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总参深喉给美军导弹带沟里中共导弹位置坐标 2020-09-22 11:13:17

PLA总参情报部潜伏深喉给美军战略洲际弹道导弹带路 

带山沟里的中央军委直属火箭军陆基基地导弹发射井

位置经纬度坐标图


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五角大楼掌控军事间谍卫星的监测 就差你这张图呢


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There’s a lot of unclear or false information out there about China’s mobile intercontinental missile forces, so I thought I would take the time to clear some of that up and also expand on the publicly available information about these systems. So this article is going to serve as a primer on the current direction of China’s mobile strategic missile modernization as well as detail some interesting information on support equipment and infrastructure. The first segment of this article will detail what we know about the missiles themselves and their organization and equipment. The second segment goes into the related infrastructure relevant to the mobile ICBM force, including brigade garrisons, garages, and production.


The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is currently modernizing its intercontinental ballistic missile forces with two new mobile systems: the new DF-41 ballistic missile and the new DF-31AG transporter-erector-launcher. The DF-31AG is thought to currently be in service with three brigades. The DF-41 is thought to be out of development but has not yet moved into Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E). The DF-41’s OT&E brigade has been identified and will be finished next year at the very latest. This article will cover all we currently know about the fielding and infrastructure of the DF-31 and DF-41 systems, starting with the DF-31 family, currently China’s only fielded mobile intercontinental ballistic missile.

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DF-31A launchers.

The DF-31 is a three-stage, solid-fueled ICBM. Originally deployed in 2006, the missile is 15.5 meters in length and has a maximum range of 7,000 to 8,000 kilometers, giving it the capacity to hit targets in Southern India and Western Russia. The DF-31 uses a single exposed reentry vehicle to deliver a one-megaton warhead. This original model has since been almost completely replaced by an upgraded version, the DF-31A. This new variant, first deployed in 2007, has a longer first stage and a shorter second stage, but its exact measurements are unknown. The DF-31A also uses a shroud to cover the re-entry vehicle and possible countermeasures, but it is not thought to be able to carry multiple warheads. The DF-31A also has an improved range of around 11,000 to 12,000 kilometers. This makes it the only deployed mobile Rocket Force system capable of hitting the contiguous United States. It should be noted that even with a range of 11,000 to 12,000 kilometers, the basing for the DF-31A in central China prohibits it from hitting the entire United States. Still, the DF-31A is capable of hitting every major city on the West Coast. Striking major targets on the East Coast is left to the DF-5 family of siloed ICBMs which are thought to have a range of around 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers.



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The DF-31 follows on the development of the DF-21, the land-based version of the JL-1, China’s first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Like the JL-1 and similar SLBM designs, the DF-31 family is cold launched, being propelled out of its canister by explosive charges before the first stage ignites. This is the same launch method that is used by the DF-26 and DF-41.

How to tell the difference between a cold-launched and hot-launched system: hot-launched systems are launched from firing tables (like on this DF-11, left), which serve as stands that help right and orient the missile, and uses flame-ducts to ensure the missile’s exhaust doesn’t fry the missile as it ignites at ground-level. Cold-launch missile canisters do not have vents (like on this DF-31A, right), as the missile does not ignite inside.

DF-26 cold launch.

While the DF-31A is an upgrade to the DF-31, it has not as of yet entirely replaced the DF-31. As of 2017, 5-10 DF-31 launchers are still in service according to the latest National Air and Space Intelligence Center Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report. Considering that some of the original DF-31 brigades only had or have six launchers per brigade (many of these brigades have been expanded to host twelve launchers, and that is something discussed in more depth in later)  it's possible that this number was produced by identifying the remaining DF-31 brigade(s) and then measuring the number of garages in place to estimate launcher size. Datong (642) is a possible candidate for the remaining DF-31 brigade, as it has ten garage spots capable of hosting a DF-31 launcher and cannot accommodate a full twelve launcher set.  Most of the other brigades have been confirmed at this point to be equipped with the DF-31A, and all of them have twelve launchers.

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Haiyan Deployment Site via Google Earth.

