在冷戰結束之後，朝鮮金家一直不停跳腳，搞得世界一驚一咋。說世界一驚一咋，其實就是美國在關注甚至操控。而美國關注操控的原因和理由，其實就是三個：
第一是朝鮮的核武動作，第二是美國對韓國的保護義務，第三就是美國在全球的戰略定位——在亞洲特別是東亞“維穩”，其實主要就是防止中日韓朝的武裝衝突甚至全面戰爭。這個三條，第三是美國的全球戰略核心，第二第一都只是連帶。 俺幾年前寫過《朝鮮和伊朗：中美面臨世紀抉擇〉 2010-08，文章主旨是讓中國轉變戰略思考，只要中美不在世界戰略上根本對立，中美如果有戰略共識與合作，中國將獲得在朝鮮半島問題上的主動權，所謂朝鮮問題，實際上就是平壤北朝鮮問題，將不是那麼複雜。其實美國人也早開始往這個方向思考。到現在，美國的有識之士甚至已經超越了所謂中美對立的世界格局來看朝鮮問題了。他們認為，即使中美無法進行戰略合作，美國也完全可以改變戰略，從朝鮮半島脫身，認識到所謂朝鮮問題，根本就不是美國的問題。今年三月，里根總統前特別助理，現為卡托研究所高級研究員的道格-班都，就發表了一篇文章，公開宣布了“北朝鮮不是美國的問題”。 文章說，所謂的朝鮮民主主義人民共和國，在一個怪誕的共產主義王朝統治下，民生凋敝，老朽不堪，民眾冒死外逃。其軍事力量同美國比較，實在是無法相提並論。可是這個國家居然讓美國的決策者和分析人員恐懼不安，美國居然要花費上十億美元在阿拉斯加建立反導彈攔截體系來防範朝鮮的導彈核武。他們聲稱朝鮮的核武與導彈對韓國有着極大的威脅，因此美國必須協助韓國保衛自己，同時防止平壤再發動一場朝鮮戰爭。 班都說，這些想象的場景是很可怕。可是這其實都是北朝鮮的超級渲染和宣傳。自從1953年停戰以來，平壤已經有過七次這樣特大的戰爭挑釁宣傳造勢，可是一次也沒有成真，金家兩個元首相繼自然去世，沒有選擇自殺，相信這個金胖小三不會也不敢自殺。這樣的把戲其實不難看透：金家一切都是做給自己國內的臣民看，這種所謂天譴式的威脅，不過是一個恐懼自己死亡的政權在看見牆上的死亡告示而弄出的聲響動靜，其他一切都是過度解讀。這就引出一個最根本的問題：為何這是美國的問題？ 這個問題是美國自找的。如果美國不在韓國駐軍，不要去保障韓國的安全，朝鮮就幾乎同美國不相干。朝韓分裂對峙是二戰結果，又是冷戰中朝鮮同毛中國和蘇聯結盟造成的。韓國面對毛中國與蘇聯支撐的平壤政權的威脅無法自保。如今這都是過去式。朝韓分裂成兩個國家已經70年了。冷戰也結束二十多年了。韓國與朝鮮現在並非依附互相直接對立對抗霸權的戰略棋子。朝韓開戰，最多是一個人道主義災難，不會是大國爭霸的世界戰略性橫禍。韓國在任何國力指標方面都遠超朝鮮，有兩倍於朝鮮的人口和40倍的國民產值。韓國完全有能力自衛抵禦和反擊朝鮮的任何侵略進攻。而美國在韓國的軍事存在除了協助韓國自衛，並沒有特別需要的戰略功用，比如遏制中國。不但很難想象中國要去攻打侵略韓國，就是中國占領了韓國也消化不了。而把韓國綁在同中國敵對的戰車上作為美國盟國，比如協助防衛台灣，這種戰略目標意圖和前景實際上讓韓國人集體神經崩潰。 因此，是美國從韓國撤軍的時候了。美國現在捉襟見肘，經濟困頓，華盛頓都要破產了。美國納稅人實在沒有必要去為一個既富裕也夠強大人口也不少的盟國提供國防福利。 如果美國軍隊撤走了，朝鮮將不再對美國有特殊興趣。平壤統治者是罪犯，但是他們不是傻子。他們對美國發出恐嚇威脅，是因為美國在韓國的軍事存在。如果沒有這個軍事對峙，他們對美國的興趣就幾乎同對歐洲差不多。 當然，對朝鮮的核武，美國還是有着全球的安全利益和關注。但是，美國如果從韓國脫身了，朝鮮的核武就只是對鄰國的直接威脅，美國沒有必要專門來幫助朝鮮的鄰居對付朝鮮核武問題，費力不討好。說實在的，美國應該告訴北京，如果朝鮮堅持搞核武，美國將不反對韓國甚至日本搞核武自衛。如果這讓中國很不高興，又咋的？讓中國自己拿出辦法去制止朝鮮搞核武。無論什麼情況，美國可以袖手旁觀。在1945年美國有充足的理由捲入朝鮮，現在已經滄海桑田了。 可能沒有任何比對付處理朝鮮核武問題更令人頭疼的事了。美國面臨的問題成堆，朝鮮問題可以從這個堆里剔除。美國早就應該把這個放射性燙手山芋交給其他國家了。
North Korea Is Not America’s Problem
By Doug Bandow
This article appeared on American
Spectator (Online) on March 20, 2013.
