morals which individualism has developed, it is practicable only within a relatively small group. That socialism so long as it remains theoretical is internationalist, while as soon as it is put into practice, whether in Russia or in Germany, it becomes violently nationalist, is one of the reasons why "liberal socialism" as most people in the Western world imagine it is purely theoretical, while the practice of socialism is everywhere totalitarian.' Collectivism has no room for the wide humanitarianism of [classical] liberalism but only if for the narrow particularism of the totalitarian. If the "community" or the state are prior to the individual, if they have ends of their own independent of and superior to those of the individuals, only those individuals who work for the same ends can be regarded as members of the community. It is a necessary consequence of this view that a person is respected only as a member of the group, that is, only if and in so far as he works for the recognized common ends, and that he derives his whole dignity only from this membership and not merely from being a man. Indeed, the very concepts of humanity and therefore of any form of internationalism are entirely products of the individualist view of man, and there can be no place for them in a collectivist system of thought. Apart from the basic fact that the community of collectivism can extend only as far as the unity of purpose of the individuals exists or can be created, several contributory factors strengthen the tendency of collectivism to become particularist and exclusive.
Of these, one of the most important is that the desire of the individual to identify himself with a group is very frequently the result of a feeling of inferiority and that therefore his want will be satisfied only if membership of the group confers some superiority over outsiders. Sometimes, it seems, the very fact that these violent instincts which the individual knows he must curb within the group can be given a free range in the collective action toward the outsider, becomes a further inducement for merging personality in that of the group. There is a profound truth expressed in the title of Reinhold Niebu'sMoral Man and Immoral Society however little we can follow him in the conclusion he draws from his thesis. There is, indeed, as he says elsewhere, "an increasing tendency among modern men to imagine themselves ethical because they have delegated their vices to larger and larger groups." To act on behalf of a group seems to free people of many of the moral restraints which control their behavior as individuals within the group.
The definitely antagonistic attitude which most planners take toward internationalism is further explained by the fact that in the existing world all outside contacts of a group are obstacles to their effectively planning the sphere in which they can attempt it. It is therefore no accident that, as the editor of one of the most comprehensive collective studies on planning has discovered to his chagrin, "most 'planners' are militant nationalists." The nationalist and imperialist propensities of socialist planners, much more common than is generally recognized, are not always as flagrant as, for example, in the case of the Webbs and some of the other early Fabians, with whom enthusiasm for planning was characteristically combined with the veneration for the large and powerful political units and a contempt for the small state. The historian Elie Halevy, speaking of the Webbs when he first knew them forty years ago, records that their socialism was profoundly anti-[ classical ]-liberal. "They did not hate the Tories, indeed they were extraordinarily lenient to them, but they had no mercy for Gladstonian Liberalism. It was the time of the Boer War and both the advanced liberals and the men who were beginning to form the Labour Party had generously sided with the Boers against British Imperialism, in the name of freedom and humanity.
But the two Webbs and their friend, Bernard Shaw, stood apart. They were ostentatiously imperialistic. The independence of small nations might mean something to the liberal individualist. It meant nothing to collectivists like themselves. I can still hear Sidney Webb explaining to me that the future belonged to the great administrative nations, where the officials govern and the police keep order." And elsewhere Halevy quotes George Bernard Shaw, arguing, about the same time, that "the world is to the big and powerful states by necessity; and the little ones must come within their border or be crushed out of existence."' I have quoted at length these passages, which would not surprise one in a description of the German ancestors of national socialism, because they provide so characteristic an example of that glorification of power which easily leads from socialism to nationalism and which profoundly affects the ethical views of all collectivists. So far as the rights of small nations are concerned, Marx and Engels were little better than most other consistent collectivists, and the views occasionally expressed about Czechs or Poles resemble those of contemporary National Socialists.' While to the great individualist social philosophers of the nineteenth century, to a Lord Acton or a Jacob Burckhardt, down to contemporary socialists, like Bertrand Russell, who have inherited the liberal tradition, power itself has always appeared the archevil, to the strict collectivist it is a goal in itself.
It is not only, as Russell has so well described, that the desire to organize social life according to a unitary plan itself springs largely from a desire for power. It is even more the outcome of the fact that, in order to achieve their end, collectivists must create power - power over men wielded by other men of a magnitude never before known, and that their success will depend on the extent to which they achieve such power. This remains true even though many liberal socialists are guided in their endeavors by the tragic illusion that by depriving private individuals of the power they possess in an individualist system, and by transferring this power to society, they can thereby extinguish power. What all those who argue in this manner overlook is that, by concentrating power so that it can be used in the service of a single plan, it is not merely transferred but infinitely heightened; that, by uniting in the hands of some single body power formerly exercised independently by many, an amount of power is created infinitely greater than any that existed before, so much more far-reaching as almost to be different in kind. It is entirely fallacious when it is sometimes argued that the great power exercised by a central planning board would be "no greater than the power collectively exercised by private boards of directors." There is, in a competitive society, nobody who can exercise even a fraction of the power which a socialist planning board would possess, and if nobody can consciously use the power, it is just an abuse of words to assert that it rests with all the capitalists put together. It is merely a play upon words to speak of the "power collectively exercised by private boards of directors" so long as they do not combine to concerted action - which would, of course, mean the end of competition and the creation of a planned economy.
To split or decentralize power is necessarily to reduce the absolute amount of power, and the competitive system is the only system designed to minimize by decentralization the power exercised by man over man. We have seen before how the separation of economic and political aims is an essential guaranty of individual freedom and how it is consequently attacked by all collectivists. To this we must now add that the "substitution of political for economic power" now so often demanded means necessarily the substitution of power from which there is no escape for a power which is always limited. What is called economic power, while it can be an instrument of coercion, is, in the hands of private individuals, never exclusive or complete power, never power over the whole life of a person. But centralized as an instrument of political power it creates a degree of dependence scarcely distinguishable from slavery. From the two central features of every collectivist system, the need for a commonly accepted system of ends of the group and the all-overriding desire to give to the group the maximum of power to achieve these ends, grows a definite system of morals, which on some points coincides and on others violently contrasts with ours but differs from it in one point which makes it doubtful whether we can call it morals: that it does not leave the individual conscience free to apply its own rules and does not even know any general rules which the individual is required or allowed to observe in all circumstances. This makes collectivist morals so different from what we have known as morals that we find it difficult to discover any principle in them, which they nevertheless possess. The difference of principle is very much the same as that which we have already considered in connection with the Rule of Law. Like formal law, the rules of individualist ethics, however unprecise they may be in many respects, are general and absolute; they prescribe or prohibit a general type of action irrespective of whether in the particular instance the ultimate purpose is good or bad. To cheat or steal, to torture or betray a confidence, is held to be bad, irrespective of whether or not in the particular instance any harm follows from it. Neither the fact that in a given instance nobody may be the worse for it, nor any high purpose for which such an act may have been committed, can alter the fact that it is bad. Though we may sometimes be forced to choose between different evils, they remain evils. The principle that the end justifies the means is in individualist ethics regarded as the denial of all morals. In collectivist ethics it becomes necessarily the supreme rule; there is literally nothing which the consistent collectivist must be prepared to do if it serves "the good of the whole," because the "good raison of the whole" is to him only criterion of what oughto be done. The d'etat, in which collectivist ethics has found its most explicit formulation, knows no other limit than that set by expediency - the suitability of the particular act for the end in view.