The DF-31 missile family had slightly different support equipment, but their functions are practically identical. A DF-31 family launcher and its support vehicles constitute a single company. A single DF-31 or DF-31A launcher company consists of nine support vehicles: one Dongfeng EQ2050 Humvee copy, three support cargo trucks, three cable vans, one launch control vehicle, and one company command vehicle. There is also a brigade command vehicle that oversees all the launch companies and directs the mission. The most distinct feature of the DF-31’s support entourage are the cable vans used to transport the vast amount of cabling needed to launch an ICBM.

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The transporter typically associated with the DF-31 (above) and the transporter typically associated with the DF-31A (below).

The DF-31 missile canister sits on a semi-trailer propelled by a Hanyang HY4301 tractor truck. This tractor-trailer configuration, in which the truck cab is not permanently integrated with the canister trailer, is referred to as a mobile-erector-launcher or MEL. This is to distinguish it from the integrated transporter-erector launcher or TEL configuration, where a single heavy vehicle carries the missile onboard with no trailer. The DF-31A uses an upgraded Hanyang HY4330 MEL and several improved support vehicles. The cable vans used by the DF-31 were originally old civilian buses with the seats torn out and replaced with cable spools.  The DF-31A uses trucks built for the purpose of carrying the cabling instead. The rest of the support equipment appears to be largely the same. While we have consistently seen Chinese media describe units using the new MEL and new cable trucks to be DF-31A brigades, the possibility that the DF-31 and DF-31A variants mix support equipment cannot be ruled out.

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The cable vans typically associated with the DF-31 (above) and the cable vans typically associated with the DF-31A (below).

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Inside the cable vans used by the DF-31.

Recently, the PLARF has been rolling out a mobility upgrade for the DF-31A, the DF-31AG. First unveiled in 2017, the AG carries the same DF-31A missile, but trades in its MEL with a TEL, known as the HTF5980B, manufactured by Tai’an Special Vehicle. When testing of the DF-31AG was originally reported, the DF-31AG was referred to as the DF-31B. Such a designation would imply changes to the missile or payload. When the system was actually paraded however, it was referred to as the DF-31AG, as the missile is the same (A) with a mobility upgrade (G). Bill Gertz later clarified his original reporting to specify that the DF-31AG is what was being tested, not a DF-31B.

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DF-31AG as seen during the 2019 National Day Parade.

While the DF-31AG does not offer any increased capacity in terms of its missile or payload, the new TEL offers several advantages in terms of its mobility. The major disadvantage with the MELs used by the DF-31 and DF-31A was that the MEL was limited to launching from paved roads or prepared launch sites due to its complete lack of off-road mobility. The DF-31AG TEL gives the system an off-road capacity that allows the Rocket Force to deploy and launch from a much wider variety of locations. This might translate to the DF-31AG TEL having a range advantage over the DF-31A MEL. If the DF-31AG were launched from exercise positions in the Gobi desert, the system would be able to strike more targets on the East Coast of the United States.

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DF-31AG practice command and launch preparation consoles (above) and the command or launch preparation console actually installed in the cab of the DF-31AG (below).

   The DF-31AG appears to share much of the same support equipment as the DF-31A, with the possible exception of some of the support vehicles being equipped with off-road tires. The largest change comes from the cab of the TEL. The previous MEL trucks were not capable of storing launch and command equipment inside their cabs. The DF-31AG cabs, like the one seen above, are capable of storing this equipment. It is probable that this equipment placement has replaced the company command vehicle. It should be noted that while this equipment is inside the cab, the crew never launches the missile while inside. All PLARF missile systems are equipped with portable launch consoles so that the missile can be fired while the crew is at a safe distance.

We’ve seen a pretty rapid uptick in the number of DF-31AG brigades in recent years. Two brigades have so far been upgraded from the DF-31A to the DF-31AG, and a third brigade is a completely new formation.

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The DF-41 ICBM.

Little is confirmed about the PRC’s “next-generation” ICBM, the DF-41. Like the DF-31AG, it also rests on an HTF5980 chassis, but a different variant of it called the HTF5980A. The major difference between the TELs themselves is the split cab used by the DF-41 to accommodate the much larger missile canister. A completely new missile, the DF-41 is reported to have an increased range of 12,000 kilometers to 15,000 kilometers and by some reports be multiple-independent-reentry-vehicle (MIRV) capable, with the capacity to carry multiple warheads. Chinese media commonly says that the DF-41 is capable of carrying ten warheads. This is almost certainly false, especially in light of what we know about the size and shape of Chinese warheads. It's possible that the DF-41 is MIRVed, but packing more than three warheads inside its shroud would require some incredibly intensive miniaturization. It is, however, believable that the PRC is pursuing a MIRV option given its range class and probable role. The only target the Rocket Force could be intending to hit with a 12,000+ kilometer range missile is the East Coast of the United States. Given the United States’ investment in missile defenses, a MIRV option and/or the development of countermeasures would be an expected response by the PRC.

