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Agenda: Bonuses Slapped Down at Bankrupt PG&E 2019-09-27 09:55:36

Bonuses Slapped Down at Bankrupt PG&E

By Tony Chapelle September 23, 2019 

Agenda (a newsletter circulated to business leaders by Financial Times)

Top executives at embattled PG&E had their request for $11 million in performance bonuses quashed last month by the federal bankruptcy court in charge of the company’s restructuring.

Creditors and others affected by the company cheered the Aug. 30 decision. The judge overseeing the case ruled that he wouldn’t allow the utility company’s managers to receive any incentive pay without them showing a clearer link to safety improvements. He also questioned whether the company could afford to pay added compensation. PG&E went into bankruptcy last January after claiming it faces $30 billion in potential liability because of its role in causing a rash of California wildfires.

“The judge made a common-sense judgment,” writes activist investor Jing Zhao in an e-mail. “In fact, it is not enough to deny new million-dollar compensation to the new executives. [The judge] should claw back the millions already paid to the old executives.”

Zhao’s proposal to eliminate the subsidiary layer at PG&E went to a proxy vote this year. Thirteen percent of shareholders supported his resolution to streamline the corporate makeup, which he claimed would save on management compensation.

“This is very supportive [of] my request to dramatically reduce executive pay [by] at least half,” Zhao concluded.

Yet bankruptcy judges and trustees frequently allow boards to pay executive bonuses while they’re reorganizing under Chapter 11. So even though survivors of the catastrophic wildfires consider it unthinkable that some of the same managers who were around when the firm ran into insolvency are seeking incentives, governance and bankruptcy experts predict that it’s not a matter of if but how much they’ll ultimately be awarded.

Last April, Judge Dennis Montali, who is presiding over the case at the federal bankruptcy court for the Northern District of California, approved a $235 million annual bonus plan for 10,000 mid-level PG&E employees. The top 12 executives, who did not include new CEO William Johnson, didn’t participate in that pool. But on Aug. 9, attorneys for PG&E argued that the executives should be awarded bonuses to “appropriately incentivize”  them. To that, Montali quipped, “If they’re not incentivized enough, they ought to find another job, frankly.”

That misses the mark from a legal standpoint, says Howard Brod Brownstein, who has been a chief restructuring officer in bankruptcies. “One has to focus on the overall recovery of the company.”

Brownstein is a director at P&F Industries as well as a certified turnaround professional who operates Brownstein Corporation, a turnaround management firm. He and other directors maintain that, since bankruptcy is the process by which creditors (and shareholders, if there’s anything left to pay them) receive money or assets from the crippled company, it’s vital that the enterprise that emerges from bankruptcy be strong enough to operate. For that, says Brownstein, “you need a knowledgeable and capable management team, who understandably will require more pay … for taking the risk of being at a company that may not survive.”

The Ghost of AIG

Dennis Chookaszian, who has served on 13 public company boards and who teaches corporate governance at the University of Chicago, says the PG&E case reminds him of the infamous bonus controversy that occurred at AIG Group in the wake of the global financial crisis.

Although AIG was the company that most directly wrecked the financial system due to its enormous market in subprime-mortgage credit default swaps, the federal government still assured the company it would be bailed out. In 2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson appointed Ed Liddy as CEO of the troubled company. Liddy requested to be paid only $1 a year. Yet just months after AIG accepted a $37 billion loan from Uncle Sam, other managers at the insurer feasted on $165 million in retention bonuses.

Contractually, Liddy was obligated to pay the bonuses. But he appealed to the executives’ consciences and asked them to return the extra pay so the company could climb back into the black quicker. Many likely declined his request, although the response to the giveback request was not revealed. His only other recourse would have been to bring a lawsuit, which Chookaszian thinks Liddy would have lost. “So he had to pay them so as to keep those executives working for AIG and keep the company going,” Chookaszian says.

The situation is similar with PG&E, Chookaszian says. “The judge probably has to pay some bonuses to keep the people.”

