一篇驳斥《皇帝新脑》的文章，（博士）怎么看？

这是一篇专门驳斥《皇帝新脑》书中对人工智能的观点的文章。登在ScienceDirect网站上的。

至于赞同《皇帝新脑》一书观点的文章，俺就不找了。

该文章俺没有看的。这里仅是它的提要。仅从提要看，它的主要观点是驳斥《皇帝新脑》关于人工智能的观点。具体的观点，俺不叙述了，那也要费时间整理的。

该文断言，Roger Penrose关于人工智能的主要观点的依据是她对哥德尔不完备定理的误解上的。

俺农民的意见是：Roger Penrose是否误解了哥德尔不完备定理，俺不清楚的；该文作者是否正确理解了哥德尔不完备定理，俺也不清楚的。俺仅知道一点：Roger Penrose关于人工智能的结论，不仅仅是基于哥德尔不完备定理的推理，还包括了其它的论据。但该文作者好像认为，那是可有可无的。

这是不成立的。如果他真那样认为，这大概说明他理解不了Roger Penrose的某些论断：

比方说，“当人们在进行数学过程时通常竭力寻找算法，但是这种努力的过程本身并不是算法过程。”

“我们的意识思维应当有非算法的性质”。

“这个世界很可能是决定性的，但同时却是不可计算的。”

他的这些观点，多数都是猜测而已。

他显然不赞同普利高津的观点：在远离平衡态时，世界是非决定性的；而其它过程则是决定性的。

（博士）如何看？有何高见？给我们农民拨云见日！

下面是文章的名字和提要：

The emperor's real mind: Review of Roger Penrose's the emperor's new mind: Concerning computers, minds and the laws of physics

Abstract

The Emperor's New Mind by Roger Penrose has received a great deal of both praise and criticism. This review discusses philosophical aspects of the book that form an attack on the “strong” AI thesis. Eight different versions of this thesis are distinguished, and sources of ambiguity diagnosed, including different requirements for relationships between program and behaviour. Excessively strong versions attacked by Penrose (and Searle) are not worth defending or attacking, whereas weaker versions remain problematic. Penrose (like Searle) regards the notion of an algorithm as central to AI, whereas it is argued here that for the purpose of explaining mental capabilities the architecture of an intelligent system is more important than the concept of an algorithm, using the premise that what makes something intelligent is not what it does but how it does it. What needs to be explained is also unclear: Penrose thinks we all know what consciousness is and claims that the ability to judge Gödel's formula to be true depends on it. He also suggests that quantum phenomena underly consciousness. This is rebutted by arguing that our existing concept of “consciousness” is too vague and muddled to be of use in science. This and related concepts will gradually be replaced by a more powerful theory-based taxonomy of types of mental states and processes. The central argument offered by Penrose against the strong AI thesis depends on a tempting but unjustified interpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Some critics are shown to have missed the point of his argument. A stronger criticism is mounted, and the relevance of mathematical Platonism analysed. Architectural requirements for intelligence are discussed and differences between serial and parallel implementations analysed.