The Travelers Companies/旅行者们公司创立于1853年,2009年6月以来是构成Dow Jones Industrial Average/ㄉㄠ·ㄐㄛㄣㄗ/道琼产业平均指数的30家超大公司成员之一,按市场总价是全美最大的保险公司(今天为482.48亿美元)。 2023年9月21日,我收到Charles Schwab提供的旅行者公司的股份证明,立即用电邮、平信和certified/认证邮件的形式发出改进高管薪酬规划的股东提案。这是我第一次关注保险公司的企业治理问题,第一次向旅行者们公司提案。 Shareholder Proposal to Improve Executive Compensation Program 改进高管薪酬规划的股东提案 Resolved: shareholders recommend that The Travelers Companies, Inc. (our Company) improve the executive compensation program to include the CEO pay ratio factor./决议:股东们建议 The Travelers Companies, Inc.(我们公司)改进高管薪酬规划,将首席执行官薪酬比率因素纳入其中。 Supporting Statement/支持提案的声明 Our Company’s CEO pay ratio was 194:1 (or 181:1) for 2022 (2023 Proxy Statement p.114)./2022 年,我们公司的首席执行官薪酬比例为 194:1(或 181:1)(2023 年股东会议声明第 114 页)。 America’s ballooning executive compensation is not sustainable for the economy, and there is no rational methodology or program to decide the executive compensation, particularly because there is no consideration of the CEO pay ratio factor. The sharp disparity of income has a direct negative impact on America’s social instability. For example, an article from Politico.com 09/16/2023 "‘No defensible argument’: Anger boils over at CEO pay" stated: “The historic UAW strike puts an exclamation point on more than a decade of efforts ... to narrow the pay gap between top executives and workers. GM CEO Mary Barra’s $29 million pay package is 362 times what her company’s median employee makes. For Ford CEO Jim Farley, the ratio is 281 times. It’s 365:1 for Stellantis CEO Carlos Tavares and his average employee. Median CEO pay at the largest U.S. public companies hit $22.3 million last year, ... And between 1978 and 2021, executive compensation at large American companies increased by more than 1,400 percent.” /美国气球般上升的高管薪酬对于经济来说是不可持续的,而且没有合理的方法论或程序来决定高管薪酬,特别是因为没有考虑CEO薪酬比率因素。收入差距的悬殊对美国社会不稳定产生直接负面影响。例如,Politico.com 2023年9月16日发表的一篇文章《‘没有辩解的余地’:对CEO薪酬的愤怒沸腾》指出:“历史性的UAW罢工给十多年来…… 为缩小顶层高管与员工之间的薪酬差距的努力打上了感叹号。通用汽车首席执行官的2900万美元薪酬是该公司员工中位数收入的362倍。福特首席执行官的比例是281倍。Stellantis首席执行官的比例为365倍。去年,美国最大上市公司的首席执行官薪酬中位数达到2230万美元,……从1978年到2021年,美国大型公司的高管薪酬增长了1400%以上。 Shareholders in JPMorgan Chase & Co., Intel, Netflix and other big companies rejected sky-high executive pay packages in 2022 and 2023./摩根大通、英特尔、Netflix等大公司的股东们拒绝了2022年和2023年的天价高管薪酬方案。 As a policy recommendation, our Company may refer to Aristotle’s Politiká/Politics, in which he concluded that in a stable community (polis), the disparity of land ownership should not be more than 5 times. Human nature has not changed so dramatically. The CEO pay ratios of big Japanese and European companies are not so far away from Aristotle’s recommendation. /作为政策建议,我们的公司可参考ㄚㄌㄧㄙㄊㄡㄊㄜㄌㄜㄙ/亚里士多德的《政治学》,其中他的结论是,在一个稳定的ㄆㄛㄌㄧㄙ/共同体(城邦)中,土地所有权的差距不应超过5倍。人性并没有发生如此巨大的变化。日本和欧洲大公司的CEO薪酬比例与ㄚㄌㄧㄙㄊㄡㄊㄜㄌㄜㄙ的建议相差不远。 认证邮件的记录显示我的提案几天后已经寄到,但我几个月都没有收到旅行者们公司的任何反应。我问老朋友Chevedden/ㄒㄝㄨㄝㄉㄣ怎么办,他建议我再用正式的认证邮件向旅行者们公司查询。我正要没有发出之际,2024年1月12日收到了旅行者们公司Vice President, Corporate Secretary and Group General Counsel/副总裁、公司秘书长兼集团总律师WCS女士的电邮,确认收到了我的提案并就我的提案安排视频/电话会议。我立即回复,同意举行会谈。 今天,我与旅行者们公司的四位官员举行视频会议。我介绍自己的中国、日本、美国经历,以及20多年来帮助美国的高科技、金融、制药行业公司企业治理的经验教训。她们(发言的是WCS和另一位女性)的论点是:“旅行者们公司的高层报酬在企业同行评比中不算高”、“高薪是为了吸引优秀管理人才”,并问我为什么把社会公共利益置于公司业绩之前? 