墨西哥餐馆的赚钱秘密 如果你有经营餐馆的冲动,或者,对于在股市发财有渴望,那么,这里的数据和分析,可能会对你有帮助。 这家餐馆是目前在华尔街还被看好的投资对象,虽然股价已经从最高峰下跌不少。 下面的文章告诉了你一些关于这家餐馆的比较关键的经营数据。 它过去开的餐馆的位置,主要以比较繁忙的一类商业地段为主,也就是我们时常喜欢光顾的比较繁忙的大型购物中心附近的地段。那里的顾客流量比较大,可以做的生意也比较多一些,当然,代价就是对店面的需求大和伴随的租金比较贵一些。 多做生意多付钱,也是公平和正常的。 在这“一类商业”地段开了之后,就是向二类商业地段的进军,也就是我们去的更为频繁的住家附近的商业点,通常称为Plaza的那些地方。那些商业点的服务对象,主要是住在附近的居民,远道而来的消费者会比较少。这样地段的消费顾客流量会少很多,所以,租金也会便宜很多。 现在的Chipotle就是打算在这样的二类商业地段大量开店。 二类地段的选择余地会大很多。毕竟,在很多城市,一类的地段已经越来越少了。在我生活的地方,很多昔日繁忙的商业区,已经关闭或者是开始败落和关闭,新兴的替代者屈指可数,数量上也变少了。是不是中国廉价商品惹的祸?我就不知道了。今天的商业布局格式,好像和二十来年之前的,有很大的不同。我估计,互联网的发达,可能也是原因之一,虚拟世界抢了实体世界的市场。 这家餐馆的建造成本,昔日在一类地段的,大约在八十万美元出头点。我估计,这么高的造价的原因,一则是面积大点,再则,是因为在购物中心,你得雇佣工会的人来装修,造价会高很多。 移到二类地段之后,下面的文章说,装修的造价在六十五万美元,面积大约在2400平方尺左右。可能是因为厨房设备比较贵,这样的预算还是偏高,除非加上了开始时的促销费开支。昔日的大店平均接近2600平方尺。 一家店每年平均有二十五万以上的顾客,平均每天,每家店有接近700位顾客光顾。我看了几家店,好像没有这么忙?!是不是我的观察有问题? 每位顾客每次的平均消费量大约在十五美元,这个数字好像也偏高,除非文章计算的是每一次所付账单的“单个单位”,而不是单个的个人消费。这样算下来,平均一家餐馆一年,就是三百七十万美元的销售额了。还是颇为惊人的数据的。按照这样的数据,即使你拥有一家这样的餐馆,你的日子也会过的不错。 注意到,人家达到这样的数字,还不是像中餐馆那样,靠低价促销获得的。她是在赚取实实在在的利润呢! 公司目前的总市值是九十三亿美元,股价按照294美元计算。 公司的市值大概是公司销售额的3.5倍,盈利的34倍,现金流的25倍。 这样算下来,平均而言,每家店的市值大概在一千三百万美元!(大家可以合计一下,看看我的计算是不是对?!)一家店的平均净利润率,大概在10%多一点。每年算上折旧和税,EDITA的毛利超过20%,有七十五万美元的样子!一年就基本上收回了自己的投资。真的很恐怖! 想起来还真的非常可怕:一家六七十万美元投资的餐馆,每年有大约七十五万的毛利,以一千三百万美元的价格卖给你我这样的“呆在华尔街”的投资者,你没有风险才怪呢?! 那么,是不是有更为安全的稳妥投资渠道呢? 我看,除非你自己开餐馆,将自己开的,再以这样的价位卖给投资者,或者做其它的生意,搞类似的买卖,否则,你辛辛苦苦打工赚钱,最终节省的几个铜板,很可能就被华尔街这样的“忽悠”给搞没了。而且,你除了被人“忽悠”之外,好像也没有太多的选择,即使是在美国。 注意到,我在这里,不是在说你不该投资这家餐馆经营店,而是说,股市就是这样的道道。至于投资,我倒是觉得,这家店还是有不错的投资价值:如果你有兴趣通过华尔街来投资餐馆经营业的话。 这家店,还在大力进军亚裔餐馆经营领域,也就是自己开亚洲餐馆来赚钱,再高价卖给华尔街的“傻瓜”们。 看来,那为数众多的中国餐馆的业主,辛辛苦苦最终赚的也只能是小钱。一万个业主经营的餐馆,很可能还不如人家十个像Chipotle这样的模式打点的业主,更为轻松经营所获得的利润高。 这和中国企业在国际上的困境非常类似:中国的手机销售量占据90%的国际市场份额,可是,获得的利润只有1%! 为什么,在美国的中国人也活的这样辛苦? 是不是我们的活法有问题?如果真的有问题,而我们有继续鼓励我们的下一代按照我们的活法和套路继续复制,我们是不是搞错了? 这样的问题,是大家该好好想想的了。 至少,你不能老是埋怨说国内的企业家通过股市圈钱来“折腾”投资者,实际上,在美国,人们也是一样的在折腾这里的投资者。这个现实不太可能被改变,你能够做的,就只能是适应和调整自己了。 链接:美国消费者最喜欢的高端汽车 转载:Chipotle Looks Beyond Busy Urban Cities As It Expands Across America 8:53 AM ET 12/24/12 | TREFIS As Chipotle Mexican Grill (NYSE:CMG) expands to more places, the restaurant chain is increasingly looking beyond metropolitan cities to open its next set of restaurants. Keeping this in mind, the company decided to open A Modelrestaurants from 2010 onward.Close to 25% of the new additions in the same year were A Model type restaurants. In 2011, the figure jumped to 30% and it is expected to remain the same in 2012. A Model restaurants are opened in secondary trade areas where the average cost of opening a new restaurant as well as the occupancy costs are lower. At the same time, you can expect average revenue for an A Model store to be lower than that for a traditional restaurant.Overall, the company feels the demographics of the area are good enough to open the restaurant such that profit and return on investment are maintained. How Much Does It Cost To Open ? In 2010, the average cost of opening a restaurant declined to $795,000 from $850,000 in the previous year. Since one-fourth of these new additions were A Model type of restaurants, the average cost of opening such a restaurant was $630,000. That price might have jumped due to a partial recovery in the housing and rental market. Still, for 2012, the figure shouldn’t exceed $650,000 which is 25% lower than opening a traditional Chipotle restaurant. Success of this type ofrestaurant is also critical in the long run since all of the restaurants are company-operated (i.e. none of them is franchised). Thus, the entire cost of opening a new restaurant falls on the company. And since neither international expansion nor the accelerated openings of its Asian cuisine