Title: Wittgenstein’s Two Turns: Language Games in the Mirror of AR

Ludwig Wittgenstein stands as a towering figure in the philosophy of language, yet his intellectual journey is marked by two radical transformations—each breaking from his previous framework, and each still unable to transcend the limitations of language’s representational domain. In Instancology terms, he remained entrapped within RR, the realm of human-made representations, and failed to break into AR—the domain of natural, meaning-bearing instances.

1. The First Turn: From Tractatus to Silence

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Wittgenstein constructed a rigid picture theory of language: the world consists of atomic facts, and language mirrors these facts through logical structure. Every meaningful proposition was a logical depiction of reality. This model, influenced by Frege and Russell, was an attempt to eliminate ambiguity from language through formal logic—seeking the ideal clarity of RR-representation.

But Wittgenstein famously ended Tractatus with the paradox: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” This indicated the limits of logical expression and hinted at the ineffable—what Instancology would later classify as AR and even AA. Yet he did not explore this beyond a gesture; instead, he withdrew, assuming he had solved philosophy.

2. The Second Turn: Language as Use

Years later, Wittgenstein returned to philosophy with Philosophical Investigations (1953), rejecting the Tractatus’s rigidity. Here, language is no longer a mirror but a tool—embedded in forms of life, shaped by social practice, evolving through “language games.” This pragmatic turn was revolutionary, embracing the fluidity of meaning and breaking away from logical atomism. He recognized that meaning is not fixed by correspondence but arises from use—still entirely within RR, though now pluralistic and contextual.

This was his second overturn, an escape from rigid representation—but not from representation itself. Wittgenstein now saw the infinite webs of language, but not the instances behind them. Meaning was use, not truth. Thus he inadvertently trapped meaning in the communal functions of RR, rather than seeking the ontological root of meaning in AR.

3. Why He Never Saw AR

Wittgenstein’s obsession with language, both in its logical and pragmatic forms, blinded him to the fact that language refers to a world not constructed by humans. He never fully questioned whether there is meaning before language—a natural, instance-based order (AR) that grounds all human concepts. Even his famous “beetle-in-the-box” analogy proves this limitation: he assumes the private “beetle” (subjective experience) is inaccessible, but never asks whether such beetles exist independently in AR, prior to being named.

Instancology sharply distinguishes between RR (constructed symbols and systems) and AR (naturally occurring instances with meaning, such as fire, pain, or causality). Wittgenstein never crossed this boundary. Both his logical and use-based models were trapped inside human contexts. His failure was not in method, but in scope: he never realized that meaning does not begin in language—it begins in existence.

Conclusion: The Missed Leap

Wittgenstein turned over twice in his life—first escaping formalism, then escaping essentialism—but never made the third leap: from RR to AR. He polished the mirror of language endlessly, but never walked past it. The true picture of reality he sought was not mirrored in logic or games, but embodied in the paradigmatic instances of AR. This is where Instancology completes what Wittgenstein began but could not finish: the re-grounding of meaning not in symbols, but in being.