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你CCP敢承担作郝海东伪证刑责吗西班牙女外交官斥责道 2020-08-27 22:55:41

我那天问郝海东 

我说你有没有什么刑事起诉你的案子

他说 我从来没有 


中共驻马德里大使馆的官员

两个月前到西班牙外交部说 

郝海东叶钊颖俩人涉嫌在中国国内刑事犯罪


人家西班牙接待的外交官是个女的 说

你要给我拿出来所有郝海东先生还有叶钊颖女士

任何刑事犯罪证据之前

我要让你先签一份法律文件

承诺承担一切你本人如果出示伪证的

外交法律刑事责任 

因为这也涉及到我们西班牙的国内刑法问题

Si no firmas, no lo aceptaré

你不签 我都不接!

她这么一说 吓得那哥们儿立马不敢吱声了!


所以 你说共产党这帮孙子唉

就 是 一 帮 垃 圾 ! 


你知道吗 你想 你跑到一个国家 

说人家中国的一个世界冠军

一个亚洲球王 —— 郝海东先生

你说他们俩刑事犯罪 

人家脑子进狗屎了啦

就那么相信你么 

郝海东叶钊颖夫妇发起对共产党的罕见谴责- 华尔街日报


她头一天还是英雄呢

她是多次的世界冠军 这位女士

我们很荣幸 她能住在我们的国家 

你现在说她刑事犯罪了 

因为他们搞了一个反对中共的独裁

你让我怎么来对待这件事情


这个驻马德里大使馆的人完全傻眼了


你想要给我任何他们刑事犯罪的文字证据

你都要给我先签下这个字 你要对此负责!


吓得中共官员收起来赶快就走了 跟狗一样


她原话说 我看到他离开的背影

我看这个国家 我就知道

El Partido Comunista en 

este país se acabó!

这个国家的共产党完蛋了


中国驻西使馆就香港局势举办中西媒体发布会| 西华在线


中共国驻西班牙王国大使馆公使衔参赞:姚飞同志


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     始自 -1:04:02


https://gtv.org/web/?

roomid=5ee80e4427ff080

da51b020c#/VideoPlay_UI


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叶钊颖开推发声灭共!比物质享乐更重要的是良知- 万维读者网

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      始自 -26:10

https://gtv.org/web/?roomid=5ee80e4427ff080da51b020c#/VideoPlay_UI


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Baidu / Via map.baidu.com

A masked tile on Baidu Maps.


This project was supported by the Open Technology Fund, the Pulitzer Center, and the Eyebeam Center for the Future of Journalism.

In the summer of 2018, as it became even harder for journalists to work effectively in Xinjiang, a far-western region of China, we started to look at how we could use satellite imagery to investigate the camps where Uighurs and other Muslim minorities were being detained. At the time we began, it was believed that there were around 1,200 camps in existence, while only several dozen had been found. We wanted to try to find the rest.

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         机翻译文:

该项目得到了开放技术基金普利策中心Eyebeam新闻未来中心的支持

在2018年夏季,由于记者在中国偏远地区新疆的有效工作变得更加困难,我们开始研究如何使用卫星图像来调查维吾尔人和其他穆斯林少数民族正在扎营的营地被拘留。在我们开始的时候,据信大约有1200个难民营,而仅发现了几十个。我们想找到其余的。

当我们注意到使用中国制图平台百度地图时,在一个已知营地附近加载卫星图像图块时遇到了某种问题,这是我们取得的突破。卫星图像较旧,但缩小时还算不错-但在某一点上,营地上方会出现浅灰色的平铺瓷砖。当您进一步放大时,它们消失了,而卫星图像被标准的灰色参考图块所代替,该图块显示了建筑物轮廓和道路等特征。

当时,百度在新疆大部分地区只有中等分辨率的卫星图像,当您拉近时,将由其一般参考地图图块取代。那不是这里发生的事情-营地位置的这些浅灰色瓷砖与参考地图瓷砖的颜色不同,并且缺少任何绘制的信息,例如道路。我们还知道,这并不是加载图块或地图中缺少的信息的失败。通常,当地图平台无法显示图块时,它会提供带有水印的标准空白图块。这些空白瓷砖的颜色也比我们在营地上注意到的瓷砖要深。