我已经很熟悉大公司法务部门的这些惯行思维和老生常谈,就耐心地解说到:第一、所谓“企业同行评比”的方法论是flawed/有缺欠的,大公司出钱雇佣评比报酬的小firm/公司,只会向大公司提供大公司高管们想听的建议,任意挑出一些高薪高管的公司,把高管报酬望高处攀比。这种做法也是错误的。我问她们知道旅行者们公司10年前、20年前的薪酬比率吗?她们回答说不知道。我进而指出:30-40年前美国的黄金时代社会安定,其中一个重要原因是高层薪酬比率不到现在的1/10。第二、美国的高层报酬和报酬比率是日本英国欧洲大公司高层报酬和报酬比率的10倍以上,降低他们的报酬也不会把他们赶到日本英国欧洲(或者中国、加拿大)去。我进而说,我比你们对美国的高管们更有信心和信任,他们不至于那么贪婪、短视而导致整个社会越来越动荡不安。而且,德国等欧洲大公司的董事会还必须有员工代表,那里的高管们没有美国高官们那样自由放任。第三、社会公共利益与公司的长期业绩是符合的,提供社会公共利益的公司,长期业绩一定会持续发展下去。她们问我CEO报酬比率多少合适?我说我不是公司董事,不能干涉公司的微观业务管理(因为这是公司排除股东提案的常见理由),但是,既然人性两千年来变化并不大,从ㄚㄌㄧㄙㄊㄡㄊㄜㄌㄜㄙ的建议(最富于最穷的差距是5倍)、日本欧洲等国际视野(CEO报酬与中位员工报酬比率是10倍左右),美国的CEO报酬与中位员工报酬比率在20倍左右比较合适,而旅行者们公司的比率是194。 她们还问我为什么关注CEO报酬比率而不是其他议题。我回答说自己的股份太少,没有资源同时关注其他议题,如董事会成员的资格多元化和民主选举(候选人数多于董事席位),而CEO报酬比率是目前美国企业治理的最大、最难问题。我进一步举出Intel和Microsoft公司部分接受我的建议改善了企业治理、所以我主动撤销了提案的经验,说明提案付诸表决不是我的目的,我的目的是改善企业治理,我愿意义务(免费)运用我的社会学方法论专长和国际经验帮助旅行者们公司设立较为科学合理的高层报酬模式,但她们没有表示进一步学习Intel和Microsoft公司接受我的帮助的意愿。 我初步判断是:旅行者们公司过了4个多月才与我会谈,既不想(哪怕是部分)接受我的提案,也来不及或者不可能向美国证券交易委员会SEC申请排除我的提案,可能会在今年的股东年会上付诸表决了。 [赵京,中日美比较政策研究所,2024年1月26日] 【后补】 3月1日,我外出旅行期间,收到WCS女士寄来董事会反对声明的电邮,值得翻译: The Board of Directors unanimously recommends that shareholders vote AGAINST this proposal for the following reasons.董事会一致建议股东们投票反对该提案,原因如下。 Although SEC rules require disclosure of the ratio of the annual total compensation of the Company’s CEO to the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the Company other than the CEO (referred to as the “CEO pay ratio”), the Board does not believe that the CEO pay ratio should be included as a factor in the Company’s compensation philosophy or objectives or guide its executive compensation decisions for the following reasons: 尽管SEC 规则要求披露公司CEO的年度总薪酬与除 CEO 之外公司的所有员工的年度总薪酬中位数的比率(简称“CEO 薪酬比率”),但董事会认为首席执行官薪酬比率不应作为公司薪酬理念或目标的一个因素,或指导其高管薪酬决策,原因如下: • Altering the Company’s executive compensation program is unwarranted, because: 改变公司高管薪酬计划是没有根据的,因为: • The Company’s longstanding executive compensation program is thoughtfully designed, reinforces the Company’s long-term perspective and is appropriately aligned with both Company and executive performance; and 公司长期的高管薪酬计划经过深思熟虑设计,强化了公司的长期愿景,并与公司和高管绩效适当保持一致;和 • As part of its longstanding and comprehensive shareholder engagement program, the Company regularly obtains shareholder feedback regarding executive compensation matters, incorporates such feedback into compensation-related decisions and, importantly, has not received requests from shareholders to add pay ratio as a factor in its executive compensation program. 作为其长期、全面的股东参与计划的一部分,公司定期获取股东关于高管薪酬问题方面的反馈,将此类反馈纳入与薪酬相关的决策中,重要的是,尚未收到股东将薪酬比率作为其考虑因素的要求高管薪酬计划。 • The CEO pay ratio is not an appropriate measure to use in executive compensation decisions because both of the underlying components comprising the CEO pay ratio – the compensation of the Company’s CEO and the compensation of the Company’s employees – are competitive and based on the market; in other words, the CEO pay ratio is simply the mathematical result of competitive and market-based decisions. 首席执行官薪酬比率不是用于高管薪酬决策的适当衡量标准,因为构成首席执行官薪酬比率的两个基本组成部分(公司首席执行官的薪酬和公司员工的薪酬)均具有竞争力且基于市场;换句话说,CEO的薪酬比率只是竞争和基于市场的决策的数学结果。 • Even assuming the CEO pay ratio were an appropriate factor to include in decisions related to executive compensation, the Company’s CEO pay ratio is in line with market practice. 