Several years ago, the Harvard political scientist Graham Allison coined the term “Thucydides’ trap.” It was based on the ancient historian’s observation that the real cause of the Peloponnesian War “was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta.” Allison saw the pattern of tensions — and frequent wars — between rising and ruling powers repeating itself throughout history, most recently, he believes, with the challenge that a rising China poses to American hegemony.

几年前，哈佛大学政治学家格雷厄姆·艾利森创造了“修昔底德陷阱”这个词。它基于这位古史学家的观点，即伯罗奔尼撒战争的真正原因是“雅典的崛起以及由此灌输给斯巴达的恐惧”。艾利森认为，新兴大国和统治大国之间的紧张关系以及双方频繁战争的模式，在历史上不断重复，他认为，最近的一次是崛起的中国对美国霸权构成的挑战。

It’s an intriguing thesis, but in China’s case it has a glaring flaw: The main challenge we will face from the People’s Republic in the coming decade stems not from its rise but from its decline — something that has been obvious for years and has become undeniable in the past year with the country’s real estate market crash.

这是一个耐人寻味的论点，但就中国的情况而言，它有一个明显的缺陷：在未来十年，我们面临中华人民共和国的主要挑战不是来自它的崛起，而是它的衰落——这一点几年来已经显而易见，而且在过去一年里，随着中国房地产市场的崩溃，已经变得不可否认。

Western policymakers need to reorient their thinking around this fact. How? With five don’ts and two dos.

西方政策制定者需要围绕这一事实重新调整思路。那要怎样调整呢？有五件不该做和两件该做的事。

First, don’t think of China’s misfortunes as our good fortune.

首先，不要把中国的不幸看作我们的幸运。

A China that can buy less from the world — whether in the form of handbags from Italy, copper from Zambia or grain from the United States — will inevitably constrain global growth. For the U.S. chip maker Qualcomm, 64 percent of its sales last year came from China; for the German automaker Mercedes-Benz, 37 percent of its retail car sales were made there. In 2021, Boeing forecast that China will account for about one in five of its wide-body plane deliveries over the next two decades. A truism that bears repeating is that there is only one economy: the global economy.

无论是从意大利买手袋，从赞比亚买铜，还是从美国买谷物，如果中国从世界各地购买的东西减少，全球经济增长将不可避免地受到限制。美国芯片制造商高通去年64%的销售额来自中国；德国汽车制造商梅赛德斯-奔驰37%的汽车零售额也是来自中国。2021年，波音公司预测，未来20年，中国将占其宽体飞机交付量的五分之一左右。一个不言而喻的真理值得重复，那就是只有一个经济体：全球经济。

Second, don’t assume the crisis will be short-lived.

第二，不要认为这场危机将是短暂的。

Optimists think the crisis won’t affect Western countries too badly because their exports to China account for a small share of their output. But the potential scale of the crisis is staggering. Real estate and its related sectors account for nearly 30 percent of China’s gross domestic product, according to a 2020 paper by the economists Ken Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang. It is heavily financed by the country’s notoriously opaque $2.9 trillion trust industry, which also appears to be tottering. And even if China averts a full-scale crisis, long-term growth will be sharply constrained by a working-age population that will fall by nearly a quarter by 2050.

乐观主义者认为这场危机不会对西方国家造成太大的影响，因为它们对中国的出口只占其产出的一小部分。但这场危机的潜在规模是惊人的。根据经济学家肯·罗格夫和杨元辰在2020年发表的一篇论文，房地产及其相关行业占中国国内生产总值的近30%。它的大量资金来自该国以不透明著称的2.9万亿美元信托业，而该行业似乎也在摇摇欲坠。而且，即使中国能避免一场全面危机，其长期增长也将受到劳动年龄人口的严重制约。到2050年，中国的劳动年龄人口将减少近四分之一。

Third, don’t assume competent economic management.

第三，不要以为中国的经济管理能力很强。

Last month Donald Trump described the rule of China’s president, Xi Jinping, as “smart, brilliant, everything perfect.” The truth is closer to the opposite. As a young man, according to a peer from his youth, Xi was “considered of only average intelligence,” earned a three-year degree in “applied Marxism” and rode out the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath by becoming “redder than red.” His tenure as supreme leader has been marked by a shift to greater state control of the economy, the intensified harassment of foreign businesses and a campaign of terror against independent-minded business leaders. One result has been ever-increasing capital flight, despite heavy-handed capital controls. China’s richest people have also left the country in increasing numbers during Xi’s tenure — a good indication of where they think their opportunities do and do not lie.

