Mapping the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force by Decker Eveleth Last Updated 07/02/2020 Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China processes one of the largest missile forces in the world. Ten years ago the number of Chinese missile brigades numbered around twenty to twenty-five. Today the number is closer to forty brigades, with ten of those brigades being added in the past three years. In addition to a growing force of ICBMs, the PRC also processes large numbers of accurate and nuclear-capable medium and intermediate-range missiles. These forces are organized into the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), one of China’s five service branches. The recent reorganization of the Rocket Force and the proliferation of brigades has warranted a reexamination of its order of battle, which has grown in both numbers and capability.
Part of the reason why China’s missile forces are so large is that unlike the United States and Russia, China was never bound by the terms of the recently deceased Intermediate-Range Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty, which banned missiles with ranges between 500 kilometers and 5,500 kilometers. Without such arms control in place, the PRC was free to develop a wide array of short and medium-range systems. The United States has no system equivalent to missiles like the DF-26 IRBM, which has a range of 4,000 kilometers.
The last time someone attempted to compile a complete picture of China’s ballistic missile forces was over a decade ago with Sean O’Connor’s report on the Second Artillery. Because no one has released an updated dataset, scholars have had to rely on decade-old orders of battle when examining the PRC military. I’m making this dataset publicly available so that more information on China's force posture is easily accessible. I have put together an as complete as possible picture of the PLARF’s order of battle entirely with data publicly available online. The majority of my own conclusions on brigade equipment come from detail matching ground imagery released by Chinese state media or collected from Chinese social media sites like Weibo. In addition, 1980s era declassified documents from the Central Intelligence Agency yielded a surprising amount of data on active ICBM brigades.
最后更新时间为07/02/2020 介绍
中华人民共和国处理着世界上最大的导弹部队之一。十年前，中国的导弹旅数量约为二十至二十五。如今，该旅已接近四十个旅，在过去三年中增加了十个旅。除了洲际弹道导弹的力量不断增加外，中国还处理大量精确和有核能力的中程和中程导弹。这些部队被编入中国人民解放军火箭兵部队（PLARF），这是中国的五个军种之一。火箭部队最近的改组和旅的扩散保证了对其战斗顺序的重新审视，战斗的数量和能力都在增长。
中国导弹力量之所以如此之大的部分原因是，与美国和俄罗斯不同，中国从未受到最近去世的《中程部队条约》（INF）条约的约束，该条约禁止射程在500公里至5500公里。如果没有这样的军备控制，中国将自由发展各种短程和中程系统。美国没有像DF-26 IRBM这样的导弹，其射程为4,000公里。
上一次有人试图编制中国的弹道导弹部队的全貌是在十多年前与肖恩·奥康纳对二炮报告。由于没有人发布更新的数据集，因此学者在审查中国军队时不得不依靠已有十年历史的战斗命令。我正在公开提供此数据集，以便可以轻松获取有关中国兵力状况的更多信息。我用网上公开可用的数据，尽可能完整地整理了PLARF的战斗顺序。我对大队装备的大部分结论来自中国官方媒体发布或从微博等中国社交媒体网站收集的细节匹配地面图像。此外，1980年代中央情报局解密的文件还产生了令人惊讶的有关洲际弹道导弹现役旅的数据。