即使假设首席执行官薪酬比率是纳入高管薪酬相关决策的适当因素,公司的首席执行官薪酬比率也符合市场惯例。 The Company’s Longstanding Executive Compensation Program Is Thoughtfully Designed and Appropriately Aligned with Both the Financial Performance of the Company and the Individual Performance of the Company’s Executives. 公司长期的高管薪酬计划经过深思熟虑的设计,制定得与公司的财务业绩和公司高管的个人业绩适当一致。 The Board’s Compensation Committee has thoughtfully designed an executive compensation program – the objectives and structure of which have been stable over time – that is aligned with the Company’s articulated financial strategy and is designed to reinforce a long-term perspective and align the interests of the Company’s executives with those of its shareholders. 董事会薪酬委员会精心设计了高管薪酬计划,其目标和结构随着时间的推移一直保持稳定,该计划与公司明确的财务战略相一致,旨在强化长期视角并与公司高管及其股东们的利益保持一致。 The “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” section of this Proxy Statement provides detailed information regarding the Company’s executive compensation program, its objectives, factors considered by the Compensation Committee and the link between pay and performance. Our executive compensation program has long been guided by a pay-for-performance philosophy. For example, for the 2023 performance year, more than 93% of our CEO’s compensation and approximately 87% of the compensation of our other named executive officers was performance-based. 本股东年会说明书的“薪酬讨论与分析”部分提供了有关公司高管薪酬计划、其目标、薪酬委员会考虑的因素以及薪酬与绩效之间联系的详细信息。我们的高管薪酬计划长期以来一直遵循按绩效付薪的理念。例如,在2023年业绩年度,我们首席执行官93%以上的薪酬和其他指定执行官约87 的薪酬都是基于绩效的。 When making compensation decisions, the Compensation Committee carefully considers the short- and long-term financial performance of the Company on both an absolute basis and relative to the Company’s peers and evaluates other factors discussed under the “2023 Overview” in the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” section of this Proxy Statement. The Committee also evaluates the contributions made by each of the Company’s named executive officers in achieving the results. 在做出薪酬决定时,在本股东说明书“2023年概览”中“薪酬讨论与分析”部分,薪酬委员会在绝对基础上和相对于公司同业的情况下仔细考虑公司的短期和长期财务业绩。委员会还评估公司每位指定执行官为实现业绩所做的贡献。 The “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” section of this Proxy Statement details the strong financial results of the Company in 2023, built upon the Company’s exceptional results for more than a decade, and demonstrates the correlation between executive compensation levels and the Company’s financial performance. Notably, the chart on page [X] illustrates the directional relationship for the past ten performance years between the total direct compensation of our CEO and the Company’s core return on equity. 本股东说明书的“薪酬讨论与分析”部分详细介绍了公司2023年以公司十多年来的卓越业绩为基础的强劲的财务业绩,并展示了高管薪酬水平与公司财务业绩之间的相关性。值得注意的是,第[X]页的图表说明了过去十年业绩年度我们首席执行官的直接薪酬总额与公司核心股本回报率之间的方向关系。 The Board believes that the Compensation Committee is best positioned to evaluate and determine the design and effectiveness of the Company’s executive compensation program based on factors relevant to the Company and its business. Moreover, the proponent has not provided a single Company-specific rationale for modifying the Company’s executive compensation program, nor has the proponent explained how the proposed change would enhance shareholder value. Because the Compensation Committee has designed an effective compensation program that appropriately links pay to the Company’s financial performance and individual performance and reinforces the Company’s long-term focus, the Board believes that the proposal’s request to alter the Company’s executive compensation program is unwarranted. 