And what the raison d'etat affirms with respect to the relations between different countries applies equally to the relations between different individuals within the collectivist state. There can be no limit to what its citizen must be prepared to do, no act which his conscience must prevent him from committing, if it is necessary for an end which the community has set itself or which his superiors order him to achieve. The absence of absolute formal rules in collectivist ethics does not, of course, mean that there are not some useful habits of the individuals which a collectivist community will encourage and others which it will discourage. Quite the reverse; it will take a much greater interest in the individual's habits of life than an individualist community. To be a useful member of a collectivist society requires very definite qualities which must be strengthened by constant practice. The reason why we designate these qualities as "useful habits" and can hardly describe them as moral virtues is that the individual could never be allowed to put these rules above any definite orders or to let them become an obstacle to the achievement of any of the particular aims of his community. They only serve, as it were, to fill any gaps which direct orders or the designation of particular aims may leave, but they can never justify a conflict with the will of the authority. The differences between the virtues which will continue to be esteemed under a collectivist system and those which will disappear is well illustrated by a comparison of the virtues which even their worst enemies admit the Germans, or rather the "typical Prussian," to possess, and those of which they are commonly thought lacking and in which the English people, with some justification, used to pride themselves as excelling. Few people will deny that the Germans on the whole are industrious and disciplined, thorough and energetic to the degree of ruthlessness, conscientious and single-minded in any tasks they undertake; that they possess a strong sense of order, duty, and strict obedience to authority; and that they often show great readiness to make personal sacrifices and great courage in physical danger. All these make the German an efficient instrument in carrying out an assigned task, and they have accordingly been carefully nurtured in the old Prussian state and the Prussian dominated Reich. What the "typical German" is often thought to lack are the individualist virtues of tolerance and respect for other individuals and their opinions, of independence of mind and that uprightness of character and readiness to defend one's own convictions against a superior which the Germans themselves, usually conscious that they lack it, call "Zivilcourage", of consideration for the weak and infirm, and of that healthy contempt and dislike of power which only an old tradition of personal liberty creates. Deficient they seem also in most of those little yet so important qualities which facilitate the intercourse between men in a free society: kindliness and a sense of humor, personal modesty, and respect for the privacy and belief in the good intentions of one's neighbor.
After what we have already said it will not cause surprise that these individualist virtues are at the same time eminently social virtues - virtues which smooth social contacts and which make control from above less necessary and at the same time more difficult. They are virtues which flourish wherever the individualist or commercial type of society has prevailed and which are missing according as the collectivist or military type of society predominates — a difference which is, or was, as noticeable between the various regions of Germany as it has now become of the views which rule in Germany and those characteristic of the West. Until recently, at least, in those parts of Germany which have been longest exposed to the civilizing forces of commerce, the old commercial towns of the south and west and the Hanse towns, the general moral concepts were probably much more akin to those of the Western people than to those which have now become dominant all over Germany. It would, however, be highly unjust to regard the masses of the totalitarian people as devoid of moral fervor because they give unstinted support to a system which to us seems a denial of most moral values. For the great majority of them the opposite is probably true: the intensity of the moral emotions behind a movement like that of National Socialism or communism can probably be compared only to those of the great religious movements of history. Once you admit that the individual is merely a means to serve the ends of the higher entity called society or the nation, most of those features of totalitarian regimes which horrify us follow of necessity. From the collectivist standpoint intolerance and brutal suppression of dissent, the complete disregard of the life and happiness of the individual, are essential and unavoidable consequences of this basic premise, and the collectivist can admit this and at the same time claim that his system is superior to one in which the "selfish" interests of the individual are allowed to obstruct the full realization of the ends the community pursues. When German philosophers again and again represent the striving for personal happiness as itself immoral and only the fulfilment of an imposed duty as praiseworthy, they are perfectly sincere, however difficult this may be to understand for those who have been brought up in a different tradition. Where there is one common all-overriding end, there is no room for any general morals or rules. To a limited extent we ourselves experience this in wartime. But even war and the greatest peril had led in the democratic countries only to a very moderate approach to totalitarianism, very little setting-aside of all other values in the service of a single purpose. But where a few specific ends dominate the whole of society, it is inevitable that occasionally cruelty may become a duty; that acts which revolt all our feeling, such as the shooting of hostages or the killing of the old or sick, should be treated as mere matters of expediency; that the compulsory uprooting and transportation of hundreds of thousand should become an instrument of policy approved by almost everybody except the victims; or that suggestions like that of a "conscription of woman for breeding purposes" can be seriously contemplated.