组织
中华人民共和国于1966年组建了第二炮兵部队，这是现代PLARF的前身。最初，这支部队仅部署了少量核能型中程弹道导弹（MRBM）和中程弹道导弹（IRBM）。多年来，该部队的发展是在1981年增加了孤立的洲际弹道导弹（ICBM），然后在1980年代后期引入了DF-21，这是中国第一个真正的移动导弹系统。第二炮兵部队没有像常规的人民解放军地面部队那样向区域军事指挥部汇报，而是直接向中央军事委员会报告，中央军事委员会是监督军队的平民共产党组织。2015年，第二炮兵总队改组为人民解放军火箭兵部队，该部队现已成为中国武装力量的完整分支。紧随其后的是，已部署的旅的数量大量增加，构成了PLARF导弹旅的总数增加25-30％。
这支部队分为七个基地，全部集中在某些地区。以前，这些基地的编号为51到56，而基地22是弹头的存储和处理基地。旅的编号为800年代。在2015年进行重组后，基地被重新编号为61至67，基地67是基地22的新名称。旅也被重新编号以匹配基地。例如，在第62基地下的一个旅将标为“第62旅”。 每个基地负责监督大约六个旅。每个旅包含数千名人员，导弹发射器本身又分为由发射公司组成的发射营。每个编队的运输者-发射者发射器（TEL）的数量根据旅配备的导弹种类而有很大不同。例如，DF-31旅每个旅大约有十二个发射器，每个公司负责一个单独的发射器，而DF-15旅每个旅有多达三十六个发射器，每个公司最多拥有三个发射器。 。巡航导弹旅被认为有27个TEL，IRBM旅则有大约16个。
旅基地的解剖
中国导弹旅的驻军通常是按照我将要概述的易于识别的标准建造的，尽管该标准似乎会随时间而变化。大多数基地都是大型的方形设施，具有清晰的安全范围。一个行政大楼或多个行政大楼位于大楼的中心附近，大部分时间都朝着大门。在行政区域的两侧是旅房。此布局与大多数其他PLA驻军都共享。导弹基地的真正标志是通常位于基地后方的高架车库和发射器车库。高架车库通常是一个20或30英尺高的结构，用于在室内安装导弹，而在情报卫星视线范围之外。附近将是导弹发射场和支援车辆的车库。有时这些车库成排排列，有时像甜甜圈（622）导弹基地的环形排列。在某些情况下，发射器车库会附接到高架海湾，例如建水（625）或莱芜（653）的车库。
信阳666旅是PLARF旅级设施的一个相当典型的例子。一扇正门正对着一个行政大楼，两旁是军营建筑。还提供支持车辆的车库，军事通讯和气象遥测站。高架就是一个带有发射器车库的例子。我们可以将该高架海湾的布局（包括其窗户和天窗图案）与央视发布的图像进行匹配，从而确认其作为DF-26旅的地位：
战斗顺序
以下是PLARF当前的战斗顺序。一共有39个旅，但另一个旅618可能最近也已经服役。一些基地具有与它们所装备的导弹相匹配的某些角色。例如，台湾正对面的Base 61基地几乎装备了PLARF的所有短程弹道导弹清单。其他基地，如基地62和63，则拥有更多的导弹清单。大胆的旅被确认配备有指定的武器。
中华人民共和国将其导弹划分为编号等级，这在一定程度上表明了其射程等级。一位数的导弹是1970年代和80年代较旧的弹道导弹。DF-4 IRBM可能仍在Sun甸（662）或通道（634）服役，而DF-5 ICBM仍在服役，其中一些已升级为DF-5C。DF-1X类由短程弹道导弹（SRBM）和巡航导弹（GLCM）组成，弹道导弹的射程低于1,000公里，巡航导弹的射程约为2,000公里。DF-2X类包括DF-21中程弹道导弹和DF-26中程弹道导弹。DF-3X和DF-4X级别只有一个导弹系统，分别是DF-31和DF-41。DF-31是一种移动式洲际弹道导弹，最初的射程仅为7 升级到DF-31A的射程为200公里，射程为11,200公里。该系统当前正在通过改进的TEL设计进行升级，即DF-31AG。DF-41是PLARF的最新移动式ICBM，其射程可达15,000公里。目前尚不清楚DF-41的基础，但汉中（644）被认为是候选人。
部队最近的一些显着扩充包括部署了四个DF-26 IRBM旅，以及升级为现在配备有DF-16 SRBM的617和636旅。我们应该期望将来看到更多的DF-26旅。TEL生产现场的最新卫星图像显示它们仍在大量生产中。
在洲际弹道导弹领域，DF-31A旅不断升级为新的DF-31AG TEL。值得注意的是，我们看到了DF-31A导弹的升级能力，但没有显着扩大其总兵力。DF-5筒仓部队仍在服役，新型DF-5C mod导弹已于近期投入生产。据报道，DF-41洲际导弹的筒仓选项与它们的机动角色一起被考虑。这些导弹可能位于内蒙古的吉兰泰或河南普罗维登斯的Sundian（662）。
剩余的问题
PLARF可以采取几个方向来发挥其洲际弹道导弹的力量。泰安特种车辆继续生产DF-31AG TEL，但是这些TEL是用于升级现有的旅还是用于创建新的旅尚不得而知。我们已经有证据表明新组建的664旅已经装备了DF-31AG，这可能意味着该地区的其他新旅将配备该系统。这些新型旅中的一些也可能会装备DF-41。
PLARF可能会通过替换一些剩余的DF-11A旅来继续扩大DF-16 SRBM的武器库。基地61训练营的最新影像显示，一架DF-11A部队同时也配备了DF-16。目前尚不知道PLARF将在其上放置新的短程高超音速飞机DF-17的位置，但Dan州可能是候选对象。
近年来，中国人民解放军的火箭队经历了大规模的扩张，在过去的三年中增加了十个或更多旅，在过去的四年中增加了三个新系统。最近的图像在解决有关战斗顺序的问题上已经走了很长一段路，但是与此同时，产生了更多的图像。希望发布更多图像可以解决许多这些问题。在我挖掘信息并进一步了解信息时，我将不断更新此KMZ。将来，我还将把中国的导弹和TEL生产设施写为单独的博客文章和KMZ。
撰写本报告时引用的作品： “中国导弹百科全书第二节：导弹及导弹设备的储存和处理设施。” 中央情报局。https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84T00171R000301550001-8.pdf
拜纳，维纳雅克。“中国媒体报道了一个可以袭击孟买的新型导弹旅。这到底有什么新消息？” 印刷品，2019年4月19日.https： //theprint.in/defence/china-media-reports-new-missile-brigade-hit-mumbai/50731/ 拜纳，维纳雅克。“中国在四川新设的秘密导弹守备所可以针对印度及其他地区。” 印刷品，2018年6月27日.https： //theprint.in/defence/chinas-new-secret-missile-garrison-in-sichuan-can-target-all-of-india-and-beyond/75347/
