远兄的剖析、表态 is mighty ubiquitous and omnipresent both at home and abroad, isnt' it?
Operation Bloody Nose :
A preventive U.S. attack in Korea, especially if it were undertaken unilaterally by Washington and even more so if it led to general war, would change everything, write Michael O'Hanlon and James Kirchick. The entire logic of U.S. extended deterrence and alliance solidarity will be put into serious doubt. This post originally appeared in The Hill.
Is President Trump really considering a preventive military action of some kind after the Olympic season is over in Korea?Michael E. O’HanlonDirector of Research - Foreign PolicyCo-Director, Security and StrategySenior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and IntelligenceThe Sydney Stein, Jr. ChairMichaelEOHanlonJames KirchickVisiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Project on International Order and Strategyjkirchick
National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster has just denied that possibility, telling a bipartisan group of senators last week that the administration has no plans to carry out a so-called “bloody nose” attack against North Korea to constrain its nuclear weapons or long-range missile programs.
But the idea has been circulating too long to be put to rest quite that easily, and President Trump has just kept it alive at the CPAC conference on Friday in Washington by stating that if sanctions against North Korea fail, we may have to consider “Phase 2.”
Some of the options Trump might consider—shooting down future North Korean missile launches, destroying uranium enrichment centrifuges, enforcing U.N. sanctions with forcible naval action near North Korean coasts—have at least a superficial allure.
Parts of the administration also may think a “bloody nose” attack would leave Pyongyang with few good retaliatory options, making it likely that Kim Jong-un would simply accept his punishment and then behave with more restraint going forward.
This possible strategy is dubious on many grounds. But as others have observed, the central reason is this: Militarily, even if it could slow North Korea’s ability to threaten North America with long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles, it could not eliminate Kim’s existing arsenal of perhaps dozens of nuclear bombs plus a suite of shorter-range missiles that could probably carry them to points throughout the region.
If Kim did decide to retaliate, an action-reaction spiral could ensue.
If Kim did decide to retaliate, an action-reaction spiral could ensue that might lead to nuclear attacks against South Korea or Japan, whether or not that was Kim’s initial intent. Wars, once started, tend to escalate. The imperfect missile defenses in place in Korea and Japan might not be enough to intercept all that was incoming. Nuclear detonations over cities could well occur.
特朗普总统 真的考虑过在韩国奥运季节结束后采取某种预防性军事行动吗？迈克尔·奥汉隆研究总监- 外交政策安全与策略联席主管高级研究员- 外交政策，中心21世纪安全和情报小悉尼·斯坦因（Sydney Stein，Jr.）迈克尔·埃汉隆詹姆斯·基尔奇克客座研究员- 外交政策，美国和欧洲中心，国际秩序与战略项目吉基奇克