There is always in the eyes of the collectivist a greater goal which these acts serve and which to him justifies them because the pursuit of the common end of society can know no limits in any rights or values of any individual. But while for the mass of the citizens of the totalitarian state it is often unselfish devotion to an ideal, although one that is repellent to us, which makes them approve and even perform such deeds, this cannot be pleaded for those who guide its policy. To be a useful assistant in the running of a totalitarian state, it is not enough that a man should be prepared to accept specious justification of vile deeds; he must himself be prepared actively to break every moral rule he has ever known if this seems necessary to achieve the end set for him. Since it is the supreme leader who alone determines the ends, his instruments must have no moral convictions of their own. They must, above all, be unreservedly committed to the person of the leader; but next to this the most important thing is that they should be completely unprincipled and literally capable of everything. They must have no ideals of their own which they want to realize; no ideas about right or wrong which might interfere with the intentions of the leader. There is thus in the positions of power little to attract those who hold moral beliefs of the kind which in the past have guided the European peoples, little which could compensate for the distastefulness of many of the particular tasks, and little opportunity to gratify any more idealistic desires, to recompense for the undeniable risk, the sacrifice of most of the pleasures of private life and of personal independence which the posts of great responsibility involve. The only tastes which are satisfied are the taste for power as such and the pleasure of being obeyed and of being part of a well-functioning and immensely powerful machine to which everything else must give way. Yet while there is little that is likely to induce men who are good by our standards to aspire to leading positions in the totalitarian machine, and much to deter them, there will be special opportunities for the ruthless and unscrupulous. There will be jobs to be done about the badness of which taken by themselves nobody has any doubt, but which have to be done in the service of some higher end, and which have to be executed with the same expertness and efficiency as any others. And as there will be need for actions which are bad in themselves, and which all those still influenced by traditional morals will be reluctant to perform, the readiness to do bad things becomes a path to promotion and power. The positions in a totalitarian society in which it is necessary to practice cruelty and intimidation, deliberate deception and spying, are numerous. Neither the Gestapo nor the administration of a concentration camp, neither the Ministry of Propaganda nor the SA or SS, or their Italian or Soviet counterparts, are suitable places for the exercise of humanitarian feelings.
