商業思考：亞馬遜在忽悠投資者？
若干年前，我去中國尋找投資機會，和一位在國內做實業頗為“成功”的朋友聊國內的機會。他的成功體現在他的營銷成長數據上：從第一年的30萬人民幣，到第二年的100萬，第三年的300萬，第四年的1000萬，和三年之後輕輕鬆鬆的突破一億人民幣。伴隨這個的，是他口中還不錯的毛利潤率：大約在10%！
我當時是驚訝不已。國內的機會真的是讓人驚訝：如此快的成長和“利潤”，在美國是難以想象的。而且，這位仁兄口中的自信更是讓我佩服的五體投地：只要是有市場，我什麼都可以造：汽車、飛機當然不在話下！（這句話很技巧！市場是因為你能夠造就有的？還是因為有了你就能夠造，那你又怎麼樣“能夠”呢？）
我當時問：如此快的成長速度，公司三年之內上市應該是肯定的事情：十個億的銷售額和一個億的利潤，那可就是至少五十億的市值了！為此，引入策略投資者，讓對方也大賺一筆，也是值得的。可惜，這一切都沒有發生，這也是我當時無法想象的。中國人玩資本市場玩倒投資者，可是世界第一的。
隨後不久，一位當地的地方政府官員告訴我這些數字背後的實情：原來，他們說到底，充其量就是一個最終組裝車間外加貿易公司！一切的都來自外包。一切來自外包的數字最終都成為自己銷售額的一分子。
即使是這樣，做過生意的人都會知道，靠10%的毛利折騰，公司是不可能盈利的，至少是在美國和對於美國的多數公司。美國零售業的毛利（進貨成本與銷售價格之間的差價，沃爾瑪和好事多的“毛利率”，估計和國內人說的不是一個概念）很多都在50%以上，不少的在75%。這也是為什麼。即使是50%的對摺，他們也能夠生存的原因所在。我自己曾經做過零售，20-25%的毛利，根本上就無法生存。一美元店每個美元商品的進貨成本，估計也就是一半的樣子。
國內的公司這麼折騰還能夠繼續生存下去，一方面是靠從外貿補貼中套利，再則，也是最重要的，就是籍此來從地產上套利——有了公司，你才能買地做公司，你才有靠地產升值大賺的前提。現在看來，結果就是這樣！
在這兩者不存在之後，大批曾經輝煌公司的敗落和破產，就是順理成章的事情了。
想不到，在美國的亞馬遜，好像也在走和中國公司類似的經營之道，而且還很成功：至少，這種成功是在股價的持續上升上體現了出來。
下面的中文是篇來自《萬維網》的文章，說出了部分實情。亞馬遜目前的經營邏輯，頗有點當年微軟的式樣：什麼都做，只要是他人證明成功的模式和產品。
也就是說，亞馬遜就是一個超級“山寨”公司，靠價廉和銷售渠道的暢通取勝。而且，它的所謂快速成長的銷售業績，很可能有很大的水分：這也是為什麼，這些銷售業績沒有向你顯示足夠高的盈利水準的原因。
亞馬遜的優勢，很快就會短命終結。銷售稅的免除不可能持續永遠！免運費的成本支出，它也難扛很久。
再者，至少對於我，在亞馬遜的購買慾望，已經越來越多的被好事多所取代。我的購買量和普通的消費者比不算小！有時候是因為就近更便宜，更多的時候是，就近更能夠確保質量和方便，雖然成本付出上可能會稍微高一點，即使是在支付了8%的銷售稅之後。想想看，在沒有這個8%的獨特優勢之後的亞馬遜，還有多少價格優勢？
這也是為什麼，亞馬遜現在猴急，趁着大家還相信他的故事的時候，大量向其它的領域擴張。在這點上，它頗有自知之明。只是，即使這樣做，在只賣吆喝不賺錢的現實面前，它最終到底能夠走多遠？
蘋果公司靠打造一個獨特的生態體系獲得了巨大的成功，成功背後是獨特的創新能力；亞馬遜也在盡力打造一個“獨特”的“生態帝國”，雖然背後的基石是“山寨文化”。但是，即使如此，對於公司的經營者特別是擁有巨多股權的管理者，已經是實實在在的獲得了巨大的成功：股價的一再高升，是他們唯一需要在乎的。目的已經達到，最終的帝國是不是真的能夠像人們和自己吹噓的那樣獲利巨大，誰在乎呢？投資者因此而遭受巨大的經濟損失，值得同情嗎？好像答案，對於公司的經營者，是否定的。
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今年諾獎得主的代表作《逃離》全文
亞馬遜賠本賺吆喝能堅持多久？
2013-10-24 21:36:22 紐約時報
舊金山——幾乎每一天，亞馬遜(Amazon)都會宣布一項新的投資。
它剛剛收購了一家在線教育公司，還推出了一個面向網絡零售商、與貝寶(PayPal)相競爭的支付系統。它首次在紐約開賣葡萄酒，更新了平板電腦產品線，新批准了三部試播版喜劇節目的製作，並啟動了亞馬遜時裝部的設計比賽。此外，為了加快配送速度，它正在寶潔(Procter＆Gamble)等供貨商內部建立迷你倉庫。
但它本月要宣布的事情中，並沒有獲得可觀利潤這一項。
誰在乎呢？亞馬遜2012年處於虧損狀態，而且分析人士預計，該公司周四發布第三季度的業績時，虧損的消息將再次傳出。但其股價目前卻創下歷史新高。
與2010年中期相比，亞馬遜股價上漲了150%左右。或許並非巧合的是，從那時起，該公司就沒再實現過大規模盈利。換句話說，只有當淨收入開始下滑時，投資者才真正得出結論：他們喜歡這家公司。