董事会认为,薪酬委员会最有能力根据与公司及其业务相关的因素来评估和确定公司高管薪酬计划的设计和有效性。此外,提案者没有提供修改公司高管薪酬计划的具体公司具体理由,也没有解释拟议的变更将如何提高股东价值。 由于薪酬委员会设计了有效的薪酬计划,将薪酬与公司的财务业绩和个人绩效适当挂钩,并加强了公司的长期关注,董事会认为该提案要求改变公司高管薪酬计划的要求是没有根据的。 The Company Regularly Obtains Feedback from Its Shareholders Regarding Executive Compensation, Which It Incorporates into Compensation-Related Decisions, and Has Not Received Shareholder Requests to Incorporate Pay Ratio as a Factor in its Executive Compensation Program. 公司定期听取股东们关于高管薪酬的反馈,并将其纳入薪酬相关决策,但尚未收到股东要求将薪酬比率作为其高管薪酬计划的一个因素。 The Company has a comprehensive and thoughtful shareholder outreach program; each year, the Company engages with its largest shareholders to discuss emerging trends and to obtain investor feedback, including with respect to the Company’s compensation practices. For example, in 2023, the Company sought meetings with shareholders representing approximately 52% of its outstanding shares and engaged with shareholders representing more than 40% of its outstanding shares. The Company considers feedback obtained through its robust shareholder outreach program and, as discussed on page [ ] of this Proxy Statement, has implemented changes to its executive compensation practices as a result of such feedback. Most recently, for example, based in part on investor input, the Company implemented a maximum cash bonus opportunity for its CEO and amended the Company’s executive stock ownership policy.公司拥有全面、周到的股东宣传计划;每年,公司都会与其最大的股东们接触,讨论新兴趋势并获取投资者的反馈,包括有关公司薪酬实践的反馈。例如,2023年,公司寻求与占其股分约52%的股东举行会议,并与占其股分40%以上的股东进行接触。公司考虑通过其强大的股东接触计划获得的反馈,并且如本代理声明第[ ]页所述,已根据此类反馈对其高管薪酬实践进行了更改。例如,最近,部分根据投资者的意见,公司为其首席执行官实施了最高现金红利机会,并修改了公司的高管持股政策。 In conversations with investors in recent years, in which shareholders were generally supportive of the Company’s compensation program, the Company has not received any feedback regarding the incorporation of pay ratio as a factor in its executive compensation program. 在近年来与投资者的对话中,股东们普遍支持公司的薪酬计划,但公司尚未收到任何关于将薪酬比率纳入其高管薪酬计划的反馈。 Importantly, shareholders also have an annual opportunity to convey their views to the Company by casting an advisory vote to approve the compensation of the Company’s named executive officers. A substantial majority of the Company’s shareholders have supported the Company’s executive compensation program in each of the past ten years. 重要的是,股东们每年还有机会通过进行咨询投票来向公司表达他们的观点,以批准公司高管们的薪酬。过去十年中,公司绝大多数股东每年都支持公司的高管薪酬计划。 The CEO Pay Ratio is Not an Appropriate Factor to Include in Executive Compensation Decisions. 首席执行官薪酬比率不是高管薪酬决策中的适当因素。 While the Compensation Committee annually reviews the Company’s CEO pay ratio and median employee compensation, it does not believe that the CEO pay ratio should factor into the Company’s compensation philosophy or objectives or guide its executive compensation decisions. 虽然薪酬委员会每年都会审查公司的首席执行官薪酬比率和员工薪酬中位数,但它并不认为首席执行官薪酬比率应纳入公司的薪酬理念或目标或指导其高管薪酬决策。 