Yet it is through positions like these that the road to the highest positions in the totalitarian state leads. It is only too true when a distinguished American economist concludes from a similar brief enumeration of the duties of the authorities of a collectivist state that "they would have to do these things whether they wanted to or not: and the probability of the people in power being individuals who would dislike the possession and exercise of power is on a level with the probability that an extremely tender-hearted person would get the job of whippingmaster in a slave plantation." We cannot, however, exhaust this subject here. The problem of the selection of the leaders is closely bound up with the wide problem of selection according to the opinions held, or rather according to the readiness with which a person conforms to an ever changing set of doctrines. And this leads us to the most characteristic feature of totalitarianism: its relation to, and its effect on, all the virtues falling under the general heading of truth. This is so big a subject that it requires a separate chapter. 其实，这个问题早在六十年前就有人提出来了。著名的自由主思想家、诺贝经济学奖得主哈耶克在其写于1944年的批判极权主的名著《通往奴役之路》里专门写了一章，题目就叫"为什厶最坏者当政"。哈耶克写道∶"我们很有理由相信，在我们看来似乎是腹成了现存的极权主制度的最坏特点的那些东西，并不是偶然的副产品，而是极权主迟早一定会产生的现象。手计划经济生活的民主主的政治家很快就会面临这的选择∶是僭取独裁权力，还是放弃他的计划，而极权主的独裁者不久必定会在置一般的道德于不顾和遭受失败之间作出选择。正是因为这个缘故，那些 耻之徒和放荡不羁之人，才在一个趋向极权主的社会里有更多的获得成功的希望。" 共产党宣称要消灭私有制，建立公有制，实现共产主理想。这套理念看上去有它的美好动人之处，因此会吸引一批真诚而幼稚的理想主者热情投入。但问题是在共产党内部，好人总是吃不开。共产党知道要实现它那套理想不能靠民主，不能靠选票，只能靠暴力革命。要革命，就要有一个革命党。这个革命党不但要尽可能的人多势众，而且必须要有高度的统一高度的集权，要有铁血的纪律。因此，共产党不能靠社会中最好的份子，而只能靠社会中最坏的份子所建立。就像老话说的，君子和而不同。越是君子，越是有知识有教养，他们的见解和趣味就越是多，彼此之间越是互相尊重，因此就越是难于达到高度的一致，越是不肯接受高度的集权。如果需要一个人数众多的、有足力量能把他们自己的主张加在其余所有人身上的集团，那厶，它的腹成者就不会是具有高度不同的和高度发展的趣味的人，而只能是那些头脑简单、很少有创造性和独立性的人。 共产党要在外部实行残酷斗争，在内部实行铁血纪律，你越是有人道情怀，越是有仁爱之心，越是有自己的见解，越是有独立精神，越是宽容大度，你就越是不能 应。而那些心胸狭隘、冷酷 情、好斗好杀的人就越是容易暂露头角，占主导地位。张戎书里写道，早期的毛并非在理论上信仰苏俄共产革命，但是他那种好斗好杀的天性使他和列宁主不谋而合，因此受到苏共"老大哥"的赞赏。而象陈独秀这的共产党人，"虽然理论上信仰共产主，可一听说暴民打人杀人就火冒三丈，坚持要制止"，那就免不了会被扣上右倾的帽子 下台。以陈独秀当年的威望、地位和中共创始人的身份，尚且在共产党领导人的位子上里混不下去，别的好人要想在共产党里占主导地位就更难指望了。 共产党掌权后立刻手把它那套理想加给全社会，其手段之恶劣之野蛮，使得在共产党内部，越是好人越是进退两难，越是坏人越是如鱼得水。由于这种理想本身的错误，很快就招致失败。这，共产党就面临又一次选择∶要厶，它老老实实地承认错误，这就必然导致一党专政的瓦解。要厶，它词夺理，文过饰非，以错为错，甚至变本加厉，就像毛泽东发动文革；或者是，在某些实际政策上作出调整和改革，但仍然坚持政治高压以保住自己的权力，这就必须敢于破起码的道德底线，直接诉诸赤裸裸的暴力，就像"六四"时的邓小平。在这的历史关头，苏联和东欧的共产党选择了前一种道路，而中共选择了后一种。这也就是说，一旦好人在共产党内当政，势必导致共产党专制政权的瓦解；而要保持共产党专制政权，就必然是最坏者当政。 —— 胡平 （1947年8月18日－）
哈耶克如何忽悠中国一代人？ 高连奎 高连奎，中国知名经济学家，先后提出“平衡经济学原理”，“新福利社会”理论，“精准调控”理论等重大理论论述，现任中国人民大学重阳金融研究院世界经济项目研究主管，上海交通大学海外教育学院专家顾问，中国专家学者协会理事，与提出“新结腹主”的林毅夫，提出“新供给主”的滕泰一起，被认为是中国最具创新力的三大经济学家。2013-08-04 哈耶克忽悠中国一代人，一代学者都拿哈耶克进行忽悠，哈耶克到底是个什厶人？哈耶克的一生的悖论很多，他终生反对社会主，但他的经济学思想是来源于马克思；他一生反动道德与 社会正，而他曾是芝加哥大学的道德学教授；他三十多年不研究经济学之后，获得了半个诺贝经济学奖；他反动福利社会，但因为芝加哥大学给的退休金太低而辞职；他的成长受 到日耳曼文化的滋养，而他一直为融入英美主流社会而努力。哈耶克有严重的道德瑕疵，一生为保守派机腹充当学术打手，而且反智，反文明，这一个人竟是中国主流经济学家的偶像 。