一旦发现可以可靠地复制空白图块现象,我们便开始查看其他营地,这些营地的位置已经为公众所知,以查看是否可以观察到那里发生的同一件事。剧透:我们可以。在我们的可行性研究中使用的六个营地中,五个营地在百度第18缩放级别的位置上有空白图块,仅在此缩放级别上出现,而在您进一步放大时消失。六个营地中的一个没有空白地砖-一位在2019年访问了该地点的人说该地点已经关闭,这很可能可以解释出来。但是,我们后来发现,空白砖并没有在市中心使用,而只是在城市边缘和更多农村地区使用。(百度未回应重复的置评请求。)

确定我们可以以这种方式找到实习营地之后,我们检查了整个新疆的百度卫星图块,包括空白的遮盖图块,这些图块在地图上形成了单独的图层。我们通过将被遮罩的位置与Google Earth,欧洲航天局的Sentinel Hub和Planet Labs的最新图像进行比较,从而分析了被遮罩的位置。

整个新疆总共有500万个蒙面砖。它们似乎涵盖了具有战略意义的任何领域,包括军事基地和训练场,监狱,发电厂,还包括矿山以及一些商业和工业设施。我们有太多的地方无法分类,因此我们通过重点关注城镇和主要道路周围的区域来缩小范围。

监狱和拘留所必须在基础设施附近,对于初学者来说,您需要在那里购买大量建筑材料和重型机械。中国当局还需要良好的道路和铁路,以将成千上万的新拘留者带到那里,就像在大规模拘留运动的头几个月那样。因此,分析主要基础设施附近的位置是重点关注我们最初的搜索的一个好方法。这使我们有大约50,000个位置可供查看。

我们开始使用为支持调查和帮助管理数据而构建的自定义Web工具,系统地对蒙版块的位置进行分类。我们以这种方式分析了新疆南部的维吾尔人心脏地带喀什地区以及邻近的克孜勒苏地区的一部分。在查看了10,000个口罩瓷砖的位置并确定了多个带有拘留中心,监狱和营地标志的设施之后,我们对这些设施的设计范围以及它们可能用于的地点的种类有了一个很好的认识。被发现。

我们很快开始注意到与早期已知的难民营相比,这些地方有多大,以及它们的证券化程度有多大。在场地布局,建筑和安全方面,与新疆较早形成的营地改建后的学校和医院相比,它们与中国其他监狱更相似。新型化合物还可以持久使用,而早期的转换则没有。例如,外围墙是用厚混凝土制成的,比起早期营地的铁丝网围栏要花费更长的时间才能建造甚至可能要拆除。

在几乎每个县,我们发现带有拘留中心标志的建筑物,以及具有大型,高安全性营地和/或监狱的新设施。通常,在镇中心有一个较旧的拘留中心,而在郊区则有一个新的营地和监狱,通常是在最近开发的工业区。在我们尚未在给定县找到这些设施的地方,这种模式促使我们继续寻找,特别是在最近没有卫星图像的地区。在没有公共高分辨率图像的地方,我们使用了Planet Labs和Sentinel的中等分辨率图像来定位可能的站点。

这是Google Earth中最新发布的高分辨率图像中的哈密县义乌。这张照片摄于2006年。白色标记显示的是一栋现已拆除的旧监狱,红色标记显示的是郊区的新监狱。

谷歌地球

这是最终建造新监狱的地点的特写镜头。

Planet Labs在2020年拍摄了一张新的卫星图像,显示了完整的设施。

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监狱要求-为什么将监狱建在原地

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这些地方在城镇附近发展是有充分的理由的。偶尔会有一个较偏僻的营地,例如在大坂城的庞大的拘留所,但即使在那儿,它也毗邻一条主要道路,附近有一个小镇。原则上,使监狱或营地靠近现有城镇可以最大程度地减少被拘留者必须被运送的距离(尽管还有一些例子表明,从喀什到库尔勒,整个新疆都被俘虏和被拘留者,整个无人机视频都重新出现了)据分析师称,最近)。对于家庭来说,探望被关押的亲人更容易。靠近城镇意味着可以更轻松地为监狱或营地配备人员。警卫有家庭,他们的孩子需要上学,其伴侣有工作,需要医疗保健,等等。首先需要建筑工人建造监狱。对于便利设施也很有用。监狱和营地需要电力,水和电话线。与将新的管道和电缆铺设到更远的地方相比,与现有的附近网络连接更便宜,更容易。