The CEO pay ratio is simply a mathematical result derived from two components – the annual total compensation of the Company’s CEO and the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the Company other than the CEO. Both the compensation of the Company’s CEO and the compensation of the Company’s employees are the result of thoughtful decisions based on individual and Company performance as well as the market for talent. CEO薪酬比率只是由两个部分得出的数学结果——公司CEO的年度总薪酬和除CEO之外公司的所有员工的年度总薪酬中位数。公司CEO的薪酬和公司员工的薪酬都是根据个人和公司业绩以及人才市场综合考虑的结果。 Because the two components of the CEO pay ratio are thoughtfully derived, competitive and based on the market, the CEO pay ratio itself is not a meaningful factor in setting executive compensation. 由于CEO薪酬比率的两个组成部分是经过深思熟虑得出的、具有竞争力且基于市场的,因此CEO薪酬比率本身并不是设定高管薪酬的一个有意义的因素。 As discussed in further detail in the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” section of this Proxy Statement, the Compensation Committee considers relevant compensation information for the Company’s Compensation Comparison Group as part of its comprehensive decision-making process. Each year, the Compensation Committee compares Travelers’ executive compensation to that of the Compensation Comparison Group and the market more generally, and each year, it has determined that the Company’s executive compensation is aligned with the market and is appropriately competitive. 正如本股东说明书的“薪酬讨论与分析”部分中进一步详细讨论的,薪酬委员会将公司薪酬比较组的相关薪酬信息视为其综合决策过程的一部分。每年,薪酬委员会都会将旅行者们公司的高管薪酬与薪酬比较组和市场的薪酬进行更广泛的比较,每年都会确定公司的高管薪酬与市场一致并具有适当的竞争力。 Similarly, the Company takes a thoughtful approach to employee compensation and pays its employees equitably and competitively. The Company’s compensation and benefits programs are designed to attract, motivate and retain high-performing employees; the Company’s longstanding pay-for-performance philosophy differentiates awards based on individual and Company performance. Pursuant to its charter, the Compensation Committee, which is advised by an independent compensation consultant, oversees the Company’s general compensation philosophy and objectives, as well as its compensation and benefit programs. 同样,公司对员工薪酬采取深思熟虑的方法,并公平且有竞争力地支付员工工资。公司的薪酬和福利计划旨在吸引、激励和留住高绩效员工;公司长期奉行按绩效付薪的理念,根据个人和公司绩效授予不同的奖项。根据其章程,薪酬委员会由独立薪酬顾问提供建议,负责监督公司的总体薪酬理念和目标,以及薪酬和福利计划。 The Company regularly reviews several data points to monitor whether its talent management, retention and compensation strategies are working as intended. As of December 31, 2023, Travelers’ average voluntary employee turnover rate for the past three years was approximately 10%, and the Company’s 2023 turnover rate has returned to pre-pandemic levels. Additionally, the average employee tenure at Travelers is 12 years and more than 20 years for the Company’s approximately 700 most senior leaders. The Company views its voluntary turnover rate and average employee tenure as important indicators that its talented employees remain engaged and fairly compensated. 公司定期审查多个数据点,以监控其人才管理、保留和薪酬策略是否按预期发挥作用。截至2023年12月31日,旅行者们公司过去三年平均自愿员工离职率约为10%,公司2023年离职率已恢复至疫情前水平。此外,旅行者们公司员工的平均任期为12年,公司约700名上层领导职员们的平均任期超过20年。公司将自愿离职率和平均员工任期视为衡量优秀员工敬业度和公平薪酬的重要指标。 