博伊德，亨利。“ 2019年五角大楼报告：中国的火箭弹弹道”，国际战略研究所军事平衡博客，2019年5月15日。https: //www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/05/pla-rocket-force- 弹道
克里斯·滕森（Hris M. 中国核力量，2019，原子科学家公报，75：4，171-178，DOI：10.1080 / 00963402.2019.1628511
汉斯·克里斯滕森（Kristensen），“中国的新型DF-26导弹出现在中国东部基地。” 美国科学家联合会，2020年1月21日.https：//fas.org/blogs/security/2019/09/china-silo-df41/
汉斯·克里斯滕森（Kristensen），“在中国核导弹训练区看到的新型导弹发射井和DF-41发射器。” 美国科学家联合会，2019年9月3日.https： //fas.org/blogs/security/2019/09/china-silo-df41/
Lafoy，Scott和Eveleth，Decker。“ Sundian正在进行ICBM现代化。” 军控一根筋，2月5日2019年https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1208828/possible-icbm-modernization-underway-at-sundian/
歌手Peter W.和Xiu Ma。“中国的导弹力量正在以前所未有的速度增长”，《科学》，2020年2月25日。https: //www.popsci.com/story/blog-eastern-arsenal/china-missile-force-growing/
PowerPoint在2013年11月于斯坦福大学举行的东亚替代性核武器期货研讨会上发表的PowerPoint中，Mark A.“中国的未来核力量基础设施” 。http: //www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nov2013-Stokes.pdf洛根， David C.“了解中国的导弹力量。” 在习近平主席重塑中国人民解放军：评估中国的军事改革。国防大学出版社，2019年.https： //ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf Logan，David C.解放军火箭部队的职业道路：他们所说的我们，亚洲安全组织，2019，15：2，103-121，DOI：10.1080 / 14799855.2017.1422089 奥康纳，肖恩，“ PLA第二炮兵”，澳大利亚空中力量，2009年。最近更新于2011年。
https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Second-Artillery-Corps.html
斯托克斯，马克。“中国的核弹头存储和处理系统”，项目2049，2010年。https：//project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf 斯托克斯，马克。《解放军火箭部队的领导和部队参考》。2049项目，2018年11月30日。
斯托克斯，马克。“广东正在建设的第二炮兵反舰弹道导弹旅设施？” 项目2049，2010. https://project2049.net/2010/08/03/second-artillery-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-brigade-facilities-under-construction-in-guangdong/ Organization
The People’s Republic of China formed the Second Artillery Corps in 1966, the precursor to the modern-day PLARF. Initially, this force deployed only small numbers of nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM). Over the years this force has grown with the addition of siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in 1981 and then the introduction of the DF-21, the PRC’s first truly mobile missile system, in the late 1980s. Instead of deployed units reporting to regional military commands like regular People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces units do, the Second Artillery Corps reported directly to the Central Military Commission, the civilian Communist Party organization that oversees the military. In 2015 the Second Artillery Corps was reorganized into the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, now a full branch of the PRC’s armed forces. This was immediately followed by massive increase in the number of deployed brigades, constituting a 25-30% increase in the total number of missile brigades in the PLARF.