最后,您需要用于监狱的大块土地,最好在将来有扩展的空间,这就是最近开发的工业区所提供的:服务完善的大块土地,靠近现有城镇。在工业区建造房屋还使营地靠近工厂以进行强迫劳动。尽管许多难民营的工厂都设有工厂,但在某些情况下,我们知道被拘留者被送往其他工厂工作。

我们的网站清单

我们总共在新疆确定了428个带有监狱和拘留中心标志的地点。这些地点中有许多都设有2-3个拘留设施-营地,审前行政拘留中心或监狱。我们打算进一步分析这些位置,并在接下来的几个月中使我们的数据库更加精细。

在这些地点中,我们认为有315个被用作当前拘留计划的一部分-268个新的营地或监狱综合体,以及47个在过去四年中没有扩大的审前行政拘留中心。我们有目击者的证词表明,这些拘留中心经常被用来拘留人员,然后这些人经常被转移到其他营地,因此,我们认为将它们包括在内很重要。从这315个营地中排除的是我们认为可能已经关闭的39个营地,以及已经关闭的11个营地-要么它们已被拆除,要么我们有证词表明它们已不再使用。其他研究人员还确定了另外14个位置,但我们的团队只能检查卫星证据,在这些情况下,这些证据很薄弱。这14个未包含在我们的列表中。

我们还找到了我们认为属于2016年之前计划的63所监狱。这些设施通常是在目前的拘留计划之前建造的,有时甚至是几十年,并且自2016年以来并未进行大规模扩建。它们的风格也不同于拘留中心(中文称为“看守所”),以及来自较新的阵营。这些设施不属于我们认为是当前实习计划一部分的315设施,而是单独包含在我们的数据库中。

许多较早的营地,是从其他用途转换而来的,通常在2018年末或2019年初拆除了庭院围栏,watch望塔和其他安全设施。在某些情况下,拆除了大多数路障,以及通常情况下,汽车停在大院中的多个地方,这表明它们已不再是露营地,在我们的数据库中被归类为封闭的。在某些情况下,安全设施的拆除与附近较大的,更高安全设施的开放同时进行,这表明被拘留者可能已被转移到较新的地点。

如果设施是专门为营地建造的,并且已经拆除了庭院围栏,但在其他方面却没有任何用途的变化(例如大院中的汽车),我们认为它们很可能仍是营地-尽管安全级别较低。

致谢

我们的工作还建立在Shawn Zhang,Adrian Zenz,Bitter Winter,Gene Bunin,ETNAM,Open Street Map贡献者和Laugai手册等人的工作之上-我们试图验证这些数据库中的所有位置(并尝试以查找《劳改手册》中的难民营),将其添加到我们相关的数据库中,并对其进行分类。澳大利亚战略政策研究所(ASPI)的工作,尤其是Nathan Ruser及其在该项目早期的建议,也具有无价的价值。我们还要指出与我们合作的口译人员的贡献。出于安全原因,我们不会共享姓名或其他标识详细信息,但还是要公开感谢我们-您知道自己是谁。

艾莉森·基林(Alison Killing)在 开放技术基金会(Open Technology Fund)的赠款和进一步协助下进行了此报告

Our breakthrough came when we noticed that there was some sort of issue with satellite imagery tiles loading in the vicinity of one of the known camps while using the Chinese mapping platform Baidu Maps. The satellite imagery was old, but otherwise fine when zoomed out — but at a certain point, plain light gray tiles would appear over the camp location. They disappeared as you zoomed in further, while the satellite imagery was replaced by the standard gray reference tiles, which showed features such as building outlines and roads.

