Several years ago, the Harvard political scientist Graham Allison coined the term “Thucydides’ trap.” It was based on the ancient historian’s observation that the real cause of the Peloponnesian War “was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta.” Allison saw the pattern of tensions — and frequent wars — between rising and ruling powers repeating itself throughout history, most recently, he believes, with the challenge that a rising China poses to American hegemony.

幾年前，哈佛大學政治學家格雷厄姆·艾利森創造了“修昔底德陷阱”這個詞。它基於這位古史學家的觀點，即伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的真正原因是“雅典的崛起以及由此灌輸給斯巴達的恐懼”。艾利森認為，新興大國和統治大國之間的緊張關係以及雙方頻繁戰爭的模式，在歷史上不斷重複，他認為，最近的一次是崛起的中國對美國霸權構成的挑戰。

It’s an intriguing thesis, but in China’s case it has a glaring flaw: The main challenge we will face from the People’s Republic in the coming decade stems not from its rise but from its decline — something that has been obvious for years and has become undeniable in the past year with the country’s real estate market crash.

這是一個耐人尋味的論點，但就中國的情況而言，它有一個明顯的缺陷：在未來十年，我們面臨中華人民共和國的主要挑戰不是來自它的崛起，而是它的衰落——這一點幾年來已經顯而易見，而且在過去一年裡，隨着中國房地產市場的崩潰，已經變得不可否認。

Western policymakers need to reorient their thinking around this fact. How? With five don’ts and two dos.

西方政策制定者需要圍繞這一事實重新調整思路。那要怎樣調整呢？有五件不該做和兩件該做的事。

First, don’t think of China’s misfortunes as our good fortune.

首先，不要把中國的不幸看作我們的幸運。

A China that can buy less from the world — whether in the form of handbags from Italy, copper from Zambia or grain from the United States — will inevitably constrain global growth. For the U.S. chip maker Qualcomm, 64 percent of its sales last year came from China; for the German automaker Mercedes-Benz, 37 percent of its retail car sales were made there. In 2021, Boeing forecast that China will account for about one in five of its wide-body plane deliveries over the next two decades. A truism that bears repeating is that there is only one economy: the global economy.

無論是從意大利買手袋，從贊比亞買銅，還是從美國買穀物，如果中國從世界各地購買的東西減少，全球經濟增長將不可避免地受到限制。美國芯片製造商高通去年64%的銷售額來自中國；德國汽車製造商梅賽德斯-奔馳37%的汽車零售額也是來自中國。2021年，波音公司預測，未來20年，中國將占其寬體飛機交付量的五分之一左右。一個不言而喻的真理值得重複，那就是只有一個經濟體：全球經濟。

Second, don’t assume the crisis will be short-lived.

第二，不要認為這場危機將是短暫的。

Optimists think the crisis won’t affect Western countries too badly because their exports to China account for a small share of their output. But the potential scale of the crisis is staggering. Real estate and its related sectors account for nearly 30 percent of China’s gross domestic product, according to a 2020 paper by the economists Ken Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang. It is heavily financed by the country’s notoriously opaque $2.9 trillion trust industry, which also appears to be tottering. And even if China averts a full-scale crisis, long-term growth will be sharply constrained by a working-age population that will fall by nearly a quarter by 2050.

樂觀主義者認為這場危機不會對西方國家造成太大的影響，因為它們對中國的出口只占其產出的一小部分。但這場危機的潛在規模是驚人的。根據經濟學家肯·羅格夫和楊元辰在2020年發表的一篇論文，房地產及其相關行業占中國國內生產總值的近30%。它的大量資金來自該國以不透明著稱的2.9萬億美元信託業，而該行業似乎也在搖搖欲墜。而且，即使中國能避免一場全面危機，其長期增長也將受到勞動年齡人口的嚴重製約。到2050年，中國的勞動年齡人口將減少近四分之一。

Third, don’t assume competent economic management.

第三，不要以為中國的經濟管理能力很強。

Last month Donald Trump described the rule of China’s president, Xi Jinping, as “smart, brilliant, everything perfect.” The truth is closer to the opposite. As a young man, according to a peer from his youth, Xi was “considered of only average intelligence,” earned a three-year degree in “applied Marxism” and rode out the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath by becoming “redder than red.” His tenure as supreme leader has been marked by a shift to greater state control of the economy, the intensified harassment of foreign businesses and a campaign of terror against independent-minded business leaders. One result has been ever-increasing capital flight, despite heavy-handed capital controls. China’s richest people have also left the country in increasing numbers during Xi’s tenure — a good indication of where they think their opportunities do and do not lie.

