FIELD MARSHAL Erich von Manstein is included here because he has been rated as the greatest German commander of World War II by his fellow German generals, his opponents, and military historians.
陸軍元帥埃里克·馮·曼施坦因 Erich von Manstein 被包括在這裡，因為他被他的德國將軍、他的對手和 軍事歷史學家評為整個二戰中最偉大的德國指揮官。
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/ 9781400825165.137/pdf
曼施坦因有着遙遠的猶太血統
1942年10月23日，時年19歲曼施坦因的兒子戰死在斯大林格勒戰役中。
His release on 7 May 1953 was partly a result of a recurrence of his eye problems but also the result of pressure by Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Liddell Hart, Paget, and others.[166][167] Also, the British wanted Germany to take part in the defence of Western Europe, and Adenauer made Germany's re-armament contingent on the release of their war criminals.[168][169]
https://www.quora.com/How-good-was-Erich-von-Manstein -as-a-general-What-were-his-most-decisive-victories
全世界各國軍事院校沒有任何商量的必讀書
《 完全可以 / 原本可以贏得的勝利 》
德國國防軍陸軍元帥埃里克·馮·曼施坦因 1955
THE WAY TO STALINGRAD The cause of Sixth Army's destruction at Stalingrad is obviously to be found in Hitler's refusal — doubtless mainly for reasons of prestige - to give up the city voluntarily. Yet the fact that Sixth Army could ever land in such a situation at all was due to the operational errors committed beforehand by the Supreme Command in the planning and execution of the 1942 offensive, most of all with regard to its final stages. The plight in which the German southern wing found itself in the late autumn of 1942 as a result of these mistakes will be dealt with in the chapter on the winter campaign of 1942-3. All I propose to do here is to bring out the points which settled the fate of Sixth Army. Thanks to the fact that Hitler's strategic objectives were governed chiefly by the needs of his war economy, the German offensive of 1942 had split into two different directions - the Caucasus and Stalingrad. By the time the German advance came to a halt, therefore, a front had emerged, to hold which there were not enough German forces available. To make things worse, no strategic reserve existed, the Supreme Command having squandered Eleventh Army in every conceivable direction immediately it became free in the Crimea. Army Group A — with its front facing south - was located in the north of the Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian. Army Group B held a front facing east and north-east which began on the Volga south of Stalingrad and bent back north of the city to join the Middle Don, along which it continued to a point north of Voronezh. Neither of the two army groups was strong enough to hold fronts of this length, particularly if one bore in mind that despite its heavy losses the enemy's southern wing had been able to avoid destruction and was not really beaten at all. Apart from this, the enemy had very strong strategic reserves in his other sectors, as well as in the hinterland. Last but not least, a gap 190 miles wide yawned between the two army groups in the Kalmyk Steppes, guarded only by the quite inadequate resources of one division (16 Motorized) based on Yelista.
通往斯大林格勒的路 第六集團軍在斯大林格勒被摧毀的原因顯然可以從希特勒的拒絕中找到 ——無疑主要是出於聲望的原因——自願放棄這座城市。 然而，第六軍能夠在這樣的情況下登陸，是因為 最高司令部事先在計劃和計劃中犯下的操作錯誤 1942 年攻勢的執行，最重要的是其最後階段。 1942 年深秋，德國南翼作為一個 這些錯誤的結果將在 1942-3 冬季戰役一章中討論。 我在此所要做的，就是提出決定第六軍命運的要點。 由於希特勒的戰略目標主要受制於他的需要 戰爭經濟，德國 1942 年的攻勢分成了兩個不同的方向—— 高加索和斯大林格勒。因此，當德國人的前進停止時，一條前線 已經出現，沒有足夠的德軍可用。做東西 更糟糕的是，沒有戰略儲備存在，最高司令部已經浪費了十一 在所有可以想象的方向上的軍隊立即在克里米亞獲得自由。 A集團軍群——正面朝南——位於高加索北部 黑海和裏海之間。 B集團軍群守住了一個面向東和東北的戰線 它始於斯大林格勒以南的伏爾加河，向城市北部彎曲，加入了 中頓，沿着它繼續到沃羅涅日以北的一點。兩軍都沒有 團體足夠強大，可以守住這麼長的戰線，特別是如果有人牢記 儘管損失慘重，敵人的南翼卻能避免破壞， 根本沒有被打敗。除此之外，敵人的戰略儲備非常強大 其他部門，以及腹地。最後但並非最不重要的一點是，190 英里寬的間隙打了個哈欠 在卡爾梅克草原的兩個集團軍之間，僅由相當不足的守衛 基於 Yelista 的一個部門（16 個機動）的資源。