At that time, Baidu only had satellite imagery at medium resolution in most parts of Xinjiang, which would be replaced by their general reference map tiles when you zoomed in closer. That wasn’t what was happening here — these light gray tiles at the camp location were a different color than the reference map tiles and lacked any drawn information, such as roads. We also knew that this wasn’t a failure to load tiles, or information that was missing from the map. Usually when a map platform can’t display a tile, it serves a standard blank tile, which is watermarked. These blank tiles are also a darker color than the tiles we had noticed over the camps.

Once we found that we could replicate the blank tile phenomenon reliably, we started to look at other camps whose locations were already known to the public to see if we could observe the same thing happening there. Spoiler: We could. Of the six camps that we used in our feasibility study, five had blank tiles at their location at zoom level 18 in Baidu, appearing only at this zoom level and disappearing as you zoomed in further. One of the six camps didn’t have the blank tiles — a person who had visited the site in 2019 said it had closed, which could well have explained it. However, we later found that the blank tiles weren’t used in city centers, only toward the edge of cities and in more rural areas. (Baidu did not respond to repeated requests for comment.)

Having established that we could probably find internment camps in this way, we examined Baidu's satellite tiles for the whole of Xinjiang, including the blank masking tiles, which formed a separate layer on the map. We analyzed the masked locations by comparing them to up-to-date imagery from Google Earth, the European Space Agency’s Sentinel Hub, and Planet Labs.

In total there were 5 million masked tiles across Xinjiang. They seemed to cover any area of even the slightest strategic importance — military bases and training grounds, prisons, power plants, but also mines and some commercial and industrial facilities. There were far too many locations for us to sort through, so we narrowed it down by focusing on the areas around cities and towns and major roads.

Prisons and internment camps need to be near infrastructure — you need to get large amounts of building materials and heavy machinery there to build them, for starters. Chinese authorities would have also needed good roads and railways to bring newly detained people there by the thousand, as they did in the early months of the mass internment campaign. Analyzing locations near major infrastructure was therefore a good way to focus our initial search. This left us with around 50,000 locations to look at.

We began to sort through the mask tile locations systematically using a custom web tool that we built to support our investigation and help manage the data. We analyzed the whole of Kashgar prefecture, the Uighur heartland, which is in the south of Xinjiang, as well as parts of the neighboring prefecture, Kizilsu, in this way. After looking at 10,000 mask tile locations and identifying a number of facilities bearing the hallmarks of detention centers, prisons, and camps, we had a good idea of the range of designs of these facilities and also the sorts of locations in which they were likely to be found.

We quickly began to notice how large many of these places are — and how heavily securitized they appear to be, compared to the earlier known camps. In site layout, architecture, and security features, they bear greater resemblance to other prisons across China than to the converted schools and hospitals that formed the earlier camps in Xinjiang. The newer compounds are also built to last, in a way that the earlier conversions weren’t. The perimeter walls are made of thick concrete, for example, which takes much longer to build and perhaps later demolish, than the barbed wire fencing that characterizes the early camps.

In almost every county, we found buildings bearing the hallmarks of detention centers, plus new facilities with the characteristics of large, high-security camps and/or prisons. Typically, there would be an older detention center in the middle of the town, while on the outskirts there would be a new camp and prison, often in recently developed industrial areas. Where we hadn’t yet found these facilities in a given county, this pattern pushed us to keep on looking, especially in areas where there was no recent satellite imagery. Where there was no public high-resolution imagery, we used medium-resolution imagery from Planet Labs and Sentinel to locate likely sites. Planet was then kind enough to give us access to high-resolution imagery for these locations and to task a satellite to capture new imagery of some areas that hadn’t been photographed in high resolution since 2006. In one county, this allowed us to see that the detention center that had previously been identified by other researchers had been demolished and to find the new prison just out of town.

This is Yiwu, Hami prefecture in Google Earth, in the most recent publicly available high-resolution imagery. The photo was taken in 2006. The white marker shows the old, now-demolished prison and the red marker shows the new one on the outskirts.

Google Earth

Here is a close-up of the location where the new prison would eventually be built.