venture, ShopHouse Kitchen, can be ruled out in the future, optimizing capital expenditure will be a key aspect in generating the required cash flows. Smaller Restaurants The trend seems to be that the new restaurants are smaller in size.The average restaurant size seems to have declined from 2,590 square feet in 2010 to 2,565 in 2011. Therefore, the average size of the new additions in 2011 was 2,380 square feet, or about 8% smaller than the size of the existing restaurants. Chipotle doesn’t reveal too much information about the A Model restaurants specifically but based on the information given out on average revenue per store and comparable sales, we estimate average revenue generated for an A Model restaurant should be about 15% lower than that for a traditional restaurant. Also, as mentioned earlier, the new additions are generally smaller in size so the lower revenue per store is not unexpected. Moreover, customer traffic and purchasing power are generally lower in secondary trade areas which again contributes to lower revenue per store.But, given its relatively lower capital requirements and occupancy costs, A Model restaurant still seems to be an attractive proposition. The company has entered a stage where it can leverage its brand name as well as supply chain to open a large number of smaller restaurants at places where it feels the dynamics of profitability are right. However, pricing could be an impediment in the expansion process. Chipotle generally has higher menu prices compared to other fast food chains. The restaurant chain is already feeling the heat from Taco Bell, which has rolled out a similar menu at much lower prices.And you would generally expect the customers in secondary trade areas to be more price sensitive than their big city counterparts. We have a price estimate of $313 for Chipotle Mexican Grill, which is about 15% higher than the current market price. 转载:Share Buybacks: One Company That Should And Another That Should Not Alexander J. Poulos, December 28, 2012 The thesis of this article is two examine the validity of the buyback policies of two different companies. The companies that I will focus on are Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG) and General Dynamics (GD). Both companies are in different fields and are in different phases of their growth. The article will contrast the plans of both and offer my view on both plans. Chipotle Mexican Grill 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Revenue in millions | 627.7 | 822.9 | 1,085.8 | 1,332 | 1,518.4 | 1,835.9 | 2,269.5 | earnings per share | 1.43 | 1.28 | 2.13 | 2.36 | 3.95 | 5.64 | 6.76 | Shares outstanding in millions | 32.54 | 32.54 | 32.98 | 32.88 | 33.47 | 33.96 | 34.36 | CMG is a quick service restaurant operator with 1,350 locations in the US. The company a is young, growing enterprise as it has financial data available since 2004. As we can see from the table above the company is in its rapid growth phase as revenues have gone up roughly fourfold since 2004. Earnings have risen more than fourfold demonstrating the sustained profitability of the company. CMG was able to post these results in spite of what can be best described as less than optimal economic conditions. This augurs well for future growth as any type of economic expansion should strengthen the bottom line further. On the most recent conference call the CFO John R. Hartung stated the following concerning share buybacks: "And over the past 4 years, we repurchased a total of $388 million of Chipotle stock in an overall average share price of $117. As we're nearing the end of our $100 million repurchase, our Board of Directors recently