The Haggle

Chookaszian predicts there will be continuing negotiations between the judge and the utility’s attorneys. He says the judge probably will attempt to help the company hold on to the maximum amount of money it can to pay as much of the $30 billion in legal liabilities as possible. “He’s probably going to have to blink to keep from diminishing the value of the company. But there are no rules on this. It’s whatever the judge can work out to keep the people. He starts out by saying he’s not going pay anything. They come back and put pressure on him. It goes back and forth.”

Chookaszian says once PG&E emerges, it will likely be sold to one or more investors who’ll probably create a new public company.


“One thing you know for sure: there’s going to be a new PG&E.” Chookaszian explains that the only mystery is whether the new company will keep all of the assets or if the judge will spin off multiple companies to different parts of the state.

Until then, however, Chookaszian says, the judge will have to approve bonuses to appease the managers. “If not, the power shuts down in California.”

Montali acknowledged that the executive bonus plan had been vetted by independent compensation consultants to bring it comparatively close to what the market would bear. But in bankruptcy cases, outright retention bonuses are verboten. Executives at bankrupt companies must prove they’re being incentivized based on performance.

Retention vs. Performance

Up until 2005, companies that filed voluntary Chapter 11 petitions routinely asked the court for bonuses through so-called key employee retention plans, or KERPs, explains Shepherd Pryor IV. He’s a former deputy head of corporate banking at Wells Fargo and former director at Taylor Capital Group. “The KERP would coax key employees to stay through resolution of the bankruptcy, and things would work out … better for both employees and the company,” writes Pryor in an e-mail.

But in 2005, when the bankruptcy code was overhauled, KERPs for senior executives suddenly were viewed as a way for failed managers to remain ensconced in their positions. What are called key employee incentive plans, or KEIPs, took the place of KERPs.

Pryor states that the difference is that KEIPs don’t aim to save the company from losing value through key departures but, instead, incentivize and require managers to perform better before they earn additional money. “Still, in a litigious atmosphere, KEIPs are often criticized in litigation for being disguised KERPs,” he says.

Indeed, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that Montali ruled that PG&E’s bonus plan failed to show an “ascertainable connection between the officers’ performance and the metrics.” He did, however, leave open a door for bonuses after the company brushed up its act. The newspaper reported that Montali said he’d let PG&E propose a new plan that did not include cash payments but that was “solely motivated by safety metrics.”

An outside counsel representing PG&E in the bankruptcy case, Stephen Karotkin at the law firm Weil Gotschal, did not return calls for comment.

Stephen H. Case, a retired senior partner at law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell and a specialist in bankruptcy and restructurings, applauds the position that Montali took. He claims the PG&E board needs to tighten up and address performance issues the way the court does.

Indeed, Case, who was chairman of Motors Liquidation Co., which had been General Motors until its assets were unwound after the financial crisis, isn’t completely sure PG&E has to pay the bonuses at all.

“Running a utility, in my limited experience, basically requires competent engineering skills, and in America there are a lot of competent engineers. Couldn’t the board hire a headhunter and in short order replace the top 20 people at PG&E? Do you really need to pay a large bonus to keep people? So it makes sense to me that Judge Montali says, ‘Come on, guys. You can do better than paying bonuses just to keep them here. Show me that they’re doing their job and doing it well.’”

On Sept. 13, PG&E announced a preliminary court settlement with insurance companies and hedge funds that had invested in insurance claims that will repay the bulk of fire victims from Northern California wildfires in 2017 and the Camp Fire in 2018. The company says the agreement covers 85% of these so-called subrogation claims. In addition, PG&E asked the court to cap its direct payments to fire victims at $8.4 billion. The requests are subject to approval by the bankruptcy court.

But on Sept. 19, bondholders – including hedge fund Elliott Management Corp. – and a court-authorized committee that represents the fires victims asked the bankruptcy court’s permission to file a competing chapter 11 plan that would pay $24 billion to victims.