“本不該發生這樣的事。”經濟學家及風險投資人威廉·H·詹韋(William H. Janeway)說，“它與主流金融理論相悖。如果不存在系統性泡沫，很少有公司會被這樣估值。”
亞馬遜今年的銷售收入可望達到750億美元（約合4560億元人民幣）。儘管沒有誰宣稱亞馬遜完全是一個泡沫，但是投資者正在越來越激烈地爭論，亞馬遜的淨利潤什麼時候才能達到投資者要求同等收入水平的其他企業實現的水平。
該公司拒絕就此發表評論。
一些分析人士指出，相對於亞馬遜創始人和首席執行官傑夫·貝佐斯(Jeff Bezos)的目標市場，那些銷售收入根本不值一提。詹韋說，“市場實際上是無限的，包括全球消費品市場，或許還有B2B商務市場。”詹韋著有《創新經濟中的資本主義經營》(Doing Capitalism in the Innovation
Economy)。
如果把爭奪市場當作目標，現在就要賺錢的想法一定會妨礙這個目標。正如倫敦的分析師本尼迪克特·埃文斯(Benedict Evans)所言：“貝佐斯已經做出的選擇是，讓亞馬遜在20年後成為世界上最大、實力最強、最成功的零售商。如果想讓它現在就盈利的話，傻瓜都辦得到。”
另外一些人則認為，一朝是廉價零售商，就永遠是廉價零售商。亞馬遜正在大舉涉足多種商業形態和多種形式的技術，但在本質上，它是一家廉價銷售日用貨品的公司，購買自亞馬遜的書或者尿布，與來自其他任何零售商的並無不同。而且亞馬遜運費低廉，客戶服務的口碑也很好。
不過，要獲得可觀的利潤，就必須對上述可變因素進行部分或全部的調整，這樣做可能造成顧客的流失，並讓原本極快的收入增長出現放緩。而這反過來又會導致投資者要求公司更快地實現盈利。
最好別冒險走那條路，BGC Partners科技產業高級分析師科林·吉利斯(Colin Gillis)表示。他說，“比起賣出東西並且賺錢，賣出東西但不賺錢要容易一些。”
按照這種觀點，亞馬遜旋風一般的舉動，只是對其零售業主體的有益補充而已。根據預期亞馬遜可能很快就會推出一款機頂盒，從而更直接地與Netflix展開競爭，與此同時，亞馬遜推出智能手機的傳言也不會消失。
一種設想是，亞馬遜可以改變自己的商業模式，從出售他人產品賺取微薄利潤，變為出售他人商品賺取高額利潤，但這種設想“是靠不住的”，Asymco公司的分析師賀拉斯·德迪歐(Horace Dediu)寫道。
他還說，企業根本不會那麼容易地改變商業模式，比如微軟儘管既有錢又有智慧，但仍然無法轉向，脫離基於PC的戰略，抓住移動計算的趨勢。
當前關於亞馬遜的討論，會讓人回想起1999年上一次系統性泡沫發生時關於這家公司的辯論。當時和現在一樣，企業的目標就是快速壯大，在其他人趕上之前，儘快搶占新市場。
但是崩盤發生時，所有“潛力無限”的談論都消失了，人們開始嚴格地關注盈利，而亞馬遜經常形容盈利就近在眼前。
2001年，貝佐斯說亞馬遜會“嚴格地管理所銷售的產品，確保只銷售有利潤的產品。30磅一盒的釘子，已經不再適合我們的世界了”。這番話安撫了投資者，公司也生存了下來。
不過那是當時。現在，顧客又能從亞馬遜上買到4000枚一盒的釘子了，配送重量38磅（約合17公斤），而且還能免費送貨上門。但是這家零售商已經遠遠不再滿足於這種平平無奇的優惠了，“雷鳥牌餅乾製做機”(Thunderbird Cookie
Dropping Machine)，售價32329美元，重量1260磅，可是亞馬遜還是會免費幫你配送。（現在已經沒貨了。）
位於芝加哥的第三方銷售商，商用食品服務設備公司(Commercial Food
Services Equipment)在亞馬遜上出售一台雷鳥機器，不過會收取2600美元運費。
“亞馬遜賣出的餅乾機要比我賣出的多很多。但即使你從我這裡買，而不是從亞馬遜買，亞馬遜仍然能從銷售額和運費中抽取提成，”這家設備公司的老闆李孝（Hyo Lee，音譯）說。“現在你知道為什麼亞馬遜的銷售額從2010年的340億美元，提高到2012年的610億美元了吧？”
不過，她也提到亞馬遜正在美國各地修建數十座倉庫，也正在僱傭數萬人來為這些倉庫服務。“現在亞馬遜有了這麼多固定成本，”她說。“我覺得他們必須得開始收更多運費了。”
其他人也同意，沒有什麼東西能一直向上發展。
弗雷斯特研究公司(Forrester Research)的CEO喬治·科隆尼(George Colony)說，“總有一天需要付出代價的。”
怎麼支付呢？“提價，我看不到其他任何辦法。”
TellApart公司是一家幫助零售商管理數據的初創企業。該公司CEO喬希·麥克法蘭(Josh McFarland)從亞馬遜上買了一雙20美元的人字拖，之後麥克法蘭又從別的地方找到了一雙更喜歡的人字拖，打算退掉從亞馬遜買的那雙。可是亞馬遜卻告訴他不用麻煩，會直接給他退款。