During the 2019 National Day Parade, China paraded sixteen DF-41 TELs from two brigades. If DF-41 brigades have the same number of launchers that DF-31 brigades are equipped with, each DF-41 brigade will have twelve launchers. Two brigades should bring us to a total of twenty-four launchers. The OT&E brigade for the DF-41 has already been identified as Hanzhong (644). The other brigade garrison has not been built, and probably won’t be deployed for some time. The standard operation of the PLARF when it comes to new systems is for the system to undergo OT&E at a single unit before additional units are deployed.  

Now that we have a good overview of these systems, we can start tackling the associated infrastructure for these missile systems. There are two key pieces of information that we can use to track how new systems will be deployed: we can monitor production sites and keep track of infrastructure at certain garrisons. By using both, we can put together a rough picture of DF-31AG deployments and what future ICBM brigades will probably look like.


Both the DF-31AG and DF-41 sit on the same chassis, the eight-axle HTF5980, which is manufactured by Tai’an Special Vehicle. A government-owned company that manufactures a variety of TELs for the PRC military and the PRC’s space industry, Tai’an is responsible for both chassis assembly and final launcher assembly of the DF-31AG. It is also responsible for chassis construction of the HTF5680A1, the TEL used by the DF-26 IRBM. However, the final launcher assembly of the DF-26 occurs at Third Academy’s 159 Factory, also known as the Beijing Xinghang Electromechanical Equipment Factory, in Fangshan, near Beijing. DF-26 launchers have also been spotted at Factory 159 in Changzhi ( 36° 9'33.67"N, 113° 7'16.91"E). Because the DF-31AG and the DF-41 share the same chassis, the DF-41 may also be made at Tai’an, but so far no DF-41 launchers have appeared on satellite imagery. Final assembly might happen elsewhere after the chassis are produced, as is the case with the DF-26. Monitoring Tai’an Special Vehicle is one way we can measure the development and deployment of missile systems. Google Earth imagery from earlier this year has shown a new set of DF-31AG launchers being produced. At this point, the launchers have probably already shipped out to their assigned brigade.

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We start to see DF-31AG TELs appear at Tai’an on 10/17/19 when two TELs are visible. On 11/03/19, three TELs are visible. On 11/10/19, four TELs are visible. Finally, on 03/14/20, ten TELs are visible. As DF-31AG brigades have twelve TELs per brigade, the brigade was almost done by March. This is an important find that allows us to estimate the rate of production of DF-31AG launchers at Tai'an. Given the rate of construction we see at Tai’an, it appears it takes around twenty days to complete a single DF-31AG launcher. If production occurs at this steady rate, it takes Tai’an Special Vehicle around eight to nine months to complete a single brigade’s worth of DF-31AGs. Adding this brigade to the number of launchers already deployed puts the number of DF-31AG launchers at 48 or more, as three brigades worth of DF-31AGs are already deployed at Tianshui (643), Shaoyang (632), and Luoyang (664). This will be the fourth brigade.

Another way we can estimate the deployment of new missile systems in the PRC is by examining their brigade garrisons. DF-31 brigades have a clear signature because the DF-31 has previously used a MEL for transportation. Unlike a TEL, a MEL has the canister sitting on a trailer that can be disconnected from the tractor. This design configuration has several drawbacks in terms of its mobility. In addition to being restricted to paved roads as it has no offroad capacity whatsoever, the MEL requires a unique garage pattern that is easily spotted on satellite imagery. These garages are open at both ends, allowing the driver to drive the vehicle right through the garage and out the other end. This layout allows the PLARF to park their large trailer-hitched MELs without having to unhitch or reverse their trailers. These drive-through garages are unique to the DF-31 and its variants, but it should be noted that not all DF-31 garrisons have them. Hancheng (641) and Luoyang (664) do not have drive-through garages, as both these facilities were not originally designed as brigade installations.