Google Earth

Planet Labs took a new satellite image in 2020, showing the fully built facility.

Prison requirements — why prisons are built where they are

There’s good reason why these places are developed close to towns. There’s the occasional camp in a more remote location, such as the sprawling internment camp in Dabancheng, but even there it’s next to a major road, with a small town nearby. Having the prison or camp close to an existing town minimizes, in principle, the distance that detainees must be transported (although there are also examples of prisoners and detainees being taken right across Xinjiang, from Kashgar to Korla, as in the drone video that reemerged recently, according to analysts). It is easier for families to visit loved ones who are in custody. Being near a town means that a prison or camp can be staffed more easily. Guards have families, their children need to go to school, their partners have jobs, they need access to healthcare, etc. Construction workers are needed to build the prison in the first place. It is also useful for amenities. Prisons and camps need electricity, water, telephone lines. It is way cheaper and easier to connect to an existing nearby network than to run new pipes and cables tens of kilometers to a more remote location.

Finally, you need a large plot of land for a prison, preferably with space to expand in the future, and this is what the recently developed industrial estates offer: large, serviced plots, close to existing towns and cities. Building in industrial estates also places the camps close to factories for forced labor. While many camps have factories within their compounds, in several cases that we know of detainees are bused to other factory sites to work.

Our list of sites

In total we identified 428 locations in Xinjiang bearing the hallmarks of prisons and detention centers. Many of these locations contain two to three detention facilities — a camp, pretrial administrative detention center, or prison. We intend to analyze these locations further and make our database more granular over the next few months.

Of these locations, we believe 315 are in use as part of the current internment program — 268 new camp or prison complexes, plus 47 pretrial administrative detention centers that have not been expanded over the past four years. We have witness testimony showing that these detention centers have frequently been used to detain people, who are often then moved on to other camps, and so we feel it is important to include them. Excluded from this 315 are 39 camps that we believe are probably closed and 11 that have closed — either they’ve been demolished or we have witness testimony that they are no longer in use. There are a further 14 locations identified by other researchers, but where our team has only been able to check the satellite evidence, which in these cases is weak. These 14 are not included in our list.

We have also located 63 prisons that we believe belong to earlier, pre-2016 programs. These facilities were typically built several years — in some cases, several decades — before the current internment program and have not been significantly extended since 2016. They are also different in style from the detention centers, known in Chinese as “kanshousuo,” and also from the newer camps. These facilities are not part of the 315 we believe to be in use as part of the current internment program and are included separately in our database.

Many of the earlier camps, which were converted from other uses, had their courtyard fencing, watchtowers, and other security features removed, often in late 2018 or early 2019. In some cases, the removal of most barricading, plus the fact that there are often cars parked in several places across the compounds, suggests that they’re no longer camps and are classified as probably closed in our database. The removal of the security features, in several cases, coincided with the opening of a larger, higher-security facility being completed nearby, suggesting that detainees may have been moved to the newer location.

Where facilities were purpose-built as camps and have had courtyard fencing removed but otherwise don’t show any change of use (like cars in the compound), we think they’re likely to still be camps — albeit with lower levels of security.

Acknowledgments

Our work has also built on the work of others, Shawn Zhang, Adrian Zenz, Bitter Winter, Gene Bunin, ETNAM, Open Street Map contributors, and the Laogai Handbook — we have sought to verify all of the locations in these databases (and attempted to locate the camps in the case of the Laogai Handbook), added them to our database where relevant, and classified them. The work of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), especially Nathan Ruser and his advice at an early stage of this project, was also invaluable. We would also like to note the contribution of the interpreters who worked with us. For security reasons, we aren’t sharing names or other identifying details, but would like nevertheless to publicly extend our thanks — you know who you are.

Alison Killing conducted this reporting with a grant and further assistance from the Open Technology Fund.

https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/satellite-images-investigation-xinjiang-detention-camps

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港媒陈全国治疆模式将向中国其余地区与邻国输出|多维新闻网|中国

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https://twitter.com/LQ0068/status/1298738698234691584https://twitter.com/LQ0068/status/1299024220869910531


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作者:Pascal 留言时间:2020-08-28 00:02:12

Stay up to date with email updates about WNYC and ProPublica’s investigations into the president’s business practices.

