一定要看到最后。 附有视频。

The Age 《时代报》

The moment a Chinese spy decided to defect to Australia

一名中国间谍决定叛逃到澳大利亚的那一刻

Staring at his own face in a false passport triggered something in Wang Liqiang. After five years as a Chinese spy he was at risk of losing himself. So he decided to defect to Australia.

看着假护照上自己的脸，王力强（音）不由自主地想了起来。当了五年的中国间谍后，他有迷失自我的危险。所以他决定叛逃到澳大利亚。

By Nick McKenzie, Grace Tobin and Paul Sakkal 作者：Nick McKenzie, Grace Tobin and Paul Sakkal

NOVEMBER 23, 2019 2019年11月23日

王力强在放弃他中国间谍生活之后现在藏身于澳大利亚

Most spies face a moment that challenges their loyalty. But rarely does it make them consider the unimaginable – risking jail or worse for renouncing their country.

大多数间谍都面临着挑战忠诚的时刻。但这很少让他们考虑到难以想象的后果——冒着坐牢的风险，或者更糟的是放弃自己的国家。

For fresh-faced Chinese intelligence operative Wang “William” Liqiang, the arrival of a fake South Korean passport earlier this year triggered such a moment.

对于新面孔的中国情报人员王“威廉”力强来说，今年早些时候假韩国护照的到来触发了这样一个时刻。

The name, date and place of birth on the passport belonged to someone else but the photo was his. His orders were to shift his attention from a covert operation to undermine Hong Kong’s democracy movement and focus instead on meddling in Taiwan’s 2020 elections. The ultimate aim was to topple President Tsai Ing-wen.

护照上的姓名、日期和出生地点属于别人，但照片是他的。他接到的命令是把注意力从暗中破坏香港民主运动转移到干预台湾2020年的选举上。最终目的是推翻蔡英文总统。

But staring at his own face in the false passport stirred something in Wang. After five years as a “cut-out” or “co-optee” for the Chinese military intelligence system, he realised he was at risk of losing himself. As he would later write, he was on the cusp of becoming “a person without real identity”.

但是，望着假护照上自己的脸，王心里却起了波澜。作为中国军事情报系统的“保险”或“合作伙伴”5年后，他意识到自己有迷失自我的危险。正如他后来写道的那样，他即将成为一个“没有真实身份的人”。

And so the unimaginable — along with its attended risks of detention, denunciation and death — began to take shape in his mind. In April, Wang travelled to Australia to visit his wife, who was studying here, and their young son. In Sydney, playing with a child he barely knew, the 27-year-old began to ponder the fallout of not returning to Hong Kong. He felt it too dangerous to put pen to paper but he began composing a letter in his mind.

于是，不可想象的事情—以及随之而来的拘留、谴责和死亡的风险—开始在他的脑海中成形。 今年4月，王前往澳大利亚看望在这里学习的妻子和年幼的儿子。在悉尼，和一个几乎不认识的孩子玩耍时，27岁的他开始考虑不回香港的后果。他觉得用笔写在纸上太危险了，但他开始在心里构思一封信。

The imagined addressee was the Australian government. The imagined contents would detail his role in Chinese intelligence operations. It would provide an unprecedented insider’s account of the extensive espionage and foreign interference network which operates with seeming impunity in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Australia. He would also describe the lure of democracy, the system he had devoted his past few years to destroying.

想象中的收件人是澳大利亚政府。想象中的内容将详细描述他在中国情报行动中的角色。他将提供一份前所未有的内部报告，描述在台湾、香港和澳大利亚似乎不受惩罚地运作的庞大的间谍和外国干涉网络。他还将描述民主的诱惑，这个他在过去几年里一直致力于摧毁的体制。

In late May, while he was still in Sydney, Wang was issued orders to travel to Taiwan under the fake identity. He made up his mind.

It would be several months before he would receive a phone call from ASIO directing him to meet a man on a street corner at a certain time. But now there was no turning back. He had decided to betray the most powerful and ruthless authoritarian country in the world.