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Drive-through garages seen at Yuxi (622) via Google Earth. White arrows demonstrate the direction of travel. Note the tire marks.

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An important note is that many of the DF-31 brigades have had infrastructure upgrades over the past ten years that effectively double their capacity to house launchers and support vehicles. Yuxi, below, is probably the clearest example of this. Out of a total of seven confirmed DF-31 brigades, four have so far been upgraded like this, and Luoyang is believed to have a full set of twelve launchers as well. This brings the total number of deployed DF-31 launchers to around seventy-two.


For the DF-31AG however, the PLARF does not appear to prefer a drive-through garage configuration for the system when they need to build more garage space. PLARF personnel linked to Brigade 632 in Shaoyang have been seen with DF-31AG TELs. At Shaoyang garrison itself (seen below), the Rocket Force has constructed a new garage set - but not a drive-through garage. Instead, the brigade uses launcher garage sets attached to the high-bay, similar to the garages we have seen constructed at DF-21 and DF-26 brigade bases. This launcher garage design is associated only with TEL systems - giving us additional confirmation that Shaoyang has been equipped with the DF-31AG. As the DF-31AG uses a TEL instead of a MEL, it does not need drive-through garages. While this rule will probably apply going forward for new construction, it does not appear to apply to brigades that already have a full set of twelve drive through garages.


This story is repeated at Brigade 644 in Hanzhong, thought to be the future home of the DF-41’s OT&E brigade. Instead of the drive-through garage set up used at DF-31 brigades, the DF-41 also uses the integrated launcher-garage high-bay concept. If this pattern continues, the construction of additional integrated launcher garage and high-bays at ICBM brigades should be taken as a sign that the brigade is upgrading to or will be equipped with the DF-31AG or DF-41. As the DF-31AG and DF-41 are both ICBMs built on the same TEL, they probably share a significant amount of their support equipment, but we have not seen any DF-41 support equipment so far.

The DF-31AG brigade at Tai’an could be destined for an existing DF-31 or DF-31A brigade. Brigade 622 in Yuxi and Brigade 663 in Nanyang are the only two DF-31 brigades not equipped with the DF-31AG that also has space for twelve launchers, so these two would be prime candidates for upgrades. It is also possible that these launchers are earmarked for a new brigade yet to be built. It is not unusual for the PLARF to produce brigade equipment before a suitable brigade garrison is completed. In addition to Hanzhong, the Rocket Force is also building three other new garrisons that might be for ICBM brigades. If the DF-31AG is meant to be a complete replacement of the DF-31 and DF-31A, then it is probable that future DF-31AG TELs will be headed to existing brigades. This would imply that the unbuilt brigades would all have the DF-41. Hopefully, we will see some of these DF-31AG units turn into new brigades, which would keep the total number of warheads down in comparison to a faster deployment of the DF-41 system.

Monitoring production sites and infrastructure construction gives us a set of powerful tools to monitor the expansion of the PLARF. Brigades 641 in Hancheng and Brigade 642 in Datong still only have room for six launchers. If we see their garrisons expanded with the same integrated garage and high-bay we see at Hanzhong and Shaoyang, we can conclude that they will upgrade to the DF-31AG. The PLARF could go several directions with their ICBM force. These monitoring tools would make it possible to predict what path they wish to take in the future.

https://www.aboyandhis.blog/post/china-s-mobile-icbm-brigades-the-df-31-and-df-41





Works Cited in the Production of This Report:

“Chinese Missile Encyclopedia Section II: Missile and Missile Equipment Storage and Handling Facilities.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84T00171R000301550001-8.pdf


Bhat, Vinayak. "China media reports a new missile brigade that can hit Mumbai. What’s really new about it?" The Print, April 19th 2019. https://theprint.in/defence/china-media-reports-new-missile-brigade-hit-mumbai/50731/

Bhat, Vinayak. “China’s new, secret missile garrison in Sichuan can target all of india and beyond.” The Print, June 27th 2018. https://theprint.in/defence/chinas-new-secret-missile-garrison-in-sichuan-can-target-all-of-india-and-beyond/75347/


Boyd, Henry. “2019 Pentagon Report: China’s Rocket Force Trajectory” Military Balance Blog, International Institute of Strategic Studies, May 15th 2019. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/05/pla-rocket-force-trajectory


Kristensen, Hans M. and Korda, Matt. Chinese nuclear forces, 2019, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:4, 171-178, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511