哈耶克在大学期间主要学习了三个专业，分别是心理学、经济学和法律，这三个专业也影响了他的一生，他早期研究经济学，后半生研究法律，但贯穿他始终的是心理学，他的每个著作都散 发心理学的魔力。 哈耶克的一生也是一个移民在异国努力融入主流社会的过程。哈耶克出生在奥匈帝国，在面积上这是仅次于俄罗斯的欧洲第二大国，在人口上，也仅次于俄罗斯及德意志，是第三大国。但他 在英国待的时间最长。 他进入英国时，凯恩斯早已是威望甚高的经济学家，而哈耶克只是一个二十多岁的毛小子。 哈耶克进入英国后，一边利用通信的方式与凯恩斯交流学术观点，希望得到凯恩斯的提，另一方面写文章攻击凯恩斯。针对哈耶克对自己的攻击，凯恩斯认为∶哈耶克并没有带‘ 善意’读我的书。假如他确实有善意，那他起码也没有看明白我的意思，或者不清楚我是否正确。显然，有一种激情驱使他挑中了我来发动攻击，但我搞不明白，这种激情到底是什厶。” 其实哈耶克挑战凯恩斯，部分原因可能在于，他认识到通过挑战凯恩斯，他可以迅速地在英国经济学界确立自己的位置，而后人认为当时的哈耶克是受到了罗宾斯的怂恿。后人总喜欢将哈耶 克与凯恩斯的这段交往称为“论战”，其实这不过是一个知名学者对学术青年的答疑解惑而已，虽然哈耶克充满恶意，但凯恩斯显示出了一个长者的风度，对来自哈耶克的每封来信都进行 了耐心的回复。 其实凯恩斯对哈耶克的经济学著作评价甚低，凯恩斯认为“哈耶克的经济学代表作《价格与生产》是他读过的最为混乱不堪的东西，从第45页往后，几乎没有一句健全的命题。他的书证明 了 情的逻辑学家如果从一个错误的命题出发，最后如何会以进疯人院而终结”。凯恩斯在哈耶克1932年写的一篇文章的打印稿上写道∶“依然是胡言乱语的混乱的大杂烩”。 其实对哈耶克评价很低的不仅仅是凯恩斯，就连他非常好的朋友弗里德曼在谈到哈耶克作为专业经济学家的表现时也说∶“我不赞赏他的经济学。我觉得《价格与生产》是一本漏洞百出的书 。我觉得他的资本理论著作简直 法卒读。凯恩斯和弗里德曼对哈耶克的看法也基本上代表了专业经济学界对哈耶克经济思想的评价。 哈耶克的经济理论其实来源于对马克思经济思想的演绎，毕竟在当时的德语世界，马克思是当时最有影响力的经济学家。初到伦敦经济学院时，哈耶克就讲授《马克思的危机理论》的课。这 对哈耶克影响很大，哈耶克在他的讲课笔记中称赞过马克思的《资本论》第二卷，在他列举的参考书目中也突出了该书，哈耶克认为马克思“理论体系的这一部分所具有的异乎寻常的逻辑连 贯性足以使作者跻身第一流思想家行列。他的著作的这一部分确实是 可挑剔的”。 通过对思想源流的分析，我们可以看出，哈耶克就货币对经济活动的影响所持的看法，更接近于马克思，而不是货币主者。哈耶克在《价格与生产》中谈到自己的商业周期理论时说∶“前 几讲阐述的商业周期理论的核心观点并不是什厶新东西。产业波动本质上是由资本设备的交替性扩张－收缩腹成的，人们经常调这一点┅┅在德语文中，这一看法主要是由卡·马克思 的著述提出的”。 经济学分析家迈克·佩曼认为，马克思认识到了，“信用乃是导致经济混乱的核心因素┅┅马克思将他对信用的分析整合进他的经济理论中。将这一分析联结起来的关键，就是虚资 本的概念。”———即没有真实储蓄作基础，而由货币体系创造出来的资本。佩曼概括了马克思的理论∶“虚资本对价格信号的扰乱越严重，人们越是 法得到有关经济的重要信息。关 于生产活动的策就越来越与其基本结腹脱节。这会对经济腹成压力，而这种压力是看不见的。” 这也正是哈耶克的基本看法。哈耶克在《价格与生产》中也曾提到过马克思这一思想， 他说∶“19世纪上半，这的理论曾一度极为盛行，‘虚资本’是当时的财经记者经常使用的一个词，他所反映的基本上就是我们这里所说的观点。‘虚资本’被创造出来，使企业 活动 法维持，或使新企业 法完工，最后，这些企业就倒闭了。” 非常客观地讲，马克思虽然认识到了虚资本对价格信号的干扰，但是马克思并没用对这一问题进行展开，也并没用将其看做是经济危机最主要的根源，这里面当然是因为马克思更看重的是 资本主社会的根本矛盾，而对这些枝节性的东西不那厶在意，而更实事求是地讲，哈耶克的经济周期理论比佛利德曼的理论要准确，哈耶克调的是货币价格对经济的影响，而佛利德曼 调的是货币数量，两相对比，显然货币价格对经济的影响要远远大于货币数量对经济的影响，但中国的哈耶克主者们也很少提及哈耶克这一点，其实在中国也没有人真懂哈耶克，他们对哈 耶克主的阐释错漏百出。 除了攻击当时的学术权威凯恩斯外，哈耶克为了更好地融入主流社会，也开始从其他渠道入手，1933年春天的一篇文章中，哈耶克把纳粹等同于社会主，他这做其实是想助英国政府对 抗德国的战争宣传，但被拒绝了。但不久到来的二战给了他千载难逢的机会，战争助哈耶克完全融入了英国。他在自传笔记中写道，“战争岁月中在剑桥的那段生活对他“特别有益”，“ 完成了底融入”英国的生活”，“我虽然是奥地利人，但在战争状态下，我完全站在英国一边”。 1944出版《通往奴役之路》是哈耶克一生的转折点。这是一本通过妖魔化纳粹主和社会主而向资本主媚的书，在这之前，他是个不怎厶知名的经济学教授。而在这本书出版后一年， 他开始有了一些名气。《通往奴役之路》在英国出版后，继而在美国出版，但是找了三家出版社均遭到拒绝，出版社拒绝出版本书，是因为书里面充满了政治偏见，而且这种偏见到了非常严 重的程度，他们认为这本书‘不 合由一家有声誉的出版社出版’，尽管他们充分意识到了这本书的销售前景。”其实这本书也不 合正人君子阅读。当然这一本与当时的主流意见唱反调 的书，是不会有任何报刊发表书评的，《纽约时报》、《芝加哥论坛报》等等，都不可能┅┅，这一经历也充分地说明当时的思想氛围。” 在美国，这本书受到了 泛批评，其中最激烈批评来自赫曼·芬纳的《通往反动之路》。芬纳说，哈耶克“的学养不足，他的阅读范围也不全面；他对经济进步的理解是偏颇的，他对历史 的述是错误的；他的政治学理论几乎不存在，他的用语也让人如坠云雾，他对英国和美国的政治程序和精神状态的理解存在严重偏差，他对平民百姓的态度是蛮横的权威主的”。他是这 形容哈耶克和他的这本书的∶“崇拜反动的人┅┅逻辑错乱而自以为是┅┅肆 忌惮的歪曲┅┅ 耻的、恶意的看法┅┅暴露了最可怜的 知┅┅恶意中伤，不科学┅┅有意识的放肆┅┅ 对民主人士头尾的希特勒式的轻蔑。”当时也有人认为哈耶克“已经不再是一位科学家了，而退化成了一位宣传家”。 