5月底，当王还在悉尼的时候，他被命令用假身份去台湾旅行。他下定了决心。 几个月后，他接到澳大利亚安全情报组织（ASIO）打来的电话，让他在某个时间在街角与一个男人见面。但是现在没有回头路了。他决定背叛这个世界上最强大、最残酷的专制国家。

‘The word spy didn’t cross our mind’

“我们没想过间谍这个词”

Wang Liqiang was born to a middle-class family in Fujian, the Chinese province ringed on one side by the grand Wuyi mountains and on the other by a 180-kilometre stretch of water separating the mainland from Taiwan. His father was a regional Communist Party official who provided for his family as China’s prosperity grew.

王力强出生在福建的一个中产阶级家庭。福建的一边是雄伟的武夷山，另一边是分隔大陆和台湾的一段180公里长的水域。他的父亲是一名地区共产党官员，随着中国的繁荣发展，他养家糊口。

Taiwan is a short distance over the water but the gulf with the mainland runs deep. Ruling the island and its territories is central to President Xi Jinping’s dream of a reunified China. The Taiwanese and Chinese governments do not interact directly, creating a major political faultline in East Asia.

台湾在海上的距离很短，但与大陆的海峡很深。统治台湾及其领土是中国国家主席习近平实现统一中国梦的核心。台湾和中国政府之间没有直接的互动，这在东亚造成了重大的政治断层。

Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hsu Szu-chien says democracy in Taiwan is an existential threat to Xi’s increasingly authoritarian realm.

台湾外交部副部长徐斯俭说，台湾的民主是对习近平日益专制的生死威胁。

“Xi has treated our incumbent government as an enemy,” Hsu tells The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and 60 Minutes, adding that Taiwan is coming under “severe” pressure. Senior United States officials have long identified Chinese government interference and espionage work in Taiwan but the lack of confirmation from a Chinese government insider has allowed the Chinese Communist Party to deny it.

徐告诉《时代报》，《悉尼先驱晨报》和《60分钟》:“习把我们的现任政府当作敌人。”他还表示，台湾正面临“严重”的压力。长期以来，美国高级官员一直认定中国政府在台湾进行干预和间谍活动，但由于没有得到中国政府内部人士的证实，中国共产党得以否认。

Wang did not learn about these deep historical rifts until he was an arts student majoring in oil painting at Anhui University of Finance and Economics. At the time, he viewed them through the prism of patriotic loyalty to the Chinese nation.

直到就读于安徽财经大学油画专业，王才了解到这些深刻的历史裂痕。当时，他是通过对中华民族的爱国忠诚来看待他们的。

王力强和香港艺术学校的其他学生一起。

When a senior university official suggested Wang work in Hong Kong at China Innovation Investment Limited (CIIL), a listed diversified investment company with interests in technology, finance and media, he jumped at the chance. Whether he was tapped due to his promise or his patriotism, Wang does not know.

当一位大学高级官员建议王到香港中国创新投资有限公司(CIIL)工作时，他欣然接受了这个机会。至于他被选中是因为他的承诺还是他的爱国主义，王不知道。

He moved to Hong Kong in 2014 and quickly realised he was not working for a normal company. Chinese website Sina describes the firm’s “main direction [as] investing in the high-quality defence industry assets of both listed and unlisted [People’s Republic of China] companies”. But he overheard company representatives whispering about more sensitive dealings with officials.

2014年，他搬到了香港，很快意识到自己并不是在为一家普通的公司工作。中国新浪网称，该公司的“主要方向是投资于(中华人民共和国)上市和非上市公司的高质量军工资产”。但他无意中听到公司代表在私下谈论与官员之间更敏感的交易。

When Wang finally twigged that advancing the aims of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its military would underpin much of his work, he was unfazed. “To be honest, for a Chinese, this was attractive,” he recalls. “It paid well and I also felt that I was doing things for the country. At that time, the word 'spy' didn’t cross our mind … [It was] a derogatory term.”

当王最终意识到，推进中国共产党及其军队的目标将是他的大部分工作时，他并不担心。“说实话，对一个中国人来说，这很有吸引力，”他回忆道。“薪水不错，我也觉得我在为国家做贡献。当时，我们并没有想到‘间谍’这个词……(这是)一个贬义词。”

An extraordinary admission

一个非同寻常的供认

It was Wang’s skill with a paintbrush that propelled him into the company’s inner sanctum. In early 2015, CIIL’s chief executive officer Xin Xiang asked Wang to teach his wife, Qing Gong, oil painting.

