But was Moscow really planning a nuclear attack? Even if a conventional “people’s war” was a frightening proposition, it can only be credited as an effective deterrent if Moscow was seriously considering a strike and subsequently refrained because the costs of a protracted war outweighed the benefits of aggression. The evidence, though still incomplete, is mixed. According to Shevchenko, in the aftermath of the 2 March conflict Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko advocated a nuclear “blockbuster” involving “unrestricted use” of multi-megaton nuclear weapons to “once and for all get rid of the Chinese threat.” On the other hand, Nikolai Ogarkov, a senior military officer, believed that a massive nuclear attack “would inevitably mean world war.” Even a limited counterforce strike on China’s nuclear facilities was dangerous, Ogarkov argued, because a few nuclear weapons would “hardly annihilate” a country the size of China, and in response China would “fight unrelentingly.”
In 1985 Nixon himself hinted at another crisis in 1969 that could have pro- duced a decision to alert U.S. strategic nuclear forces. In a Time magazine inter- view, Nixon stated that he had “considered using nuclear weapons” during the 1969 “border con•icts” between China and the Soviet Union: “Henry [Kissinger] used to come and talk about the situation. . . . Henry said, ‘Can the U.S. allow the Soviet Union to jump the Chinese?′—that is, to takeout their nu- clear capability. We had to let the Soviets know we would not tolerate that.”
In August and September 1969, the Soviet press and journalists abroad had hinted at the possibility that Moscow would launch a preventive conventional or nuclear attack on China′s nuclear facilities. Scholars had known for many years that a Soviet KGB intelligence ofŽcer had privately approached a U.S. diplomat to ask how the United States would react to such an attack. Based on an interview with a SAC B-52 pilot, New York Times reporter Patrick Tyler argued that the United States had secretly gone on a high-level nuclear alert as a signal to Moscow—and perhaps also to Beijing—that the Nixon administra- tion would oppose any such attack on China.
1985年，尼克松本人曾暗示 1969 年的另一場危機可能
會促使美國做出警告美國戰略核力量的決定。在
《時代》雜誌的一次採訪中，尼克松表示他在 1969 年
中蘇“邊界衝突”期間“考慮過使用核武器”：“亨利
[基辛格] 過去常常來談情況。 . . .亨利說，“美國
能允許蘇聯撲向中國嗎？”——也就是說，要幹掉他們
的核能力。我們必須讓蘇聯人知道我們不會容忍這種
情況。”
1969年8月和9月，蘇聯在國外的媒體和記者曾暗示莫斯
科可能會對中國的核設施發動預防性常規或核攻擊。
多年來，學者們都知道，蘇聯克格勃情報局官員曾私下
聯繫一名美國外交官，詢問美國將如何應對此類襲擊。
根據對 SAC B-52 飛行員的採訪，《紐約時報》記者
帕特里克·泰勒辯稱，美國已秘密發出高級別核警報，
以此向莫斯科——或許也向北京——發出尼克松政府
反對任何針對中國的攻擊。
Others have speculated that Nixon may have been tell- ing the truth in his Time interview: U.S. political authorities might have or- dered a nuclear alert to underscore their public and private statements that they would not condone a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on China.20 The second explanation—to deter an attack on China—appears logically to be the most likely one. After all, many deterrence theorists would argue that
nuclear threats are most effective, and perhaps can only be used, to deter an- other state′s nuclear attack. According to this logic, the October 1969 alert was a signal of U.S. opposition to Soviet aggression and preventive war. This expla- nation also appeals to a common perception that U.S. nuclear weapons serve defensive purposes, and indeed, one could even argue that deterring Russian aggression in this manner was a responsible use of extended nuclear deterrence.
The third consideration of nuclear options came in an intensification of the Soviet-Chinese border dispute. Mr. Nixon said the United States indicated to Moscow it ''would not tolerate'' a move to destroy China's nuclear capability.