Kristensen, Hans M. “China’s New DF-26 Missile Shows Up At Base in Eastern China.” Federation of American Scientists, January 21st 2020. https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/09/china-silo-df41/


Kristensen, Hans M. “New Missile Silo and DF-41 Launchers Seen in Chinese Nuclear Missile Training Area.” Federation of American Scientists, September 3rd 2019. https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/09/china-silo-df41/


Lafoy, Scott and Eveleth, Decker. “Possible ICBM Modernization Underway at Sundian.” Arms Control Wonk, February 5th 2019. https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1208828/possible-icbm-modernization-underway-at-sundian/


Singer, Peter W. and Xiu, Ma. "China’s Missile Force is Growing at an Unprecedented Rate", Popular Science, Febuary 25th 2020. https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-eastern-arsenal/china-missile-force-growing/


Stokes, Mark A. “China’s Future Nuclear Force Infrastructure”, PowerPoint presented at the East Asian Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures Workshop at Stanford University, November 2013. http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nov2013-Stokes.pdf Logan, David C. “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces.” In Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms. National Defense University Press, 2019. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf Logan, David C. Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force: What They Tell Us, Asian Security, 2019, 15:2, 103-121, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2017.1422089 O’Connor, Sean, “PLA Second Artillery Corps”, Air Power Australia, 2009. Last updated 2011. https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Second-Artillery-Corps.html


Stokes, Mark. "China's Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System", Project 2049, 2010. https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf

Stokes, Mark. "PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference." Project 2049, November 30th 2018.


Stokes, Mark. “Second Artillery Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Brigade Facilities Under Construction in Guangdong?” Project 2049, 2010. https://project2049.net/2010/08/03/second-artillery-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-brigade-facilities-under-construction-in-guangdong/


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推演

近来中共外交部、CCTV还有各种大内宣疯了一样开始抨击美国的正义力量同时鼓吹

中共的军事实力,又拿草鸡蛋航母、固定自焚场、移动火葬场、空中火葬场出来说事,

简直是无耻至极、无知至极。我们爆料革命的战友不喜欢口炮我们只讲事实。这段文章

涉及到的所有内容均为公开信息,已以及平日里bo博士分享的信息,不足之处请各位

战友包涵。

先回顾一下前面的文章,中共火箭军现役弹道导弹

按照射程分类
近程导弹,例如DF-15全系列,主要针对台海目标
中程导弹,例如DF-21 DF-25(21D升级款)DF-26,主要针对第二岛链目标以南亚、

东亚地区
远程导弹、洲际导弹,例如DF-5A DF-5B DF-5C DF-31 DF-31A DF-41,主要针对

欧美俄

按照燃料类型分类
液体燃料,目前只有DF-5系列导弹
固体燃料,DF-5系列以外所有

按照发射模式分类
固定阵地,导弹发射井,目前只有DF-5系列导弹
机动阵地,所谓机动,DF-5系列以外所有
潜艇发射,巨浪系列,巨浪系列说白了就是把21、31、41塞进潜艇,没有本质区别

按着飞行阶段分类
主动段,发动机会话
被动段,发动机关机至击中目标
细分为,中途阶段(或亚轨道飞行阶段),发动机关机至再入大气层阶段,
再入段,进入大气层至击中目标

按照弹头种类分类
单弹头
分导式多弹头

发射阵地部署
东北地区,辽宁省、吉林省及外围省,主要部署中程导弹
西北地区,青海省、甘肃省及外围省,主要部署中程导弹
西南地区,云南省及外围省,主要部署中程导弹
中原地区,河南省、湖南省,主要部署远程、洲际导弹
东南地区,安徽省、福建省、江西省、广东省及外围省,主要部署进程导弹