正是王的画笔技巧将他推入了公司的密室。2015年初，CIIL的首席执行官向心请王教他的妻子青宫（音）油画。

“Winning her favour was one key point as [to] why I could become a core member,” he says.

他表示:“赢得她的青睐是我能够成为核心成员的关键因素之一。”

王画的一幅油画

Invited to the couple’s Hong Kong house, Wang says his boss gradually took him into his confidence. Xiang revealed his actual name was Xiang Nianxin and that in the 1980s and early ’90s he had worked for the Chinese military controlled Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence and Defence Industries – an organisation dedicated to building China’s weapons program.

王被邀请到这对夫妇在香港的家中，王说他的老板逐渐把他当成了知己。向他透露，他的真实姓名是向年心（音），在20世纪80年代和90年代初，他曾在中国军方控制的中国国防科技工业委员会工作，这是一个致力于建设中国武器项目的组织。

Xiang also claimed to have worked for high-ranking Communist official Zou Jiahua, a former vice-premier who in the 1980s helped develop China’s defence industry by acquiring foreign military technology.

向还声称曾为中共高级官员邹家华工作。邹家华曾任国务院副总理，在上世纪80年代通过收购外国军事技术帮助中国发展国防工业。

Xiang told Wang he had come to Hong Kong in 1993 to conduct intelligence work. CIIL was created under the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department to “infiltrate into Hong Kong’s financial market, as well as collecting military intelligence”, Wang says. Corporate records and newspaper archives reveal CIIL’s close connection to Norinco, the Chinese military’s main weapons company.

向告诉王，他在1993年来到香港进行情报工作。王说，香港投资情报研究所是在中国人民解放军总参谋部的领导下成立的，目的是“渗透到香港的金融市场，并收集军事情报”。公司记录和报纸档案显示，CIIL与中国军方主要武器公司——中国北方工业总公司(Norinco)关系密切。

Xiang told Wang his most important work was “to buy other countries’ weapons and steal US intelligence from them”. As a result, the US had been closely monitoring him. The weapons, he said, were taken to Hong Kong. A spokesman for CIIL said Xiang did not want to answer questions from The Age, the Herald and 60 Minutes over the phone, because he had never spoken to the journalists who were calling, and when questions were emailed to Xiang, the spokesman said Xiang would not answer because he could not verify that the email was not sent covertly by the Australian government in order to obtain intelligence.

向告诉王，他最重要的工作是“购买其他国家的武器并窃取美国的情报”。因此，美国一直在密切监视他。他说，这些武器被运到了香港。CIIL 的发言人说，向不愿在电话上回答《时代报》，《先锋报》，《60分钟节目组》的问题，因为他从来没有和打电话的记者说过话，当记者通过电子邮件向他提问时，这位发言人说，他不会回答，因为他无法证实这封邮件不是澳大利亚政府为了获取情报而秘密发送的。

After the story was initially published, an email response from a man called Edison Li said, "Anyone with a little common sense will know that these problems are ridiculous and untrue, and the accuser very likely did this for economic purposes. We will refer the matter to the lawyer."

这篇报道最初发表后，一个名叫Edison 李的人在电子邮件中回复说，“任何有一点常识的人都知道，这些问题是荒谬的、不真实的，而原告这么做很可能是出于经济目的。我们将把此事提交律师处理。”

Wang says that he became an important part of the operation run by Xiang. The opening paragraph of a lengthy and sworn statement Wang provided to ASIO in October pulls no punches: “I have personally been involved and participated in a series of espionage activities.”

王说，他成为了向进行活动的一个重要部分。去年10月，王向ASIO提供了一份冗长的宣誓声明，开篇就直言不讳:“我个人参与了一系列间谍活动。”

It’s an extraordinary admission which comes as tension between Hong Kong and the mainland has erupted into violence. Western security sources say Wang is telling the truth.

在香港和大陆之间的紧张关系升级为暴力冲突之际，这是一次非同寻常的供认。西方安全部门的消息人士说，王说的是实话。

The Causeway Bay Five

铜锣湾五人

The intelligence operation that Wang joined has its headquarters in an unassuming office tower on Hong Kong’s Des Voeux Road West, a busy strip dominated by hawkers selling dried seafood.