沒有多少零售商以為自己有實力做出這麼慷慨的舉動，可是亞馬遜的其他購物者最近也說遇到了相同的經歷。這是一個瞄準長遠的策略，可是消費者明年還會記得你今天為他們做過什麼嗎？
“亞馬遜想做的是提高我對零售商的期待，從而最終讓我什麼東西都從亞馬遜買，”麥克法蘭說。“總會有一天，其他競爭者都消失了，到時候我也不會知道價格是不是提高了，因為已經沒有比較對象了。”
DAVID STREITFELD2013年10月25日。翻譯：李瓊、王童鶴
I Concede Defeat
In Amazon.com
Oct 25 2013, 08:40
When
I started writing about Amazon.com (AMZN), I had a divergent view from the market. It was late October
2011, and the consensus was that the earnings weakness was temporary due to an
"investment phase". My own view was that the earnings weakness was
structural, driven by several unfavorable trends working against Amazon.com,
from the changing mix of sales, to the migration to digital OS-integrated
stores, to the need to collect sales taxes. My own view was that earnings would
get worse and the "investment thesis" was basically false. My own
view was that Amazon.com would soon post earnings losses, instead of showing
strongly growing earnings as expected.
And back then, I thought earnings mattered.
Thus, with the stock already trading at 169 times 2011 estimates at the time
($1.28 per share), I thought that if I was right regarding what was going to
happen to earnings, I'd be right regarding the stock.
I was wrong.
I
was not wrong regarding the earnings, though. Amazon.com went on to post a
quarterly loss (in Q3 2012). It even went on to post a yearly loss for the
whole of 2012. And even more brutal, this is what happened to 2014 estimates
over the last 3 years (Source:bwolf, Twitter stream. This is non-GAAP, so it includes
compensation paid in stock)
In a way, Amazon.com did worse in the
earnings front than even I could have ever imagined. I didn't expect it to post
a yearly loss, and it did. Time and time again, Amazon.com failed to deliver
the expected earnings and estimates were drawn lower and lower quarter after
quarter. At some point, each passing quarter meant estimates for the next
quarter got cut 80% or more. And it was not just short-term earnings estimates
that were being cut, as we can see above with the 2014 non-GAAP estimates.