核弹头存储阵地
陕西省

培训院校
陕西西安 中国人民解放军火箭军工程大学
湖北武汉 中国人民解放军火箭军指挥学院
山东青州 中国人民解放军士官学校

导弹的发射的过程
日常存储在水平阵地,进入临战状态,根据作战指挥程序、测试发射程序,进行弹体测

试以及弹上惯性单元测试,测试完成后进行转运,液体导弹由转运车转运至发射阵地,

固体导弹测试完成后吊装至发射车。
液体导弹运输至固定发射阵地后,经过吊装进入发射阵地,后续进行惯性仪器安装、

弹体测试、燃料加注等准备。这部分的细节前面文章有介绍。
固体导弹运送至经过平整的“移动阵地”,进行起竖、测试、瞄准,才能进行发射。

这里,问题来了,美军现在的侦察飞机已经挂着民航呼号每天过来打招呼了,我想一定

还有共匪雷达探测不到的飞行器过来侦查,高空的无人机,近地面的军事卫星,肯定还

有我不知道的侦察手段。上述所有导弹里面最小的DF-15系列导弹,弹体长10米左右,

在发射车上运输,所有的发射车,都是特种车辆,无论外型特征、红外特征、雷达反射

特征都有很明显的特征,还有各种保障车辆,如此阵仗,美军发现不了?!
液体导弹发射阵地,和固体导弹发射阵地,地貌特征明显,不用美军分析,拿来图,我

这个离开火箭军十几年的普通人根据我的知识都能分析。更何况我曾经做过阵地伪装

工程,更清楚里面并没有技术含量,都是腐败工程。

水平阵地、发射阵地、转运路径,基本上都是裸奔了。

好,我们进一步假设,以上这些美军都没能掌握。导弹成功到达阵地,并且测试完成、

起竖完毕,发射了。

主动段,发动机点火至发动机关机
还用最小的DF-15系列导弹分析,导弹弹体和弹头总重量在7000kg~10000kg ,弹道

高度大于3000m,理论上讲,起飞重量越大,起飞时放热越大,美军及其盟军在亚洲布

局的萨德系统、还有X波段雷达,甚至能探测出手雷爆炸时的热量特征,导弹发射的热量

肯定是完全掌握的。飞行距离越远的导弹,弹体重量越大,起飞时释放的热量就越大,就

越容易被探测。主动段的飞行时间根据弹道高度和飞行距离决定,射程越远,主动段飞

行时间越长。主动段一般在2min-6min。手雷爆炸都能探测到,持续性的大热量释放。

呵呵。


即使前面所有的转运、吊装、测试过程都侥幸没被发现,这个阶段肯定被发现。根据发

射点坐标、关机点高度、速度,可以算出目标点范围(多弹头分导已经广泛装备,所以

这里是范围)。美军和盟军的防御系统从太空部队到空基反导武器到地面反导系统全面

进入战斗状态。

被动段,亚轨道飞行段,发动机关机到战斗部再入
根据最简单的物理原理,这个阶段势能达到最高,动能最低。在本阶段携带多弹头重返

大气层载具或者是分导式多弹头的洲际弹道导弹会释放出携带的子弹头,以及金属气球、

铝箔干扰丝和全尺寸诱饵弹头等各种电子对抗装置,以欺骗雷达。这时候无论是真弹头

还是干扰弹头,相对于天基激光武器来说,运动速度可以忽略。打个比方,就是固定靶

射击。

好,我们再进一步假设,还是有弹头通过。

被动段,再入大气层,战斗部重返大气层

这个阶段,战斗部经过被动、主动加速,速度可以到7倍音速以上甚至30倍音速。
简单计算一下
音速
340m/s ,20倍音速 6800m/s ,30倍音速10200m/s

光速
300000000m/s
粗略计算,光速是20倍音速的44117倍,是30倍音速的29411倍
根据bo博士的分享,F35可以挂载激光反导武器,呵呵,以前我也不知道,跟bo博士

学了很多。
这里也是共匪宣传机器和军事专家经常吹牛逼的地方,多弹头分导,变轨制导,各种名

词就喷出来吓唬人了。我给这些专家一个建议,分弹头制导的前提是,主动段和亚轨道

飞行段能够生存下来。

好,我们再进一步假设,还有弹头通过。

下面即将登场的是昂贵的标准和性价比高的爱国者反导系统。

好,我们再进一步假设,还有弹头通过。

压轴登场的是方阵近迫武器系统每分钟发射6000-12000发防空炮,形成的弹幕,别说

导弹战斗部,🦟飞过去都难。还有很多地面,舰船上装载的激光反导武器伺候。

相信战友们看了以上一而再再而三的假设都明白了!如果司令员、旅长等指挥官都是

我们的战友,那么,还有没有以上假设的存在?!如果发号施令的猪头被斩首了,还有

没有以上假设的存在?