王加入的情报机构，总部设在香港德和路西一幢不起眼的办公大楼里。德和路西是一条繁忙的街道，主要是沿街叫卖海鲜干货的。

The Hong Kong protesters have marched past the building, chanting slogans about democracy, extradition and Beijing’s tightening grip. But the case that terrified Hong Kongers more than anything before rallies became sieges was the disappearance of five booksellers from the nearby Causeway Bay Books.

香港抗议者游行经过这座大楼，高喊着有关民主、引渡和北京加强控制的口号。但在集会变成围城之前，最令香港人恐慌的是附近铜锣湾书店(Causeway Bay Books)五名书商的失踪。

The Causeway Bay Five disappeared in October 2015, only to reappear on the Chinese mainland and reveal they had been detained and interrogated. The Chinese government has steadfastly denied allegations any were kidnapped. One, Lee Bo, told a pro-CCP television station that he had returned voluntarily.

2015年10月，铜锣湾5人失踪，随后在中国大陆再次出现，并透露他们被拘留和审讯。中国政府坚决否认任何绑架指控。李波(音）告诉一家支持共产党的电视台，他是自愿回国的。

Wang tells a different story. The reason for the kidnapping, he says, was that the bookshop was selling works that displeased the CCP, including a book called Xi and his Six Women.

王讲述了一个不同的故事。他说，绑架的原因是这家书店出售令中共不悦的作品，包括《习近平和他的六个女人》。

“[Our operative] told us later that he sent six agents who took Lee Bo from the storeroom of Causeway Bay Books directly to mainland China,” Wang says, adding that the operation was organised and overseen by figures inside CIIL. “I was responsible for the negotiation and tasks to be implemented … me and [the team chief] held the negotiation at Xiang Xin’s home,” Wang says.

王说:“(我们的特工)后来告诉我们，他派了六名特工，把铜锣湾书店的李波直接带到中国大陆。”他还补充说，这次行动是由CIIL内部人士组织和监督的。王说:“我负责商谈和执行任务……我和(队长)在向心的家里举行了商谈。”

Western security sources say Wang’s account is likely to be accurate. It’s backed by another of the detained booksellers, Lam Wing-Kee, who during an interview last month said he has no doubt that Lee Bo was kidnapped. Lam has fled to Taiwan to avoid the terrifying ordeal of being detained again.

西方安全部门的消息人士说，王的说法可能是准确的。另一名被拘留的书商林荣基(Lam Wing-Kee)也支持这一说法。上个月接受采访时，林荣基表示，他毫不怀疑李波是被绑架的。林已经逃到台湾，以避免再次被拘留的可怕折磨。

The fear this operation provoked in Hong Kong was intentional, Wang says. The Chinese government wanted to “bring a thorough deterrent effect on those people”.

王说，这次行动在香港引起的恐慌是有意的。中国政府希望“彻底震慑这些人”。

A ‘core, central agency’

一个“核心的，中央代理机构”

Wang says Xiang’s company was a front. Its real business was as a “core, central agency” of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus. “It is in direct contact with the Chinese side … playing the role of communicating between the top level and lower levels … of military intelligence.”

王说，向的公司只是一个幌子。它的真正业务是作为北京情报机构的“核心、中央代理机构”。“它与中方有直接联系……在军事情报的最高级别和最低级别之间发挥沟通作用……”

Wang was a middleman who did both intelligence and political interference work, passing orders from bosses in Beijing to operatives in Hong Kong. He claims he met with senior military figures on trips to China and that senior figures from CIIL liaised with the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff Department (since renamed and restructured) and other agencies and officials. Wang says Xiang was in personal contact with the executive officer in Xi Jinping’s office.

王是一个中间人，既从事情报工作，又从事政治干预工作，把北京老板的命令传递给香港的特工。他声称，他在访问中国期间会见了高级军事官员，中国创新投资公司CIIL的高级官员与中国人民解放军总参谋部(后来更名和重组)以及其他机构和官员进行了联络。王说，向与习近平办公室的执行官员有私人接触。

Former CIA analyst and co-author of the recently released Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer Peter Mattis says Wang appears to be a “cut-out" or "co-optee". “They act as adjutants to the intelligence officer, who is often building up a suite of resources to use for intelligence or political influence.”