The attempt to hold this over-extended front for any length of time constituted the first of the mistakes which were to plunge Sixth Army into its desperate situation at the end of November 1942. The second and even more fatal mistake was that Hitler compelled Army Group B to tie down its principal striking force, Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies, in the fighting in and around Stalingrad. The job of protecting the deep northern flank of this group along the Don was left to Third Rumanian Army, one Italian and one Hungarian army and, in the Voronezh sector, to the weak Second German Army. Hitler must have known that even behind the Don the allied armies could not stand up to a strong Soviet attack. The same was true of Fourth Rumanian Army, which he had entrusted with the task of guarding the open right flank of Fourth Panzer Army. The attempt to gain control of the Volga by taking Stalingrad in a set battle after the original assault had been only partially successful would at best have been admissible on a very shortterm basis. But to leave the main body of the Army Group at Stalingrad for weeks on end with inadequately protected flanks was a cardinal error. It amounted to nothing less than presenting the enemy with the initiative we ourselves had resigned on the whole southern wing, and was a clear invitation to him to surround Sixth Army. A third mistake was the utterly grotesque chain of command on the German southern wing. Army Group A had no commander of its own whatever. It was commanded by Hitler in what might be called a part-time capacity. Army Group B had no fewer than seven armies under command, including four allied ones. No army group headquarters can cope with more than five armies at the outside, and when most of these are allied ones, the task inevitably becomes too much for it. H.Q. Army Group B had quite rightly established itself at Starobyelsk, behind the defensive front on the Don, in order to keep a better eye on the allied armies. The choice of this location, however, also meant that the headquarters was much too distant from the right wing of its sector. Another factor was that by his frequent interference in the conduct of operations Hitler largely deprived the Army Group Headquarters of control of Sixth Army. It is true that O.K.H. had recognized these command problems and made plans to create a new Don Army Group under Marshal Antonescu. The new headquarters had not been set up, however, as Hitler first wished to see Stalingrad fall. This failure to use the Rumanian Marshal was a serious mistake. Admittedly his capacity for command was untried so far, but he was certainly a good soldier. In any case, his presence would have lent greater weight to our calls for further forces to guard the flanks of the Stalingrad front. He was, after all, a Head of State and an ally to whom Hitler had to pay greater heed than to German army group and army commanders. Above all, Antonescu's personality would have served to brace up the senior Rumanian commanders, who respected this man no less than they did the Russians. It was clear from an impassioned letter he wrote me after my assumption of command that the Marshal had on several occasions called attention to the dangers of the situation in general and that of Third Rumanian Army in particular. As long as he did not hold a responsible command at the front, however, these comments of his inevitably lacked the emphasis they would have carried if uttered by a Head of State simultaneously answerable for the sector that was threatened. It was equally clear that neither Army Group B nor Sixth Army had failed to
試圖在任何時間保持這個過度擴張的戰線構成了第一個 11月底使第六軍陷入絕境的錯誤 1942 年。 第二個也是更致命的錯誤是希特勒強迫 B 集團軍 它的主要打擊力量，第四裝甲集團軍和第六集團軍，在其周邊地區的戰鬥中 斯大林格勒。保護沿頓河的這群人的北翼深處的工作被留下了 向羅馬尼亞第三集團軍、一支意大利軍隊和一支匈牙利軍隊，以及在沃羅涅日地區， 弱小的德意志第二軍。希特勒一定知道，即使在唐的背後，盟軍 軍隊經不起蘇軍的猛烈進攻。第四羅馬尼亞人也是如此 陸軍，他委託其負責保衛第四裝甲部隊的右翼開闊地帶 軍隊。 試圖通過在原版之後的一場固定戰鬥中占領斯大林格勒來控制伏爾加河 襲擊只取得了部分成功，充其量只能在很短的時間內被接受。但是要在斯大林格勒連續數周離開集團軍群的主力 側翼保護不足是一個主要錯誤。它無異於呈現 以我們自己為首的敵人在整個南翼都辭職了，而且是 明確邀請他包圍第六軍。 第三個錯誤是德國南翼完全怪誕的指揮系統。 A集團軍群沒有任何自己的指揮官。它是由希特勒指揮的 可以稱為兼職能力。 B集團軍群有不少於七支軍隊，其中包括四支盟軍。 任何一個集團軍司令部都不能在外面應付五支以上的軍隊，而當 其中大部分是盟軍，任務不可避免地變得太多了。總部軍團 B 完全正確地在斯塔羅別爾斯克站穩了腳跟，在頓河的防禦陣線後面，在 為了更好地監視盟軍。然而，這個位置的選擇也 意味着總部離其部門的右翼太遠了。其他 因素是他經常干涉希特勒的行動 剝奪了集團軍總部對第六集團軍的控制權。 確實，O.K.H.已經認識到這些指揮問題，並計劃創建一個新的 安東內斯庫元帥麾下的頓河集團軍。新總部還未成立， 然而，正如希特勒最初希望看到斯大林格勒淪陷的那樣。未能使用羅馬尼亞語 元帥是一個嚴重的錯誤。誠然，他的指揮能力到目前為止還沒有受到考驗，但 他當然是個好士兵。在任何情況下，他的存在都會賦予更大的權重 我們呼籲增派部隊守衛斯大林格勒戰線的側翼。畢竟，他是一個頭 國家和盟友，希特勒必須比德國集團軍更加注意 軍隊指揮官。最重要的是，安東內斯庫的個性將有助於支撐 羅馬尼亞高級指揮官，他們對這個人的尊重不亞於對俄羅斯人的尊重。 在我上任後，他寫給我的一封熱情洋溢的信清楚地表明， 元帥曾多次提請注意總體局勢的危險性 尤其是羅馬尼亞第三軍。只要他不追究責任 然而，在前線指揮部，他的這些評論不可避免地缺乏他們所強調的重點 如果由同時負責該部門的國家元首發表 受到威脅。同樣清楚的是，無論是 B 集團軍群還是第六集團軍都沒有失敗