approved investment of an additional $100 million into Chipotle stock." The company has been fortunate to repurchase shares at a very advantageous price as compared to the current stock quote. Going forward, I believe the company would be best served spending the money to expand into international markets. The company currently operates 5 locations in London, 4 in Toronto, 1 in Paris and will be opening a location in Vancouver, British Columbia and in Germany. From my perspective, I would like to see the company accelerate the overseas expansion a bit. Share buybacks are a tool best left for older mature companies that have fewer ways to grow revenue. That is certainly not the case here for CMG. I am content to wait and watch CMG here for a possible entry at some point next year. I believe that the company has an outstanding future ahead of it and I will wait for an opportune time to enter into a long-termposition. Consumer spending has been weak especially during last summer. I wouldn't be surprised if the restaurant industry as a whole experience earnings issues (rising commodity prices, weaker consumer spending) and trade lower offering an attractive entry point. CMG traded in a range of 233 to 442 in 2012 so patience and buying in at an opportune time can have an outsized impact on total return. The second company that I would like to examine is General Dynamics. GD is primarily a defense company with a commercial aviation division. To say the least the company's future prospects are uncertain primarily due to the fiscal cliff negotiations currently being conducted by Congress. I had written about GD previously here, after noticing that it was a recent Warren Buffett holding. GD has been an outstanding creator of shareholder value. From 2002 through 2012 the company has increased dividends from 60 cents a share to $2.00 per share while the shares have risen from an adjusted $32 a share to a current quote of roughly $69 per share. What caught my attention is during the most recent conference call management stated that they have suspended the share buyback program due to fiscal cliff uncertainties. The uncertainty is where the opportunity presents itself. GD suffered a similar fate in 1990 when due to the fall of the USSR defense spending was cut back significantly. In 1990 GD had revenue of 10 billion and watched it fall to roughly 3.5 billion in 1993. However in that time frame the stock went up 5 fold due to shuttering of business and a significant share buyback. For more detailed info please click here. Warren Buffett himself invested in the company in 1992 to take advantage of the Dutch auction that GD employed to reduce share float. Upon reading the financials and noticing the stellar job the CEO was doing he decided to hold and received a tremendous gain for a short period of time. (Info also provided by The Warren Buffet Way by Robert Hagstrom Jr.). As currently constructed, GD has 3.9 billion in debt which they can easily afford. It would be advantageous for the company to enter into the corporate bond market and raise capital similar to what INTC did. An aggressive share repurchase would provide a significant boost to shareholders especially for a company trading at less than 10 times earnings. In conclusion, the article examines two distinct companies at different phases of their life cycle. In my opinion each should be engaging in the opposite behavior to benefit shareholders. I would be an active buyer of CMG on any significant pullback and of GD after the fallout of the fiscal cliff has been determined. Thank you for reading and I look forward to your comments. 链接:美国消费者最喜欢的高端汽车 |