前中央情报局分析员、最近出版的《中国共产党的间谍活动:情报入门》一书的作者之一彼得·马蒂斯说，王似乎是一个“保险”或“合作者"。“他们充当情报官员的副官，后者经常建立起一整套资源，用于情报或政治影响力。”

US counter-intelligence assessments say China’s espionage system uses cut-outs “under a variety of covers, posing as diplomats, journalists, academics, or business people” who are “tasked with spotting, assessing, targeting, collecting, and running sources”.

美国反情报评估称，中国的间谍系统使用“各种掩护下的“保险”，伪装成外交官、记者、学者或商人”，“负责发现、评估、锁定、收集和运行消息来源”。

Wang says he was sworn to secrecy – with one exception. He could talk to the woman he was teaching to paint, Xiang’s wife Qing Gong, because he claims she was part of Xiang's inner circle. As Wang grew close to Qing, he filed away details he learnt about her life. She had become intimate with the intelligence operations being undertaken in Hong Kong and Taiwan. She had also spent time as a postgraduate student at the University of South Australia. This last detail would make Wang wary about fleeing to Australia.

王说他发誓保守秘密— 只有一个例外，他可以和他正在教画画的女子——向的妻子青宫交谈，因为他声称她是向的核心圈子的一部分。随着王与青渐行渐近，他把了解到的青的生活细节整理归档。她已经熟悉了香港和台湾的情报工作。她还曾在南澳大利亚大学读研究生。这最后一个细节会让王对逃往澳大利亚持谨慎态度。

“This is something that I am scared of. As she studied in Australia, I don’t know how many personnel there are in... [the] intelligence network.”

“这是我害怕的事情。由于她在澳大利亚学习，我不知道有多少人在……情报网络。”

‘They would be willing to work for us’

"他们愿意为我们工作"

Hong Kong’s tertiary sector, which has since exploded into violence, was a key battleground for Wang. His organisation targeted students through fronts including the China Science and Technology Education Foundation, a charity recognised by the Hong Kong government. Corporate records confirm it is controlled by Xiang.

香港的大学后来爆发了暴力冲突，成为王的主要战场。他的组织通过中国科学技术教育基金会(China Science and Technology Education Foundation)等机构瞄准学生。中国科学技术教育基金会是一家得到香港政府认可的慈善机构。公司记录证实它是由向控股的。

“They have infiltrated into all universities, including students’ associations and other students’ groups and bodies,” Wang says. “[Some of] the mainland Chinese students … if they are given some petty favours and benefits and opportunities to attend some occasions, they would be willing to work for us.”

“他们已经渗透到所有的大学，包括学生协会和其他学生团体和机构，”王说。“(一些)大陆学生……如果能给他们一些小恩惠和机会，让他们参加一些活动，他们会愿意为我们工作。”

香港校园抗议活动中，抗议者打着雨伞。

Wang was put in charge of organising and “educating” mainland students, “guiding their ideology”.

王被任命负责组织和“教育”大陆学生，“指导他们的思想”。

“I exchanged ideas with them and learnt about their thinking, then I influenced them with patriotism, guiding them to love the country, love the Party and our leaders, and fight back strongly against those independence and democracy activists in Hong Kong.”

“我和他们交换了意见，了解了他们的想法，然后我用爱国主义影响了他们，引导他们爱国，爱党，爱我们的领导人，并强烈反对香港的独立和民主活动人士。”

He helped set up alumni associations to build a network and counter dissidents.

他帮助建立了校友会，建立了一个网络，并打击持不同政见者。

“We sent some students to join the students’ association and they pretended to support Hong Kong independence,” Wang says. “They found out information about those pro-independence activists … and conducted human flesh search [a Chinese term for researching using internet media such as blogs and forums]”. Then they “made public all their personal data, their parents’ and family members’, then we attacked them verbally, swearing at them.