上個月，特朗普形容中國國家主席習近平的統治“聰明、出色、一切完美”。事實卻恰恰相反。據習近平年輕時的一位同儕說，習近平“被認為智力平平”，獲得了三年制的“馬克思主義實踐”學位，通過讓自己變得“比紅更紅”的方式渡過了文化大革命及其餘波。在他擔任最高領導人的任期內，國家加大了對經濟的控制，加強了對外國企業的騷擾，並對有獨立思想的商業領袖採取了恐怖行動。結果之一是，儘管實施了嚴厲的資本管制，但資本外逃卻不斷地增加。在習近平任期內，中國最富有的人也越來越多地離開中國——這充分說明他們認為自己的機會在何處。

Fourth, don’t take domestic tranquillity as a given.

第四，不要把中國的國內穩定視為必然。

Xi’s government’s recent decision to suppress data on youth unemployment — just north of 21 percent in June, double what it was four years ago — is part of a pattern of crude obfuscation that mainly diminishes investor confidence. But the struggles of the young are almost always a potent source of upheaval, as they were in 1989 on the eve of the Tiananmen Square protests. Never mind Thucydides’ trap; the real China story may lie in a version of what’s sometimes called Tocqueville’s paradox: the idea that revolutions happen when rising expectations are frustrated by abruptly worsening social and economic conditions.

習近平政府最近決定隱瞞青年失業率數據——6月份失業率略高於21%，是四年前的兩倍——這是一種粗暴的掩蓋模式的一部分，這種模式主要是削弱了投資者的信心。但年輕人的抗爭幾乎總是動盪的有力源泉，1989年天安門廣場抗議活動前夕就是如此。別管修昔底德陷阱了，真正的中國故事可能會是有時被稱為“托克維爾悖論”的一個版本：當不斷提高的期望因突然惡化的社會和經濟條件而受挫時，革命就會發生。

Fifth, don’t suppose that a declining power is a less dangerous one.

第五，不要認為一個正在衰落的大國就不是那麼危險。

In many ways, it’s more dangerous. Rising powers can afford to bide their time, but declining ones will be tempted to take their chances. President Biden was off the cuff but on the mark this month when he said of China’s leaders that “when bad folks have problems, they do bad things.” In other words, as China’s economic fortunes sink, the risks to Taiwan grow.

在很多方面，它會變得更加危險。崛起的大國有能力等待時機，而衰落的國家則會忍不住去冒險。拜登總統這個月在談到中國領導人時說：“當壞人出現問題時，就會做壞事。”換句話說，隨着中國經濟的衰落，台灣面臨的風險也在增加。

Sixth, do stick to four red lines.

第六，堅持四條紅線。

American policymakers need to be unbending and uncowed when it comes to our core interests in our relationship: freedom of navigation, particularly in the South China Sea; the security of Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific allies; the protection of U.S. intellectual property and national security; and the safety of U.S. citizens (both in China and in the United States) and residents of Chinese ancestry. Helping Ukraine defeat Russia is also a part of an overall China strategy, in that it sends a signal of Western political resolve and military capability that will make Beijing think twice about a military adventure across the Taiwan Strait.

當涉及我們兩國關係中的核心利益時，美國的政策制定者需要毫不妥協、毫不畏懼，它們包括：航行自由，尤其是在南海；台灣和其他印太盟友的安全；保護美國知識產權和國家安全；以及（在中國和在美國的）美國公民和華裔居民的安全。幫助烏克蘭擊敗俄羅斯也是對華整體戰略的一部分，因為它發出了西方政治決心和軍事能力的信號，這將使北京在對台灣海峽進行軍事冒險時三思而後行。

Seventh, do pursue a policy of détente.

第七，奉行緩和政策。

We should not seek a new cold war with China. We cannot afford a hot one. The best response to China’s economic woes is American economic magnanimity. That could start with the removal of the Trump administration tariffs that have done as much to hurt American companies and consumers as they have the Chinese.

我們不應該尋求與中國進行新冷戰。我們負擔不起熱戰。對中國經濟困境的最佳回應是美國在經濟上的寬宏大量。這可以從取消特朗普政府的關稅開始，這些關稅對美國公司和消費者的傷害與對中國的傷害一樣大。

Whether that will change the fundamental pattern of Beijing’s bad behavior is far from certain. But as China slides toward crisis, it behooves us to try.

這是否會改變北京不良行為的基本模式，眼下還遠不能確定。但隨着中國滑向危機，我們有必要嘗試一下。