In light of the fact that CEO and employee compensation at Travelers are thoughtful, competitive and market-based, and given the Compensation Committee’s effective oversight of both the Company’s executive and employee compensation programs, the Board believes that it would be misguided to incorporate the CEO pay ratio as a factor into the Company’s executive compensation program. 鉴于旅行者们公司的首席执行官和员工薪酬是深思熟虑的、有竞争力的和以市场为基础的事实,并且考虑到薪酬委员会对公司高管和员工薪酬计划的有效监督,董事会认为将首席执行官薪酬比率作为一个因素纳入其中将误导公司高管薪酬计划。 Even Assuming that the CEO Pay Ratio Were Relevant to the Executive Compensation Decision-Making Process, the Company’s CEO Pay Ratio Is in Line with Market Practice. 即使假设首席执行官薪酬比率与高管薪酬决策过程相关,公司的首席执行官薪酬比率也符合市场惯例。 The Compensation Committee annually reviews the Company’s CEO pay ratio and median employee compensation, as well as the reported ratios and median employee compensation of the Company’s peers. The Company’s CEO pay ratio and median employee compensation have historically compared favorably with those of its peers. 薪酬委员会每年审查公司首席执行官薪酬比率和员工薪酬中位数,以及公司同行报告的比率和员工薪酬中位数。本公司的首席执行官薪酬比率和员工薪酬中位数与同行相比历来毫不逊色。 For instance, for 2023, the ratio of the annual total compensation of the Company’s CEO to the median of the annual total compensation of all of the Company’s other employees was 194:1. For 2022 – the most recent year for which market data is available – the Company’s CEO pay ratio was also 194:1; this ratio was between the 25th percentile (of 159:1) and median (of 238:1) of ratios for the companies in the Company’s Compensation Comparison Group, whose ratios ranged from a high of 972:1 to 112:1.例如,2023年,公司首席执行官的年度总薪酬与公司所有其他员工的年度总薪酬中位数之比为194:1。2022年(可获得市场数据的最近一年),公司CEO薪酬比率也为 194:1;该比率介于本公司的薪酬比较组中的公司们的比率的第25个百分点(159:1)和中位数(238:1)之间,其比率范围为 972:1至112:1。 For 2022, the median of annual total compensation of all Travelers employees other than the CEO was $108,583 ($116,770 for full-time employees in the United States who worked for Travelers for the entire year), which was significantly higher than the median of reported median employee compensation of $75,400 for S&P 500 companies, $82,500 for S&P 500 companies in the financial industry and $71,000 for companies in the Company’s Compensation Comparison Group and, based on U.S. Census Bureau data, the U.S. median household income of $74,580. 2022年,除首席执行官之外的所有旅行者们公司员工的年度总薪酬中位数为108,583美元(在美国工作一整年的全职员工为116,770美元),明显高于标准普尔500强公司的中位数员工薪酬75,400美元,标准普尔500强金融行业公司的中位数员工薪酬为82,500美元,本公司的薪酬比较组的公司中位数员工薪酬71,000美元,根据美国人口普查局的数据,美国家庭收入中位数为74,580美元。 For all of these reasons, the Board believes that the proposal’s request to alter the Company’s executive compensation program is unwarranted. 出于所有这些原因,董事会认为该提案要求改变公司高管薪酬计划的要求是没有根据的。 Summary概括 The Board believes that the proposal’s request is not in the best interest of shareholders because: 董事会认为该提案的要求不符合股东们的最佳利益,因为: • the Company regularly obtains shareholder feedback regarding executive compensation matters, incorporates such feedback into compensation-related decisions and has not received requests from shareholders to add pay ratio as a factor in its executive compensation program; 公司定期获取股东们关于高管薪酬事宜的反馈,并将此类反馈纳入薪酬相关决策,并且未收到股东要求在高管薪酬计划中增加薪酬比率的要求; • the CEO pay ratio is not an appropriate measure to use in executive compensation decisions, because the two components of the CEO pay ratio are the result of thoughtful decisions based on individual and Company performance as well as the market for talent; and CEO薪酬比率并不是用于高管薪酬决策的适当衡量标准,因为CEO薪酬比率的两个组成部分是基于个人和公司绩效以及人才市场深思熟虑决策的结果;和 • the Company’s CEO pay ratio is in line with market practice. 