“我们派了一些学生加入学生协会，他们假装支持香港独立，”王说。“他们发现了那些支持独立的活动人士的信息……并进行了人肉搜索(使用博客和论坛等互联网媒体进行研究的中文术语)”。然后他们“公开了他们所有的个人资料，包括他们的父母和家人的资料”，然后我们对他们进行口头攻击，骂他们。

“[We] effectively silenced them.” Another battleground for CIIL was Hong Kong’s media. Wang says the company invested in outlets, appointing and influencing senior media personnel to support the CCP’s message and drown out dissenting voices. “A lot of media outlets are under [Xiang’s] control - he either holds actual or nominal shares or his company holds shares. Currently, the battlefield in Hong Kong is mainly one of public opinion.”

“(我们)有效地压制了他们的声音。” CIIL的另一个战场是香港的媒体。王说，该公司投资于媒体渠道，任命和影响高级媒体人员来支持中国共产党的信息，并掩盖异议的声音。“许多媒体机构都在(向）的控制之下——他要么持有实际或名义上的股份，要么他的公司持有股份。目前，香港的战场主要是舆论战。”

One of the most senior intelligence operatives in Hong Kong, according to Wang, was a senior manager of a major Asian television network. He also played a vital role in the kidnapping of bookseller Lee Bo. The Herald, Age and 60 Minutes have decided not to name the executive for legal reasons.

据王说，香港最高级的情报人员之一是一家大型亚洲电视网的高级经理。他还在书商李波(Lee Bo)被绑架事件中扮演了重要角色。《先驱报》、《时代报》和《60分钟节目组》出于法律原因决定不透露这名高管的姓名。

“He was the one responsible for organising the agents to kidnap and persecute Hong Kong democracy activists,” he says, claiming the man “is a current military cadre with a Division Commander rank.”

他表示:“他是负责组织特工绑架和迫害香港民主活动人士的人。”他声称，这名男子“是一名现役军官，军衔为师长。”

‘China could do whatever they wanted’

“中国可以为所欲为”

Kidnapping the bookseller scarred Wang. He realised that “China could do whatever they wanted. So I felt quite scared in Hong Kong." Adding to his fear were the alliances between members of his organisation and the triads – Chinese mafia organisations “who also represent the Chinese government”.

绑架书商让王伤痕累累。他意识到“中国可以为所欲为”。所以我在香港感到很害怕。” 令他更加担心的是，他所在组织的成员与三合会(triads)之间的联盟。三合会是中国的黑手党组织，“也代表中国政府”。

Painting became Wang’s escape. His art took on a shimmering, colourful quality, evoking places and feelings far from the steel and concrete of the city. When he talked to his wife Mia, who was studying in Australia, he never wanted their conversations to end.

绘画成了王的逃避。他的艺术呈现出一种闪闪发光、色彩缤纷的特质，唤起远离城市钢筋混凝土的地方和感受。当他和在澳大利亚学习的妻子米娅(Mia)交谈时，他从不希望他们的谈话结束。

王画的油画

In January 2017, Mia told him she was pregnant. He wondered how he would tell his child about his job and what sort of life they would have in Hong Kong or the mainland. But his bosses wanted him to keep working.

2017年1月，米娅告诉他她怀孕了。他想知道如何告诉他的孩子他的工作，以及他们在香港或大陆的生活。但他的老板希望他继续工作。

The so-called “nine-in-one” elections in Taiwan in 2018 (during which officials from county magistrates to local mayors were elected) presented Beijing with an opportunity to challenge the rule of President Tsai Ing-wen. Wang helped direct a major operation which was ultimately aimed at throwing Tsai out of office in favour of a pro-Beijing candidate.

2018年台湾所谓的“九合一选举”(从县长到地方市长都是选举出来的)给了北京一个挑战蔡英文统治的机会。王帮助导演了一场大型行动，最终目的是将蔡英文赶下台，支持亲北京的候选人。

“Our work on Taiwan was the most important work of ours – the infiltration into media, temples and grassroots organisations,” says Wang.

王表示:“我们在台湾的工作是我们最重要的工作——渗透到媒体、寺庙和基层组织。”

He helped Chinese intelligence agencies build a “cyber army”, largely of university students, to shift political debate and candidates’ fortunes.

