REVENTADOR, Ecuador — The dam sits under the glare of an active volcano, with columns of ash spewing toward the sky.
厄瓜多爾雷文塔多火山——大壩坐落在一座活火山下，縷縷火山灰噴入天空。
Officials had warned against the dam for decades. Geologists said an earthquake could wipe it away.
數十年來，官員們一直對這座大壩發出警告。地質學家表示，一場地震就能將其抹去。
大壩附近的雷文塔多火山在噴發火山灰。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
Now, only two years after opening, thousands of cracks are splintering the dam’s machinery. Its reservoir is clogged with silt, sand and trees. And the only time engineers tried to throttle up the facility completely, it shook violently and shorted out the national electricity grid.
This giant dam in the jungle, financed and built by China, was supposed to christen Ecuador’s vast ambitions, solve its energy needs and help lift the small South American country out of poverty.
Nearly every top Ecuadorean official involved in the dam’s construction is either imprisoned or sentenced on bribery charges. That includes a former vice president, a former electricity minister and even the former anti-corruption official monitoring the project, who was caught on tape talking about Chinese bribes.
Then there is the price tag: around $19 billion in Chinese loans, not only for this dam, known as Coca Codo Sinclair, but also for bridges, highways, irrigation, schools, health clinics and a half dozen other dams the government is scrambling to pay for.
It doesn’t matter whether Ecuador can afford them.
厄瓜多爾付不起這些錢，沒關係。
China gets paid either way.
無論如何，中國都能得到回報。
To settle the bill, China gets to keep 80 percent of Ecuador’s most valuable export — oil — because many of the contracts are repaid in petroleum, not dollars. In fact, China gets the oil at a discount, then sells it for an additional profit.
But that is not enough. Hobbled by the debts, President Lenín Moreno has slashed social spending, gasoline subsidies, several government agencies and more than 1,000 public jobs. Most economists expect the country to slide into recession, stirring outrage.
“China took advantage of Ecuador,” said Ecuador’s energy minister, Carlos Pérez. “The strategy of China is clear. They take economic control of countries.”
在叢林中央為科卡科多辛克雷項目修建的輸電線。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
在庫尤哈鎮，一家人在自家門廊前剝豆子。他們每月大約要付60美元電費。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
The story of how the dam got built brings together two natural allies, both eager to change the course of the hemisphere and displace the United States as the unrivaled power in the region.
China made its plans clear a decade ago, when it swept into Latin America during the global financial crisis, tossing governments an economic lifeline and promising to “treat each other as equals,” a clear swipe at American dominance.
It worked. China, now South America’s top trading partner, has seeded the region with infrastructure and a staggering trail of loans. It has reaped political benefits, too, getting Latin American nations to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Still, as the giant dam in Ecuador shows, the two sides were hardly equal partners.
但就像是厄瓜多爾的巨型大壩所體現的那樣，這兩方遠算不上是平等的夥伴。
Both nations were willing to overlook deep design flaws, questionable economics and independent warnings that the technical studies for the dam were decades out of date.
During his time in government, officials had rejected a much smaller version of the project. The whole idea was doomed, he said, because of the volcano nearby. A major earthquake had decimated oil infrastructure in the area in 1987.
“The volcano has been erupting since the time the Spanish came to Ecuador in the 16th century,” Mr. Santos said, adding that investing so much money “in such a risky location was nonsense.”
An independent review of the project in 2010, prepared by a Mexican government agency and obtained by The New York Times, warned that the amount of water in the region to power the dam had not been studied for nearly 30 years.
Since that time, Ecuador had suffered punishing droughts, and there were concerns that its glaciers were melting because of climate change.
自那之後，厄瓜多爾一直遭受着嚴重乾旱，人們還擔心由於氣候變化，該國冰川也在融化。
Despite the advice, Luciano Cepeda, the dam’s former general manager, said top Ecuadorean officials pressed ahead anyway because “a new study would have taken several years” and they didn’t want to slow down.