PG&E issued a statement complaining that the bondholders already were to be paid in full for their bonds under its proposed plan, and therefore should not have voting rights on the bankruptcy terms. PG&E claims Elliott and its allies are trying to “get more than they are entitled to under the law,” which ultimately will cost the utility’s customers extra billions of dollars.

The bondholders dispute that. According to the Wall Street Journal, they said they were “cheated [out] of their contract rate of interest as well as premiums they say are due on the debt.” Meanwhile, they’ve offered to give PG&E an infusion of $28.4 billion in exchange for 59% of the equity in the new company that emerges from bankruptcy.

Editor's Note: This story was updated to include information about the settlement announced today.


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· 钓鱼岛非主权化可解决中日争端/
· 朝日新闻2009年6月8日-日本で旅
· 《雁鸣》编辑部告读者
· 如何翻过当代中日关系史上最黑暗
· 关于钓鱼岛/尖阁诸岛的非主权方
【美日关系相关文献、资料】
· 美日物品与服务相互提供协定
· 美日安全保障协议委员会联合声明
· 驻留日本的美军地位的协议
· 美日安保条约
· “琉球国”钟原来在这里
· 美日M资金备忘录
· 1951年吉田书简(对中政策)
【文明创新/方法论】
· 中文书写系统里导入汉音元素的方
· Hangeul/韩古尔/韩文书写系统初
· 作为nation/ㄋㄟㄒㄣ语言的汉语
· Manchu/满洲文明译注的方法论基
· 亚洲纪行/Asian Mission 2023
· 以汉音元素词母创制少数民族书写
· Esperanto/ㄝㄙㄆㄜㄌㄢㄊㄛ/希
· 作为nation/ㄋㄟㄒㄣ语言的汉语
· 创制鄂温克/Эвенки[Evenki]/ㄜㄨ
· 藏文书写系统转写与藏文明译注初
【韦伯社会主义(译文)等】
· 目前状况下对革命的展望(韦伯)
· 社会主义的路线上的几个问题
· “共产党宣言”批判/韦伯
· 《新教伦理与资本主义精神》读后
· 3、资本主义和社会主义
· 翻译说明, 1 前言, 2 民主主义
【全球化/社会运动】
· 世界水论坛推行水的商业化和私有
· 参与硅谷人权会议的成果
· 参加硅谷人权会议后记
· 国际经济学的政治条件
· 从天安门到热诺亚
· 金融市场全球化的政治条件
· 足球比赛的政治经济学
【美日同盟及其与中国的互动】
· 在IBM股东大会上对安倍访美发出
· 所谓“吉田路线”
· 全球化格局下参与国际新秩序的改
· 奥巴马-安倍联合声明的问题
· 美日关系的基础
· 安保条约的修订及其反对斗争
· 美日安保体制的“再定义”与克林顿
· 以股东大会推动东亚太平的新途径
· 在日美军地位协议
· 违宪的日本国家军队“自卫队”
【国家形态与社会秩序】
· 国家教育制度与民主主义
· 乌托邦的共产性格
· 国民主权的立法精神
· 近代国家存立的形态规格
· 社会秩序的宗教伦理
· 国家形态与社会秩序/前言
· 《近代诸社会形态之系统》札记
· 熊彼特论帝国主义与社会阶级
【文学与文学评论】
· 亚洲纪行-1:徐志摩纪念馆
· 从诗词中读出什么?
· 我的几个先生(巴金/民国29年版)
· 我的幼年(巴金,民国29年版)
· 克鲁泡特金的亲笔短信
· 三十年代日本文学界民族主义和国
【政治经济学】
【旧文】
· 基督教神学政治译注论V5
· 2024年改革Gilead公司董事会构架
· 改进Bank of America/ㄚㄇㄝㄌㄧ
· 改进The Travelers Companies/旅
· America/ㄚㄇㄝㄌㄧㄎㄚ/美洲史
· 亚洲纪行/Asian Mission 2023
· 亚洲纪行-8:Academia Sinica/中
· 改进Applied Materials高管薪酬
· Amazon/亚马逊公司2024年股东会
· Charles Schwab/嘉信公司2024年
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