公司CEO薪酬比例符合市场惯例。 For the above reasons, your Board recommends you vote AGAINST this proposal. 由于上述原因,您的董事会建议您投票反对此提案。 3月底至5月初,我在台湾、中国、韩国旅行考察,因为担心与公司的通讯不便,就委托老朋友Chevedden代理我出席股东年会。5月15日,我的第7号提案在股东年会得以宣读,得到赞同17,844,225股(9.9%,是我的23股的78万倍)、 反对163,297,712股(90.1%)、弃权1,553,990股、未投票20,204,550股。公司的高层报酬第3号提案实际上与我的提案相反,得到赞同108,821,725股(59.8%)、反对73,253,605(40.2%)、弃权620,597股、未投票20,204,550股。 我的提案获得高于5%的赞同,可以在明年的股东年会继续同样的提案付诸表决;公司的提案远低于通常期待的90%-95%股赞同,应该要改进高层报酬政策。5月21日我致函董事会: Dear members of Board of Directors/尊敬的董事会成员们: There is no need to repeat the validation of my proposal, but the voting result of our 2024 shareholders meeting clearly demonstrates that the Company’s methodology to decide executive compensation is flawed. For example, The Company only met very few (8 or 5) large shareholders (Notice, p.6: “With whom we engaged”), --and I think that the Company met them individually, not collectively at a joint conference--, so the Company “has not received requests from shareholders to add pay ratio as a factor in its executive compensation program” (p.91). Is there any way to know the numbers or percentages of shareholders who voted against proposal #3 (representing 40.2% shares) and voted for proposal #7 (representing 9.9% shares)? The Company failed to reach these large numbers of shareholders./无需重复我的提案的有效性,但我们2024年股东大会的投票结果清楚地表明公司决定高管薪酬的方法论是有缺陷的。例如,公司只与极少数(8或5个)大股东会面(《通知》第6页:“我们接触了谁”),--我想公司是单独会见他们,而不是在一个集体联席会议上会面--,因此公司“尚未收到股东要求将薪酬比率作为其高管薪酬计划的一个因素的要求”(第 91 页)。 有没有办法知道投票反对提案#3(代表40.2%股份)和投票支持提案#7(代表9.9%股份)的股东数量或百分比?公司未能接触到如此众多的股东。 I would recommend that our company learn from good practices, such as Intel with HP did following my suggestion (so I withdraw my proposal). Our company should invite compensation comparison group’s members (p.58) to hold a joint conference with large, middle, and small shareholder and employee representatives and experts to review the basic principles and methodology of compensation policy. /我建议我们公司学习好的做法,例如英特尔和惠普就遵循了我的建议(所以我撤回了我的建议)。 我们公司应邀请薪酬比较组成员公司们(第58页)与大、中、小股东和员工的代表及专家召开联席会议,审查薪酬政策的基本原则和方法。 The shareholders meeting vote result is very valuable to guide our company’s governance but the vote per se is not the purpose. The purpose of my proposal is helping our company to improve corporate governance especially in the very important fields which were ignored by the Company. I hope we can continue constructive communications without submitting further proposals. /股东大会的投票结果对于指导我们公司的治理非常有价值,但投票本身并不是目的。我的提案的目的是帮助我们公司改善公司治理,特别是在公司忽视的非常重要的诸领域。 我希望我们能够继续进行建设性的沟通,而无需提交进一步的提案。 公司副总裁、秘书长兼集团总律师WCS女士第二天在电邮中回复我说:“董事会正在评估股东年会的结果,欢迎你的反馈,期待今年秋季与公司一同审视包括高层报酬在内的企业治理讨论。”如果秋季之前公司不与我联系,我只能等着“秋后算账”了。我保留继续提案的权利。 我的微小股份和个人精力的资源制约要求我必须从方法论方面客观、科学地推进企业治理才能有效地帮助美国公司。类似地理学出身的Кропоткин/Kropotkin/ㄎㄌㄨㄆㄛㄊㄎㄧㄣ/克鲁包特金,加速器专业的5年本科教育背景对我的人文研究影响深远,好像一只“看不见的手”,始终在充满感性的世界(社会学、政治学、书写系统和企业治理等领域)力图沿着理性的指导展开[1]。 [赵京,中日美比较政策研究所,2024年6月14日]
[1] 赵京,亚洲纪行-11:台湾与长江流域,2024年5月18日。
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