And yet, I was wrong.
The stock proceeded to march ever higher on
ever lower earnings estimates. The stories started being more and more
otherworldly, with analysts even pulling targets from 2019 earnings multiplied
by 50, when they couldn't get next quarter's earnings right 3 months ahead.
But I was the loser in all of this.
Let there be no doubt, I was the loser. I
would have been better served by complete ignorance of Amazon.com's
fundamentals. I would have been better served by not knowing that investments
are capitalized and depreciated over time - because time and time again we see
analysts, commenters, authors, pulling the "earnings are not there because
they are being reinvested" meme.
I would have been better served by not
understanding Amazon.com's business, not seeing the flaws and structural
problems. Not seeing shipping costs shooting up even with the expanded
distribution network. Not seeing how 3P and AWS are not really 100% gross
margin businesses, like Amazon.com accounts them for, and how that inflates
gross margin as a percent of sales.
I simply knew too much, where ignorance would
have been bliss.
I knew too much, because if I was going to
go back to October 2011 with the knowledge I have today of what happened to
Amazon.com except for the share price, I'd have done it all again. And I would
have lost, again, just like I did.
Yes, I lost because I knew too much.
Perhaps this is simply what Bernanke wants
from the markets. To drive compliance into people's skulls, or have them lose
heavily no matter what happens. Thou Shalt Not Sell Short, no matter what. I
had partially learned my lesson, in that I no longer sold short and held
anything except Amazon.com. But it was not enough, the point had to be driven
home.
And it was, I lost. No matter what.
Regarding this latest quarter
A quick comment regarding Q3 2013:
·
Earnings met expectations due to an income tax benefit; they'd
be somewhat lower without it;
·
Amazon.com is again seeing CSOI margins dropping, unexpectedly;
·
Amazon.com's revenues were probably helped by the ebook
accounting change, driving revenues from 3P to 1P. Amazon.com won't
say how much this effect was, I'd estimate it at around 3.9% of revenues ($666
million);
·
Gross margin dropped from 28.62% (Q2 2013) to 27.65% (Q3 2013),
an effect that was expected if the accounting change helped revenues. This drop
is consistent with around $666 million in additional revenues from the
accounting change;
·
Gross shipping costs continued up;
·
Net shipping costs also increased marginally, which is
surprising.
All in all, a quarter that was like many
which preceded it. Not becoming of a $170 billion market capitalization
company, but it all doesn't matter.
Regarding
the accounting change, the analyst from JPMorgan, Douglas Anmuth, did ask
Amazon.com in the earnings conference call about the impact. This was the
question and answer:
Douglas
Anmuth - JPMorgan
Great, thanks for taking the question. Just
want to ask two things. First, Tom, can you give us some color on where you are
in the shift from third-party to first-party e-books and how much of the factor
that's been in reaccelerating media revenue, you have seen reacceleration in
media in the last three quarters, I think in North America? And then secondly,
it looks like there is six fewer shopping days this holiday season between
Black Friday and Christmas, just curious what you do with anything differently to
prepare for that and do you think that could actually even drive more holiday
shopping online? Thanks.
Tom
Szkutak
Sure. In terms of your second one, second
question, there are fewer days. There is not a lot that we do different. We
certainly see when that happens. And there is some behavioral differences on
behalf of customers just because of the shorter time period that we have
certainly some more sizable days during that period, but there is not a lot to
add to that. In terms of the transition for e-books, in terms of our total
growth across Amazon both North America total, our global total, it's not a
significant or meaningful impact to the overall growth rates and certainly this
transition has been going on for you know some number of quarters now so it's
not a lot I can help you with there.
Amazon.com brushed it off as "not a
significant and meaningful impact". But we need to understand what's
significant for Amazon.com. Amazon.com once brushed off an inquiry from the SEC
regarding Kindle sales as not being material. Amazon.com seems to have taken an
accounting threshold to it - as long as it's less than 10% of revenues, it's
not material. Here, I'd estimate the impact from the accounting change to have
been 3.9% of sales, or $666 million. The difference between a revenue beat and
a miss. Not material. Even though Amazon.com breaks off things like the
currency impact well below that threshold.
Anyway, it doesn't matter.
I lost, I concede defeat.
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