This force is organized into seven bases, which are all concentrated in certain regions. Previously, these bases were numbered 51 through 56, with Base 22 being the warhead storage and handling base. Brigades were numbered in the 800s. After the reorganization in 2015, the bases were renumbered bases 61 through 67, with Base 67 being the new designation of Base 22. Brigades were also renumbered to match their base. For example, a brigade under Base 62 will have the designation Brigade 62X. Each base supervises around six brigades. Each brigade encompasses thousands of personnel, with the missile launchers themselves being divided into launch battalions formed of launch companies. The number of transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) per formation varies greatly depending on what kind of missile the brigade is equipped with. For example, DF-31 brigades are though to have around twelve launchers per brigade, with each company being responsible for a single launcher, while DF-15 brigades have as many of thirty-six launchers per brigade and each company having up to three launchers. Cruise missile brigades are thought to have twenty-seven TELs, and IRBM brigades are thought to have around sixteen.
Anatomy of a Brigade Base
Chinese missile brigade garrison are usually built to an easy to identify standard that I will outline, although the standard does seem to change depending on time period. Most bases are large, square facilities with a clear security perimeter. An administration building, or multiple administration buildings, are near the center of the complex, most of the time facing the main gate. On either side of the administration area are rows of housing for the brigade. This layout is shared with most other PLA garrisons. The real signature of a missile base is the high bay garage and launcher garages usually near the back of the base. The high bay garage is usually a twenty or thirty foot tall structure used to erect missiles indoors and out of sight of intelligence satellites. Nearby will be garages for the missile launchers and support vehicles. Sometimes these garages are aligned in rows, and sometimes in a doughnut pattern, like the ones in Yuxi (622) missile base. In some cases, the launcher garages are attached to the high bay, like the ones at Jianshui (625) or Laiwu (653).
Xinyang, Brigade 666, is a fairly typical example of a PLARF brigade-level facility. A single main gate faces an admin building flanked by barracks buildings. Support vehicle garages, military communications, and a weather telemetry station are also present. The high bay is an example of one with attached launcher garages. We can match the layout of this high bay, including its window and skylight pattern, to imagery released on CCTV, confirming its status as a DF-26 brigade:
Order of Battle
Below is the current order of battle for the PLARF. There are a total of 39 brigades, but another brigade, 618, might also have been recently commissioned. Some bases have certain roles that match the missiles they are equipped with. For example, Base 61, directly opposite Taiwan, is equipped with almost the entirety of the PLARF’s short-range ballistic missile inventory. Others, like bases 62 and 63, have much more diverse missile inventories. Bolded brigades are confirmed to be equipped with the specified armament.
The PRC designates its missiles in numbered classes that are somewhat indicative of their range class. Missiles in the single digits are the older 1970s and 80s era ballistic missiles. The DF-4 IRBM might still be in service at Sundian (662) or Tongdao (634), while the DF-5 ICBM is most definitely still in service with some being upgraded to the DF-5C. The DF-1X class constitutes short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and cruise missiles (GLCM), with ranges below 1,000 kilometers for ballistic missiles, and around 2,000 kilometers for cruise missiles. The DF-2X class encompasses both the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile and the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. The DF-3X and DF-4X class each only have one missile system, the DF-31 and DF-41 respectively. The DF-31 is a mobile ICBM that originally had a range of only 7,200 kilometers before being upgraded to the DF-31A, which has a range of 11,200 kilometers. This system is currently being upgraded with an improved TEL design, the DF-31AG. The DF-41 is the PLARF’s newest mobile ICBM, which could have a range up to 15,000 kilometers. The basing for the DF-41 is currently unknown, but Hanzhong (644) has been noted as a candidate.
Some recent notable expansions to the force include the deployment of four DF-26 IRBM brigades and the upgrades to brigades 617 and 636, which are now armed with the DF-16 SRBM. We should expect to see more DF-26 brigades in the future. Recent satellite imagery of TEL production sites show that they are still being produced in large numbers.
In the realm of intercontinental ballistic missiles, DF-31A brigades continue to be upgraded to the new DF-31AG TEL. It is worth noting that we have seen upgrades, but not a significant expansion of the total force of DF-31A missiles. The DF-5 silo force remains in service, with the new DF-5C mod missile having gone into production quite recently. A silo basing option for the DF-41 ICBM is reportedly being considered alongside their mobile role. These missiles may be based in Jilantai in Inner Mongolia or at Sundian (662) in Henan Providence.