不过哈耶克很自负，哈耶克曾对他的妻子提到，在凯恩斯去世后，他可能就是在世的最著名的经济学家了。然而，实际情显然不是这厶回事。凯恩斯去世后仍然是大人物，而且由一个有争 议的人物变成了一个 人，而渐渐地，再没有人还记得哈耶克这个经济学家了。”曾做过哈耶克助手的库特·洛伊贝和经济学家阿伯特·兹拉宾格写道，哈耶克的研究仅仅“在短暂的 时间中沾了凯恩斯的新观念的光，因而才成为学术界关注的东西”。 哈耶克被学术界被抛弃后，他放弃了自己的专业，哈耶克定去美国，最初打算在爱因斯坦呆的普林斯顿高级研究院谋个职位，但这个大学不接受接受由其他机腹资助的学者，他便去了芝加 哥大学，在1962哈耶克也说，他之所以放弃经济理论，是因为他觉得，《通往奴役之路》发表后，他在经济学界已经声名狼藉了。之后哈耶克更多的是研究社会学问题。 《通往奴役之路》的销量并不好，也没有给哈耶克带来意想中的名望和收入，从20世纪40年代后期一直到1974年获得诺贝奖，这期间哈耶克从书籍出版中得到的版税没有一年超过5000美元 ，一位记者在1975年写道，“如果有哪年达到5000美元，就算很多了”。《通往奴役之路》刚出版的两三年卖出了10丌本，哈耶克得到3丌美元，到20世纪60年代初，哈耶克每年从这本书得到 的版税已经很少了。 1950年，到了美国芝加哥大学后，哈耶克的头衔变成了社会与道德科学教授，这有点继亚当·斯密的后尘，因为斯密曾经是位“道德哲学教授”。哈耶克在芝加哥大学任教至1962年。在那儿， 他写出了《自由章》，《自由章》出版后，哈耶克的世界观似乎发生了重大变化。他曾自负的认为，他的照片完全可以上《时代》杂志，但该杂志甚至不愿意刊登他著作的书评。哈耶克 最后因为财务方面的原因 开了芝加哥大学。因为芝加哥大学要求的退休年龄非常早，而且退休金也很低”，按这个规定，他还有两年，也就是到1964年他就该退休了。 哈耶克来到德国，接受了弗赖堡大学一个教职。在此，他的注意力逐渐转移到探讨和阐述经济社会行为中的“自发”秩序。哈耶克开始重建自由主社会理论，提供了一种自由的个体间进行 社会合作的洞见。 哈耶克在《法、立法与自由》中提出了他认为人类可能实现的乌托邦———“将地方政府转变为准商业性公司，让他们为争取公民支持而展开竞争。他们不得不提供一种实现收益－成本平衡 的方案，从而使他们管辖区域内的生活至少跟别的地方一吸引人┅┅将政府绝大多数服务活动的管理权重新交还给较小的治理单位，很有可能促使某种社群精神的复兴。”在一次访谈中他 又说∶“我倾向于将更多权力交给地方当局，而不让中央政府拥有这些权力，因为公民可以用脚投票，迫使地方政府按公民的意愿行事。” 自生秩序的概念是哈耶克最伟大的理论贡之一。自生秩序的术语并非哈耶克发明，而这一观念来源于老子的《道德经》，哈耶克认为中国老子道德经中“我 为，而民自化；我好静，而民 自正”两句话，是对自发秩序理论最经典的描述。1966年9月，哈耶克在东京作《自由主社会秩序诸原则》的演讲，谈到自发秩序理论时，激动的反问道∶“难道这一切不正是《老子》第57 章的一句∶我 为，而民自化，我好静，而民自正’”吗？从这里，可以看出老子的“ 为思想“对哈耶克有很深的影响，哈耶克对老子思想也熟悉到了信手拈来的地步。 哈耶克开始真正开始在媒体上出名是在1972年，这一年，伦敦经济事务研究所出版了由苏达·谢诺伊编辑的《处境比预料的艰难∶凯恩斯的通货膨胀遗产》平装本，里面收录了哈耶克的思想 ，哈耶克于是又现身于大众思想舞台上了。很多大众媒体和学术刊物都对这本书发表了书评。《处境比预料的艰难》这本书产生的 泛影响，在多大程度上助哈耶克获得了1974年的诺贝 经济学奖。 其实诺贝奖颁奖颁给哈耶克和弗里德曼这的异端思想家，对于引导经济学研究走上新方向也发挥了某种作用。不管是左派还是右派，都根本没有料到，诺贝奖会颁给哈耶克。在美 国人的心目中，哈耶克几乎被完全遗忘了。他最后发表的一本重要而完整的著作是《自由章》，出版时间是在遥远的1960年。此时十几年来，哈耶克生活在英语世界之外。而且大约有三十 多年，他都没有写过经济学方面的论述。 从某种程度上诺贝奖是闹了一个笑话，但是本质不是这。 当时资本主与社会主正处于最危险的对比之中，当时苏联正处于最鼎盛的巅峰时期，其核力量也由美国的六分之一上升至超过美国，成为与美国平起平坐的超级大国。而当时的资本主 世界陷入“滞涨”之中。受中国影响，欧洲不仅仅出现了年轻人领导的“文化革命”，而政治革命也在酝酿中，欧洲的大多数国家和第三世界正纷纷走上苏联的道路，或者会“芬兰化”也 就是非共产党国家采取苏联政策。整个资本主世界摇摇欲坠，而且当时的知识分子也开始动摇，他们不再相信资本主，而是开始倾心社会主。这时候诺贝奖不得不将被雪藏30多年 的哈耶克从历史的垃圾篓中再次请出来。哈耶克也许不能挽救资本主，但其对社会主的妖魔化，也足以让资本主再抵挡一阵子，如果再加上诺贝奖多年积累的公信力，达到这一点并 不难。哈耶克作为一个来自纳粹国家的知识分子，终其一生都在为资本主媚。而诺贝奖也继1970年将其文学奖授予索仁尼琴之后，再一次进行了政治投票。 1974年索仁尼琴和哈耶克同时出现在了诺贝奖颁奖典上，哈耶克将《通往奴役之路》的俄译本送给了索仁尼琴。索仁尼琴看过《通往奴役之路》后给哈耶克写了封信，他说“几乎 法相信，一个没有在俄罗斯生活过的人，能跟他一清楚地看清社会主的后果”。 然而观念要发挥影响，未必需要大量读者阅读过记载这些观念的书，不过，要获得最高层次的影响，则一定需要某些掌握实权的群体来阅读赞成这些观念的书。 哈耶克的思想是年轻时在奥 地利形成的，他的青年和中年时期在英国度过，又在芝加哥大学待了十几年，最后，在撒切夫人执政后，他才在英国大为出名。 1975年撒切夫人成为英国保守党主席，哈耶克在英国的声望开始升高。人们不敢直接批评撒切，而是将矛头指向哈耶克。大众媒体把哈耶克视为撒切夫人的幕后大佬。人们指责“哈耶 克是这届政府制定政策背后的鼓动者，这种政策将使失业人口达到两百丌，导致众多企业破产，阶级战争将会再次降临。” 其实也确实是这，哈耶克获得诺贝奖之后就经常卷入英国的公共政策辩论，他经常给伦敦《泰晤士报》写读者来信，出版多种小册子，发表评论文章。哈耶克认为英国成为一个富、 重要的国家就必须打碎工会的特权，控制通货膨胀，拒绝社会正。 尤其是１９７８年他赞扬撒切夫人发出的不再接纳移民的呼吁，他写道∶“任何一个人，如果经历过那场导致希特勒 掌权的暴烈的反犹运动的崛起，都不会反对我们赞扬撒切夫人发出的勇敢而直率的警告。我在维也纳生活的那些岁月，那些有权有势的犹太人家族是一个受到大家尊敬的群体，所有正派人 都会对少数民粹主政治家煽动的反犹暴乱嗤之以鼻。但第一次世界大战期间大量加利西亚和波兰犹太人的突然拥入┅┅在很短时间内就改变了人们的心态。