上个月，特朗普形容中国国家主席习近平的统治“聪明、出色、一切完美”。事实却恰恰相反。据习近平年轻时的一位同侪说，习近平“被认为智力平平”，获得了三年制的“马克思主义实践”学位，通过让自己变得“比红更红”的方式渡过了文化大革命及其余波。在他担任最高领导人的任期内，国家加大了对经济的控制，加强了对外国企业的骚扰，并对有独立思想的商业领袖采取了恐怖行动。结果之一是，尽管实施了严厉的资本管制，但资本外逃却不断地增加。在习近平任期内，中国最富有的人也越来越多地离开中国——这充分说明他们认为自己的机会在何处。

Fourth, don’t take domestic tranquillity as a given.

第四，不要把中国的国内稳定视为必然。

Xi’s government’s recent decision to suppress data on youth unemployment — just north of 21 percent in June, double what it was four years ago — is part of a pattern of crude obfuscation that mainly diminishes investor confidence. But the struggles of the young are almost always a potent source of upheaval, as they were in 1989 on the eve of the Tiananmen Square protests. Never mind Thucydides’ trap; the real China story may lie in a version of what’s sometimes called Tocqueville’s paradox: the idea that revolutions happen when rising expectations are frustrated by abruptly worsening social and economic conditions.

习近平政府最近决定隐瞒青年失业率数据——6月份失业率略高于21%，是四年前的两倍——这是一种粗暴的掩盖模式的一部分，这种模式主要是削弱了投资者的信心。但年轻人的抗争几乎总是动荡的有力源泉，1989年天安门广场抗议活动前夕就是如此。别管修昔底德陷阱了，真正的中国故事可能会是有时被称为“托克维尔悖论”的一个版本：当不断提高的期望因突然恶化的社会和经济条件而受挫时，革命就会发生。

Fifth, don’t suppose that a declining power is a less dangerous one.

第五，不要认为一个正在衰落的大国就不是那么危险。

In many ways, it’s more dangerous. Rising powers can afford to bide their time, but declining ones will be tempted to take their chances. President Biden was off the cuff but on the mark this month when he said of China’s leaders that “when bad folks have problems, they do bad things.” In other words, as China’s economic fortunes sink, the risks to Taiwan grow.

在很多方面，它会变得更加危险。崛起的大国有能力等待时机，而衰落的国家则会忍不住去冒险。拜登总统这个月在谈到中国领导人时说：“当坏人出现问题时，就会做坏事。”换句话说，随着中国经济的衰落，台湾面临的风险也在增加。

Sixth, do stick to four red lines.

第六，坚持四条红线。

American policymakers need to be unbending and uncowed when it comes to our core interests in our relationship: freedom of navigation, particularly in the South China Sea; the security of Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific allies; the protection of U.S. intellectual property and national security; and the safety of U.S. citizens (both in China and in the United States) and residents of Chinese ancestry. Helping Ukraine defeat Russia is also a part of an overall China strategy, in that it sends a signal of Western political resolve and military capability that will make Beijing think twice about a military adventure across the Taiwan Strait.

当涉及我们两国关系中的核心利益时，美国的政策制定者需要毫不妥协、毫不畏惧，它们包括：航行自由，尤其是在南海；台湾和其他印太盟友的安全；保护美国知识产权和国家安全；以及（在中国和在美国的）美国公民和华裔居民的安全。帮助乌克兰击败俄罗斯也是对华整体战略的一部分，因为它发出了西方政治决心和军事能力的信号，这将使北京在对台湾海峡进行军事冒险时三思而后行。

Seventh, do pursue a policy of détente.

第七，奉行缓和政策。

We should not seek a new cold war with China. We cannot afford a hot one. The best response to China’s economic woes is American economic magnanimity. That could start with the removal of the Trump administration tariffs that have done as much to hurt American companies and consumers as they have the Chinese.

我们不应该寻求与中国进行新冷战。我们负担不起热战。对中国经济困境的最佳回应是美国在经济上的宽宏大量。这可以从取消特朗普政府的关税开始，这些关税对美国公司和消费者的伤害与对中国的伤害一样大。

Whether that will change the fundamental pattern of Beijing’s bad behavior is far from certain. But as China slides toward crisis, it behooves us to try.

这是否会改变北京不良行为的基本模式，眼下还远不能确定。但随着中国滑向危机，我们有必要尝试一下。