为全地球遭受中共病毒的人类祈祷,为香港同胞祈祷。

一切已经开始!


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作者:Pascal 留言时间:2020-09-26 21:12:41

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作者:黃三封

这一场病毒改变了许多事,也让我们看清了许多人。

庚子年的疫情事件过后,人类的历史势必会被重新书写。而随着历史一起被记住的,此前绝无仅有的女英雄,就是我们的科学家闫丽梦博士。那个流着泪说:[留给人类的时间不多了]的女生,那个斩钉截铁地通过福克斯告诉世界[要解决这个病毒,必须先把邪恶的中共体制解体],这是人类的警世恒言,从一个女性的口中说出。人类最终会明白这个事实,其实只有[灭共]这一条路可以走了,而且是唯一的一条,就连这唯一的一条,也不是永远敞开在那里,再犹豫下去,等恶魔再使出什么灭绝人性的坏招,到那时再想解体它们恐怕也没有机会了。

闫丽梦博士柔弱的肩膀担起了全人类的未来!难以想象她是如何九死一生逃过了恶魔编织的重重罗网,奔向自由,冒着随时可能被灭口的危险向世界揭露病毒真相。为此,她失去了家庭,失去了朋友,年迈的双亲至今还在中共的威胁之下!她当然知道自己站出来反对的是什么,当然知道自己站出来对她及家人意味着什么,放弃优渥的生活、放弃自己曾为之奋斗的学术领域、放弃已经拥有的一切!甚至那个曾经为她披上嫁衣的人,亲手为她配制了欲置她于死地的早餐。这是什么样的创伤?至亲之人都能下此毒手,对闫博士的心理是多大的冲击?我们普通人,想想这样的场景都会怀疑人生吧?

当然,科学家在关键时刻舍生忘死地站出来拯救的人类,当然也包括了你们——正在猖狂攻击闫丽梦博士的伪类们!因为你们从生理上区分勉强也算是人类。而你们非但不感恩,还恩将仇报,好像你们不是人类一样,你们竟然恶意攻击抹黑英雄科学家。当然,科学层面的质疑不在此列,只要是有理有据的科学讨论,都是对人类社会的贡献,科学家就应该有一分证据说一分话,可惜,你们连基本的常识都没有,拿什么进行科学讨论?闫博士的文章字字珠玑,句句实证,直接把恶魔钉死在科学的大门上。然而,你们呢?你们拿不出任何证据,只会无理取闹,只会恶毒地人身攻击,你们没有原则,只有立场,而你们的立场恰恰是人类的反面、你们的立场是有奶便是娘,谁给狗粮你们就替谁说话。你们罔顾事实,大放厥词,伤害我们的英雄!你们的良知呢?你们还是人吗?

从另一个角度上说,你们也太自不量力了!我们的闫博士是全天下所有知道真相的人都会拼力保护的人、是值得我们所有战友用生命呵护的人、是全知全能的上帝选中的人!经历这一番殊死拼杀,我们的英雄什么阵仗没见过?至亲至爱之人的出卖都经历过了,她的内心只会更强大!就凭你们一般斗筲之徒,潦倒到吃了上顿没下顿的Loser,也想伤害我们的英雄科学家,你们也配?!你们拼尽全力制造的谎言,最多只是别人茶余饭后的谈资和笑料,仅此而已,你们活到今天,也只能是这荒谬时代的一个笑话,你们的一辈子,也只是一个笑料而已,悲催啊!

放心吧伪类们,网络时代,你们今天的所作所为都将成为未来你们受审判的铁证,你们混淆视听、释放假消息、公然造谣污蔑敢于站出来的英雄、阻止人民获得真相,阻碍正义力量对抗恶魔,你们的无耻已经超出人类的想象。

伪类们,你们成为邪恶体制帮凶的那一刻,便是亲手把自己送进了万劫不复遗臭万年的不归路,你们活在世上会被人唾弃,你们死了也会愧见先人。你们这帮不要脸的东西!从现在开始,从三块硬盘公诸于世开始,你们的主子就已经是泥菩萨过江自身难保了,你们还在垂死挣扎,压垮骆驼的那根稻草已经在骆驼的背上了,它不在水里,无法成为你们救命的那一根了。今天的所有丑行都会被记录在案,你们终将被审判,一个也逃不了!

https://gnews.org/zh-hans/385083/

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