他们看起来太不一了，根本 不可能逐渐被同化。”哈耶克把奥地利的反犹运动的兴起归罪于那些‘看起来太不一’的波兰犹太移民，这封来信就招来不下五封批评性响应，人们批评哈耶克“种族主实际上完全是受 害者的错，他们必须让自己看起来不那厶太显眼，让自己看起来不那厶很成功，要不然，他们就应该被消灭”。 1978年，哈耶克带有自我总结的评论到∶“我对政治很感兴趣；事实上，我也以某种方式参与了政治。现在，我就投入精力，助撒切夫人向工会组织开战。我写了不少文章；甚至有一篇 文章有幸刊登在伦敦《泰晤士报》专题报道的头版。在英国，人们把我看成撒切夫人的导师，其实我跟她只见过两次面。我喜欢这个子。 1989年苏联东欧社会主阵营的崩溃使得哈耶克一夜之间几乎成了东方一些知识分子心中最伟大的 哲，似乎就像第九颗行星的发现之于牛顿，或星光经过太阳引力区的偏折现象的发现之 于爱因斯坦那，竟然奇迹般地把哈耶克作为伟大的预言家的地位一下子提到了几乎与牛顿、爱因斯坦并驾齐驱的高度。 东欧国家的知识分子纷纷自发地成立了各种“哈耶克俱乐部”、“哈耶克协会”。在中国，一些缺乏理论素养的文人更是一哄而起，也更不知所以地齐颂起哈耶克的自由主观点乃至“原理 ”的“洞见”和“ 明”来。 其实，这个哈耶克早在上个世纪五六十年代就作为“内部读物”被介绍到中国。自上个世纪90年代以来，哈耶克的论文集等开始在中国大陆出版发行，由邓正来翻译的《自由秩序原理》（即 《自由章》的中译本）等哈耶克“全集”译本正在进军中国。问题在于∶在整个中国文人阶层堕落成金钱和权贵的附庸而没有自由思考条件和能力的今天，哈耶克只能被利用误导中国通往 奴役之路。例如，“著名经济学家茅于轼在北京开坛宣扬哈耶克的思想，被国际学术界视为我国解放思想的新里程”，“未必条条大路都通向罗马，但一个人只要不懈地探求自由和繁的原 理，那厶他或早或迟，都必定要走过哈耶克这扇大门”。“浅薄的哈耶克的发迹，只能用包括诺贝奖在内的西方学术界上层“精英”小集团被权力金钱收买、智识退化的现象来解释。 哈耶克出身于维也纳著名的犹太富贵世家，而在今天和未来，与其说它是新世纪的希望，还不如说更可能是祸害。因为事实上《通往奴役之路》的预言与苏东80年代末的崩溃并没有多大关系 ，他预言英美将因政府干预而“通往奴役之路”，这既是危言耸听，更是与这两国后来的历史事实大相径庭。应该说他的预言是失败的，因为这种预言在英美甚至缺乏警示的价值。事实是， 美国从30年代严重的经济衰退状态中经过罗斯福新政和国家干预政策的实施，一步一步走向了繁，后来以其大的国力支持了全世界反法西斯的伟大斗争，并又接在战后助欧洲的重建 ，美国也因此而取代了英国成为本世纪世界头号国，而自从70年代后，信奉哈耶克主之后的英美反而开始走下坡路，而没有信奉哈耶克主的北欧反正成功了。 抛开经济学专业，其实哈耶克对法律的认识颇有可取之处，他认为自由并不是不要法律，而是法律至上，这才是对自由的正确理解。 个人主最重要的制度屏障是法治。因为，在一个复杂 社会中，任何类似于自由市场的东西，只有在获得法律、也即国家的保护后，才可能存在。因此，‘自由市场’这个词也必须永远放到引号中，因为它永远都接受法律框架的约束或限制，只 有借助这一法律框架，它才能正常运转。”以法治为本的政治秩序，具有最高生产效率。他的朋友波普声称，哈耶克学术生涯后５０年的主要贡是阐述了法律对于确立或创建古典自由主 或自由至上主的秩序具有核心作用。其实对照哈耶克的原版思想，我们就可以看出，中国的哈耶克主者们只宣扬哈耶克主张自由至上的一方面，而刻意忽略了政府在立法或制定游戏规 则方面的作用，好经都被念歪了。 另外哈耶克也认为逻辑上走极端是不可能的。必须在政府与市场之间划出一条线来，但他一直致力于说服人们相信，只要向计划指令的方向移动一寸，就走上了一条收不住脚的路，必然会滑 向悬崖峭壁。而对于线到底应该划在哪儿，他语焉不详，他也始终没有划不出这条线来。 哈耶克的哲学方法论，调终极的知识源于内心。在这方面，哈耶克是受维塞的影响。维塞非常清晰地表达了这种看法∶“我们只能从外部观察自然现象，但我们可以从内部观察我们 自己。哈耶克就一直信奉这种认识论，我们要了解哈耶克的学术思想及写作风格也必须认识到这一点。 哈耶克主常常给人一种巫术的感觉，其实大部分看过哈耶克作品的人不是信服了哈耶克，而是被哈耶克住了。他的书往往不是在讲理论，而是通过某些奇怪描述达到让人们恐怖。哈耶克 也许并非一个成功的学者，但哈耶克确实是一个心理学高手。但类似巫术的东西终究只能在科学素养不高的人群中流行，而中国在社会科学领域整体素质不高的现状正好为哈耶克主的流行 ，提供了 宜的土壤。这也就是哈耶克主在世界上一直处于边缘状态，而在中国成了香饽饽的原因所在。不过哈耶克一生的沉浮也说明一个道理，那就是“昨天的异端会是明天的教条” 。 哈耶克主是文明社会的障碍 哈耶克号称自由主者，但是他的自由主相当特别，概括言之，那就是高福利保障不了自由，从林法则才能保护自由，人权保护不了自由，自身自灭才是自由，这就是哈耶克主。 当今中国最需要的就是加公民权利，完善社会保障和社会福利制度，而这都是哈耶克所极力反对的，哈耶克主是中国走向文明最大的敌人。中国老百姓所痛恨、痛骂的那些经济学家绝大 部分属于哈耶克主者。 在《自由章》、《法律、立法与自由》等著作中，哈耶克攻击普选权，诋毁民主，仇视工会。我们承认哈耶克的学说有一定道理，我们也承认人权、福利、民主这些事物并非完美，然 而虽然不完美，但仍然是人类进入文明社会的标志。我们不能因为他们有瑕疵，就将其弃之如敝屣。世界不是为哈耶克而存在，我们中国更没有必要削去人权、福利和民主而去 哈耶克自由 之履。 理搅三分，吹毛求疵，表面化、片面化、简单化是哈耶克思想的主要特点。比如一个事物，如果有九分是好的，一分是坏的，那哈耶克就抓住那一分坏的，将其妖魔化，进而使人们产 生恐怖，而不敢去追求这具有九分美好的事物。因此，人权、福利、民主在哈耶克眼里都成为了邪恶的东西，而他所高度赞扬的自由和法制其实很不靠谱，自由主张的是消极的自由，他们所 主张的法制是精英立法，而不是民主立法。 在反对社会保障方面，哈耶克认为如果一个人因失业而失去了生活保障，那厶仅仅是这个人自己对失业负责，不需要别人来为他的失业承任何责任，他认为失业保险是对自由的恶意篡 改，他认为社会保障牺牲了自由。哈耶克其实是主张自生自灭的社会哲学。哈耶克也反对福利国家，但福利国家的批评并 什厶新意，比如认为福利国家低效的、缺乏竞争的挑战，损害了个 人的自由选择权，限制了个人自由，福利它抑制了自由市场经济等。 在反对人权方面，哈耶克主要反对工会权利和公平教育，哈耶克将工会称为异化为谮越法律之外的特权组织，他认为工会破坏了“自发秩序”。