The so-called
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is
impoverished and decrepit. Its people are starving and risk death to flee their
tragic land. The country is virtually friendless and suffers under a bizarre
system of monarchical communism. Pyongyang’s armed forces are dwarfed by those
of the U.S., the globe’s premier military power.
Yet the DPRK has
struck fear into the hearts of otherwise sober American policymakers and
analysts. The administration announced plans to spend a billion dollars to add
14 interceptors to the missile defense in Alaska to guard against a North
Korean attack. Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter rushed to Seoul to
consult the South’s government. The
Washington Post’s David Ignatius worried: “Counting on
North Korean restraint has been a bad bet. It may be wiser to assume the worst
and plan accordingly.” The International Crisis Group observed that “North
Korea has taken a number of recent steps that raise the risks of
miscalculation, inadvertent escalation and deadly conflict on the Korean
peninsula.” “Seoul, let us remember, can very well defend
itself.”
The Associated
Press’s Foster Klug warned: “Recent Korean history reveals a sobering
possibility. It may only be a matter of time before North
Korea launches a sudden, deadly attack on the South. And, perhaps more
unsettling, Seoul has vowed that this time, it will respond with an even
stronger blow.”
Worse, declared
defense analyst Steven Metz: “Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country
on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security.” Indeed, the DPRK foreign
ministry might be proved right when it “asserted that a second Korean War is
inevitable.”
The Heritage
Foundation’s Bruce Klingner argued that the U.S. needed “strong military forces
to protect” itself from the North and denounced planned military budget cuts as
undermining “U.S. military capabilities and credibility.” The ICG urged “U.S.
officials, including the president,” to reaffirm “that the U.S. will fulfill
its alliance commitments, including robustly against any North Korean military
attacks.”
In Metz’s view
this would be no minor affair. Rather, “The second Korean war would force
military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the
military’s existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require
a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military’s
training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow.”
It’s a
frightening picture, and it seems almost as wildly overblown as the DPRK’s
rhetoric. After all, though the North’s wild gesticulations are unsettling,
this is the seventh time Pyongyang has renounced the 1953 ceasefire reached.
War has yet to erupt. While one cannot take anything for granted, there’s no
evidence that Kim Jong-un and those around him have turned suicidal after the
death of his father.
The DPRK’s
behavior almost certainly reflects other considerations. Almost alone is Sheila
Miyoshi Jager of Oberlin College, who argued that the North’s “apocalyptic
threats” are primarily intended for a domestic audience. She added: “it would
be a mistake to read into them anything more than the noises of a dying regime
that clearly recognizes the writing on the wall.”
However, there’s
a more basic question. Why is any of this America’s problem?
One need not
blame the U.S. for the DPRK’s behavior to recognize that America is involved in
Korean affairs as a result of its own choosing. If Washington did not guarantee
the ROK’s security and station troops in the South, the North’s behavior would
be largely irrelevant for the U.S.
America’s
involvement in the Korean peninsula dates to the end of World War II.
Washington’s intervention in the Korean War grew out of the larger Cold War.
The U.S. stayed for decades because the South remained vulnerable to a
threatening North allied with both Maoist China and the Soviet Union.
None of these
circumstances still apply.
The division of
the Korean peninsula lies almost seven decades in the past. The circumstances
which drew America into that region’s affairs are long over. The Cold War ended
more than two decades ago; the struggle between the two Koreas is no longer
tied to a global struggle with a dangerous hegemonic adversary. War on the
peninsula would be a humanitarian tragedy, not a strategic disaster.
Washington’s
ally has more than recovered from the Korean War. The ROK has sped past the
North on most measures of national power. Indeed, South Korea has some 40 times
the GDP and twice the population of the North. Thus, the South is capable of
defending itself.
Nor do American
forces on the Korean peninsula perform any larger role, such as helping to
contain the People’s Republic of China. Seoul doesn’t mind being defended
against unlikely contingencies involving the PRC — which has no interest in
attacking the ROK, a country that would not be easy to swallow, let alone
digest. But Seoul would not make a permanent enemy of its neighbor by helping
America to protect, say, Taiwan. A U.S. request to use South Korean bases in a
war against Beijing for such a purpose likely would lead to a collective
nervous breakdown in Seoul.
It is time for
U.S. forces to go home. And to terminate the American security guarantee for
the ROK. Washington is broke. It can’t afford to continue providing defense
welfare to populous and prosperous allies. And there’s no longer any security
justification for U.S. taxpayers to subsidize South Korea’s defense.
If Americans
came home, Pyongyang no longer would be interested in the U.S. The Kim family
dictatorship is criminal, not stupid. It threatens Washington because
Washington’s military confronts North Korea’s forces. Otherwise Kim & Co.
would have as much interest in America as it has in Europe.
The U.S. still
would have a general interest in encouraging nonproliferation. But a nuclear
DPRK is primarily a problem for its neighbors, not America. There’s no reason
for Washington to take on the thankless task of dealing with Pyongyang.
Indeed, Washington
should inform Beijing that if North Korea develops a growing nuclear arsenal
America has no objection to South Korea and Japan creating countervailing
weapons. If that displeases China, so what? Let the PRC apply real pressure on
Pyongyang to abandon the latter’s nuclear plans. In any case, Americans should
wash their hands of the issue.
There may be no
more frustrating experience than dealing with the DPRK. The U.S. has many
problems, but North Korea need not be one of them. Washington had reason to get
involved in Korean affairs in 1945, but the justification for doing so
disappeared years ago. It’s time to transfer the problem of the radioactive
North to others.
Doug Bandow is a
senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President
Ronald Reagan
|