This story was co-published with WNYC.

Presidential lawyer and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani has largely fallen out of the public eye since his starring role in President Donald Trump’s impeachment. But Giuliani hasn’t gone silent.

Instead, he’s in his home, doing a call-in radio show and a podcast — “Common Sense” — during which he has repeatedly gone on bigoted rants about China and its government.

“They have no morals,” he said on his April 28 radio show. “They’re amoral in the sense that human life means something in Western civilization, it means a lot. Human life doesn’t mean the same thing to them.”

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Giuliani has also speculated that the spread of the coronavirus may be a plot by the Chinese government.

For example, Giuliani has raised the possibility that China purposely released the virus from a biological lab in Wuhan. “We have to say accidentally,” Giuliani said in a recent radio broadcast. “But I don’t think as responsible investigators we can rule out that it wasn’t done deliberately.”

據美國“ProPublica”新聞網站5月4日的報導,在川普總統彈劾案中扮演重要角色之後,總統的私人律師、前紐約市市長魯迪·朱利安尼(Rudy Giuliani)很大程度上淡出了公眾的視線。但是,他並沒有沉默,而是在家裡播送一個電話廣播節目,並運作一個叫“常識”的播客(podcast)。在此期間,朱利安尼一直在節目里大聲地怒懟中共國政府。

報導披露,朱利安尼在4月28日的廣播節目中指出,中共是沒有道德的,他們不理解人的生命在西方文明里特有的非凡意義。他說,“人類生命對他們(中共)而言,與我們的認知完全不一樣。” 朱利安尼認為,中共冠狀病毒的傳播,可能是中共政府的陰謀。在一次廣播中,他提出了中共國故意從武漢的一個生物實驗室釋放病毒的可能性,“我們不得不說, 作為負責任的調查人員,我不認為我們可以排除這(病毒傳播)是故意的。

儘管有些專家認為沒有公開證據表明中共病毒來自實驗室,但據報導美國情報機構在白宮的指示下,正在調查該病毒的起源。

朱利安尼還相信中共國政府有意將病人送往海外這種說法。他在4月27日的播客節目中表示,中共允許100多萬武漢人前往美國、英國、法國、意大利和德國。他說:“我希望那些國家的人民對生命的價值和生命的喪失有著和我們同樣的反應。”

一天后,朱利安尼在廣播節目中說:當中共發現這種可怕的病毒從實驗室逃逸,認為這反正不是他們故意所為,便抓住這個機會讓西方國家也遭受到與他們遭受過的同樣甚至更大的損失。 “這不算是一個大膽的假設,因為沒有與此相反的解釋。”

該報導指出,朱利安尼自稱多次與川普總統談論過中共冠狀病毒。在朱利安尼說他確定病毒來自武漢實驗室的兩天后,川普總統也表示他有同樣的證據。朱利安尼的節目有廣泛的聽眾,播出該節目的WABC 77頻道的一位廣告主管表示,聽眾對朱利安尼的節目“反饋非常好”,在線收聽人數“直線上升”。

在4月23日的廣播節目中,朱利安尼采訪了保守派中共國專家章家敦(Gordon Chang),他經常預言中共國政府將會垮台。章家敦在採訪中表示,如果說中共國釋放出這種病毒是無意的,那麼讓病毒變成全球大流行就是故意的。他說,“我認為是習近平決定讓病毒傳播出去的,以便使世界與中國無差別,這樣中國就不是唯一陷入這樣困境的國家。”朱利安尼回應道,如果章家敦的理論正確,冠狀病毒就不會被認為是一種生物武器。中共因此看到了一個偶然出現在面前的機會,然後他們就利用了這一機會。張家敦表示,他不能確切知道中共在想什麼,但他認為,“很有可能中共是蓄意和惡意(釋放病毒)的,這是一種危害全人類的罪行。”

原文 鏈接

Experts say there’s no public evidence the virus came from the lab. Amid a reported White House push, U.S. intelligence agencies have said they are investigating the origins of the virus.

