Economy and Society by Max Weber

Max Weber is generally regarded as one of the founders of sociology. But his academic appointment was an economics professor. His goal was to make economic theory more consistent with reality.   

The following are some quotes from his book.

That the orientation to the naked self--interest of oneself and to that of others creates effects entirely similar in character to those sought (often vainly) in the forcible imposition of uniform conditions. This phenomenon is well known in the economic domain and was a principal source for the development of political economy as a science. (p 108)

The strength of (mere) custom derives for the most part from the fact that he who fails to orient his action to custom acts “inappropriately” and has to put up with greater or lesser humiliation and mortification so long as the action of the majority of those around him presume the continued existence of the custom and is so oriented.

Likewise, the strength of given interests derives from the fact that he who fails to orient his action to others’ interests—does not “count on” them— provokes their opposition, or succeeds in a manner he had neither wanted nor foreseen and, consequently, risks damaging his own interests. (P 108)

We can observe that many communalisations and sociations alternate between expansion and closure. This is true of gilds, for example, and also of the democratic cities of ancient and medieval times, whose members alternately expanded and contracted their number, sometimes seeking as great a number as possible as a means of securing their Chancen through power, while at other times they sought to restrict such growth in the interest of their monopoly. (P 125)

The means and extent of regulation and external closure can be quite various, so that the transition from openness to regulation and closure is fluid. The most varied levels of condition for participation can be set: admission tests; probationary periods; the purchase of a share in the membership; election of new members by ballot, membership, or eligibility by birth (heritability), or by virtue of competitions open to anyone; or (where there is closure and the appropriation of rights) through the attainment of an appropriate right—membership conditions are graduated in a wide variety of ways. “Regulation” and outward “closure” are therefore relative concepts. An exclusive club, a theatre performance for which entry is by ticket, a widely advertised party rally, a church service open to all, the act of worship of a sect and a secret society—all sorts of transitions are conceivable. (P 125)

Inner closure—among the agents themselves and in their relationship to each other—can also assume the most various forms. For example, a caste, a gild, or even a stock exchange association can be closed externally while at the same time offering free competition among members for the allocation of all Chancen so monopolized, or it might strictly allocate to each member Chancen with respect to clients or business prospects for life, or on a heritable and alienable basis, as in India. Or an externally closed agricultural community (Markgenossenschaft) may allow its members either free use of its resources, or allocate them strictly to individual households, while a closed group of settlers might permit use of land in common, or assign specific holdings on a permanent basis. In all these cases, a wide variety of intermediate conditions can be found. Historically, closure of eligibility to fief, benefices, and offices within the group, and their assignment to those with right of enjoyment, has assumed a wide variety of forms, and can continue to do so. This is why the development of “works councils” could be, but does not have to be, the first step in a sequence where eligibility and the holding of positions in the workplace runs from the closed shop,44 on the one hand, to a right to a particular position on the other; a preliminary stage for this is prohibition of dismissal without the agreement of workers’ representatives. (P 126)