他帮助中国情报机构建立了一支“网络军队”，主要由大学生组成，以改变政治辩论和候选人的命运。

“In Taiwan we had many places - restaurants, and IT companies - which we either acquired or funded,” Wang says. “If we wanted to attack someone, we could instantly collapse their Facebook” from Hong Kong, using false IP addresses to put out anti-democracy messages.

王表示:“在台湾，我们有很多地方——餐馆和IT公司——我们要么收购，要么出资。”在香港，“如果我们想攻击某人，我们可以立即摧毁他们的Facebook”，使用虚假的IP地址发布反民主信息。

I know very well that the Chinese Communist Party can never be trusted. Once I go back, I will be dead.

Chinese spy Wang Liqiang

我很清楚，中国共产党是不可信的。一旦我回去，我就会死。

中国间谍王力强

Wang says CIIL also invested in Taiwanese media companies and built covert alliances with TV stations, allowing the control and censorship of news. He names food manufacturer and media owner the Want Want group as a key ally.

王说，中国创新投资有限公司CIIL还投资台湾媒体公司，与电视台建立秘密联盟，允许对新闻进行控制和审查。他将食品制造商和媒体所有者旺旺集团(Want Want group)列为关键盟友。

“We also controlled media, like buying their ads to propagate the trend, and let them report in favour of those candidates we were supporting,” says Wang. Want Want’s owner Tsai Eng-meng has had “a very close relationship and cooperation with Xiang Xin,” Wang says. A Financial Times article in August accusing Want Want of taking editorial direction from Beijing was dismissed by the company as “fake news”.

“我们还控制了媒体，比如购买他们的广告来宣传这一趋势，让他们报道那些我们支持的候选人，”王说。旺旺的老板蔡衍萌(Tsai Eng-meng)“与向心有着非常密切的关系和合作，”王说。今年8月，英国《金融时报》一篇指责旺旺接受北京方面的编辑指导的文章，被该公司斥为“假新闻”。

As well as directing positive media attention towards favoured politicians, including presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu, Wang claims he helped finance grassroots political support for the opposition. “With the Kuomintang [the Chinese Nationalist Party] candidates we … gave them full support. Then we also made donations to the temples and organised those believers to tour mainland China and Hong Kong, and influence them with [the CCP-aligned] United Front propaganda. As a result, we had a huge win ... and it was a glorious record,” Wang says.

除了将正面的媒体注意力引导到受欢迎的政治人物身上，包括总统候选人韩国瑜。王还声称他帮助为反对派提供草根政治支持。“对于国民党候选人，我们……给予了全力支持。之后，我们还捐钱给寺庙，组织信徒们到中国大陆和香港旅游，并通过统一战线的宣传来影响他们。结果，我们取得了巨大的胜利……这是一个辉煌的记录，”王说。

‘My heart is extremely sad’

“我的心非常难过”

For Wang it was a hollow victory. His son had been born in November 2017. Wang wanted to travel to Australia to visit him but his success in the 2018 Taiwan elections meant he was given a new task: interfering in the 2020 presidential election with the aim of unseating Tsai. This was when he received the envelope bearing fake identity papers.

对王来说，这是一个空洞的胜利。他的儿子出生于2017年11月。王想去澳大利亚看望他，但他在2018年台湾选举中的成功意味着他被赋予了一个新任务: 以推翻蔡英文为目的，干涉2020年总统大选。就在这时，他收到了装着假身份文件的信封。

“I was requested to change my name and whole identity to go to Taiwan and be a spy there,” he says.

他说:“我被要求改变我的名字和身份，去台湾当间谍。”

Part of Wang’s interference would rely on what he calls “Taiwan’s black society”, or the triads. But Wang feared being caught by Taiwan’s counter-espionage authorities. Out of hours, he painted furiously and plotted his escape. “If anything happened to me, my family would be ruined. What would my family, my young son do? Who could protect me?”

王的干涉部分依赖于他所称的“台湾黑社会”，即三合会。但王担心被台湾反间谍机构抓住。在工作之余，他疯狂地画画，密谋如何逃跑。“如果我出了什么事，我的家庭就会毁了。我的家人，我的小儿子会怎么做? 谁能保护我?”

Earlier this year, Wang told his boss’ wife that he needed to travel to Australia to visit his son. He flew into Sydney on April 23 knowing he would neither return home nor see his parents again.