Even a Chinese diplomat in Ecuador, who was not authorized to speak publicly, said he had his doubts about the project.
甚至一名駐厄瓜多爾中國外交官都表示，他對這個項目有疑問。該外交官未獲公開發言的授權。
“We didn’t give sufficient attention to the environmental reporting,” the diplomat said.
“我們沒有對環境報告予以足夠的關注，”該外交官表示。
火警電話上的標記，清楚地表明是誰修建了這座大壩。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
厄瓜多爾官員曾經否決一個比該大壩規模小得多的方案。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
China’s record offered both encouragement and cause for concern. Its massive Three Gorges Dam, which cuts the Yangtze River and rises 600 feet high, was the largest hydroelectric project in the world, designed to produce 20 times the power of the Hoover Dam.
But inadequate safety measures led to the deaths of 100 workers, the dam displaced more than one million people, and the environmental damage was considerable, including the destruction of forests.
Warnings aside, there were bigger geopolitical forces at play. Ecuador’s president at the time, Rafael Correa, was a left-wing populist who had vowed to modernize his country and free it from the orbit of the United States.
Elected in 2006 under a surge that brought leftists to power across Latin America, Mr. Correa took aim at the United States with fiery, anti-imperialist speeches. In 2008, he refused to renew a lease that allowed American anti-narcotics surveillance flights to operate from an Ecuadorean air force base.
Soon, Western financial institutions fell in Mr. Correa’s cross hairs. He denounced the International Monetary Fund, saying it put restrictions on his spending. Then in 2008, he defaulted on $3.2 billion of his country’s foreign debt and invited China to fill in the breach.
“Correa wanted to get away from Western banks and institutions,” said Diego Borja, Mr. Correa’s former minister of economic coordination. “We knew this relationship wouldn’t be an easy one with China.”
Mr. Borja and other officials were staggered by the terms on Chinese loans. Most came from a large state-owned lender, the Chinese Export-Import Bank, which had high interest rates and required Ecuador to use Chinese companies in construction, effectively eliminating competition.
China seemed particularly interested in oil from Ecuador, one of OPEC’s smallest members. In one deal in 2009, China lent Ecuador $1 billion, to be repaid in oil shipments to the state oil company PetroChina.
“But we didn’t have other options,” Mr. Borja recalled. “The doors were closed to the West.”
“可是我們別無選擇，”博爾哈回憶道。“通往西方的大門是關着的。”
Mr. Correa suddenly had access to money, but a new crisis emerged: The country was running out of power. A drought was depleting the nation’s reservoirs, paralyzing its dams. Rather than look for another source, Mr. Correa doubled down on hydro power.
Officials say it was Mr. Correa’s electricity minister, Aleksey Mosquera, who first mentioned Coca Codo Sinclair: a megaproject that was supposed to provide a third of the country’s electricity and represent the single largest investment in Ecuador’s history.
When it finally opened in late 2016, China’s president, Xi Jinping, flew to Ecuador to celebrate.
2016年底，當它終於要啟用時，中國主席習近平飛到厄瓜多爾參加慶祝活動。
Yet only two days before the visit, the dam was in chaos.
而就在訪問前兩天，大壩還在混亂之中。
Engineers had tried to generate the project’s full 1500 megawatts, but neither the facility nor Ecuador’s electrical grid could handle it. The equipment shuddered dangerously, and blackouts spread across the country, officials said.
Ecuadoreans were never told about the failure, and a full power test has not been attempted since.
厄瓜多爾人始終不知道有這個故障，並且自那以後再也沒有嘗試過滿負荷測試。
Today, the dam typically runs at half capacity. Experts say that given its design — and the cycle of wet and dry seasons in Ecuador — it would be able to generate the full amount of electricity for only a few hours a day, six months out of the year.
Ecuador still has to pay back the debt, though. The $1.7 billion loan from China’s Export-Import Bank is lucrative for China: 7 percent interest over 15 years. In interest alone, Ecuador owes $125 million a year.
Now, many Ecuadoreans say the burden falls on them.