Remaining Questions
There are several directions the PLARF could take their ICBM force. Tai’an Special Vehicle continues to produce the DF-31AG TEL, but whether these TELs are for upgrading existing brigades or are for the creation of new brigades is unknown. We already have evidence that the newly formed Brigade 664 has been armed with the DF-31AG, which might mean that the other new brigades in the area will be equipped with that system. It’s also possible that some of these new brigades will be equipped with the DF-41.
The PLARF will probably continue to expand its arsenal of DF-16 SRBMs, probably by replacing some of their remaining DF-11A brigades. Recent imagery out of base 61’s training garrison shows a DF-11A unit with DF-16s present as well. Where the PLARF will put their new short-range hypersonic, the DF-17, is currently unknown, but Danzhou is a possible candidate.
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has undergone a massive expansion in recent years, adding ten or more brigades in the last three years and three new systems in the last four. Recent imagery has gone a long way in clearing up questions about the order of battle, but at the same time has produced many more. Hopefully, the release of further imagery will clear up many of these questions. I will continually update this KMZ as I dig up information and further information comes to light. In the future I will also write up the PRC’s missile and TEL production facilities as a separate blog post and KMZ.
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Stokes, Mark. "China's Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System", Project 2049, 2010. https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf Stokes, Mark. "PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference." Project 2049, November 30th 2018.
Stokes, Mark. “Second Artillery Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Brigade Facilities Under Construction in Guangdong?” Project 2049, 2010. https://project2049.net/2010/08/03/second-artillery-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-brigade-facilities-under-construction-in-guangdong/
https://www.aboyandhis.blog/post/mapping-the-people-s-liberation-army-rocket-force
  
一个有自省精神的民族，才有远大的未来。 应该说，“汉奸现象”就是抗战期间中华民族最大的“痛点”。我们赞美近代中国百年沉沦后的民族觉醒达到了空前的程度，无数中华义士用生命和鲜血谱写了气壮山河的反抗外来侵略的英雄史诗，但也不能忘记，在中华民族最危险的时候，多少民族败类变节投降、卖国求荣，认贼作父、助纣为虐，在中国历史上留下了奇耻大辱的一笔。直到今天，抹黑英雄、洗白叛徒、为汉奸“翻案”的奇谈怪论，仍在挑战我们的价值和道德底线。
历史因多元、复杂而愈显其波澜壮阔。重新审视历史的创痛，晾晒民族虫蠹发霉的一面，深刻反省“汉奸现象”，彻底扫除美化汉奸的雾霭，对于培塑国人的民族气节和民族精神，牢固确立社会主义核心价值观，凝聚起实现中国梦强军梦巨大精神力量，无疑具有重要的历史意义和现实价值。
电影《地道战》里有一个耐人寻味的场景——民兵队长高传宝在大槐树下敲钟传达情报：来犯的有“一百多鬼子，二百多伪军……”对这一传为笑谈的镜头，我们又怎能一笑了之?
要说“汉奸”，顾名思义得从汉朝讲起。据清人《汉奸辨》云，“中国汉初，始防边患，北鄙诸胡日渐构兵。由是汉人之名，汉奸之号创焉。”
作为一个王朝，“汉”成了中国第一个具有帝国形式的稳定实体，作为帝国子民一个文化符号——“汉人”，其奸细自然被称为“汉奸”。
汉奸是一个特定的历史概念。按照《辞海》定义，汉奸原指汉族之变节败类，后演变为“中华民族中投靠外国侵略者，甘心受其驱使，出卖祖国利益的人”。
汉奸，可以说是我们民族历史上永难消除的一块伤疤。兵荒马乱的战争年代已经渐行渐远，但曾给国家民族带来深重灾难的“汉奸现象”并未绝迹。
君不见，就在我们现实生活中，一些人继承了汉奸先辈的衣钵，成为出卖民族利益的新一代“经济汉奸”“政治汉奸”“网络汉奸”等。
君不见，西方国家搞“颜色革命”和“政治转基因”工程愈演愈烈，一些政治上的意志薄弱者和利欲熏心的贪婪之徒，已经或正在成为敌对势力捕猎对象。
君不见，今天的中国产生汉奸的土壤仍然肥沃，“汉奸理论”“汉奸思维”并未清除，甚至在新形势下有了某种“创新发展”。
历史掀开了新的一页。作为一种社会赘瘤，“汉奸现象”应时而生、应时而灭，而我们铲除滋生汉奸的土壤，同“汉奸现象”作斗争正未有穷期!
（原标题：解放军报长篇署名文章：《历史的拷问》） https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/kwP5dY2hD-qVPiRuu9QHfw?
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