give warning of the big offensive the enemy was preparing to launch against the covering fronts on each side of Stalingrad. Finally, mention should be made of a fact which had grave repercussions on the position of Sixth Army and the entire southern wing. The whole of Army Group A, as well as Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies, Third and Fourth Rumanian Armies and the Italian Army, were based on a single Dnieper crossing, the railway bridge at Dnepropetrovsk. The repair of the Zaporozhye railway bridge and the link across the Ukraine through Nikolayev and Kherson to the Crimea and thence across the Straits of Kerch had either been discontinued or was not yet complete. The north-to-south link behind the German lines was equally unsatisfactory. When it came to bringing up fresh troops or quickly switching forces behind the front, therefore, the German Supreme Command found itself at a permanent disadvantage vis-a-vis the enemy, who had much more efficient communications at his disposal in every direction. Every Commander-in-Chief must run risks if he wants to succeed. The risk undertaken by the Supreme Command in the late autumn of 1942, however, should never have consisted in tying down the most hard-hitting forces of Army Group B at Stalingrad over a long period in which it was content to leave the Don front covered by such an easily destructible screen. One possible argument in the Supreme Command's favour is that it was quite unprepared for the allied armies to break down so completely. Yet the Rumanians, who were still the best of our allies, fought exactly as our experiences in the Crimea implied they would. Any illusions about the Italians' fighting capacities, of course, were inexcusable from the start. The risk which the German command ought to have taken, after the summer offensive had merely won us more territory without bringing about the decisive defeat of the Soviet southern wing, consisted in returning to mobile operations between the Caucasus and middle reaches of the Don - with due advantage being taken of the large bend of the river— in order to prevent the enemy from attaining the initiative. But to substitute one risk for another was not in keeping with Hitler's mentality. By failing to take appropriate action after his offensive had petered out without achieving anything definite, he paved the way to the tragedy of Stalingrad! DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND STALINGRAD UP TO MY TAKE-OVER OF DON ARMY GROUP The O.K.H. order received by Eleventh Army Headquarters on 21st November in the Vitebsk area laid down that for the purpose of stricter co-ordination of the armies involved in the arduous defensive battles to the west and south of Stalingrad, we were to take over command of Fourth Panzer Army, Sixth Army and Third Rumanian Army as H.Q. Don Army Group . Since we lacked a quartermaster-general's branch, we were to be joined by the one already formed for Marshal Antonescu. It was headed by Colonel Finkh, a General Staff officer whose soundness of character was matched only by his extraordinary talent for organizing supply and transport, and who in due course mastered all the supply difficulties with which the Army Group constantly found itself confronted. The airlift to Sixth Army, unfortunately, was outside his control. After my recall in April 1944 Colonel Finkh was transferred to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief in the west, where, I am told, he soon had supply and transport in a state as near perfection as the enemy's complete domination of the skies permitted. As one of the men implicated in the conspiracy against Hitler, he was executed after 20th July 1944.