現在，很多厄瓜多爾人說負擔落到了他們身上。
Under the constant hum of the dam’s transmission towers, residents in the town of Cuyuja worry that the towers will topple in the constant mudslides. Geologists say the tower foundations weren’t built into bedrock by the Chinese.
Another complaint is the bill. Maria Esther Tello paid $60 last month to keep the lights on in her home, a shock given the government’s promises electricity prices would go down.
At an entrance to the dam is an inscription, in marble.
大壩入口處刻有如下大理石碑文。
“Jorge Glas Espinel, vice president of the republic,” it says. “For having forged and envisioned this monumental project.”
“共和國副總統豪爾赫·格拉斯·埃斯皮內爾(Jorge Glas Espinel)”，上面寫道。“他設想並實現了這一不朽的工程。”
Mr. Glas now sits in a cell in Ecuador, sentenced to six years in prison.
格拉斯如今在厄瓜多爾監獄中，被判六年監禁。
He was convicted of taking bribes from China’s main competitor for infrastructure projects in much of Latin America: Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction giant. American prosecutors say Odebrecht paid $33.5 million in bribes in Ecuador as part of a worldwide scheme to win business.
Now Ecuadorean officials are investigating whether the Chinese also made payments to Mr. Glas and others around him.
眼下，厄瓜多爾官員正在調查中國人是否也給格拉斯和他身邊的人付過錢。
蔗農卡洛斯·烏薩馬和家人在手工榨甘蔗。去年附近一座大壩泄洪，導致他們家失去了一名親人。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
當地皮艇手雅伊爾·羅布雷斯在大壩附近的吉柯斯河上。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
“I don’t think it’s a coincidence that all the same people managed all these projects,” said Mr. Pérez, the energy minister.
“我不認為所有這些項目都由同樣的人員管理是個巧合，”能源部長佩雷斯說。
The officials include Mr. Mosquera, the former electricity minister, who is serving a five-year sentence for taking $1 million from Odebrecht; and Carlos Pólit, the former anti-corruption official, who was charged with receiving millions in bribes from the company. Ricardo Rivera, another close associate of Mr. Glas, was also convicted of receiving payments from the Brazilians.
But evidence has emerged suggesting that officials took bribes from China as well.
但表明官員們收受中國人賄款的證據也已浮現。
Ecuadorean law enforcement officials say they have confirmed a secret tape recorded by an Odebrecht executive, given to Brazilian prosecutors and leaked to the Brazilian news media. In the recording, made at the house of Mr. Pólit, the anti-corruption official, the two men discuss a bribe.
The executive can be heard saying that Mr. Glas, Ecuador’s vice president, was “asking for a lot of money.”
可以聽到這名高管說厄瓜多爾副總統格拉斯在“要很大一筆錢。”
The executive then explained that he was told “it was an obligation because the Chinese had already paid.”
高管隨後解釋，他當時被告知“這是一項義務，因為中國人已經付了錢。”
The recording has set off an investigation, particularly around Mr. Rivera, who presented himself as the vice president’s representative during multiple visits to China, according to Ecuadorean law enforcement officials.
They say they are examining 13 bank transfers worth $17.4 million authorized by Mr. Rivera to an HSBC account in Hong Kong. Law enforcement officials say they consider the bank transfers authentic — and want to know how Mr. Rivera deposited so much money in China.
Until recently, Attorney General Paúl Pérez was leading an investigation into corruption by the Chinese, and traveled to China in November to ask for help.
But Mr. Pérez abruptly resigned on Nov. 13, shortly after returning. He did not respond to interview requests.
但在11月13日回國後不久，佩雷斯突然辭職。他沒有回應採訪請求。
A lawyer for Mr. Glas denied that his client had been involved in corruption with Coca Coda Sinclair, calling Mr. Glas “an honorable, honest man” and describing the dam’s problems as “small imperfections.”
Mr. Correa, the former president, is in exile in Belgium, wanted for organizing the kidnapping of a rival. Many of his lieutenants have been sentenced for corruption or are on the run as well.