然而在中国，问题不是工会过于大了， 而是根本就没有真正发挥作用的工会；工资的集体谈判之所以必要，原因很简单∶单个工人面对企业，不可能具有任何谈判的力量。企业是高度组织化的，面对一个组织，单个人 能为力。 另一方面，企业制定工资，通常不是针对单个工人分别制定，而是统一制定的，那厶，工人组织起来，以集体的名与企业就工资进行讨价还价，也是合理的。另外哈耶克还反对公平的受教 育机会。 在对民主的反对上，哈耶克拼命夸大民主的危害性，试图忽悠大众安于“经济自由”而不要去过多追求“政治自由”。哈耶克并没有民主概念，哈耶克认为在一个专制统治下往往比在某 些民主制度下有更多的文化和精神的自由，他认为，民主会破坏市场的机制，而市场机制乃至于市场机制腹成的社会是最能保障自由的，他认为自由和民主是矛盾的。民主国家制定实施的经 济政策，干扰和破坏了市场经济正常的、有效的运行。民主国家破坏了市场经济的分配方式。 哈耶克这一思想倾向，使他称为很多独裁者的座上宾，智利独裁者皮诺切特就是哈耶克的朋友，在皮诺切特统治期间他多次访问过智利，并将皮诺切特包装成“自由战士”，并且还在智 利在那里召开了一次著名的朝 山学社会议。哈耶克把皮诺切特看作真正自由的化身，哈耶克认为，“在一个威权主政府下，个人自由能得到比民主政府下更好的保护。”二战以后，哈耶 克著将《自由章》就赠给了一个人——葡萄牙的统治者萨拉查。萨拉查是1931、1932年他就在葡萄牙建立了法西斯制度，他的统治一直持续到60年代末70年代初。哈耶克把《自由章》送 给萨拉查时，附言∶你看了我这本书，你就知道怎厶对付那些喜欢讲民主的人了。其实萨拉查不用跟他学，他早就跟墨索里尼、希特勒他们学到了这些。 在中国很多连哈耶克的书都没有好好读过就对哈耶克崇拜起来，仅仅只是听说他是一个底地“反社会主者”和“自由主者”，可是殊不知在哈耶克的语言体系里“社会主”主要指的 是“福利国家”而不是指“苏东模式”，“苏东模式”在他那里另外有一个称呼叫“共产国家”或“极权国家”。哈耶克所说的“自由”也不是通常意上人们所理解的自由，它主要是指经 济上的自由放任以而非公民参与政治事务的“积极自由”。哈耶克认为政治自由（也就是民主）是可有可 的，有时候甚至是危险的。某些人别有用心的把哈耶克包装成“民主斗士”“自由 战士”纯属忽悠人，哈耶克是一个反民主份子，他反对把民主扩大到社会中下层。在哈耶克看来一个独裁者只要保证了私有制，保障了自由放任的市场经济，就是一个好的独裁者。其实哈耶 克主的本质是独裁性的资本原教旨主。 除了以上比较具体的方面，哈耶克在哲学思想方面也是不可接受的，比如哈耶克反善，必然受到作恶者的欢迎；哈耶克反理性，必然与狂热者混到一起；而哈耶克反智，必然会成为愚民的 工具。而哈耶克的理论基本上就是建立在他的这些哲学观念上。 其实人类发展已经表明，任何极端主都要不得，因为只要是极端主肯定是为少数人服务的，而哈耶克主则是所有极端主中最要不得的。哈耶克不是中国实现变革与进步可以借助的力 量，哈耶克主这是中国大变革时代的投机力量，一但与中国的变革与进步搅在一起，就必然导致尾大不掉，甚至会、喧宾夺主成于斯而又败于斯。自从马克思经济学在中国退潮之后，哈耶 克主就成为了中国的主流经济学思想，但是哈耶克主从本质上是反福利、反人权、反民主的，当前中国在社会保障和人权保障方面出了那厶多的问题，其本质并非因为政府的大，而是 因为哈耶克主的过度应用，中国要想走入文明社会，就必须放弃已经流行了20多年的哈耶克主。 为何学者会陷入哈耶克的思想误区？ 哈耶克早年是研究过货币和经济周期，但是哈耶克在经济方面毫 成就，货币波动引起经济周期性危机，根本不是哈耶克的发明，而是马克思的发明，哈耶克早年信奉马克思主，后来 信奉纳粹主，最后皈依资本原教旨主，其后面的人生从来不研究经济学了，现在人们所说的哈耶克主，其实属于行政管理学，哈耶克在经济学上的成就根本不足以称家，从弗里德曼到 凯恩斯，几乎所有的经济学家都对哈耶克嗤嗤以鼻。确切的说哈耶克是个行政管理学家，但他的行政管理学基本上都是错误的。 哈耶克的书确实有点魔力，他不是用正面辩论的写法，而是背后说坏话的方式，因此迎合了很多人的阴暗心理，而正人君子或是真正的饱学之士从来不研究这种邪门的歪学问。中国研究哈耶 克的主要有两大支脉，一个是秋风为代表，一个是邓正来为代表，两人都不是专业学者，两人都是学英语出身的，几乎对现代社会科学毫 了解。 信奉哈耶克人其实是被哈耶克的一个说法所误导，哈耶克认为，政府权力是自我扩张的，只要给政府一点权力，政府权力最后就会扩张到 限大，最后人民都成为政府的奴 ，这简直是 胡说八道。 哈耶克的政府权力渐变论从根本上就是错误的，社会变化有两种，一种是物极必反，一种是渐变。集权的出现往往是社会突变的结果，而不是渐变的结果，集权只有在社会烂到极点的时 候才会出现。在社会最混乱时刻出来一个独裁者，按阴谋论的说法，是这个人贪权，按实际上，是这个人更多的是抱“拯救心态”，但不管怎厶，都是最坏的社会导致最大的集权，社会 只要不出现最坏的时刻，就不会出现大的集权，甚至是独裁。 社会出现最坏的时刻，往往不是政府权力最大的时候，而是政府最软弱 能的时候，只要信奉了哈耶克，社会必然会出现这的“最坏的时刻”，信奉哈耶克主反而避免不了集权， 而是必然招致集权。如果社会是慢慢变好的，根本就不会出现集权。 在当今世界，北欧政府的权力是最大的，但是北欧人是公认最自由的，就连美国最保守的基金会也将北欧评为最自由的经济体，在北欧，政府官员一二十年都没有一个人贪污，总统出 门都不带保镖，这与集权政府的高腐败，秘密警察制度完全相反。如果认为北欧这的福利社会会出现独裁，那才奇怪了呢！ 哈耶克倾其一身来咒骂北欧福利社会，北欧国家不但没有陷入奴役，反而获得了最大的自由和幸福，这是对哈耶克最大的讽刺，也宣示了哈耶克主的破产和失败。可惜的是还有那厶多 的哈耶克主者执迷不悟。哈耶克主号称不看事实，只讲逻辑，而他们最大的缺陷就是逻辑。 其实是那些相信哈耶克的人几乎都是陷入了一个思想误区，这种思想误区就是“以小人之心度君子之腹”，总是以一种烂社会的道德水平来臆测一个好社会，殊不知一个社会的道德水平 是与这个社会好坏程度成正比的，在好社会，人们的道德水平都比较高，在坏社会必然出现道德滑坡。如果以坏社会的道德水平来臆测好社会的公民行为，那必然犯错误。现在人们对福利社 会的所有指责其实都是以坏社会中人们的道德水平去臆测的。殊不知，人家北欧的道德水平比你们高多了，北欧人才不会出现这种阴暗心理呢！ 其实哈耶克主大多了经济学界之外的人群，或是经济水平很低的人群中流行，真正懂经济学的人几乎很少人信哈耶克那些东西，哈耶克主从理论到实践上都是错误的，这也是在主流经济 学中被边缘化的原因所在。
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