警告敵人正準備對掩體發動的大規模攻勢 斯大林格勒兩側的戰線。 最後，應該提到一個對美國的立場產生嚴重影響的事實。 第六軍和整個南翼。整個 A 集團軍群，以及第四集團軍 裝甲部隊和第六集團軍、羅馬尼亞第三集團軍和第四集團軍以及意大利集團軍 基於一個單一的第聶伯河口岸，第聶伯羅彼得羅夫斯克的鐵路橋。的修復 扎波羅熱鐵路橋和通過尼古拉耶夫和赫爾松穿越烏克蘭的連接 克里米亞和刻赤海峽的對岸要麼已經停產，要麼還沒有 完全的。德國防線後面的南北連接同樣不能令人滿意。什麼時候 到了調動新兵或迅速轉戰後方，因此， 德國最高統帥部發現自己在敵人面前永遠處於劣勢， 他可以在各個方向進行更有效的溝通。 每個總司令要想成功，就必須冒險。所承擔的風險 然而，1942 年深秋的最高統帥部決不應該包括捆綁 長期以來，在斯大林格勒擊落了 B 集團軍群中最猛烈的部隊，其中 讓 Don 的前部被這樣一個容易破壞的屏幕覆蓋是很滿足的。一 對最高司令部有利的可能論點是，它對 盟軍就這樣徹底崩潰了。然而羅馬尼亞人，他們仍然是我們最好的 盟友，正如我們在克里米亞的經歷所暗示的那樣進行戰鬥。任何幻想 當然，關於意大利人的戰鬥力，從一開始就是不可原諒的。 在夏季攻勢之後，德國司令部本應承擔的風險 只是為我們贏得了更多的領土，而沒有導致蘇聯的決定性失敗 南翼，包括返回高加索和中部之間的機動作戰 頓河的河段——充分利用了河流的大彎——為了 以防止敵人獲得主動權。但是用一種風險代替另一種風險是 不符合希特勒的心態。在他的進攻之後沒有採取適當的行動 在沒有取得任何確定的情況下逐漸消失，他為悲劇鋪平了道路 斯大林格勒！ 斯大林格勒周邊局勢的發展 我對唐軍集團的收購 O.K.H.第十一軍司令部於 11 月 21 日在維捷布斯克收到的命令 地區規定，為了更嚴格地協調參與戰爭的軍隊 在斯大林格勒西部和南部進行艱苦的防禦戰，我們將接管指揮權 第四裝甲集團軍、第六集團軍和羅馬尼亞第三集團軍作為總部。頓集團軍。 由於我們缺少一個軍需官的分支機構，我們將由已經加入的那個 為安東內斯庫元帥組建。它由總參謀長芬赫上校領導 只有他非凡的組織才能與他的品格相匹配 供應和運輸，誰在適當的時候掌握了所有的供應困難， 集團軍群不斷發現自己面臨着挑戰。空運到第六集團軍，不幸的是， 不在他的控制範圍內。 1944 年 4 月我被召回後，芬克上校被調到 西部總司令的參謀，據我所知，他在那裡很快就有了補給和 以接近完美的狀態運輸，就像敵人完全統治天空一樣 允許。作為參與反對希特勒的陰謀的人之一，他被處決 1944 年 7 月 20 日之後。 Jǐnggào dírén zhèng zhǔnbèi
德國武裝力量最高統帥部一名高級軍官，幾乎每日 與元首見面，並出席了更多與其私下會晤的場合， 寫信給曼施坦因，透露了一個與所有人感覺正相反 的阿道夫真情實感的形象 —— 竟然是 心 太 軟 。
很像原本是養雞農場場主的希姆萊，去過一次集中營 巡視，眼見毒氣散去之後、鐵門一打開的景象，當場 嘔吐不止，再也不敢去看第二眼。
http://file:///C:/Users/Windows/Downloads/Lost%20Vic tories%20(Erich%20Von%20Manstein)%20(z-lib.org).pdf
https://www.google.ca/search?q=%E5%A4%B1%E5%8E%BB%E7%9A%84%E8%83%9C%E5%88%A9+%E4%B8%8B%E8%BD%BD&hl=en&sxsrf=ALiCzsbbfEqp27yD3dWdXUksojnEiF_bgg%3A1662513884812&ei=3PIXY_eYMb-eptQPpPWlwAI&oq=%E5%A4%B1%E5%8E%BB%E7%9A%84%E8%83%9C%E5%88%A9&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAEYAzIFCC4QgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDIECAAQHjIECAAQHjIGCAAQHhAPMgQIABAeMgQIABAeMgQIABAeMggIABAeEA8QB0oECEEYAEoECEYYAFAAWABgrDFoAHAAeACAAXGIAXGSAQMwLjGYAQCgAQHAAQE&sclient=gws-wiz
|