前總統科雷亞如今流亡在比利時，因謀劃綁架對手被通緝。他的多名副手已因貪污被判刑或者也在逃亡。
Mr. Pólit and a lawyer for Mr. Rivera did not respond to requests for comment; nor did Sinohydro, the Chinese state-owned construction giant that built the dam.
波利特和里維埃拉的一名律師未回應置評請求；修建該大壩的中國國有建設巨頭中國水電亦未回應。
7,648 cracks in the dam’s machinery
大壩機械出現7648道裂縫
When you approach Coca Codo Sinclair along the Quijos River, it’s hard to tell you’re nearing a dam at all.
沿着吉柯斯河走向科卡科多辛克雷水電站時，你根本無法看出來你是在靠近一座大壩。
Much of the reservoir containing the project’s water supply has filled up with small trees and bushes. Boats sometimes get grounded because the sediment is so thick.
儲存該項目供水的水庫大部分地方都塞滿了小樹和灌木。由於沉澱物太厚，船只有時會被擱淺。
Workers at the dam say the silting, a consequence of design flaws, is only the latest problem.
大壩的工作人員說，設計缺陷導致的淤塞只是諸多問題中最新的一個。
As early as 2014, technicians noticed cracks in the Chinese-made stainless steel equipment. That December, 13 workers were killed when a tunnel flooded and collapsed.
A senior engineer sent records to Mr. Correa, the president, asking to brief him on the problems, according to documents viewed by The Times. The engineer was fired days later, according to former officials.
由於設計問題，水庫出現了泥沙和樹木的堵塞。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
為了支付修建大壩的費用，中國占據了厄瓜多爾最珍貴的出口資源——石油——出口量的80%，因為許多合同是以石油而非美元付款的。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
Mr. Pólit, the anti-corruption official, performed audits. But they resulted in only mild criticism like work delays, with minor fines against the Chinese.
反腐官員波利特進行了審計。但他們只是對中國人不痛不癢地批評了幾句，比如工作延誤，並處以輕微罰款。
Ecuadorean law enforcement officials say they are investigating whether Mr. Pólit and other officials were paid by the Chinese to overlook the problems. It was part of Mr. Pérez’s inquiry before his resignation, they say.
Now, 7,648 cracks have developed in the dam’s machinery, according to the government, because of substandard steel and inadequate welding by Sinohydro. Sand and silt are also big concerns because they can damage vital equipment.
On a recent visit, an engineer looked on nervously as readouts showed sand flowing into the dam. But workers say they’re sometimes confused because of shoddy translations.
One sign in Chinese reads correctly: “Direct-Current (DC) Pumping Group.”
有一塊牌子上的中文是正確的：“直流泵組壓力”。
The Spanish does not: “Pressure Group from Washington, D.C.”
西班牙語則變成了：“來自華盛頓特區的壓力組”。
一塊用中文、英文和西班牙文寫的設備標牌。中文是正確名稱：“直流泵組壓力”。西班文則變成了“來自華盛頓特區的壓力組”。FEDERICO RIOS ESCOBAR FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
The communication problems extend downriver.
溝通問題還會影響到下游。
The heavy sedimentation means engineers sporadically release large amounts of water to clear out the system, causing flash floods where Carlos Usamá, a sugar cane farmer, lives. No one warns him, he says.
“They know they don’t have too many financing sources, so they are going back to knocking on China’s door,” she said.
她說：“他們知道自己沒有太多的融資來源，所以他們會回去敲中國的門。”
China has already made some concessions to Ecuador, like paying 92 cents more per barrel of oil. The share of Ecuador’s oil going to the Chinese has also dropped — to 80 percent, from 90 percent.
But the government still needs $11.7 billion to finance its debt, and it is billions short, analysts say.
但分析人士稱，政府仍然需要117億美元來為債務融資，而且仍有數十億美元的缺口。
Beyond China, the new government is going back to the institutions Mr. Correa demonized: the World Bank and the I.M.F. Some worry that Ecuador is simply seeking another set of financial masters.