Giuliani is also fixated on the idea that the Chinese government sent sick people overseas. In an April 27 episode of his podcast, he said that China allowed “over a million people from Wuhan travel to us, to the United States, to England to France to Italy to Germany.” He added, “I hope the people there have the same reaction we have to the value of human life and the loss of human life.”

“When they found out about this terrible virus that escaped, assuming they didn’t do it on purpose,” Giuliani said a day later on his radio show, “they were going to make sure the West suffered as much if not more than they did and jumped on top of an opportunity, it’s not a big assumption to make. And there isn’t a contrary explanation.”

The New York Times found that thousands, not millions, of people flew internationally out of Wuhan.

Asked about his comments, Giuliani did not respond.

The comments by Giuliani have come as discrimination against Asian Americans has spiked. And they reinforce the White House’s emerging push to blame China for the pandemic.

Giuliani has said he’s spoken to the president a number of times about the coronavirus. Two days after Giuliani said he was sure the virus came from the Wuhan lab, Trump said he has evidence of the same. (The president declined to give the evidence, saying it’s secret.)

Giuliani appears to have found a receptive wider audience too. An advertising executive at 77 WABC, which airs Giuliani’s radio show, said “feedback has been amazing” and online listening has “skyrocketed.”

The station’s parent company, Red Apple Media, did not respond to a request for comment.

In an April 23 radio show, Giuliani interviewed Gordon Chang, a conservative pundit who frequently predicts the collapse of the Chinese government. Chang said if China released the virus accidentally — for which, again, there’s no evidence — it then decided to create a global pandemic. “I think what Xi Jinping did was he decided he was going to spread the virus so that he would level the playing field so that China would not be in such a hole,” Chang said, referring to China’s president.

“Wow,” Giuliani responded. “So he saw an opportunity, if that theory is correct, and it wasn’t a bioweapon to start with, he saw an opportunity that was sort of accidentally presented to him, and then he took advantage of it. It was opportunistic.”

Chang acknowledged, “We can’t know what was in Xi Jinping’s mind for sure.” But then he went on, “It looks more like they were deliberate and malicious and that means Mr. Mayor ... this is a crime against all of humanity.”

Giuliani ended the interview by inviting Chang to be a guest on his other show, the podcast.

Giuliani has also said he’d use his access to help guests on his show move ahead with exploratory treatments. Talking with one pharmaceutical executive on his show in late March, Giuliani told his guest, “I’ll use whatever my yelling and screaming can do to do it faster, to help you.”

As the Times reported, the executive’s company received initial trial approval from the Food and Drug Administration soon after. (The FDA has said the application was subject to “internal scientific review.” And Giuliani has said he has no business connection to the company.)

Read More

“I don’t obby the government,” Giuliani emailed in response to a request for comment. “I do hope, however, that they and others are successful.”

Giuliani appears to have strong feelings about the government’s process for approving drugs.

In an April 23 broadcast, Mark, a pharmacist from New Jersey, called in to report on his “informal study” of the patients who have used a drug cocktail that includes hydroxychloroquine — the anti-malaria drug that Trump long has touted.

Giuliani was excited when Mark reported that none of his patients had been hospitalized: “Why doesn’t this count with all these geniuses in Washington? The double blind study and the triple blind study and this study and that study, we don’t have time for that, we’ve got to go to people like Mark in New Jersey!”

In fact, the FDA has warned against widespread use of the drug, noting that it can cause heart problems.

The discussions with his listeners, though, often come back to China.

One caller to Giuliani’s radio show, identifying himself as “George from Bay Ridge,” went on a rant against Chinese people, likening them to serial killers with “no conscience” who are attempting to take over businesses all over the world.

Giuliani responded, “George, I’ve been getting complaints about this for a long time.” He added: “It almost reminds me of the Mafia. You know, they say, if you do business with America it’s one thing. If you do business with China you don’t realize, all of a sudden you start owing them too much and they believe they own you.”

https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-inc-podcast-2020-giuliani-podcast

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