今年早些时候，王告诉老板的妻子，他需要去澳大利亚看望儿子。他于4月23日飞抵悉尼，知道自己既回不了家，也见不到父母了。

“Whenever I think of this, I am very sad. My family, not only my parents, but also my grandparents … I dare not communicate much as our phones are tapped. This is the saddest thing … my heart is extremely sad and no words can express my grief,” Wang says.

“每当我想到这一点，我都很难过。我的家人，不仅是我的父母，还有我的祖父母……因为我们的电话被窃听的，我们不敢多交流。这是最悲伤的事情……我的心非常悲伤，无法用语言来表达我的悲伤，”王说。

叛逃者王力强现在躲藏在悉尼

Both his family and his wife’s have a strong Communist Party pedigree – all are party members and loyal to the country. “I really have no idea what this will bring to the rest of my life,” he says.

他的家庭和他的妻子都有很强的共产党血统——他们都是党员，对国家忠诚。“我真的不知道这会给我的余生带来什么，”他说。

It took seven months after Wang arrived before he was called by ASIO – it is likely that ASIO did not know his intelligence value until his application for protection reached an immigration official. In the meantime, Wang moved from house to house and took counter-surveillance measures, watching for people following him and changing his routine. He painted and played with his son and watched the protests in Hong Kong get bigger as those he had likely recruited hit back.

王抵达后过了七个月才接到ASIO的电话——很可能ASIO是在他的保护申请到达移民局官员那里时才知道他的情报价值的。与此同时，王不断更换住处，采取反监视措施，监视跟踪他的人，并改变自己的日常生活规律。他和儿子一起画画、玩耍，看着香港的抗议活动愈演愈烈，因为他曾经招募来的人可能开始反击。

Gradually, his worldview changed.

渐渐地，他的世界观改变了。

“China’s view of life and the world simply cannot create outstanding talents because it is totalitarianism, it is dictatorship,” Wang says. “I hope that my child and my family can ... do something for human beings. I feel that in Australia this can be achieved.”

王说:“中国的人生观和世界观根本无法培养出杰出的人才，因为这是极权主义，这是独裁。”“我希望我的孩子和家人能……为人类做点什么。我觉得在澳大利亚这是可以实现的。”

Wang will not say what he has disclosed to ASIO. But he is willing to help the Australian government understand China’s intelligence system and he has knowledge about operatives. Mattis says Wang’s disclosures are unprecedented and valuable – and also extraordinarily brave. Until now, the relatively small number of defectors have kept quiet.

王不愿说他向ASIO透露了什么。但他愿意帮助澳大利亚政府了解中国的情报系统，而且他对特工有一定的了解。马蒂斯说，王披露的信息是前所未有的、有价值的，也是非常勇敢的。到目前为止，相对少的叛逃者一直保持沉默。

Wang says he hopes his public comments will energise the fight for human rights and democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan. He describes his decision to take on the Chinese government and its powerful intelligence operation as an ant challenging an elephant. But at the very least, he says his son will one day understand that he stood up for what counts.

王说，他希望他的公开讲话能够激发香港和台湾争取人权和民主的斗争。他形容自己决定与中国政府及其强大的情报机构较量，就像一只蚂蚁挑战一只大象。但至少，他说他的儿子总有一天会明白，他为有意义的事挺身而出。

For now, though, he is in no man’s land, counting down the days of his tourist visa and watching his back.

不过，目前他还在无人区，一边倒数着他的旅游签证有效期，一边小心翼翼地等着。

“I know very well that the Chinese Communist Party can never be trusted. Once I go back, I will be dead.”

“我很清楚，中国共产党是永远不能被信任的。一旦我回去，我就会死。”

More on Chinese operations in Australia in The Sunday Age, The Sun-Herald, 60 Minutes and The Age and the Herald on Monday.

《星期日时代报》、《太阳先驱报》、《60分钟》、周一的《时代报》和《先驱报》将刊登更多关于中国在澳大利亚的间谍活动。

原文链接：

https://www.theage.com.au/national/the-moment-a-chinese-spy-decided-to-defect-to-australia-20191122-p53d0x.html

【秘密翻译组】